I'm a Yankee Mogul Dandy...

[Dave Hunt]

Moreover, it seems to be seen as acceptable to have a go at Midland locomotive practice. Would such outrageously ill-founded and prejudiced remarks be thought acceptable when commenting on the practices of Swindon or Doncaster?

I could write a book on this subject (and have actually discussed it in some detail in several books) but you are quite right. Most comments with the usual "dead hand of Derby" type nonsense ignore the fact Midland locomotives in Kirtley's, Johnson's and Deeley's days were well up with the best practice and the commonly bandied around Midland "small engine policy" didn't exist - what it actually had was a policy of trying to run trains on time whilst handicapped by problems with weak short span girder bridges that it took a long time and heavy expense to put right - even in the LMS era it was still being addressed and led to much double-heading as well as purchasing the Garrats etc. Not only are most of the usually made comments ill-founded and prejudiced but are perpetuated by people who have made no effort to look into them but merely repeat what others start. Many of the usual anti-Derby rants were started by people with their own agendas such as E. S. Cox (who, Adrian Tester has proved, actually once falsified Rugby test plant results in a paper to the ILocoE to support his own standpoint!). It has to be remembered as well that the aim of a railway company was to make a profit and in the years leading up to WW1, when the cold winds of economy were being felt in most boardrooms, the Midland's operating costs as a percentage of its revenue were better than those of its main rivals - in fact, the only company to better it was the L&SWR in, if I recall correctly, 1911. I haven't got my research material ready to hand at the moment but can easily check the figures if anyone so wishes. And there's the rub - checking primary source material and not just relying on secondary sources that are often in themselves just repeats of old myths.

 

Sorry to go on so long about this but it is something that annoys me intensely. I hope that I haven't ruffled too many feathers in my replies - the last thing I want to do is upset folk in what is, after all, a friendly site to do with enjoyment of a hobby.

 

Dave

[Corbs]

On the contrary, I am enjoying learning more about the subject and thank you for the information.

[jamie92208]

I could write a book on this subject (and have actually discussed it in some detail in several books) but you are quite right. Most comments with the usual "dead hand of Derby" type nonsense ignore the fact Midland locomotives in Kirtley's, Johnson's and Deeley's days were well up with the best practice and the commonly bandied around Midland "small engine policy" didn't exist - what it actually had was a policy of trying to run trains on time whilst handicapped by problems with weak short span girder bridges that it took a long time and heavy expense to put right - even in the LMS era it was still being addressed and led to much double-heading as well as purchasing the Garrats etc. Not only are most of the usually made comments ill-founded and prejudiced but are perpetuated by people who have made no effort to look into them but merely repeat what others start. Many of the usual anti-Derby rants were started by people with their own agendas such as E. S. Cox (who, Adrian Tester has proved, actually once falsified Rugby test plant results in a paper to the ILocoE to support his own standpoint!). It has to be remembered as well that the aim of a railway company was to make a profit and in the years leading up to WW1, when the cold winds of economy were being felt in most boardrooms, the Midland's operating costs as a percentage of its revenue were better than those of its main rivals - in fact, the only company to better it was the L&SWR in, if I recall correctly, 1911. I haven't got my research material ready to hand at the moment but can easily check the figures if anyone so wishes. And there's the rub - checking primary source material and not just relying on secondary sources that are often in themselves just repeats of old myths.

 

Sorry to go on so long about this but it is something that annoys me intensely. I hope that I haven't ruffled too many feathers in my replies - the last thing I want to do is upset folk in what is, after all, a friendly site to do with enjoyment of a hobby.

 

Dave

 

Another major factor was that Midland Locosheds were mainly roundhouses, so if locos got longer then the turntables would all have to have been rebuilt at the same tie as the aforementioned bridges.  That would have been a significant amount of capital expenditure.

