East Coast Mainline Blockade for Werrington Junction diveunder

[rockershovel]

52 minutes ago, melmerby said:

Or as a military man would say "Collateral Damage"!

 

.... not necessarily. Most, although not all, collateral damage is foreseen, if not necessarily averted. 

[iands]

13 hours ago, caradoc said:

 

Interesting iands, but I wonder if the question was asked: Has anyone ever actually received an electric shock in such circumstances ?

 

Hi Caradoc, 

Good point. Not to my knowledge, but in the risk-averse times we now live in, to wait until someone gets electrocuted in such circumstances before you do anything, especially when you are aware of the potential risk, I think would be seen by the legal system as a very serious dereliction of duties. 

[iands]

13 hours ago, Mike Storey said:

...... There is a minimum distance, and that is it.

 

Except Mike, when we were receiving "electrification training" prior to the ECML going live there were, from memory, at least three different "minimum distances", depending on who you are and what task you are doing! 

[Titan]

Most of the clearances concerned were not so much for safety, but service reliability. Below certain clearances the risk of a flashover increases.  Normally it is of slight inconvenience, the breakers need to be reset and off you go again.  However reduced clearances require more maintenance - more frequent checks for flashover damage, and in bad cases regular replacement of the wires.  A lot of engineers did not read the new regulations properly, and misinterpreted them, resulting in a perceived requirement for increased clearances.  The reality was that things were much the same, the only significant difference being that the 'reduced' and 'special reduced' clearances were no longer allowed. However these clearances were rarely used, as the 'Normal' minimum static clearance to earth of 270mm usually sufficed.

 

The big cock up was on clearance to platforms, which was for safety reasons.  This was made a statutory requirement.  No problem on the continent with their taller trains and lower platforms, but in the UK any station that had a bridge nearby would be non-compliant. And as many stations have footbridges even if there is no other bridge nearby, that was an awful lot of non-compliant stations...

 

The policy at the moment is that all 'new build' must comply with the statutory regulations, I suppose since it is statutory they don't have much choice - but 'modification to existing' does not have to. It requires a lot of work to raise wire heights, as the grading or slope of the wire has to be shallow for high speed running. This means that even a modest height increase will require modification to hundreds of meters of OLE, which might include new structures if the existing is not tall enough. I hope we never get to the point of lawyers arguing the dividing line between 'new build' and 'modification'...

Edited March 5, 2020 by Titan

[Mike Storey]

25 minutes ago, iands said:

Except Mike, when we were receiving "electrification training" prior to the ECML going live there were, from memory, at least three different "minimum distances", depending on who you are and what task you are doing! 

 

Indeed Ian, but two things there:

 

1. The safe working distance clearances for staff have little to do with structural clearances for the safety of the public, and were anyway modified several times following the ECML electrification, the most recent guidance having been issued in 2013 (unless there has been one more recently?).

 

2. Structural clearances were re-defined, following re-issue of EU regs (ENE TSI, incorporated into GL/RT1210) in 2015 to become a standard 2.7 metres, whereas previously 2 m and even 1.5 m had been allowed, in certain circumstances. For platform edge to OLE, and to un-insulated pantographs on trains, it became 3.5 metres!! There is a process for applying for derogations from these minima, but the process required to be used (CSM RA) is so complex, being dependent on literally hundreds of measurements at just one location, and thus very expensive and time consuming, that it is meaningless, other than for very major one-offs. The classic example of a decision taken to avoid the cost and delay of applying for derogations was the six month delay to commissioning of the EGIP electrification, where it proved faster and cheaper to modify all the previous designs to become compliant, but still at an overrun of £32m.

 

Incidentally, the area of disagreement about whether NR, or DaFT, or another, failed to apply for a blanket derogation for the railways (the Regulations applied to all high voltage works across all industries), concerns Appendix G. NR believed they had done all they needed to, to suit the BR gauge, but then Appendix G was excluded in the final document by the British Standards Committee (unconnected with the railway industry but who were in charge of the process), despite reference to it elsewhere, when finally issued. Some suspect the RSSB did not do their stuff,  but nobody comes out well.

