What if nationalisation had happened earlier?

[GC Jack]

Thank you John for a very comprehensive and accurate analysis of the situation after WW1.

 

Herbert Walker was a strong contender but IIRC was he not opposed to the idea? One very keen supporter was Guy Granet of the Midland who would have been a strong competitor for the job - he had very close political connections and was the chosen representative of all the companies in negotiations with the unions.

 

He certainly took control of LMS forcing the livery change to Midland red ( and much more) - much to the dismay of the ex LNWR men.

 

Jack

[kevinlms]

Didn't Lord Stamp later state that the LMS was actually too big to manage properly?

 

On that basis, to nationalise the whole British railway network in 1923, almost certainly would have resulted in a huge dinosaur of a system that would have been hopeless to manage.

 

So how would this particular problem have been overcome? Perhaps the network could have been divided into geographical areas, somewhat similar to the BR regions, where some sections of lines where transferred between areas, such as the LTSR section being transferred to its logical Eastern district. No doubt the rest of you could give similar examples of dividing the system up and into how many geographical areas.

 

An alternative could have been that the track was Nationalised, but the trains were run by private companies - the same obviously as Major's Privatisation. But I think there would have been far less companies than Major's version.

 

 

Then comes the CME's of the pre-group companies, what if by modern practice, they all had to re-apply for their jobs which could be anywhere around the country? Suppose for the sake of discussion the network was divided into 4, with the same 4 CME's.

 

What if Maunsell was appointed to the LNER, Gresley to the LMS, Collett to the Southern & Hughes/Fowler to the GWR? Perhaps for a couple of years - to experience as to how others did the job.

 

 

 

What if those officers with say electrical experience had been put together on the Southern, would the combined experience of the Midland Railway (Morecambe/Heysham/Lancaster) & LBSCR, have persuaded the Southern to stick with overhead electrification, instead of 3rd rail?

 

Perhaps a nationwide decision to adopt the Westinghouse air brake, would be another.

 

 

This thread raises all sorts of possibilities of radical changes that would have resulted in an entirely different outcome.

 

 

Kevin Martin

[coachmann]

Nationalization in 1923 would have led to the appointment of a CME. Politics in those days spun around the Liberals and Conservatives so this might have had a bearing on the chosen loco man. Not Fowler of the Midland thats for sure, so no more little engines and thick ideas from that quarter. Not Hughes of the L&Y as he was too old. Not Beames of the LNWR as that company's engnes had hit a technological dead end and were not suitable for widespread adoption over other areas. Not Collett of the GWR for the same reasons as the LNWR. Not Gresley of the Great Northern as his conjugated valvegear was not necessary in the face of experience with walchaerts. Not Robinson of the GCR as he couldnt design a decent large engine. That leaves Maunsell of the SE&C. That he could design locos that were all-rounders had been shown with his doodlings around 1917.

 

Nevertheless, my votes go with those young rising stars : Stanier, Riddles and Bullied. The latter was influential with politicians and maybe he would get the job until they discovered he needed to be sent to mess up some other folks railway in the colonies. So my bet goes with Stanier & Riddles plus their draughtsmen.....What a combination!

 

Maunsell would have got the carraige job and Gresley would be in charge of the GBR* publicity department.

 

* Great British Railways

[Old Gringo]

Thanks Jack (post 26). I'm assuming that it's my "mini-essay" in post 10 that you're referring to.

 

I’d not read anywhere that Herbert Walker didn’t favour a unified system. As I mentioned earlier I thought the fact that he managed to get the representative twelve members of the Railway Executive to work together for the war effort would have made him the favourite to head up the whole business, should Eric Geddes have tried to push through unification policies.

 

What a shame Granet (MR Chairman) was in charge of negotiations with the unions - a man from a railway that needed two engines and two crews to pull the same train that either of the Western lines (GW or LNW) would only use one to haul!