 

Jamie

[Compound2632]

Another major factor was that Midland Locosheds were mainly roundhouses, so if locos got longer then the turntables would all have to have been rebuilt at the same tie as the aforementioned bridges.  That would have been a significant amount of capital expenditure.

 

Jamie

 

Kirtley's roundhouses set the standard with 42ft turntables that were well-matched to the 8'0"+8'6" 0-6-0s and 2-4-0s. These were too small for any of Johnson's 4-4-0s or 4-2-2s (or, indeed, the American moguls) so 50ft turntables were installed at most of the passenger sheds and more important stations by the late 1890s, along with places like Hawes Junction and Marple that saw a lot of light engine movements. Even these were too small for the bogie-tendered passenger engines of 1899-1903; 55ft or 60ft tables started to appear contemporaneously with these engines; by 1911, twenty-seven locations had a turntable that could turn any engine [Hawkins & Reeve, LMS Engine Sheds Vol. 2]. A 60ft table could turn any LMS 4-6-0, they might just squeeze onto a 55ft table?

 

So, the capital was there for turntables to accommodate the big engines being introduced at the turn of the century, just as it was to start strengthening the underbridges - £96,000 was approved in 1902 to strengthen 108 underbridges, including 24 on the Settle-Carlisle line, the Compounds' first stomping-ground [baughan, North of Leeds].

[Dave Hunt]

As an addition to the above, the first Compounds were sent to Leeds and Carlisle for working over the ‘long drag’, which at the time was the only road they could be employed on as their weight was appreciably greater than the ‘Belpaires’ at a notional 59 tons 10 cwt 1 qtr in working order with a maximum axle loading of 19 tons 6 cwt. That was over a ton more than that agreed with the Chief Engineer for the rest of the main line in 1897. The necessary bridge strengthening to accommodate 18½ tons axle loading was well under way and following the Board being appraised of the situation regarding the Compounds in February 1902, the Locomotive Committee minuted on 7^th March that it had:

 

‘Read the (Chief) Engineer’s report to the effect that in order to admit of the new type of engines being worked between London and Derby, Kettering and Nottingham, Derby and Bristol, Derby and Carlisle via Staveley and Chesterfield, Trent and Clay Cross and Ambergate and Manchester via Disley will involve the strengthening of 108 bridges under the line at an estimated cost of £96,000 in addition to ordinary bridge renewals and it is recommended that the work be carried out at once.’

 

The Board and the Locomotive Committee were both concerned that there may be other locomotives too heavy for some of the main line bridges but a joint report by Johnson, the General Manager, Mathieson, and the Chief Engineer, McDonald, confirmed that the only problem involved the Compounds south of Leeds. Johnson wrote to McDonald on 21^st March giving 2631’s particulars and pointing out that as it was a three-cylinder locomotive, the stress on bridges (i.e., the hammer blow) would be less than for a two-cylinder engine. McDonald replied that he was prepared to accept 19 tons 1 cwt 2 qtrs axle loading but the Compounds were still for the present limited to the Leeds – Carlisle line.  By 1903 they were permitted to run through from St. Pancras and in 1909 some of Deeley’s later engines were stationed at Trafford Park for working over Peak Forest from Manchester to Derby. It wasn’t until 1924, though, that Compounds were allowed on the west road from Birmingham to Bristol.

Edited December 23, 2018 by Dave Hunt

[DCB]

Moreover, it seems to be seen as acceptable to have a go at Midland locomotive practice. Would such outrageously ill-founded and prejudiced remarks be thought acceptable when commenting on the practices of Swindon or Doncaster?

Absolutely, if such criticism was justified.  Some of Brunels's designs for the GWR were truly awful even by Midland standards and Gresley missed a trick by making one Garratt with two 02 power units instead of several with Robinson GC 04 type power units .

However the Midlands stagnation was indefensible, RM Deeley chucked in the towel after all his sensible advanced designs were rejected, and their limpet like addiction for tiny axle boxes, indeed tiny barrel shaped journals which simply can't work in the real world was by 1910 quite indefensible. 