 

 

[caradoc]

8 hours ago, iands said:

Hi Caradoc, 

Good point. Not to my knowledge, but in the risk-averse times we now live in, to wait until someone gets electrocuted in such circumstances before you do anything, especially when you are aware of the potential risk, I think would be seen by the legal system as a very serious dereliction of duties. 

 

I would agree 100%.......if 25kV OLE was an entirely new system with therefore unknown risks ! However, in the what, 60 years since this system was first installed in the UK, if there has not been a single incident of a member of staff receiving an electric shock when standing in the four foot, I would argue the risk is non-existent.

 

On the other hand, members of the public are slightly closer to the OLE when on a station platform, and as mentioned the OLE may be lower than normal if there is an overbridge, so I do see the argument for increased clearances there, although again, the risk is surely tiny; Have there actually been many, or any, incidents of members of the public receiving a shock in such circumstances ? There have of course been many occasions when members of the public have received a shock, or been electrocuted, and sadly a few involving staff too, but this has usually been due to human error and/or misadventure.

 

[melmerby]

9 hours ago, Titan said:

 

The big cock up was on clearance to platforms, which was for safety reasons.  This was made a statutory requirement.  No problem on the continent with their taller trains and lower platforms, but in the UK any station that had a bridge nearby would be non-compliant. And as many stations have footbridges even if there is no other bridge nearby, that was an awful lot of non-compliant stations...

 

Even Bromsgrove which was a new station build on a different site had to raise the footbridge to meet the new regs, even though it had already been approved at it's original height.

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-hereford-worcester-33562835

[Titan]

5 hours ago, caradoc said:

 

On the other hand, members of the public are slightly closer to the OLE when on a station platform, and as mentioned the OLE may be lower than normal if there is an overbridge, so I do see the argument for increased clearances there, although again, the risk is surely tiny; Have there actually been many, or any, incidents of members of the public receiving a shock in such circumstances ? There have of course been many occasions when members of the public have received a shock, or been electrocuted, and sadly a few involving staff too, but this has usually been due to human error and/or misadventure.

 

 

I do sometimes wonder how on earth we have avoided killing someone. At York, the wiring there is at minimum height due to the footbridge, at about 4.2m above rail level, or about 3.3 meters above the platform. If you are 6ft tall and raise your hand, your fingertips will be around 4ft from live 25kv, as the live supports come up to above the platform edge.

 

The worry is that with selfie sticks, foil balloons etc.  the risk has increased, not to mention the higher number of passengers carried these days and therefore the greater numbers exposed to that risk, but with no statistically significant data to work with nobody knows what the likelihood actually was, or by how much it has increased, and no one wants to find out the hard way either!

[cheesysmith]

I do love this about the new regulations. 3.5m from the platform to the live part of a pantograph? Has no one who wrote these measured a UK train? On one had the regs want level access from train to platform, meaning higher platforms, but want bigger gaps between platform and pantograph. And then you have the situation of the 3rd rail, which for different reasons is now a no no.

 

Sometimes I don't think the people who write some of these live in the same world as the rest of us.

[Donington Road]

Update for Friday 6th 2020

Work going on at the old Hurn Road bridge and the Lincoln Road bridge.

 

Digging out around the recently installed piles under the A15 dual carraigeway bridge.

 

 

1st sheet pile at the foot of the embankment to Lincoln Road bridge.

 

Digging out between the abutments to Lincoln Road bridge.

 

 

 

 

View from Hurn Road today of access to the wide-way.

[not shown, but the dumpers are using the underbridge to take spoil away]

 

[The Stationmaster]

On 06/03/2020 at 10:40, cheesysmith said:

I do love this about the new regulations. 3.5m from the platform to the live part of a pantograph? Has no one who wrote these measured a UK train? On one had the regs want level access from train to platform, meaning higher platforms, but want bigger gaps between platform and pantograph. And then you have the situation of the 3rd rail, which for different reasons is now a no no.

 

Sometimes I don't think the people who write some of these live in the same world as the rest of us.

It's just that the people who wrote it happen  to live in a different part of the world - mainland Europe where even the latest station platforms are a bit lower than here, and the trains are a lot higher.  So written to match UIC standards and not done with a UK approach to risk assessment.

[Richard E]

Thank you for this. Hurn Road footbridge vibrates well when a train goes under ...