 

Josiah Stamp (1880-1941) was a brilliant statistician, and administrator and became the first President of the executive of the LMS in 1926. On the retirement of Burgess (GM) in 1927 control was vested in the president. The late John Marshall says, "On the retirement of Granet in 1927 Stamp was appointed to succeed him" However, it appears that he still had outside commercial interests, and it took "the economic crisis of 1931, to make him decide to make the LMSR his main concern. Stamp united the company into a closely integrated organisation", a concern which was then one of the largest companies in the world. Unfortunately, he was killed in an air raid during 1941.

 

If he said it was too big to manage (Kevin post 27), then he made a heck of a good job trying to do it.

 

All the best,

 

John

[D9020 Nimbus]

But what if Geddes had been in charge? Might not Raven have become the CME, and possibly introduced electrification (as the NER wanted to do; he'd already built a prototype--number 13!--there were 12 locos on the Shildon-Newport (Middlesbrough) line.

[GC Jack]

Interesting and very informative John, you clearly have an excellent grasp of railway history which is one of my major passions.

 

It would be interesting to pursue this discussion on private messages.

 

I have a respect for Granet though. True the small engine policy was a disaster literally as it had a direct bearing on the accidents at Ais Gill and Hawes.

 

However, he was a shrewd operator when it came to negotiations and won the respect of Lloyd George and very surprisingly Jimmy Thomas of the NUR.

 

Best wishes,

 

Jack

[asmay2002]

Not Fowler of the Midland thats for sure, so no more little engines and thick ideas from that quarter.

 

Not apponting Fowler would not have got around the small engine problem That was caused by the CIVIL engineers who simply would not allow large engines with short coupled wheelbases because of the fear of weak bridges on the MR. It was only when EC Trench was appointed as CE on the LMS that that was allowed to change for the better and the 8' + 8-6" wheelbase dictated by the CIVIL Engineers was relaxed. The Civil enginers would have stopped Gresley or anybody else from building big engines just as they scuppered the Fowler 4-6-2 and 2-8-2 designs because most Standard locos would still have had to run on the MR.

 

I agree that Maunsell would probably have been the best man for the job in 1923 (even if his engines were designed by Clayton and Holcroft) but there would have been some missed opportunities as in real life. It was a pity that J R Billington (LMS Chief Designer under Hughes) - and reckoned a genius by some contemporaries - died so young just before Hughes resigned.

[coachmann]

Not appointing Fowler would not have got around the small engine problem

Tell that to the GWR, NER, Caley and LNWR. Fortunately the railways of Britian did not revolve around the Midland.

 

Many pre-Group companies had responded to the need for bigger engines for increasingly heavier trains before 1923. Men of strength and foresight were required. Fowler couldnt even run his own tiny department on the Midland without Anderson's gang overuling him. Can you imagine the mess the Midland brigade would have caused if they had imposed their Compounds and 2Ps on important lines like the North Eastern and Great Western.

[DavidB-AU]

Nationalisation of the railways was seriously proposed in 1918 by the then Minister for Munitions, a gentleman named Winston Churchill, citing the benefits of running all the railways under the REC. By that stage, varying degrees of nationalisation had been happening across Europe for the best part of 30 years. But the recent Communist revolution in Russia, and in 1919 a near revolution in Scotland, scared Lloyd George off complete nationalisation.

 

Cheers

David

[2ManySpams]

Sadly Old Gringo (John) is away from his PC for a few days but I'm sure he'll be adding more lessons from history in the week.

 

A great debate chaps.

[Old Gringo]

Bad news everyone, I’m back! Just imagine it’s a bloke with another wedge of a big pie!

 

There are just so many ideas, interesting information and opposing angles appearing in this thread, regarding the possibilities of the unification of the railway network immediately after the First World War. It’s fascinating to those of us who enjoy poking about in railway history. And naturally, as John (Allegheny 1600) asked in the OP and because we all like all the different locomotives of the “Big Four†period, many of the answers focus on who might have ended up in the CME’s job of the national railway system.

 

However, I think the CME’s job would have been quite a long way down the considerations of the men working out whether or not to “nationalize†the railways in 1919. The bigger power struggle would probably have been, who might head up the new organisation and how it would have been effectively controlled and managed ?

