Italy train crash: 'Ten killed' near Bari

[phil-b259]

Looks nasty - and eerily similar to the recent German one.

 

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-36774059

[phil-b259]

The only resemblance so far is the fact they'd collided on a (slightly) curved single track with vegetation either side.

 

And the fact that quite clearly both trains should not have been there at the same time!

 

Why - we will not know for some time but as with the German case, its pretty obvious something went seriously wrong for the event to occur.

 

As you say however speculation as to what that might be is unwarranted and the immediate reaction should be sadness that lives have been lost.

[Neil]

I'm afraid my Dutch is nowhere near as good as your English DM.

 

On checking the BBC website there's an update which tells of the focus on the signalling system (or lack of) and the operating practises.

[Tim H]

News reports seem to imply single-line working is along the lines of the old "Telegraph and Train Order" system long abandoned in Britain in favour of single-line tokens.

 

Is their system of operation really that primitive, or is it closer to tokenless block? 

[dullsteamer]

News reports seem to imply single-line working is along the lines of the old "Telegraph and Train Order" system long abandoned in Britain in favour of single-line tokens. Is their system of operation really that primitive, or is it closer to tokenless block?

The system of "safeworking" used on that line is "blocco telefonico" - telephone block working.

 

Cheers,

 

Mark.

[meil]

The system of "safeworking" used on that line is "blocco telefonico" - telephone block working.

Cheers,

Mark.

Incredible 19th century methods in the 21st century.

 

Remind me not to travel on single lines in Europe.

[Reorte]

Incredible 19th century methods in the 21st century.

 

Remind me not to travel on single lines in Europe.

Give me 19th century in plenty of things over 21st century. Although certainly not in this case (sounds like systems they were keen to find something better than when they were using them then!)

[St. Simon]

Incredible 19th century methods in the 21st century.

 

Remind me not to travel on single lines in Europe.

 

Hi,

 

You could say that, but actually the system is safe, as long as it is operated with the correct procedure and to the rulebook, unfortunately in this case, this may not of happened. We see it as an old and 'broken' system, but that isn't necessarily the case.

 

Remember, lots of Network Rail lines are still controlled by 19th Century Technology, and some rely on the correct communication and working of human signallers not too dissimilar to a Telephone block system (we use Bell codes, they use Telephones).

 

Simon

[meil]

Hi,

 

You could say that, but actually the system is safe, as long as it is operated with the correct procedure and to the rulebook, unfortunately in this case, this may not of happened. We see it as an old and 'broken' system, but that isn't necessarily the case.

 

Remember, lots of Network Rail lines are still controlled by 19th Century Technology, and some rely on the correct communication and working of human signallers not too dissimilar to a Telephone block system (we use Bell codes, they use Telephones).

 

Simon

Big difference - when you have a token, that locks the block to other trains. This is not about the form of communication.

[Reorte]

Hi,

 

You could say that, but actually the system is safe, as long as it is operated with the correct procedure and to the rulebook, unfortunately in this case, this may not of happened. We see it as an old and 'broken' system, but that isn't necessarily the case.

 

Remember, lots of Network Rail lines are still controlled by 19th Century Technology, and some rely on the correct communication and working of human signallers not too dissimilar to a Telephone block system (we use Bell codes, they use Telephones).

What happens on our systems if you don't follow the correct procedure and rulebook, even the bits operated with the oldest technology? I appreciate that nothing is completely bombproof but the most likely outcome is hopefully trains not going anywhere rather than in to each other.

[eastwestdivide]

Article from Il Sole 24 Ore (the Italian equivalent of the Financial Times) here:

http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/notizie/2016-07-13/il-ministro-delrio-riferisce-camera-disastro-ferroviario-puglia-124800.shtml?uuid=ADiZJFs&refresh_ce=1

in which the transport minister says the "telephone block" system in use there is a higher risk because it relies entirely on the human factor

...un sistema come quello del controllo telefonico che lascia interamente all’uomo la possibilità di intervento è oggi considerato maggiormente a rischio...

My fairly literal translation: "...a system like telephone control which leaves the possibility of intervention entirely to the person is now considered to be high risk..."

