East Coast Mainline Blockade for Werrington Junction diveunder

[Donington Road]

Nothing much has changed in the last week.

All the old track in the site yard has been taken away which just leaves a few panels left in the wide-way.

A bit more hard standing has been done in the wide-way ready for the pile driver,

Not much point in repeating the same photographs taken last week by Richard Elms so I've done a small video for a change.

 

 

Edited March 1, 2020 by Donington Road

[melmerby]

With all the recent rainfall, it makes you wonder whether the new drains will cope!

[Donington Road]

Just now, melmerby said:

With all the recent rainfall, it makes you wonder whether the new drains will cope!

 

I think they will.  There is still no water going through to Werrington Brook which runs under the railway, so it is all going into the new drain at the moment.

It is a sure fact the old drain would not have coped as it was much smaller,

[Crun]

34 minutes ago, Donington Road said:

Nothing much has changed in the last week.

All the old track in the site yard has been taken away which just leaves a few panels left in the wide-way.

A bit more hard standing has been done in the wide-way ready for the pile driver,

Not much point in repeating the same photographs taken last week by Richard Elms so I've done a small video for a change.

 

 

 

Very informative with the annotations explaining how the changes to the various water courses have come about.

[Donington Road]

The monthly meeting today unearthed another previously unseen photograph taken about the beginning of October last year.

Top is Hurn Road with the start of the dive under to the right.  In the centre is the start of the road bed going down for the Stamford lines, left of that is a new pond for water retention and left of that is the new drain. Bottom centre is the start of the underbridge to access the wide-way.

 

Other news is that the boring machine is in place in the dive under on the right hand side ready to start.

And lastly another website article worth reading https://www.newcivilengineer.com/the-future-of/future-of-rail-curved-box-jack-takes-out-east-coast-main-line-junction-19-02-2020/

 

[ess1uk]

IVE been there most of the day and it is coming along well 

[Richard E]

The website article is interesting as it says they are providing headroom for OHLE under the A15 thereby future proofiong it should the Joint ever be electrified.

[Fat Controller]

44 minutes ago, Richard E said:

The website article is interesting as it says they are providing headroom for OHLE under the A15 thereby future proofiong it should the Joint ever be electrified.

I believe that it's been policy to put in  new and replacement structures  with sufficient clearance for OHLE for some time now; a lot cheaper than doing it when they're in use.

[jamie92208]

25 minutes ago, Fat Controller said:

I believe that it's been policy to put in  new and replacement structures  with sufficient clearance for OHLE for some time now; a lot cheaper than doing it when they're in use.

I think that policy goes back 20 or 30 years.

 

Jamie

[rockershovel]

Started driving through the piles yesterday.. filthy job, that fibreglass reinforcement stinks and tends to jam in the screw conveyor. 

[Mike Storey]

10 hours ago, Fat Controller said:

I believe that it's been policy to put in  new and replacement structures  with sufficient clearance for OHLE for some time now; a lot cheaper than doing it when they're in use.

 

Er, yes, except that the clearances allowed, until more recently, proved to be non-compliant, particularly at over-bridges (at least unless or until the UK decides to drop European High Voltage regulations).

[rockershovel]

3 hours ago, Mike Storey said:

 

Er, yes, except that the clearances allowed, until more recently, proved to be non-compliant, particularly at over-bridges (at least unless or until the UK decides to drop European High Voltage regulations).

 

Why would we care about European High Voltage Regulations? We don’t use the same loading gauge, and there are no through-running services, so why are OHLE dimensions relevant? 

[cheesysmith]

More likely to be that someone at DaFT has to sign off on the required regulations and wants to protect their backside if anybody gets killed. By making the standards greater, they can stand up in court and say they did everything they could, and avoid any chance of any blame heading their way.  After all, they don't have to pay for it, someone else does.

 

Cynical, moi?

[rockershovel]

3 hours ago, cheesysmith said:

More likely to be that someone at DaFT has to sign off on the required regulations and wants to protect their backside if anybody gets killed. By making the standards greater, they can stand up in court and say they did everything they could, and avoid any chance of any blame heading their way.  After all, they don't have to pay for it, someone else does.

 

Cynical, moi?

 

That’s probably the reason; there WOULD be a requirement to demonstrate that appropriate standards had been complied with, and there would be no reason to regard them as anything other than EU High Voltage Regulations (unless other requirements can be demonstrated to apply). It’s just one of the non-sequiturs which arise in any large organisation with isolated, historic sections, I don’t suppose anyone at DfT would see a value in pursuing the matter. 

 

Since there would be no reason to expect an ACTUAL European locomotive to run anywhere in U.K., it would be a safe policy to flag up the non-compliance and leave it at that. 

