Jump to content
 

Modernisation Plan Diesels


Recommended Posts

  • RMweb Premium

The BR response to the 59 was the class 60, a design which has been under estimated and one which has prodigious hauling power and had a very fuel efficient engine for its time. And a fine example of industrial design to boot.

Link to post
Share on other sites

Conclusions after 100 posts, seem to be:

 

- diesel traction wasn't, taking a broad perspective, "new technology" c1950;

 

- the BR dieselisation of the 50s and 60s was botched, for lots of complicated reasons revolving around the sheer challenges of creating a semi-unified BR, while trying to deal with rapidly changing traffic demands, and a deal with load of antediluvian infrastructure and practices, with a hefty sprinkling of political meddling, and a dash of ineptitude added to the mix;

 

- at the level of procurement/technical/engineering choices made, "they" certainly could have done better;

 

- of the Type 1, only the Class 20 really "cut the mustard".

 

Is that a fair summary?

 

If so, I propose we move on to Type 2.

 

I know next to Nuffink about Type 2, so look forward to learning which were the Arab thoroughbreds, and which the wooden-legged-donkey's among this lot?

 

Kevin

Link to post
Share on other sites

You missed one rather important last conclusion - all of this is with the benefit of well in excess of 55 years of hindsight.  It is so easy to look back and say well they should have done this or done that, but the reality of modernising and running a post-war nationalised railway in a truly bankrupt country made many of these so-called right answers nigh on impossible - that cannot be ignored. 

Link to post
Share on other sites

  • RMweb Premium

By the time of the modernisation plan the UK was in a much better economic position than the immediate post war era, but if money really was short then it'd make it even more baffling that so much of it was squandered.

Link to post
Share on other sites

UK National debt (as a % of GDP) had been falling from 1930 to the start of WWII - it rose year on year to a massive 230% in the late 1940's when it began to fall - it never reached it's pre-war level for another 10 years - it was still high in 1954 with the introduction of the modernisation & re-equipment plan to try and stem BR's losses - whether that was squandered or not can only be viewed with hindsight.  I very much doubt they squandered it on purpose back then.

Link to post
Share on other sites

  • RMweb Premium

The pilot scheme as conceived was pretty sensible. Buy small batches of trials locomotives for evaluation before selecting those suitable for series production. The decision to effectively abandon that idea by going directly into series orders completely negated that whole idea. Whilst I think that the issues around changes in traffic patterns are very susceptible to wisdom based on hindsight I think that the fundamentals of purchasing and developing new equipment were the same in the mid 50's as they are now and as they were long before the mid 50's (many management buzz words excepted....) and a lot of the mistakes made were just bad purchasing.

Link to post
Share on other sites

Bob

 

I couldn't differ from you that "they" had a monster task on their hands, which was what I was trying to capture in the second point.

 

But, I still hold firmly that it was perfectly possible to identify and buy decent diesel locomotives, at the time. No hindsight needed. Plenty of other railway administrations worldwide managed to 'dieselise' their railways over the same timespan without getting into anything like the same pickle.

 

Maybe it was unfair of me to sum-up the way I did, though. Because that is my opinion, and (very rough guess) the opinion of about half of those who have contributed; the other half go with your "hindsight is a wonderful thing" view, and (I think) concludes that "they" did the best they could with a bad hand of cards.

 

Kevin

 

PS: I agree with you that "they" didn't squander money deliberately ........ They did so accidentally. Collectively inept, not collectively negligent or criminal, is the charge I'm laying.

Link to post
Share on other sites

The difference between then and now is just this - they were not dealing with the replacement of penny numbers of locomotives carriages and wagons the likes of which modern contracts deal with - we're taking about a rolling program to replace what was in 1949 almost 20,000 locomotives, 40,000 carriages and 1.1m wagons, and with a view to changing traffic.  Sure there were a lot of errors along the way but all in all they didn't do that bad.  Could you imagine what a cock up the modern government procurement system would make of that lot?

