If The Pilot Scheme Hadn't Been Botched..........

[BernardTPM]

Not according to this article:

 

http://www.railwaywondersoftheworld.com/jubilee.html

 

 Another use for electricity in the train is in the ir-conditioning plant, which forces fresh filtered air, cold or warm according to season, into the compartment at a predetermined temperature.

Michael Harris wrote in depth about both LNER and GWR coaches and he pointed out that the LNER streamliners did not have true air-conditioning (see posts 121 and 123 on the importance of dehumidification in the cooling process) hence the provision of sliding vents on all the windows, similar to earlier Mk.II coaches.

[jjb1970]

Something often overlooked when considering the success or otherwise of locomotive builders is the softer side of how businesses work. People tend to focus on the big lumps and bits that go up and down and round and round. Some of the key reasons for the breakthrough of EMC/EMD were excellent customer support, client training services, excellent spare parts supply and not least, being able to arrange attractive financing. And efficient manufacturing, whereas rivals such as Alco and Baldwin (and many British builders from what I can see) were saddled with a lot of steam baggage and approached diesel traction as almost being a different form of what they already knew how to build EMC/EMD had a clean sheet and implemented a system of standardisation and serial production, limiting customer requested changes. And acceptance of welding at a time when other locomotive builders were still casting and riveting. The failure of traditional builders to successfully make the technological transition from steam wasn't limited to some of the old British builders.

Personally I've always much preferred the early diesel locomotive designs of Baldwin, Alco and Fairbanks Morse to those of EMD but it would be absurd to see EMD's rise to market dominance in the US as in any way undeserved.

On engines, some British diesel engines were very good and the British builders were at times very innovative. British builders were applying multi-stage very high pressure turbo charging, cranking BMEP right up and playing with the injection process and electronic engine management a long time ago. In terms of build quality, they made some junk (but so did builders such as MAN, MaK, Wartsila, Sulzer etc) and the better British designs were very good.

[jjb1970]

Something which some early efforts were slow to appreciate was the importance of matching the detailed engine design and set up to the appropriate duty cycle. Failure to match engine specification to the appropriate duty cycle can result in rather undesirable through life performance and reliability. This is often presented in terms of marine engines not making good rail engines but that isn't really correct. Engines are designed and set up around duty cycles and most engine builders use the same basic design to serve a range of applications by adjusting certain details and how engines are set up.

[rodent279]

But, you seem to be assuming that “they” thought 2000hp was enough, and they didn’t, they were working on roughly 200hp in a diesel loco per coach, to equal steam performance “over the route”, so were always trying to get to 2400hp, for a 12 car train. They simply couldn’t get 2400hp into a single unit in the mid-1950s.

 

Talking of a Duchess as 3200hp is hugely misleading, I think, unless it is coupled with words like “for about 15 minutes”. It’s “over the route” performance was probably 2000ho, probably less.

 

You can I think about get about 40hp out of a square foot of locomotive grate area, and I think a Duchess has 50sq.ft, or 2000hp. Any more for peak performance will come from depleting the pressure of the boiler, built up to maximum in readiness for a burst of high power, and once the loco is “puffed out”, it’s puffed out.

Post deleted

Edited February 16, 2018 by rodent279

[rodent279]

Something which some early efforts were slow to appreciate was the importance of matching the detailed engine design and set up to the appropriate duty cycle. Failure to match engine specification to the appropriate duty cycle can result in rather undesirable through life performance and reliability. This is often presented in terms of marine engines not making good rail engines but that isn't really correct. Engines are designed and set up around duty cycles and most engine builders use the same basic design to serve a range of applications by adjusting certain details and how engines are set up.

Which is presumably why some marine engines were de-rated in their rail applications?

[rodent279]

Something often overlooked when considering the success or otherwise of locomotive builders is the softer side of how businesses work. People tend to focus on the big lumps and bits that go up and down and round and round. Some of the key reasons for the breakthrough of EMC/EMD were excellent customer support, client training services, excellent spare parts supply and not least, being able to arrange attractive financing. And efficient manufacturing, whereas rivals such as Alco and Baldwin (and many British builders from what I can see) were saddled with a lot of steam baggage and approached diesel traction as almost being a different form of what they already knew how to build EMC/EMD had a clean sheet and implemented a system of standardisation and serial production, limiting customer requested changes. And acceptance of welding at a time when other locomotive builders were still casting and riveting. The failure of traditional builders to successfully make the technological transition from steam wasn't limited to some of the old British builders.