 

 

Edited March 4, 2020 by rockershovel

[Mike Storey]

5 hours ago, rockershovel said:

 

That’s probably the reason; there WOULD be a requirement to demonstrate that appropriate standards had been complied with, and there would be no reason to regard them as anything other than EU High Voltage Regulations (unless other requirements can be demonstrated to apply). It’s just one of the non-sequiturs which arise in any large organisation with isolated, historic sections, I don’t suppose anyone at DfT would see a value in pursuing the matter. 

 

Since there would be no reason to expect an ACTUAL European locomotive to run anywhere in U.K., it would be a safe policy to flag up the non-compliance and leave it at that. 

 

 

 

Well, you would think so, wouldn't you? But you have only to read the history of GWEP to see why it has not worked out that way.

 

The increased clearances are not for Euro gauge locos, by the way. They are as interpreted by UK safety authorities, and were not challenged by NR in time (although NR dispute that).

[62613]

1 hour ago, Mike Storey said:

 

Well, you would think so, wouldn't you? But you have only to read the history of GWEP to see why it has not worked out that way.

 

The increased clearances are not for Euro gauge locos, by the way. They are as interpreted by UK safety authorities, and were not challenged by NR in time (although NR dispute that).

Or anyone else, for that matter.

 

[The Stationmaster]

10 hours ago, cheesysmith said:

More likely to be that someone at DaFT has to sign off on the required regulations and wants to protect their backside if anybody gets killed. By making the standards greater, they can stand up in court and say they did everything they could, and avoid any chance of any blame heading their way.  After all, they don't have to pay for it, someone else does.

 

Cynical, moi?

Actually it seems that the problem is that 'somebody' at DafT didn't query the draft European standard when it was issued nor did they bother to seek an exemption for the UK.  Now the interesting thing is that speaking from the lineside there are an awful lot of 25kv contact/catenary wire clearances under overbridges on the GWML that don't look any different from long established BR clearance standards.  in fact there are various places where the track wasn't lowered and the bridge wasn't altered under brick arch bridges which date back to the broad gauge period or, of course, in one case where the drawings for the bridge were signed off by one I.K.Brunel plus there is wiring under at least two overbridges erected in the 60s/70s to then BR clearance standards which also have not been altered.

 

But the the Western (allegedly) always went its own way .

[rockershovel]

1 hour ago, The Stationmaster said:

Actually it seems that the problem is that 'somebody' at DafT didn't query the draft European standard when it was issued nor did they bother to seek an exemption for the UK.  Now the interesting thing is that speaking from the lineside there are an awful lot of 25kv contact/catenary wire clearances under overbridges on the GWML that don't look any different from long established BR clearance standards.  in fact there are various places where the track wasn't lowered and the bridge wasn't altered under brick arch bridges which date back to the broad gauge period or, of course, in one case where the drawings for the bridge were signed off by one I.K.Brunel plus there is wiring under at least two overbridges erected in the 60s/70s to then BR clearance standards which also have not been altered.

 

But the the Western (allegedly) always went its own way .

 

... all of which, was pretty much my point. It’s a common cycle in organisations like railway networks;

 

- the historic clearances, on existing structures, already exist and are known to work

- a new standard appears

- non-conformance is flagged up

- it is difficult and time-consuming to contest the new standard, there is no necessary expectation of succeeding in the challenge and no obvious benefit accrues from doing so

- engineering study demonstrates that the existing clearances work in local conditions

- engineering study is used to demonstrate that no quantifiable risk exists from non-compliance with new standard

- operation continues as before on that basis, the engineering study mitigates the notional risk

[Mike Storey]

2 hours ago, rockershovel said:

 

... all of which, was pretty much my point. It’s a common cycle in organisations like railway networks;

 

- the historic clearances, on existing structures, already exist and are known to work

- a new standard appears

- non-conformance is flagged up

- it is difficult and time-consuming to contest the new standard, there is no necessary expectation of succeeding in the challenge and no obvious benefit accrues from doing so

- engineering study demonstrates that the existing clearances work in local conditions

- engineering study is used to demonstrate that no quantifiable risk exists from non-compliance with new standard

- operation continues as before on that basis, the engineering study mitigates the notional risk

 

But my point is that such Quantified Risk Assessments do not work in the case of this (and a few other) "new" regulations. 

 

The primary issue is not clearance per se (although that has been tightened), but the ability of a member of the public to access the overhead line. That has led to multiple parapet raisings and anti-climb works on many of the GW bridges and some tunnels. In a few cases, demolition and re-building has been needed, unnecessarily in the opinion of some - it remains an arguable point whether these were needed under the old regulations anyway.