 

This topic question has really got me thinking and after researching towards the answers that I’ve put forward in the previous posts, I began to wonder; “Why didn’t the Government of the day in 1920 go ahead with Nationalization, or at the very least a unification of the railways – under a private “British Railways†company ?â€

 

David (in post 34) mentions the Russian situation and unrest in 1919, plus Winston Churchill’s apparent support for a unified system. Jack (in post 31) mentions Sir Guy Granet (1867-1943), GM of the Midland Railway, who served at the War Office, alongside Sam Fay (GCR) and H.W. Thornton (GER). Granet was no doubt in close contact with Churchill, who was Minister of Munitions from 1917 and Granet also had influence in the Railway Companies Association. Interestingly, it was Sam Fay (1856-1953) who was instrumental in setting up the Conciliation boards with the railway unions, which were included in an agreement dated November 1907 (and to which only one of the major U.K. railways was not signed up to by the outbreak of WW1.).

 

Now, Eric Geddes (the new Minister of Transport) had no doubt seen and helped produce the benefits of a unified ‘co-operative’ network; bringing all the railway companies to work together to help the war effort. So, what event, or who made him, a first rate railwayman through and through, change his mind about unification? And then, leave the Ministry and the railway problem abruptly, to go and work for a Rubber factory?

 

Then I remembered reading about something to do with Coalition governments and industrial strife. Ha, ha, Sounds familiar, and I hit on part of a possible answer to the questions above.

 

In 1914, the Railway companies still had pretty much a monopoly of transport movements in the British Isles. (A bit like today, when the big supermarkets almost have a monopoly of our shopping habits!). The railway businesses not only controlled much of the passenger travel and goods traffic throughout the U.K., but they also had majority share-holdings in coastal shipping, dock complexes and canal networks, plus they held share-holdings in some of the suburban tramways, omnibus corporations, etc. Some of the latter outfits were just beginning to take a lot of local traffic away from the railway companies.

 

By the outbreak of WW1, the railways had been unionized and the members had called the first national railway strike in 1911. Post war, as the new Ministry was deciding what shape the railway network should take and balanced the pros and cons of nationalization, they announced the proposed new wages for railway workers, who numbered somewhere in excess of 625,000 persons, employed in 36 classes of labour. Several grades were to have their wages cut by the Coalition government and this resulted in the railway unions taking action again, in September 1919.

 

Professor Philip Bagwell says, “The strike was the most important in railway history and marked a decisive turning-point in railway industrial relations. The unions had demonstrated their considerable power†– that was the power to bring the whole country to a virtual standstill. Most politicians exist to grasp and wield power, squirming and squealing in the fancy Gothic palace beside the Thames and I would venture to suggest that the frightful idea of creating a State-controlled network that they could no longer control, perhaps wasn’t to their liking. I wonder which way the P.M. David Lloyd George favoured ? He would be out of office soon after the “Big Four†Act was passed, after splitting the coalition over a more serious issue.

 

Beyond the eastern side of war-battered Europe, the Red army was taking control and the British Government wasn’t going to risk turning over the nation’s fortunes to the ‘nasty railwaymen’. Even though “the charge made by the government that J.H.Thomas was leading an ‘anarchist conspiracy’ lacked credibility†- the fear factor was there for all to see. However, if Lloyd George, Granet and Thomas respected each other (as inferred by Jack in post 31), who would have made this remark and who had most to gain from "de-railing" nationalization ?

 

And perhaps here was the reason that the major players stepped back from the unified railway answer.

 

Postscript: At the Grouping, Sir Guy Granet went on to become the deputy chairman of the new LMSR and chairman within a year. Andrew Dow says that before he retired in 1927, “he was largely responsible for introducing an American style of managementâ€, that would eventually lead to Sir Josiah Stamp taking control of the huge company.

 

Going to the pub now, I'm worn out.

 

All the best,

 

John.

[2ManySpams]

See, I said he'd be back....

[GC Jack]

Professor Philip Bagwell says, “The strike was the most important in railway history and marked a decisive turning-point in railway industrial relations. The unions had demonstrated their considerable power†– that was the power to bring the whole country to a virtual standstill. Most politicians exist to grasp and wield power, squirming and squealing in the fancy Gothic palace beside the Thames and I would venture to suggest that the frightful idea of creating a State-controlled network that they could no longer control, perhaps wasn’t to their liking. I wonder which way the P.M. David Lloyd George favoured ? He would be out of office soon after the “Big Four†Act was passed, after splitting the coalition over a more serious issue.