Personally I've always much preferred the early diesel locomotive designs of Baldwin, Alco and Fairbanks Morse to those of EMD but it would be absurd to see EMD's rise to market dominance in the US as in any way undeserved.

On engines, some British diesel engines were very good and the British builders were at times very innovative. British builders were applying multi-stage very high pressure turbo charging, cranking BMEP right up and playing with the injection process and electronic engine management a long time ago. In terms of build quality, they made some junk (but so did builders such as MAN, MaK, Wartsila, Sulzer etc) and the better British designs were very good.

The point about after sales is very important. There is a parallel with the Morris Minor and VW Beetle, both of which were exported in large numbers to the USA.

The Beetle took off and became the more popular car partly because Morris & later BMC, had nowhere near the same level of dealer support in the USA as VW.

[jjb1970]

Which is presumably why some marine engines were de-rated in their rail applications?

 

Rating may be adjusted, a basic engine is normally available in a range of outputs but rating is only one parameter that may be adjusted. The critical bits tend to be thermal stresses and load profile, whether the engine will drive a generator or be connected to a mech-drive is also pretty important and the effects on torsional characteristics. This isn't a marine - rail thing as within marine there are different duties. People tend to think of marine in terms of the classic auxiliary engine application or propulsion engines for conventional cargo ships but there are marine duty cycles that if anything are more exposed to fluctuating output and binary loading than rail traction engines. And the power - torque characteristic is important, in many applications it is torque rather than power which is the main limiting factor.

[jjb1970]

Something that is easy to forget since we now take it for granted is that designers didn't always have the number crunching capabilities made possible by computers. Over the last 30 years the weight of engines has in many cases halved with no sacrifice in reliability or durability as analytical tools made possible by computing have allowed designers to optimise designs and eliminate over engineered margins in ways that weren't possible in the 1950's.

[Titan]

They simply couldn’t get 2400hp into a single unit in the mid-1950s.

 

So 3,300bhp in 1955 does not count?

[F-UnitMad]

Something often overlooked when considering the success or otherwise of locomotive builders is the softer side of how businesses work. People tend to focus on the big lumps and bits that go up and down and round and round. Some of the key reasons for the breakthrough of EMC/EMD were excellent customer support, client training services, excellent spare parts supply and not least, being able to arrange attractive financing. And efficient manufacturing, whereas rivals such as Alco and Baldwin (and many British builders from what I can see) were saddled with a lot of steam baggage and approached diesel traction as almost being a different form of what they already knew how to build EMC/EMD had a clean sheet and implemented a system of standardisation and serial production, limiting customer requested changes. And acceptance of welding at a time when other locomotive builders were still casting and riveting. The failure of traditional builders to successfully make the technological transition from steam wasn't limited to some of the old British builders.

Personally I've always much preferred the early diesel locomotive designs of Baldwin, Alco and Fairbanks Morse to those of EMD but it would be absurd to see EMD's rise to market dominance in the US as in any way undeserved.

On engines, some British diesel engines were very good and the British builders were at times very innovative. British builders were applying multi-stage very high pressure turbo charging, cranking BMEP right up and playing with the injection process and electronic engine management a long time ago. In terms of build quality, they made some junk (but so did builders such as MAN, MaK, Wartsila, Sulzer etc) and the better British designs were very good.

The effects of WW2 economics also have to be taken into account with the EMD story. Whilst they introduced F-Units into service before WW2 (from an American standpoint), once the USA was fully engaged in the conflict EMD had the diesel locomotive field almost entirely to itself, as it was authorised to keep building diesels whilst Alco, Baldwin etc had to focus on Steam for the war effort. This gave EMD several years to perfect their diesels without any competition, so that the F- & E- series were a hard act to follow when the other manufacturers got going with diesels post-war.

EMD did slip back later, sticking to the full-width carbody style & being slow to develop the now-familiar Road Switcher style which was designed by Alco IIRC. The GP7 & 9 put EMD back in the lead, of course.