The amount bof shareholders profits they squandered using two engines and two sets of blokes where one GW or GN engine would have coped quite happily was scandalous.

I thiomk Churchward and Gresley were both genius's while Fowler was a metalurgist.

[Dave Hunt]

The 'limpet like' addiction to small axle boxes was deliberate. As Deeley stated, it was considered better to have smaller boxes that would require more frequent maintenance but would confer a greater degree of flexibility to the frame structure as a whole than to have wider boxes that would probably result in more stress on the frames and lead to more cracking. The common story that Deeley resigned in a huff after his 4-6-0 was rejected has no basis in fact; he actually left after the decision was made to separate the duties of CME (effectively) and motive power superintendent and his departure was quite amicable. The 'squandered' profits from using two locomotives and two sets of men were not sufficient to make the company less profitable than the other big concerns - in fact, far from it as I wrote in a previous post. With the 1907 traffic control system that was adopted, more but smaller trains as well as double heading made sense for the Midland as it stood; admittedly in later years the operating methods had to be altered but that was relatively far into the future in the early 1900s.

It is also of note that Deeley was the noted expert on locomotive lubrication of his day and co-authored what became the standard work on the subject.

 

Edited to correct a few typos.

Edited December 27, 2018 by Dave Hunt

[Compound2632]

However the Midlands stagnation was indefensible, RM Deeley chucked in the towel after all his sensible advanced designs were rejected, and their limpet like addiction for tiny axle boxes, indeed tiny barrel shaped journals which simply can't work in the real world was by 1910 quite indefensible. 

The amount bof shareholders profits they squandered using two engines and two sets of blokes where one GW or GN engine would have coped quite happily was scandalous.

I thiomk Churchward and Gresley were both genius's while Fowler was a metalurgist.

 

I think you're falling into the simplistic fallacy of assuming that the CME was the sole person responsible for locomotive design. I doubt it was ever like that; certainly by the end of the 19th century the Locomotive Superintendent or Chief Mechanical Engineer of any of the major lines was at the head of a large and experienced drawing office staff. The extent of practical experience in locomotive design of Fowler or, to pick a similar example, Wainwright was largely irrelevant; they owed their position to their managerial ability. 

 

DavidCBroad, it seems to me that if you are to continue to make remarks like the above, you need to support your argument with properly-referenced evidence and address the evidence that has been advanced in defence of Midland / early LMS locomotive design and policy. LMS Locomotive Profiles Nos. 10 (Standard Class 4 0-6-0s) and 13 (The Standard Compounds) by David Hunt, John Jennison, Bob Essery, and Fred James (Wild Swan Publications) would be a good place to start. 

 

Happy Christmas!

[Dave Hunt]

Adrian Tester's works such as in defence of the 4F are also excellent sources of reasoned and carefully explained rejections of many of the usual uninformed or ill-informed criticisms of Midland locomotive policy and design. The fact that the LMS found the standard MR engines to be the most cost-effective designs in its stock is also worth keeping in mind?

[jamie92208]

It must also be remembered that Derby remained, IIRC, the principle drawing office for the LMS, certainly throughout Stanier's time. It was Derby that designed the superlative Princess/Coronations though they were built at Crewe. Without the work of Coleman and his staff the fabulous boiler which was at the heart of the Duchess's, would never have been the success that it was.

 

Jamie

[Tom Burnham]

Hmm, James Clayton from Derby went to join Maunsell's team at Ashford and helped to produce some notably competent locomotives, albeit with some Swindon input too via Holcroft - http://www.steamindex.com/people/clayton.htm

 

Rushing in where angels fear to tread, it seems to me that the Midland wanted locos that gave predictable performances well within their limits - compared say with the London & North Western with heroic performances (and occasional spectacular failures) which knocked the engines to pieces.  And Cecil Paget (in his General Superintendent period) comes across as a control freak who hated trade unions.  I don't think he would have wanted motive power that only performed adequately in the hands of highly skilled top link men...