 

Beyond the eastern side of war-battered Europe, the Red army was taking control and the British Government wasn’t going to risk turning over the nation’s fortunes to the ‘nasty railwaymen’. Even though “the charge made by the government that J.H.Thomas was leading an ‘anarchist conspiracy’ lacked credibility†- the fear factor was there for all to see. However, if Lloyd George, Granet and Thomas respected each other (as inferred by Jack in post 31), who would have made this remark and who had most to gain from "de-railing" nationalization ?

 

 

Interesting points John.

 

Who made the remarks about Thomas? Asquith was in power then and the Imperial wing of the Liberal Party were, in reality, right wing conservatives. Thomas was a labour MP for Derby who had many enemies - some in his own party - he clearly had a wider agenda and many on the right suspected him of Marxist sympathies. Which in fact was not true. although he was on the far left of his party.

 

I don't know who actually made this specific remark but many establishment newspapers of the time printed similar descriptions of the Union movement.

 

Jack

[The Stationmaster]

Professor Philip Bagwell says, “The strike was the most important in railway history and marked a decisive turning-point in railway industrial relations. The unions had demonstrated their considerable power†– that was the power to bring the whole country to a virtual standstill. Most politicians exist to grasp and wield power, squirming and squealing in the fancy Gothic palace beside the Thames and I would venture to suggest that the frightful idea of creating a State-controlled network that they could no longer control, perhaps wasn’t to their liking. I wonder which way the P.M. David Lloyd George favoured ? He would be out of office soon after the “Big Four†Act was passed, after splitting the coalition over a more serious issue.

 

Beyond the eastern side of war-battered Europe, the Red army was taking control and the British Government wasn’t going to risk turning over the nation’s fortunes to the ‘nasty railwaymen’. Even though “the charge made by the government that J.H.Thomas was leading an ‘anarchist conspiracy’ lacked credibility†- the fear factor was there for all to see. However, if Lloyd George, Granet and Thomas respected each other (as inferred by Jack in post 31), who would have made this remark and who had most to gain from "de-railing" nationalization ?

 

 

Interesting points John.

 

Who made the remarks about Thomas? Asquith was in power then and the Imperial wing of the Liberal Party were, in reality, right wing conservatives. Thomas was a labour MP for Derby who had many enemies - some in his own party - he clearly had a wider agenda and many on the right suspected him of Marxist sympathies. Which in fact was not true. although he was on the far left of his party.

 

I don't know who actually made this specific remark but many establishment newspapers of the time printed similar descriptions of the Union movement.

 

Jack

 

I would doubt the assertion that 'the1919 strike was the turning point in industrial relations' (in the railway industry), for example Kew holds records in respect of the Railway Staff Conference (RSC) dating back to 1911 and there is no particular indication that any new parts of the machinery of negotiation emerged in the railway industry following the 1919 strike.

 

Equally on the contrary there is considerable contemporary evidence from individual staff records that a major change in attitude on the part of management, if not staff, occurred following the General Strike of 1926 and that a hard line was pursued well into the 1930s, for example in standing-off Juniors when they reached their 18th birthday. It would be interesting, but rather O/T, to know Bradwell's sources from information within the industry.

[GC Jack]

I would doubt the assertion that 'the1919 strike was the turning point in industrial relations' (in the railway industry), for example Kew holds records in respect of the Railway Staff Conference (RSC) dating back to 1911 and there is no particular indication that any new parts of the machinery of negotiation emerged in the railway industry following the 1919 strike.

 

Equally on the contrary there is considerable contemporary evidence from individual staff records that a major change in attitude on the part of management, if not staff, occurred following the General Strike of 1926 and that a hard line was pursued well into the 1930s, for example in standing-off Juniors when they reached their 18th birthday. It would be interesting, but rather O/T, to know Bradwell's sources from information within the industry.