Edited February 15, 2018 by F-UnitMad

[jjb1970]

The effects of WW2 economics also have to be taken into account with the EMD story. Whilst they introduced F-Units into service before WW2 (from an American standpoint), once the USA was fully engaged in the conflict EMD had the diesel locomotive field almost entirely to itself, as it was authorised to keep building diesels whilst Alco, Baldwin etc had to focus on Steam for the war effort. This gave EMD several years to perfect their diesels without any competition, so that the F- & E- series were a hard act to follow when the other manufacturers got going with diesels post-war.

EMD did slip back later, sticking to the full-width carbody style & being slow to develop the now-familiar Road Switcher style which was designed by Alco IIRC.

 

That's not really correct. I believe EMD's market share of the NA diesel market fell in WW2 (largely thanks to others building a lot of switchers) and whilst production was controlled during WW2 R&D wasn't. Baldwin and Alco had something of a windfall with wartime production (not just trains, they manufactured all sorts of material) but failed to use an interruption in EMD's ascendency to prepare their own post war diesel program. If anything the increased market share of companies like Baldwin in WW2 actually worked against them as it highlighted just how far behind EMD they were. The Baldwin centipedes for example were built like steam locomotives in some respects.

[Nearholmer]

Something for the graphologists among us, from Wardale, The Red Devil, 2013.

 

Power is in kW , rather than hp, and the ‘super class 5’ is his ultimate loco dream/design.

Edited February 15, 2018 by Nearholmer

[jjb1970]

I tend to see the diesel engine as being at the same point as steam locomotives had reached in the late 30's, i.e. developed almost as far as it'll go. Even the shipping sector, probably the sector most wedded to the large diesel, is actively thinking about life beyond diesel engines.

[MarkC]

Something that is easy to forget since we now take it for granted is that designers didn't always have the number crunching capabilities made possible by computers. Over the last 30 years the weight of engines has in many cases halved with no sacrifice in reliability or durability as analytical tools made possible by computing have allowed designers to optimise designs and eliminate over engineered margins in ways that weren't possible in the 1950's.

 

Another big change has been materials - we now see engines putting out twice the power of an equivalent physical sized engine from only, yes, 30 years or so ago. Higher charging air pressures, and thus the ability to burn more fuel for a given swept volume, have been possible because of stronger, lighter materials. Then there's the developments in fuel injection equipment etc. . That's just simple oil burners. Then there's the shift to LNG, which is another story altogether. It's fascinating stuff.

 

[Nearholmer]

And to go with Wardale’s graphs, possibly the best “steam vs diesel” comparison on the web, well, the best I’ve found after quite a bit of searching over the years http://www.railway-technical.com/trains/steam-vs-diesel.html

 

The maths in this will not have been at all foreign to the BR engineers of the 1950s, or indeed the LMS engineers under Ivatt, notably Tommy Hornbuckle, who was the LMS ‘go to’ man for expertise on diesel traction.

Edited February 15, 2018 by Nearholmer

[Clive Mortimore]

A few little points.

 

Not only was the whole of the WCML to be electrified but the Modernisation plan called for the ECML as far north as south Yorkshire. The AL5s and AM9s were being built for this service when it was cancelled. Both matched the Deltics performance wise and left the Deltics in the starting blocks reliability wise.

 

In 1955 English Electric offered BR a double cabbed type 2 with the 8 cylinder engine, they also offered a 1500hp loco with the basic 12 cylinder engine.

English Electric had by the time of the modernisation uprated its engines which BR did take on later the 12 cylinder (Class 37 and Class 31) and the 16 cylinder (DP2 and class 50), BR did not trust the uprated engines to start with so ordered the less powerful versions. And for some daft reason were tempted by the Napier gang within EE. Like many institutions EE had its own internal fighting.

 

BR had to provide work for its own work shops, and divide its orders amoungst the nations locomotive builders. Two mistakes.

 

When the national traction plan was put together the most reliable classes were the class 20, the class 40 and class 37s. Had BR known this result in 1955, foresight is normally as good as hindsight, I am sure the offer of a double cabbed uprated 8 cylinder loco would have been jumped on, even the 1500 hp 12 cylinder would have looked very attractive if the uprated engines were a no no to start with, well BR did get them in the end with the re-engined class 30s running with the uprated 12 cylinder but down rated. (I know it was to match the electrics.)