[Dave Hunt]

Whilst I don’t want to turn this thread into a never-ending discussion of Midland locomotive policy, I will make this post in order to put a few things that have been raised on the issues into what I think is a more correct perspective. To encapsulate what often leads commentators to decry the Midland, the nub of the matter is simply the contrasting views of that company and L&NWR regarding motive power in the early 20^th century. In essence, they were that  the Midland believed in building locomotives to last as long as possible and to work them well within their capabilities whereas the L&NWR had a sort of ‘build them cheap and flog them’ approach. Both approaches had, and still do have, their adherents and while the arguments are many and complex I think that it is probably worth expanding a little on that simplistic statement, particularly regarding the Midland's ideas.

 

As far as the Midland’s mythical ‘small engine policy’ is concerned, not only did Johnson and Deeley want to build bigger engines such as 0-8-0s and 4-6-0s but for a time the Board was also in favour of such things. However, as well as the problem of weak short-span girder bridges to which I and others have referred before, there were still sections of Midland lines that wouldn't allow even a Class 3 engine to take its maximum load as the train length would be too great for the lie-bys and sidings en route. The cost of lengthening these facilities would have been enormous and in the early Edwardian era the cold wind of economy was beginning to bite severely. Admittedly, there were some instances, such as the Toton to Brent Sidings coal workings, that would, on the face of it, have benefitted from being worked by a single engine of much greater capacity than the existing 0-6-0s but to produce one equal to twice the power of even a B boiler 0-6-0 within the axle loading and weight per foot run restrictions of the Midland main line would have required something like a Garratt. This would have been a costly exercise and one which probably would not have been justified in the days when wages were still not the major factor that they later became. Added to these considerations, the huge increase in the number of Midland goods engines during the 1890s and early years of the 20^th century probably meant that purely in terms of quantity there were nearly enough of them. If the capacity of existing locomotives could be increased to a moderate degree, such as by fitting H boilers and later Belpaire types, and a few more acquired, they would probably meet the Company's needs for some time to come. With this in mind, it would make sense for the number of different types to be limited so that the expense of patterns, flanging blocks, spares etc, could be minimised, negating the need for yet more capital expenditure and leading to a healthier balance sheet. Thus, it was probably more attractive to make up any slight shortfall with more of an existing design rather than introduce a new one. It should also be noted that there were financial advantages in rebuilding locomotives rather than producing new ones. Not only could at least some components be re-used but the cost of rebuilding could be set against revenue and thus attract immediate tax advantages. New engines, however, were normally charged to capital and the tax allowance was more protracted. For this reason, many railways became quite expert at 'rebuilding' using little more than a few components, not least the Midland which sometimes stretched the term to its elastic limit.

 

Added to that was the effect of the traffic control system developed by Paget and Follows that was adopted in 1907. Rather than the L&NWR way of working by using locomotives fresh out of the Works to their maximum capability then reducing the demands made on them as time went by between repairs, the Paget/Follows system was based on any engine of a particular class being capable of operating a particular train, i.e., whether fresh out of the works or due for repair. This not only made life easier for shed staff to roster engines to tasks but also contributed to lower overall maintenance costs. Additionally it gave the operating department the ability to define what any class was capable of for any section of the line; this approach was designed primarily to overcome the timekeeping problems that had beset the company at the turn of the century and soon proved itself.