 

It seems Lincoln Road will be the main spot to observe changes for now.

[Mike Storey]

On 06/03/2020 at 11:40, cheesysmith said:

I do love this about the new regulations. 3.5m from the platform to the live part of a pantograph? Has no one who wrote these measured a UK train? On one had the regs want level access from train to platform, meaning higher platforms, but want bigger gaps between platform and pantograph. And then you have the situation of the 3rd rail, which for different reasons is now a no no.

 

Sometimes I don't think the people who write some of these live in the same world as the rest of us.

 

To an un-insulated pantograph, otherwise to the nearest, uninsulated live OLE cable. Apparently, reassurance was given that all new trains would have insulated pantos to their outermost wings. I am not sure it has worked out that way.

 

[melmerby]

32 minutes ago, Mike Storey said:

 

To an un-insulated pantograph, otherwise to the nearest, uninsulated live OLE cable. Apparently, reassurance was given that all new trains would have insulated pantos to their outermost wings. I am not sure it has worked out that way.

 

I.E. top of the train where the HV cables run along, some 3.0 m away.

 

[rockershovel]

Speaking of electric locos, these arrived today..

 

[DY444]

On 05/03/2020 at 18:22, caradoc said:

 

I would agree 100%.......if 25kV OLE was an entirely new system with therefore unknown risks ! However, in the what, 60 years since this system was first installed in the UK, if there has not been a single incident of a member of staff receiving an electric shock when standing in the four foot, I would argue the risk is non-existent.

 

On the other hand, members of the public are slightly closer to the OLE when on a station platform, and as mentioned the OLE may be lower than normal if there is an overbridge, so I do see the argument for increased clearances there, although again, the risk is surely tiny; Have there actually been many, or any, incidents of members of the public receiving a shock in such circumstances ? There have of course been many occasions when members of the public have received a shock, or been electrocuted, and sadly a few involving staff too, but this has usually been due to human error and/or misadventure.

 

 

On 05/03/2020 at 23:49, Titan said:

 

I do sometimes wonder how on earth we have avoided killing someone. At York, the wiring there is at minimum height due to the footbridge, at about 4.2m above rail level, or about 3.3 meters above the platform. If you are 6ft tall and raise your hand, your fingertips will be around 4ft from live 25kv, as the live supports come up to above the platform edge.

 

The worry is that with selfie sticks, foil balloons etc.  the risk has increased, not to mention the higher number of passengers carried these days and therefore the greater numbers exposed to that risk, but with no statistically significant data to work with nobody knows what the likelihood actually was, or by how much it has increased, and no one wants to find out the hard way either!

 

What I struggle with is that in the late 1960s, on wet mornings, every station from Bletchley to Watford Junction and Clacton to Ingatestone would be crowded with people holding large umbrellas in the air, those near the platform edge not being too far from the 25KV.  There were no flashovers and I don't see that was a lesser risk than selfie sticks. 

 

What I do see is an over zealous standards setting regime with no understanding of the R in ALARP and seemingly no accountability for the additional cost it imposes on the industry.  What makes it worse for me is that there is no prospect at all of the vast route mileage electrified under the old standard being changed.  That together with the absence of incidents on those pre-existing routes renders the whole thing very questionable.  I would like to think that freedom from EU rules will result in a re-think but as common sense does not seem to feature in railway decision making any more I'm not hopeful.

[Mark Saunders]

Why does there seem to be an automatic assumption with many in the UK that any rule that comes from the EU is bad or wrong!

 

The there are those that say that ALARP is not good enough either.

 

[rockershovel]

It’s probably because so many people are unable to differentiate between the original Regulations and Directives, and the manner in which they are implemented in the U.K; and other issues which are undoubtedly related, but not directly derived from the EU at all. 

 

It’s also unfortunately true that the British press do a fairly comprehensive job of “knocking” various EU figures, especially Messrs Juncker and Barnier; but having seen them on European tv, and speaking enough French to understand them, I can’t really envisage how it could be otherwise. 

 

A sizeable section of the British electorate have been brought to the conclusion that, whatever the solution to the problems in their daily lives might be, it won’t come from Brussels. The exact details don’t really matter, in that sort of thinking. 