Link to post
Share on other sites

  • RMweb Premium

The BR response to the 59 was the class 60, a design which has been under estimated and one which has prodigious hauling power and had a very fuel efficient engine for its time. And a fine example of industrial design to boot.

 

IIRC, the Class 60 contract was awarded as "lifetime cost", so including the likes of fuel over the period.

 

The specification was pretty much aimed at another batch of 59's but the lifetime fuel consumption was the real deal clincher for the Brush/Mirlees bid. (As it turned out, the 60 is very marginally superior to the 59 in haulage capability - with extensive back to back testing on iron ore trains on the South Wales mainline).

 

Cheers,

Mick

(Who quite likes Class 60's...............................)

Link to post
Share on other sites

If so, I propose we move on to Type 2.

 

I know next to Nuffink about Type 2, so look forward to learning which were the Arab thoroughbreds, and which the wooden-legged-donkey's among this lot?

 

First  type 2 question. Why did they keep building Class 25s well into the 2nd half of the 60s?  The 24/25 Derby/Sulzer design eventually numbered well over 400, yet few of them saw 20 years in traffic, and they were outlived by the older BRCW class 26s.

 

Surely it ought to have become apparent that late that the Type 2 was underpowered?  Perhaps a repeat order for a second batch of 33s for the Midland and Scottish Regions might have made more sense?.

Link to post
Share on other sites

Bob

 

"Could you imagine what a cock up the modern government procurement system would make of that lot?"

 

Yes.

 

It would be even more collectively inept.

 

Tim

 

I've never been able to understand the loads of 24/25 thing either.

 

Coming from 'down South', I thought that there was some mysterious traffic, somewhere in the Midlands or Up North, which necessitated them all. Then, when I started to travel round the country, it dawned on me that there seemed to be an awful lot of them, doing very little for a great deal of the time.

 

Kevin

Link to post
Share on other sites

I'm not sure that the 1250hp versions were that underpowered - they were certainly lively enough on the passenger traffic they were allocated to on the ScR and as the drive towards bulk contracts / traffic was still in it's early days, they still coped well with fairly decent freight loads despite a medium rating.  Not unlike most of the Type 1 designs the traffic they were intended for disappeared and the early 70s Traction Plan rationalisation of types put and end to any future prolonged use beyond preservation.  The late departure of a few of the 26s came about as a result of specific freight workings and only on those that were given the life extension with Heavy General Overhaul's otherwise they'd have ended their days with the 27s.

Link to post
Share on other sites

  • RMweb Gold

I'm not sure if this has been mentioned, but a major problem of the 1960s dieselisation programme was the tardy elimination of unfitted wagons, which was proposed under the modernisation scheme, unfitted freights lasted until the late 70s if not later. This was the downfall of the Hymeks, they had insufficient brake force compared to an EE3, otherwise BR would have ordered many more 'meks. Of course coupled with the traction plan where hydraulics were given their death sentence.

Link to post
Share on other sites

Certainly a great many locomotives needed to be replaced, but was the need so urgent that the pilot scheme could not be left to run its course as intended? BR did, after all, have an established program of building its Standard steam locomotives, most of which appear to have been competent and pretty much none of which were life expired by the end in 1968. So why the desperate urgency? Why not wait that extra year or so to find out which of the Pilot Scheme locos were turkeys? Given just how bad some of them were, surely it wouldn't  have taken much longer.

 

As for the apparent reluctance to obtain proven designs or components from overseas, Neville Shute's autobiography Slide Rule contains some pungent comments on the design and procurement processes followed in the government run R101 airship project, vs. those applied to the privately built R100. In short, on the R101 the wheel was repeatedly reinvented for largely political reasons, resulting in huge costs and the production of components and systems of mediocre design because everything on the ship was, effectively, a prototype. On the R100 proven components were bought from commercial manufacturers at good prices resulting in an airship which, whilst overall a prototype, at least contained components which could be relied upon to work as intendded.