 

Whilst I can’t state unequivocally that these factors were the cause of what has led many commentators to denigrate the Midland’s record of locomotive building between 1905 and the Grouping, i.e., no engines were bought from outside contractors for fourteen years after 1905 and apart from the two 'prototype' superheated 0-6-0s built in 1911, Derby Works didn't produce any truly new locomotives for the Midland system between 1910 and 1917, it seems to make more sense than some of the nonsense that suggests no one in a position of authority in the Midland knew what he was doing. I have stated before, and will no doubt do so again, that the men who ran the Midland Railway were not fools and they reached their decisions for sound economic and operational reasons (which didn't include satisfying railway enthusiasts a century later regarding the minutiae of perceived locomotive performance). That there were other possible solutions to the company’s problems such as strengthened bridges, longer sidings and refuges, bigger engines and fewer, heavier trains - all of which were adopted to greater or lesser degrees by other railways - is indisputable but they were obviously not thought right for the Midland at the time. The fact that the Company's commercial performance was at least on a par with the other major railways of Britain and that its operating costs were lower than nearly all the other major companies between 1900 and 1914 suggest that its policies can’t have been too bad, at least in the medium term. Admittedly, it would eventually have had to change its ways but the distortion of railway economics brought about by the events surrounding 1914 - 1918 makes how and when imponderable.

 

It can be argued, of course, that the Midland operating department was actually somewhat pessimistic in its assessment of the capabilities of its engines. For example, the maximum loading allowed for an unassisted Class 4 locomotive running to express timings from Leeds to Hellifield was given in 1920 as 260 tons and from Hellifield to Carlisle was just 230 tons. When this is compared with the performance of 1008 in the trials of 1923 with over 350 tons, it does occur that even a Compound approaching scheduled repair could have taken considerably more over the ‘long drag’ than was officially permitted, but there may well have been other considerations that militated against it within the control system.

 

As far as Paget’s attitude to the men who worked on the Midland is concerned, I have never seen any primary evidence one way or the other but I honestly doubt that the Board would have let one man’s prejudices affect the profitability of their company.

 

Despite the length of this post, I hope that it will contribute positively to this thread and be of benefit to at least some readers.

 

Dave Hunt

[PenrithBeacon]

The Midland Railway expanded dramatically between 1844 and 1876 or so and its infrastructure, though good enough for this period, was becoming dated by the early 1900s. It was by no means alone in this there is plenty of evidence that the LNWR and GWR, amongst many others, had the same issue. The problem was how to finance the modernisation of the railway.

 

The MRs income was primarily from coal produced in the Derbyshire/Nottinghamshire area and it was into this area that the LD&ECR was insinuated in the late 1890s. This railway, so often rerided by railway enthusiasts, was initially a failure but it was later supported by the GER (which wanted access to the area's coal) and even later was taken over by the GCR which was looking for a profitable lifeline to support its really poor finances. The GCR's takeover did transform the GCR's balance sheet but at the expense of the MR which had a lot of its coal traffic siphoned off.

 

The effect of this severely impacted the MR and badly affected its need to modernise its infrastructure, not just its bridges, but also a planned by-pass of Bradford to improve its access to the S&C.

 

Supporting Dave Hunt in his post above it's well worth noting that initially only two 4Fs were built and they were extensively tested before the design was put into production. This wouldn't have happened if the 4F was considered a failure. It's issues with axleboxes only came to light in the early 1930s in very different operating conditions as a result of Stampe's managerial changes to the LMS.

[Compound2632]

It's issues with axleboxes only came to light in the early 1930s in very different operating conditions as a result of Stampe's managerial changes to the LMS.

 

The fundamental point that has benn made by Adrian Tester is that there was no design issue with the axleboxes. The issue was with the type of lubricant used in the 30s, an issue that had been resolved within a few years - certainly by the early nationalisation period.

[Dave Hunt]

The fundamental point that has benn made by Adrian Tester is that there was no design issue with the axleboxes.

As Adrian has pointed out, size for size the Midland type was actually the equal of the much-vaunted Stanier axlebox.

[PenrithBeacon]

But the Stanier axlebox was lubricated by a worsted pad in an underkeep, a design borrowed from the Illinois Central RR (IIRC) by Churchward. It actually originated in a locomotive built by Baldwins for a RR which I cannot remember now, but the book is stuffed somewhere in a shelf somewhere in the house!