 

Unfortunately, I don’t see this changing much. Looking at EU relations with, and attitudes toward Switzerland in particular, I’m afraid that our relations with them will continue to be fractious and contentious for a long time to come. They will continue to stalk the stage, flourishing their opera capes, for a long while yet; Boris Johnson, or whoever holds the office, will continue to strike poses of astonished incredulity while the audience cry “it’s behind you!” 

 

 

[rockershovel]

The great problem with ALARP is that it seeks to avoid the problem of “proving a negative”, by requiring a subjective assessment and decision, which SOMEONE has to put their signature to. In our present climate of risk aversion and breakdown of support within companies, the chance that SOMEONE will respond to any actual adverse occurrence by criticism of the ALARP undertaken, is pretty much 100%, with obvious consequences. 

[Mike Storey]

I am a little out of date with the progress of risk assessment, but I do know this.

 

ALARP, as a calculated, mostly objective process, became a key feature of determining the outcomes of risk assessment, and of rules and regulations, in the 1980's onwards. The process by which ALARP was calculated/assessed became increasingly sophisticated. It had of course existed before that, but in a more rudimentary and subjective way.

 

However, the introduction of new, cross-industry regulations from c.2000 onwards, saw a trend towards absolute standards and regulations, for which derogations could still be sought (in other words, ALARP). But the process required to justify such derogations became increasingly scientific, requiring multiple measurements and calculations in support, rendering such applications, usually, uneconomic. So we are left with a situation where, if the base regulation is already too stringent, the ability to change is significantly problematic.

 

To reduce the costs of future railway electrification will require a change in the law, or at least in the regulations, by which the methodology to seek derogations can be much simplified. As Rockershovel has said, it would take a very brave person to sanction that, given the possibility of just one bad thing arising as a result.....

[The Stationmaster]

19 hours ago, rockershovel said:

The great problem with ALARP is that it seeks to avoid the problem of “proving a negative”, by requiring a subjective assessment and decision, which SOMEONE has to put their signature to. In our present climate of risk aversion and breakdown of support within companies, the chance that SOMEONE will respond to any actual adverse occurrence by criticism of the ALARP undertaken, is pretty much 100%, with obvious consequences. 

I don't think you are necessarily 'proving a negative' but what you are doing when assessing a risk at ALARP is accepting that there is a line between the practically possible (i.e. it being possible to actually do the job) and making the job impossible to carry out.  That is all there is to it in practical terms.  But obviously it goes wider if measured in other terms because it might be possible to do the job in a safer manner by spending a lot of money, or it might be possible to do it in a safer manner by closing down all sorts of things around the site of the actual work.

 

If you take these two latter elements into account you are really back to assessing the value of a life against the money it would cost to reduce the potential risk to that life.  And don't forget we are always looking at potential risk when carrying out a risk assessment - not just the obvious risks (which ALARP should usually remove or mitigate in any case).  In some cases the 'closing down things around it' is the only way to make a job ALARP and anybody who has ever got near power generation industry safety procedures would be aware of that because of the way they use restriction (normally by padlocking equipment) to reduce potential risk to what they consider ALARP.

 

And that illustrates another feature because even quantifiable risk assessment will treat ALARP in a way which sits within the safety arrangements of a particular industry or concern.  For instance the use of padlocks to ensure personnel safety on a power generation site can be completely at odds with the normal railway industry process of also using padlocks to ensure operational safety in different situations apart from ensuring personnel safety.  At one site we solved that conundrum in the end but it took a lot of discussion to reach a workable conclusion which satisfied everyone involved,. Until we told NR what had been agreed and then I had to take their rep through it all to secure his agreement which I then drafted into an Instruction for his signal box.   The next thing to happen was that the signal box was closed and control was transferred to another where one of the Signalmen(lers) promptly took exception to the agreed arrangement because the standard NR form didn't cater for it (of course it wouldn't - because it looked at safety from a railway operational safety angle and not power industry personnel safety).  So again this illustrates how ALARP can be, and sometimes has to be, a compromise.

[Zomboid]

I've heard it said that some people mistake the P in ALARP as being "possible", rather than "practicable", which can be quite a significant difference. I think some also forget that the R is for "Reasonably".