 

The class 50 problems mainly came about because instead of a simple machine like DP2 was (highest availability of any single loco) BR insisted on loads of add-ons I am pretty sure  a fleet of DP2s would have stomped over all the Sulzer Type 4s. 

 

Back to the two mistakes, had BR known the reliability of the EE product in 1955 and not had to spread is finances too wide I am sure there would have been a generation of mainly EE products whistling away. 

 

Many have mentioned the class 45s. The Crompton railway electrics were rubbish and brought the company down. I worked with many ex Crompton men when I was at Marconi's in Chlemsford, they said towards the end of the company's existence they were too busy repairing what BR had sent back than making new stuff and the company lost orders from then on.

[Nearholmer]

Titan

 

Re:134

 

Point well made.

 

How about: “....... they simply hadn’t reached series production of 2400hp in a single unit, although there was one demonstrator on trial delivering 3300hp, using what proved to be a workable, but very costly-to-maintain, pair of engines.”

 

I’ve edited the post that you picked-up on, and credited you with the prompt.

 

Kevin

Edited February 15, 2018 by Nearholmer

[jjb1970]

The Deltic was an ingenious solution to achieving an exceptional power - weight ration for its day and its amagnetic qualities were rather useful in warships but ultimately it was an expensive technological dead end. I'll be off a few Christmas card lists now.......   

[slilley]

The 47 was the only one's where the pilot scheme plan "test a few prototypes, take the best bits and build a standard loco" approach was actually followed. 

 

Hmmm. Are you sure about that?

 

The rapid multiplication of the Brush Type 4 (later Class 47) design into mass construction failed to address numerous problems on the locos resulting in a long period of experiments, modifications and of course de-rating of the licence built Sulzer design engine.  In effect the choice of the Brush design from a suite of Type 4 higher horsepower prototypes was almost a repeat of the error in going for large numbers of one Pilot Scheme design (the Derby/Sulzer Type 2, later Class 24/25) which was definitely not the best of the Pilot Scheme Type 2s.  Oddly in both cases it was a BRC&W design which was dropped, I wonder why?

 

The reason why the BRCW option for the standard type 4 was not proceeded with, even though BRCW "won" the 1960 tender exercise is set out in very great detail in Class 47 50 Years of Locomotive History.

[slilley]

A few little points.

 

Not only was the whole of the WCML to be electrified but the Modernisation plan called for the ECML as far north as south Yorkshire. The AL5s and AM9s were being built for this service when it was cancelled. Both matched the Deltics performance wise and left the Deltics in the starting blocks reliability wise.

 

In 1955 English Electric offered BR a double cabbed type 2 with the 8 cylinder engine, they also offered a 1500hp loco with the basic 12 cylinder engine.

English Electric had by the time of the modernisation uprated its engines which BR did take on later the 12 cylinder (Class 37 and Class 31) and the 16 cylinder (DP2 and class 50), BR did not trust the uprated engines to start with so ordered the less powerful versions. And for some daft reason were tempted by the Napier gang within EE. Like many institutions EE had its own internal fighting.

 

BR had to provide work for its own work shops, and divide its orders amoungst the nations locomotive builders. Two mistakes.

 

When the national traction plan was put together the most reliable classes were the class 20, the class 40 and class 37s. Had BR known this result in 1955, foresight is normally as good as hindsight, I am sure the offer of a double cabbed uprated 8 cylinder loco would have been jumped on, even the 1500 hp 12 cylinder would have looked very attractive if the uprated engines were a no no to start with, well BR did get them in the end with the re-engined class 30s running with the uprated 12 cylinder but down rated. (I know it was to match the electrics.)

 

The class 50 problems mainly came about because instead of a simple machine like DP2 was (highest availability of any single loco) BR insisted on loads of add-ons I am pretty sure  a fleet of DP2s would have stomped over all the Sulzer Type 4s. 

 

Back to the two mistakes, had BR known the reliability of the EE product in 1955 and not had to spread is finances too wide I am sure there would have been a generation of mainly EE products whistling away. 

 

Many have mentioned the class 45s. The Crompton railway electrics were rubbish and brought the company down. I worked with many ex Crompton men when I was at Marconi's in Chlemsford, they said towards the end of the company's existence they were too busy repairing what BR had sent back than making new stuff and the company lost orders from then on.