 

When Churchward tested this system of lubricating against the design of axlebox on a Dean engine that was, in all essentials, the same as the Johnson axlebox on the 4F, he found that the journal was fully lubricated in less than a revolution of the axle, but it took several revolutions for the Dean axle to be fully lubricated. In that time damage can be done to the bearing surfaces which, when added to over time, can amount to a serious reliability problem. This is essentially the issue with the 4F.

 

When Stanier joined the LMS there were serious issues with the axleboxes on the Scots and Patriots which Stanier was told to resolve. He did so by adopting the Churchward design and then these engines were OK. There were plans to do the same with the Fowler 7F 0-8-0 too c1936-7 but it was overtaken by planning for the war and never implemented. I don't know of any plans to modify the 4F.

[Crimson Rambler]

The main criticisms levelled against Midland axleboxes are that they retained a loose brass design, were ‘under-sized’, ran hot and used a poor method of delivering oil to the journal. While E S Cox may not have approved of loose brass boxes they were fitted to large European engines e.g. Germany post-war.

As with short-lap valves, the overwhelming majority of the locomotives running in 1922 had inside cylinders, which necessitated crank axles and therefore limited the length of the axleboxes. Yet it is only Midland locomotives, that are vilified and singled out for ridicule by enthusiasts – in large part thanks to E S Cox. With a track gauge of 4ft - 8½ins and inside cylinders it is difficult to obtain generous axlebox dimensions if at the same time the engine is to have an adequate crank axle. Since the latter was rightly judged more important, designers sacrificed bearing area to minimize the risk of crank axle failure. To demonstrate a flaw in the enthusiasts’ criticism consider the following table:-

The main criticisms levelled against Midland axleboxes are that they retained a loose brass design, were ‘under-sized’, ran hot and used a poor method of delivering oil to the journal. While E S Cox may not have approved of loose brass boxes they were fitted to large European engines e.g. Germany post-war.

As with short-lap valves, the overwhelming majority of the locomotives running in 1922 had inside cylinders, which necessitated crank axles and therefore limited the length of the axleboxes. Yet it is only Midland locomotives, that are vilified and singled out for ridicule by enthusiasts – in large part thanks to E S Cox. With a track gauge of 4ft - 8½ins and inside cylinders it is difficult to obtain generous axlebox dimensions if at the same time the engine is to have an adequate crank axle. Since the latter was rightly judged more important, designers sacrificed bearing area to minimize the risk of crank axle failure. To demonstrate a flaw in the enthusiasts’ criticism consider the following table:-

The figure that is being compared in the final column is the maximum piston thrust divided by the projected area of the bearing (i.e. L × d). This is the accepted method used even when, as in our case, the bearing area was nominally one-half the figure given as only ½ bearings were normally used. Inspection of these maximum loads demonstrate the flaw in enthusiasts’ reasoning since if Midland axleboxes were undersized, then so were those fitted a large number of other inside cylinder locomotives – in some instances to a considerably greater extent.

So why – according to E S Cox – did Midland bearings run hot whereas the equally or more heavily loaded bearings fitted to the engines of other railways seemingly did not – or to be more accurate, at least not so frequently? To answer this anomaly satisfactorily we must consider how an axlebox bearing actually worked. We must start by immediately dismissing some widespread misconceptions concerning lubrication. It is commonly believed by many, the underpad lubrication, promoted by Churchward, Stanier et al, resulted in hydrodynamic lubrication.

It does not.                 It cannot.

This is because the pad is unable to deliver sufficient oil to the bearing for it to be hydrodynamically lubricated, furthermore, if for one moment we suppose a pad could be devised that could deliver the necessary quantity of oil, then the reservoir capacity of the bearing would be exhausted in a matter of minutes. As an aside, Richard Deeley was fully aware of underpad lubrication – Sir Henry Fowler reported in March 1922:-

“When his predecessor came back from America some years ago, he was very delighted with the system of lubrication in which a mixture of waste and horse-hair was used. It was given an extended trial, but there was difficulty from the fact that the horse-hair tended to get into the oil channels and curl up into small balls.”