 

I haven't read Bagwell's account so I can't comment. I have read both accounts of Thomas's life.

 

1911 was a major turning point as it forced the railway companies to recognise the unions a collective negotiating body. At the start of the strike on the L & Y their management had stated that they would rather close their railway than recognise the unions. They had to eat those words.

 

Off the thread sorry.

 

Jack

[Old Gringo]

Apologies to John E., I seem to have led a drift "off-topic" whilst delving into the murky world of British railway history between the two world wars.

 

However, I think it seems fair to say that Mike, Jack and myself see that the relationship between the railways and the unions certainly didn't help the post WW1 "nationalization proposals".

 

However, (returning to the "what if nationalization had happened earlier" rather than the "why it didn't) had a better "deal" been struck by the national management of the railways in 1919, maybe the workforce might not have willingly joined the general strike of 1926?

 

And with the network divided up into smaller groups than the big four, reporting to a smaller Railway Executive management body, surely an even more positive attitude could have been taken than what actually happened from 1923 to 1939 to Britain's railways?

[The Stationmaster]

However, (returning to the "what if nationalization had happened earlier" rather than the "why it didn't) had a better "deal" been struck by the national management of the railways in 1919, maybe the workforce might not have willingly joined the general strike of 1926?

I really doubt that John. The 'solidarity of the working class' and the closeness of the unions to each other together with a wish on the part of all not to be seen as 'blacklegs' by the others was more than enough to ensure that a large majority of railwaymen struck during the General Strike. And in some communities those few who didn't strike were treated even more harshly by those who had (and their families) than was the case following the Scargill inspired strikes in the coal industry in the 1970s etc.

 

It is very difficult to resist peer pressure in these circumstances and the union machine never wants to be seen to to step out of line however good its management. Looking at stuff on personal files it was clear that the GWR's attitude to its staff prior to the General Strike was positively benign and amazingly polite - there is a very noticeable difference in correspondence with employees after that strike. And one of my staff in South wales in the 1970s always used tp recall his old dad saying that the GWR was the best railway a man could ever want to work for - which does sound odd but was to a large extent explained once you learnt that before he worked for the GWR his dad had worked for the Taff Vale, where clearly a lot of bitterness had remained into the war years and the last years of that company. But his dad still went on strike with the rest.

 

And with the network divided up into smaller groups than the big four, reporting to a smaller Railway Executive management body, surely an even more positive attitude could have been taken than what actually happened from 1923 to 1939 to Britain's railways?

I'm not entirely sure on that, the Railway's call for 'a square deal' seems to have been a reasonably effective one and it definitely resulted in the injection of a lot of Govt money in the 1930s (albeit there were wider political reasons as well no doubt). I also wonder about the ability of the centre to manage properly far more smaller groups than than the four. The BTC and BR had more than enough trouble trying to sort out what they had to manage from 1948 onwards as a number of re-organisations and numerous changes of Regional boundaries testify. True they had to unite at that time 4 relatively diverse and differently structured Railways but that task would have been all the greater in, say, 1921 with even more vested interests to deal with.

[GC Jack]

We are really drifting away from the OP !!

 

The general strike was called on far bigger issues than the railways, Mike is right to point out Union solidarity here but as we know the strike was a failure.

 

On the subject of the GWR Mike, if you check Thomas's autobiogaphy, you will find a very different opinion of the Company. They were quite ruthless to many union men - though to be fair I suspect most of the other companies were the same.

 

I would agree that a nationalised railway in the 1920's would have been a mammoth task but IIRC, did not the French pull it off without too many tears?

 

Jack

[The Stationmaster]

We are really drifting away from the OP !!

 

The general strike was called on far bigger issues than the railways, Mike is right to point out Union solidarity here but as we know the strike was a failure.

 

On the subject of the GWR Mike, if you check Thomas's autobiogaphy, you will find a very different opinion of the Company. They were quite ruthless to many union men - though to be fair I suspect most of the other companies were the same.

I would agree that a nationalised railway in the 1920's would have been a mammoth task but IIRC, did not the French pull it off without too many tears?