 In the 1960 tenders for the new standard type 4 the cheapest option was from Brush for a loco a bit like Falcon but with the 16 cyl EE engine in it.BR rejected it as they thought the leap from 2000hp to 2700hp was too far. Instead they opted for the more conservative uprating offered bu=y Sulzer of 2500hp to 2750hp.

 

Simon

[Edwin_m]

I think the reasons to deploy locomotive orientated traction strategies was entirely logical, given the lead in to the modernisation plan. railways like all big institutions , are going to base change in the future grounded in operating practices of today. To do otherwise is to engage in wholesale risk. Taken in the context of the day , where steam loco hauled trains dominated , it's entirely understandable that a loco based strategy was followed.

 

One must remember , that wagon load freight was still being accomadated and multi purpose locos , especially after the success of the BR standard classes was seen as the correct strategy. It not at all surprising that what happened happened.

 

Equally , because the ground shifted under them so rapidly , it's entirely understandable why so many classes were considered , especially relatively low power units. CIE , which changed to diesels earlier , found itself in exactly the same position, where the rapid closure of branch lines , the almost overnight disappearance of wagon loads business and the arrival of larger block trains , resulted in an excess of small diesels with no role to play. ( leading to frequent multi unit working on in many cases )

 

I can easily see the reluctance to go to all encompassing push pull operation , firstly you have massive institutional inertia , the " it's not broke , so don't fix it " , you had virtually generations of " on-demand " train reconfigurations, as opposed to implementing higher frequency passagner services and overall you had a railway where " freight first " thinking still predominated. ( passagner traffic for many years was not the profit centre for most companies outside the SR )

 

What is clear , is that British manufacturers , both in house workshops and external manufacturers , by and large , did not have enough experience to build diesels at the time. In essence we had something of a 10-15 year experimentation phase , where both purchaser and supplier learnt " on the job " , of course with the added advantage of the tax payer picking up the tab

 

This is not unusual , it happens in many industries going through change , the airline business is a case in point. in the case where the tax payer isn't picking up the tab , the usual result is some fail in the process of change and go out of business

A locomotive policy was followed for the principal expresses but the mass influx of DMUs onto the rural and non-electrified surburban routes (and even some "intercity") probably eliminated more than 50% of BR's locomotive-hauled passenger trains.  That and 25kV electrification were probably the main successes of the Plan. 

[Nearholmer]

This is getting a bit dry without any pictures.

[Bob Reid]

If the Internet had been around in the 50s, the BRB Facebook page would have been awash with thousand of posts / "likes" et al and bugger all would have been built whilst disputes over the thermal efficiency of Steam Vs Diesel would have gone viral.   Given the same choices and the same circumstances (including the current state of the network in 1947), a Government who were already tightening the purse strings futher, I doubt very much anyone on here could or would have done any better.   Sitting on your backside prevaricating over the relative merits of otherwise of USA Vs Home built diesel engines is so much easier than having to actually do the job.  Looking back over those near 70 years is one hell of a lot of hindsight.

Edited February 15, 2018 by Bob Reid

[Clive Mortimore]

 In the 1960 tenders for the new standard type 4 the cheapest option was from Brush for a loco a bit like Falcon but with the 16 cyl EE engine in it.BR rejected it as they thought the leap from 2000hp to 2700hp was too far. Instead they opted for the more conservative uprating offered bu=y Sulzer of 2500hp to 2750hp.

 

Simon

Hi Simon

 

Even the best can get things wrong ....with hindsight.

 

 

Wasn't a class 56 a Falcon like loco with a super uprated 16 cylinder engine of EE parenthood, but marketed as a Ruston?

I have been digging out photos of 47 601 to do a drawing of its roof, I am going to use a class 40 drawing for the position of the four exhaust ports and size the rest from them.

[cheesysmith]

IIRC the EE engine in the 31 was set to a BHP figure to match the cooling system, when the uprated mirrlees engines were tried, they required the cooling system modified to a pressurised circuit as signified by the bolted down roof panels but the brush electrics were unaltered even when the engine was uprated to 2000BHP. Plus is the EE engine in the 31 even inter cooled? The v12 engine in the 37 is identical, and that is derated from its full power of 2000BHP, so a debating of the engine to 1470BHP is lower than what the engine was set to in the pilot scheme orders (BHP per cylinder). Which is another way of saying it avoids the need to alter the cooling circuit to add inter cooling.