 

I don't know enough about the systems and procedures involved in Italy to be able to make any sensible comment on the specifics, other than to say if humans are recognised to be fallible, you might need a system to stop stupid mistakes.

 

That article also says that the telephone system has been in use on that stretch of line for 60 years, and the service frequency has been unchanged for about 10 years, during which there have been no incidents:

Nella tratta in esame «è in uso da oltre 60 anni. L’attuale frequenza dei convogli è inalterata da circa 10 anni durante i quali non si sono verificati» incidenti.

[Coryton]

What happens on our systems if you don't follow the correct procedure and rulebook, even the bits operated with the oldest technology? I appreciate that nothing is completely bombproof but the most likely outcome is hopefully trains not going anywhere rather than in to each other.

 

Well if you don't follow the "don't enter the single section without the correct token" procedure bad things can happen.

[Reorte]

Well if you don't follow the "don't enter the single section without the correct token" procedure bad things can happen.

I thought (and please excuse, or better still, correct, my ignorance if I'm completely wrong) that you'd also need to pass a signal to enter the single line section, and that couldn't be cleared if the token was in the wrong place, and couldn't be passed (by much) if you did try because of AWS at the least.

[Titan]

Was Cowden in 1994 the last single line head on crash in the UK? That one was due to a train passing a red signal.

[meil]

I thought (and please excuse, or better still, correct, my ignorance if I'm completely wrong) that you'd also need to pass a signal to enter the single line section, and that couldn't be cleared if the token was in the wrong place, and couldn't be passed (by much) if you did try because of AWS at the least.

The mechanical token system does not allow the section signal to be clear unless a token is obtained.

 

For a head on to happen not only has the train to pass a signal at danger but also not be in possession of a token.

[rue_d_etropal]

The reports yesterday just said that 'one train should not have been there' . It does seem odd that in the 21st century a simple and cheap system could not be introduced. With GPS and mobile phones it would not be that difficult to in effect create an electronic token. Simple interface on control board of train, requiring key card(ie token), which can only be programmed to allow one train on that track. If you can control a car using a playstation then this should be simple, safe and cheap.

One other thing in the report was that it stated the line was operated by a private company, I suppose that was to stop people blaming the government.

[Kenton]

 

With GPS and mobile phones it would not be that difficult to in effect create an electronic token. Simple interface on control board of train, requiring key card(ie token), which can only be programmed to allow one train on that track. If you can control a car using a playstation then this should be simple, safe and cheap.

 

Probably too easy to hack.

 

I would have thought the easiest system is one of direct 2-way communication between drivers. Self-preservation is one of the best safety locks. The drivers must know it is single track and where they are on the route. Two drivers about to head down a single tract in opposite directions would contact each other to find out who is going down the line first. Starting with the position that if not specifically told it is safe by the oncoming driver that there is one coming their way. Too simple, yes. Foolproof? No. But basic and better than what seems to be reported to have been in place here.

 

I do not understand the "too costly" to implement argument. The trains look comparatively modern and were by all reports quite fast. Just poor decision making on allocation of resources.

 

I hope that any investigation does go further than blaming one individual and look more into the reasons as to why it was able to happen.

[phil-b259]

The reports yesterday just said that 'one train should not have been there' . It does seem odd that in the 21st century a simple and cheap system could not be introduced. With GPS and mobile phones it would not be that difficult to in effect create an electronic token. Simple interface on control board of train, requiring key card(ie token), which can only be programmed to allow one train on that track. If you can control a car using a playstation then this should be simple, safe and cheap.

Which is sort of what RETB was - a virtual token transmitted by radio between trains. While the kit was quite expensive to install, these days it would be very easy to come up with something similar at a fraction of the cost.

 

Also human voice communication is one of the worst ways of communicating safety critical information - it's one of the big advantages of bell codes - the phrases are predefined and thus cannot be corrupted by persons 'add lobbing'*

 

 

* you try and read from a script to an audience without putting your own spin on it - it's not as easy as you think.

[phil-b259]

Was Cowden in 1994 the last single line head on crash in the UK? That one was due to a train passing a red signal.

I believe so - and the circumstances which allowed the train which SPADed have been addressed by TPWS.