Jack

I'm sure union men got a rough ride but they were very much a minority among the total staff - I was referring to the treatment and attitude towards ordinary employees (as you obviously realised). I suspect the patrician GWR could in fact see no reason for a union!

 

The comparison with France is interesting (and still is as the massive bureaucracy of SNCF is very much akin to BR of the early 1960s) and it would be illuminating to learn how it was done?

[2ManySpams]

I know a few folk have self commented that discussion has gone off topic but I for one find it fascinating. Please don't stop the discussion.

[yorkie_pudd]

I know a few folk have self commented that discussion has gone off topic but I for one find it fascinating. Please don't stop the discussion.

 

I totally agree that it`s great info and make think like the OP asked, would it have brought nationalisation quicker, or maybe the opersite effect and the railways never been nationalised, NO BR blue, yellow nose end, small or large logo`s, would many of the modern diesels ever been built, HST, APT etc etc.

 

But like the OP said if earlier what would have been done earlier, steam end by 1940 or 1950 ?? who knows. imagination overtime ??

[GC Jack]

I'm sure union men got a rough ride but they were very much a minority among the total staff - I was referring to the treatment and attitude towards ordinary employees (as you obviously realised). I suspect the patrician GWR could in fact see no reason for a union!

 

The comparison with France is interesting (and still is as the massive bureaucracy of SNCF is very much akin to BR of the early 1960s) and it would be illuminating to learn how it was done?

 

I think it may have depended, as on other railways, where you worked and your status how you viewed the railway company. The GWR, I agree, especially in the inter war years, encouraged high morale and pride in its workforce, probably better than anyone else. I did read an article though about the lot of train crews on the valley lines coal trains. "Good Workers Ruined" was a rather unkind name given by some, especially before 1914 IIRC.

 

I am not student of French railway history but I know a little bit - which may be dangerous! SNCF was formed in 1938 from five seperate companies, some of which themselves (like the UK) were almagamations. Unlike the UK (before WW2) parts of the system had been seriously damaged by war (Franco/Prussian) and government involvement became increasingly essential before WW1 and very much after.

 

One company, Chemins de Fer de l'Elat had to be nationalised - I think in 1919 to prevent it becoming bankrupt. In a sense nationalisation probably evolved rather than a big bang. The government initially took only a 51% stake in the companies. It was not a major battle but some of the more profitable companies resisted it.

 

Jack

[Fenman]

The GWR, I agree, especially in the inter war years, encouraged high morale and pride in its workforce, probably better than anyone else.

my emphasis

 

That's an audacious statement. I've seen archive footage of interviews with ex-M&GN men where they talk with extraordinary pride about their (sic) railway, and the anecdotes included one particularly rough patch where there was so little money the men didn't get paid; they all turned up for work anyway. Difficult for many of us today to feel that much loyalty to our employers.

 

Paul

[GC Jack]

my emphasis That's an audacious statement. I've seen archive footage of interviews with ex-M&GN men where they talk with extraordinary pride about their (sic) railway, and the anecdotes included one particularly rough patch where there was so little money the men didn't get paid; they all turned up for work anyway. Difficult for many of us today to feel that much loyalty to our employers.

 

Allow me to clarify that Paul.

 

I was referring to the GWR in the big four era. There is little doubt that the LMS suffered very poor morale before the later management took over. The evidence of western pride can be found after nationalisation when the individualism of the Western Region asserted itself on many occasions.

 

You are entirely correct - up to a point - to allude to the "esprit de corps" in the pre grouping companies, it was an undeniable fact.

 

Almost all of the larger companies - as you rightly say - encouraged loyalty and "ownership" of their line. However, a lot of that was superficial and masked appalling working condtions for many workers. Jack

[The Stationmaster]

I think it's perfectly reasonable to mention appalling working conditions but that should perhaps be tempered by comparisons with the world outside the railway where conditions could be equally bad or worse. Generally railway wages for staff such as porters were fixed by relation to agricultural wages - which made them fairly inadequate in many larger towns and cities. But in many respects railway employees were in a much better position than those employed in agriculture with generally greater job security plus a few side benefits - which made railway jobs quite highly sought after in country areas even into the 1950s.