 

One wonders if there was a similar "not invented here" undercurrent to some of the diesel procurement in the 1950s.

Link to post
Share on other sites

PatB

 

I mentioned it briefly before, but I think that perhaps for both airships and diesel locomotives (and by the way probably for other things like jet aircraft and missile systems too) quite a bit of what we see, with hindsight, as "political interference" was an inept attempt by politicians and civil servants to use government procurement as the vehicle to "limber up" British industry to sell lots of things abroad.

 

In context of diesel locos, British industry seems to have really struggled to get itself sorted out to be able to compete effectively for business abroad, especially once the semi-protected markets of empire/colonies ceased to be. British industry in the 50s was still quite an "un-consolidated mess" when compared with the US, for instance.

 

In the long run, BR diesel procurement policy might actually have contributed to British diesel loco production "falling at the first fence", because it encouraged continued multi-versity, rather than encouraging the necessary consolidation of the industry.

 

Kevin

Link to post
Share on other sites

  • RMweb Gold

Yes, if BR had said "We're going to order one private loco and one from our workshops (perhaps in conjunction with an outside manufacturer) for each power range", it would have focussed minds considerably. Some manufacturers might have decided not to bother, avoiding wasting money while others might have combined forces and expertise.

Link to post
Share on other sites

  • RMweb Gold

First  type 2 question. Why did they keep building Class 25s well into the 2nd half of the 60s?  The 24/25 Derby/Sulzer design eventually numbered well over 400, yet few of them saw 20 years in traffic, and they were outlived by the older BRCW class 26s.

 

Surely it ought to have become apparent that late that the Type 2 was underpowered?  Perhaps a repeat order for a second batch of 33s for the Midland and Scottish Regions might have made more sense?.

Not much to do with being underpowered (although they were) - the Derby Type 2 with the Sulzer engine had a number of design faults with impacted on maintenance/maintainability and in reality I don't think a host of slighty different production series ever solved them.  In contrast to that the BR&CW designs were reputedly better and less prone to faults and that was very definitely the case with what became the Class 33 although I believe the 26 & 27 weren't really any worse.

 

But let's face if you have designed your own loco and it works reasonably well, notwithstanding a few problems, are you really going to opt for one built by an outside company?  Answers on a  postcard but don't overlook the long term power of the Derby cabal which only really started to be broken when Director of M&EE power was centralised on the BRB and some of the senior jobs went to ex Western Region men (but the old Derby influence still fought back - even into the 1990s - when some of them still thought they knew best).

Link to post
Share on other sites

I've heard it said a few times from people in the know - usually speakers who have come to our railway circle giving lectures of their experiences operating them - that the Baby Deltics were not the failure that everyone thinks they were. When built, they were actually overweight and mods had to be done to lessen that. Initially they suffered failures which resulted in a rebuild ( ie the early disc to headcode panel time). After that they settled down to be as good as any others on the same duties. However, being a small class they were singled out for withdrawal in favour of the more numerous types. Also their "crack" duties on the KGX-CBG turns were only just attainable with any of the type 2s, which meant they had difficulty in keeping time, and were thus driven hard.

 

Stewart

Indeed, they were worked by Hitchin crews who loved them and kept the cabs spotless. Even in their early careers, any talk of replacing a baby deltic with an L1 on a service met stiff opposition from the crews. The class 23's also had excellent acceleration compared to some of their type 2 counterparts. The main issue was stubborn management further up the chain refusing to allow common sense to prevail when Finsbury Park requested facilities at the depot to perform engine lifts the request was refused and Baby deltics had to be towed to Doncaster for an engine swap. Doncaster worked a strict five day week, so it could take several days or more for a loco to return. On occasion the breakdown crane was used at FP and an engine replaced within a shift. The Western region had engine lift facilities at OOC and Laira which made those depots far more efficient at turning round loco's with serious engine issues. Sometimes baby deltics were sent to Stratford which was better.