 

The biggest issue though, was the new standard applicable to platforms (or other areas where the public would be adjacent to the lineside). It meant that you could not adopt the very unlikely scenario of a chap pointing his golfing umbrella, selfie-stick, or similar metallic object (even metallic balloons were mentioned!), up towards the OLE to within a certain distance, no matter how many QRA's were undertaken, because DfT (or NR) did not seek the ability to do so when the regulations were being adopted. You have to abide by them..

[iands]

Acknowledging all the valid comments above, there is another explanation for the increase of the OLE contact wire height (above rail level) and the EU regulations/standards being adopted (which may or may not have been challenged by NR or others?), is one concerning "safety of personnel" (any staff, e.g. OLE, S&T, P-way, etc.) carrying out their duties on an OLE electrified line.

 

As explained to me recently by one of our very experienced OLE engineers (who also happens to be very much involved with the Werrington Dive-under project),  that one reason (I stress one, there may be additional reasons) for the height of the contact wire being raised, is that staff working (or walking), say in the 4ft of the Down Line, would raise one arm above their head to acknowledge a warning from a train approaching on the Up Line.

 

For general risk assessments for such scenarios (and I have been involved with similar issues concerning positioning of SPTs in the Thames Tunnel on the ELL, but I digress), a 90th percentile male with an arm raised above the head demonstrates* that the hand would "infringe" the recognised safe-distance from the live overhead contact wire. To maintain the safe-distance in such scenarios, the "standards" were changed to increase the contact wire height above the rail. 

 

*I haven't been party to the "calculations", so I accept this explanation is "valid". 

 

As I have said, I'm not implying this is the main, or only, reason the height of the contact wire was raised, but having worked in the industry for 46+ years (and a significant amount of time "on the line") I can see the logic behind the thinking. However (and this is a personal observation), in many cases of acknowledging what seem to be (on the surface) reasonable health and safety mitigations to keep staff as safe as possible when on or about the line, the practicalities and cost of implementing such mitigations is often either ignored or at best, grossly underestimated.

 

Apologies if I have perpetuated the "off topic" discussion on what is otherwise a most excellent and informative topic. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[rockershovel]

I suppose that’s one of the benefits of working in the offshore sector... dealing with the potential imbecilities of the general Public, and the vultures who seek to profit by representing them in hypothetical scenarios, isn’t something you need to worry about very much. 

 

I’ve seen some internal correspondence about OHLE heights. I’m quite happy to treat it as an SEP*

 

 

 

* these are very important in any field engineering environment. They are Somebody Else’s Problems, and the main thing is to spot them as far away as possible, and ensure that whoever’s desk they nest on, isn’t yours  

 

 

Edited March 4, 2020 by rockershovel

[caradoc]

2 hours ago, iands said:

Acknowledging all the valid comments above, there is another explanation for the increase of the OLE contact wire height (above rail level) and the EU regulations/standards being adopted (which may or may not have been challenged by NR or others?), is one concerning "safety of personnel" (any staff, e.g. OLE, S&T, P-way, etc.) carrying out their duties on an OLE electrified line.

 

As explained to me recently by one of our very experienced OLE engineers (who also happens to be very much involved with the Werrington Dive-under project),  that one reason (I stress one, there may be additional reasons) for the height of the contact wire being raised, is that staff working (or walking), say in the 4ft of the Down Line, would raise one arm above their head to acknowledge a warning from a train approaching on the Up Line.

 

For general risk assessments for such scenarios (and I have been involved with similar issues concerning positioning of SPTs in the Thames Tunnel on the ELL, but I digress), a 90th percentile male with an arm raised above the head demonstrates* that the hand would "infringe" the recognised safe-distance from the live overhead contact wire. To maintain the safe-distance in such scenarios, the "standards" were changed to increase the contact wire height above the rail. 

 

*I haven't been party to the "calculations", so I accept this explanation is "valid".

 

Interesting iands, but I wonder if the question was asked: Has anyone ever actually received an electric shock in such circumstances ?

 

[Mike Storey]

Just now, caradoc said:

 

Interesting iands, but I wonder if the question was asked: Has anyone ever actually received an electric shock in such circumstances ?

 

 

Ah, now you are back into Quantified Risk Assessment, which is not how the new Regulations are defined (because no-one, who had the power to do so, challenged them at the time). There is a minimum distance, and that is it.

 

I guess one (perhaps the only) good thing that can come out of Brexit, is that QRA can become the test under which such regulations are applied, once again.

[rockershovel]

I think that Brexit will result in quite a lot of people in Westminster, receiving unwanted (and probably unwelcome) lessons in the Law of Unintended Consequences! 

[melmerby]

38 minutes ago, rockershovel said:

I think that Brexit will result in quite a lot of people in Westminster, receiving unwanted (and probably unwelcome) lessons in the Law of Unintended Consequences! 

Or as a military man would say "Collateral Damage"!