[rockershovel]

35 minutes ago, Zomboid said:

I've heard it said that some people mistake the P in ALARP as being "possible", rather than "practicable", which can be quite a significant difference. I think some also forget that the R is for "Reasonably".

 

Safety people sometimes tend to take the same view as HR - that their role is to safeguard the company or organisation from any conceivable outcome. Like HR, they also frequently lack practical experience of the actual function of the organisation. 

 

Really, it’s a fault of our legal structure. We need some sort of procedure by which cases are assessed prior to being taken to court, with a clearly understood assumption that at least 75% of them will fail the burden of proof and not proceed. I’m not entirely unknown for observing that European companies tend to be notably slack in this respect (my last, Dutch, employers appeared to regard any sort of certification of lifting gear as a sort of optional extra, for example, and would gaze owlishly at eccentricities such as Lifting Plans) but this is WHY they do behave in this manner. 

 

That, and their rather different employment practices, which mean that they have far more confidence in their operational management and trades training 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[Mike Storey]

8 hours ago, The Stationmaster said:

I don't think you are necessarily 'proving a negative' but what you are doing when assessing a risk at ALARP is accepting that there is a line between the practically possible (i.e. it being possible to actually do the job) and making the job impossible to carry out.  That is all there is to it in practical terms.  But obviously it goes wider if measured in other terms because it might be possible to do the job in a safer manner by spending a lot of money, or it might be possible to do it in a safer manner by closing down all sorts of things around the site of the actual work.

 

If you take these two latter elements into account you are really back to assessing the value of a life against the money it would cost to reduce the potential risk to that life.  And don't forget we are always looking at potential risk when carrying out a risk assessment - not just the obvious risks (which ALARP should usually remove or mitigate in any case).  In some cases the 'closing down things around it' is the only way to make a job ALARP and anybody who has ever got near power generation industry safety procedures would be aware of that because of the way they use restriction (normally by padlocking equipment) to reduce potential risk to what they consider ALARP.

 

And that illustrates another feature because even quantifiable risk assessment will treat ALARP in a way which sits within the safety arrangements of a particular industry or concern.  For instance the use of padlocks to ensure personnel safety on a power generation site can be completely at odds with the normal railway industry process of also using padlocks to ensure operational safety in different situations apart from ensuring personnel safety.  At one site we solved that conundrum in the end but it took a lot of discussion to reach a workable conclusion which satisfied everyone involved,. Until we told NR what had been agreed and then I had to take their rep through it all to secure his agreement which I then drafted into an Instruction for his signal box.   The next thing to happen was that the signal box was closed and control was transferred to another where one of the Signalmen(lers) promptly took exception to the agreed arrangement because the standard NR form didn't cater for it (of course it wouldn't - because it looked at safety from a railway operational safety angle and not power industry personnel safety).  So again this illustrates how ALARP can be, and sometimes has to be, a compromise.

 

Indeed - the ALARP cost was £1 million per life saved, for years, until raised arbitrarily to £2 million in the early 2000's. Goodness knows what it is now, if indeed, it does exist as other than an actuarial figure.

 

The problem is that there is no incentive or even compulsion, to explore anymore the gamble between actual expenditure and potential of lives saved in 10, 50, 100 or 1,000 years. It all seems to come down to 1 life saved, in any amount of time. Frankly, that's cobblers, but try arguing that with a judge.

 

The law has to change back to something like it used to be.

 

[Richard E]

I've been out today, not a lot of change but here goes:

 

There is a fair size spoil heap building up in the workway for the dive under.

 

 

And plenty of rebar formers for the piles too.

 

 

And the trackbed preparation work is moving forward quite well too.

 

 

 

Although they still have to deal with the brook at one point.

 

 

If you've been cutting flexi track and have some short oddments left over then just stack them in a worksite or alongside the trackbed to await disposal. Don't worry if you've got some short lengths on the bottom either.

 

 

Over on Hurn Road they have dug out a hole alongside the piles that were cast under the A15.

 

 

The digger driver was being quite cautious with the boom.

 

 

And they are now digging out all the gravel they put in when digging out the bridge abutment on Lincoln Road which seems to have been well exposed now.

 

 

Edited March 10, 2020 by Richard E