Link to post
Share on other sites

"The Board of the LNER has approved plans for the construction of 25 diesel electric locomotives of 1600hp, which are to be used for hauling the principal Anglo-Scottish expresses ......"

My understanding is that this was cancelled soon after Nationalisation in favour of electrification of KGX to Grantham at 1500v (plus the Nottingham line as far as Colwick yard for coal trains to London). The initial order of EM2 locos was much larger than the 7 eventually built, as it appears to have included the locos to work this. This all then got cancelled at some point in the 1950s.  

Link to post
Share on other sites

Re the Derby Type 2s, they had a number of issues. Firstly they never got close to their design weight. This was after some elements of the design were compromised to try and keep the weight down so the traction motors were on the small side. These were actually based on a narrow gauge diesel in the USA. Secondly the construction used along with the traditional materials, glass fibre was used, unfortunately the interfaces between the glasfibre and the steel frame of the roof resulted in leaking cab roofs and rampant corrosion.

There also seemed to be an overestimate by the traffic depts of the haulage capacity, anyone standing at Altrigham station listening to a BR Sulzer being absolutely thrashed on a heavy stone train would have wondered why a bigger loco was not diagramed for the train.

 

Perhaps the Scottish Sulzers (Class 26/7) were used on more lightly loaded services and hence had a better reputation?

Link to post
Share on other sites

I think another factor we overlook is at the time of the Modernisation Plan, we were in a different world. Today we have the internet, with instant access to information and rapid e-mail communication. In that era, we were just about into the era of direct subcriber dialling on the phone - if you had access to one. So everyone lived/worked/played in their own local area. I'm thinking that if Doncaster did something, it just wouldn't be known about (especially in real time) in Eastleigh Derby or Swindon. There may have been official channels, but the path would have been protracted. Surely with the scale of change, this would have had an impact on things happening?

 

Stewart

Link to post
Share on other sites

Reading a lot of reports, it would appear that the whole thing was done in unnecessary haste.  As has been mentioned, there were many serviceable steamers available for years to come so what was the hurry.  I have never seen a good answer to this.  There probably is one buried somewhere deep in lost files and if there is, I should like to know the answer.  A bit late to worry about it now, just curious.

 

Brian.

Link to post
Share on other sites

Gents

 

What trains did Type 2s work?

 

I'm aware of light passenger services, having ridden behind them in Scotland and on the Cambrian, where they seemed quite suitable, in a steam-age sort of way, and Kings Cross suburban (pathetically poor acceleration on suburban work, and "out of breath" trying to be a buffet car express to Cambridge, I do remember).

 

Engineer's trains on the LMR.

 

But, these hundreds of locos must have done more than that ....... Did they work in pairs, or just go slowly? Where?

 

Kevin

 

PS: I also remember being a bit go smacked by how crude the cab of a Class 31 was. By comparison, SR diesels and electrics felt quite "up market".

Link to post
Share on other sites

The whole topic of dieselisation was severely neglected when the initial concept needed defining. Diesel and electric locomotives had been successfully built and run in several countries, including the UK, in the 1930s and the concept should have been progressed during the 1940s, so that the Standard steam locomotives were probably never even designed, or made in much smaller numbers to augment a rapidly declining fleet of older units, until dieselisation and/or electrification in the 1950s.

 

I've long suspected that the decision to embark on an extension of steam power was driven by the pressures to export virtually anything that could be sold, combined with the availability of coal in virtually unlimited quantities within the home islands.

Link to post
Share on other sites

Reading a lot of reports, it would appear that the whole thing was done in unnecessary haste.  As has been mentioned, there were many serviceable steamers available for years to come so what was the hurry.  I have never seen a good answer to this.  There probably is one buried somewhere deep in lost files and if there is, I should like to know the answer.  A bit late to worry about it now, just curious.

 

Brian.

The Clean Air Acts? I understand that there was one due to come into force in August 1968 which would have made the mass operation of stem locomotives en masse impossible

Link to post
Share on other sites

Archived

This topic is now archived and is closed to further replies.


×
×
  • Create New...