 

As with the German incident earlier this year I am staggered that some railway systems in Western Europe are still using,or have procedures in place, that the UK has got rid precisely because of the potentially fatal consiquences if something goes wrong with them.

[burgundy]

That article also says that the telephone system has been in use on that stretch of line for 60 years, and the service frequency has been unchanged for about 10 years, during which there have been no incidents:

I presume that this means reported incidents. 

It would be interesting to know how many "oh sh1t" moments there have been (or the Italian equivalent), which have never been reported. I believe that there is a rule of thumb that for every accident, there are 10 near misses, and for every near miss, there are ten incidents which could have developed into something more serious. 

Best wishes 

Eric 

[phil-b259]

Every system in use is safe, if everyone follows the rules.

Which is why any good railway system has backup systems. While yes, there is the 'Swiss Chease' example where if all the holes line up something can slip through, it also stands to reason the more layers you have, the less likely it is to occur in the first place.

 

As such a single line token (be it virtual or physical) or full track circuiting (or something similar to prove the section clear or occupied) plus having the appropriate enterance signals interlocked with the previous items and either trap points or some way of stopping a train that has SPADed are the basics for a safe single line railway in this day and age.

[Fat Controller]

The reports yesterday just said that 'one train should not have been there' . It does seem odd that in the 21st century a simple and cheap system could not be introduced. With GPS and mobile phones it would not be that difficult to in effect create an electronic token. Simple interface on control board of train, requiring key card(ie token), which can only be programmed to allow one train on that track. If you can control a car using a playstation then this should be simple, safe and cheap.

One other thing in the report was that it stated the line was operated by a private company, I suppose that was to stop people blaming the government.

The 'cheap and dirty' solution is initially very tempting; however, you have to make sure (as with any safety-critical system) that it cannot be hacked into. A system based around GSM-R should be secure.

The railway may not be part of FS (or whatever the infrastructure part is now called), but this doesn't mean it's a private company. Many such railways around Italy are in fact owned by Regional and Local authorities, who either operate them directly, or offer an operating concession to a suitable operator (which might be FS)

[eastwestdivide]

I presume that this means reported incidents. 

It would be interesting to know how many "oh sh1t" moments there have been (or the Italian equivalent), which have never been reported. I believe that there is a rule of thumb that for every accident, there are 10 near misses, and for every near miss, there are ten incidents which could have developed into something more serious. 

Best wishes 

Eric

 

Well the Italian verb is a bit of a false friend. It says "non si sono verificati incidenti", and verificarsi (the reflexive verb used) means "to happen/occur/take place", rather than "verified" as you might expect. 

 

Your point still stands though, if no-one reports an "oops" moment, it's like a tree falling in a forest with no-one to hear it. Also depends what you mean by incident.

[Coryton]

I presume that this means reported incidents. 

It would be interesting to know how many "oh sh1t" moments there have been (or the Italian equivalent), which have never been reported. I believe that there is a rule of thumb that for every accident, there are 10 near misses, and for every near miss, there are ten incidents which could have developed into something more serious. 

Best wishes 

Eric 

 

I've read (may or not be true) that before TPWS it wasn't unheard of for drivers in RETB territory to forget to obtain the token before entering a section and to then get it 'on the fly.'

 

It presumably wouldn't be hard now - in principle - to install a GPS system that provided a warning when entering a section without the token. But presumably there's little point in updating RETB now rather than replacing with something more modern.

 

The mechanical token system does not allow the section signal to be clear unless a token is obtained.

 

For a head on to happen not only has the train to pass a signal at danger but also not be in possession of a token.

 

I must confess I wasn't aware that the token machines were interlocked with the signals, though it clearly makes sense.

 

So these days (and presumably not the for the Abermule accident) the token is not so much required in order to give the driver authority to enter the section, but to prove that the train has reached the other end of the section and the line is now clear so the signalling can allow another train in?

[phil-b259]

 

I must confess I wasn't aware that the token machines were interlocked with the signals, though it clearly makes sense.

 

So these days (and presumably not the for the Abermule accident) the token is not so much required in order to give the driver authority to enter the section, but to prove that the train has reached the other end of the section and the line is now clear so the signalling can allow another train in?

 

Spot on.