Hydrodynamic lubrication is highly desirable in machinery because then bearing wear rates become insignificant. A car engine, by virtue of its closed circulation pumped lubrication system does operate with hydrodynamically lubricated bearings. If we assume a car travelling in top gear at 40mph, the corresponding engine speed will be around 2,000rpm or 120,000 revolutions per hour. This is equivalent to 3,000 revolutions per mile. Nowadays a life of 100,000 miles is not unusual so this equates to the engine having made a minimum of 300,000,000 revolutions yet the big end and main bearings will exhibit negligible wear. In practice, because the car is driven in lower gears for much of the time this assessment will be a gross underestimate of the engine revolutions.

The goal for Cox et al was for the axleboxes to last for 100,000 miles between repairs. This, was more or less achieved latterly, but only in express engines. So, assuming driving wheels 6ft - 9ins diameter, these will make in round figures 250 revolutions in a mile; hence they were aiming for a bearing life of 25,000,000 revolutions or only 1/12 that of a car engine. Furthermore, after completing 100,000 miles the wear in the locomotive's bearings could be measured with a ruler – as well as being heard! Locomotives employed in lower speed traffic never attained 100,000 miles before the equivalent wear appeared maxima of 50,000 or 60,000 miles was more their lot.

Ironically, the car engine derives its lubrication system from a design patented in 1890 and 1892 by Albert Pain the Chief Draughtsman of Bellis & Morcom, makers of stationary steam engines. The first example, built in 1890 continued in use until 1919 producing 20 horsepower at 625rpm. Journals and bearings shewed little signs of wear after 29 years of service during which the crankshaft made more than 4,000 million (4 billion) revolutions.

To appreciate why locomotive axleboxes did not behave in this way we have to remember the lubrication system was completely different. In the Bellis & Morcom system or a car engine there was a closed-loop oil circulation system, which enabled a high flow of oil to be delivered to, and then pass through, the bearings. It was this sufficiency of oil delivery which enabled the bearing to operate hydrodynamically and thus with negligible metal-to-metal contact. As the oil escaped from each bearing it drained down into the sump before being pumped round again. In direct contrast, in a locomotive axlebox, because the oil was consumed on a total loss basis the bearing could only receive a meagre quantity of oil so that the very limited supply would last the journey. These two approaches may be demonstrated in a Stribeck diagram.

ZN/P is a mathematical relationship tying bearing load P, speed N and oil viscosity Z to the coefficient of friction m in the bearing. It is important to note the scale for the friction is logarithmic so each division changes by a factor of ten-fold. At the point of minimum friction, hydrodynamic lubrication has been achieved and bearing wear becomes negligible. the coefficient of friction m is synonymous for bearing wear and also for the running temperature of the bearing since it is the friction that gives rise to both.

Locomotive axleboxes operate in the thin-film (or mixed-film) region to the left of the point of minimum friction. The oil pad, irrespective of where it is placed, or a mechanical lubricator, cannot deliver sufficient oil for the bearing to operate hydrodynamically. Instead, because of the far smaller quantity of oil present there was some metallic contact between the journal and the bearing – hence the higher coefficient of friction and the resulting wear.

Since the ability the lubricant/metal combination possessed in forming this layer was affected by the metals used in the bearing as well as the choice of lubricant, this gave rise to the need to be able to measure it. Mountford Deeley not only invented a machine for doing just that, but also introduced the term ‘oiliness’ to describe the effectiveness of the oil/metal combination.

The machine was designed primarily for the study of the ‘oiliness’ of lubricants and the variation in frictional resistance produced by different oils and metals. This is demonstrated by the fall in the static friction recorded by a Deeley machine as the percentage of rape oil was increased.

 

Eric Langridge observed:-

“The bearings that were sufficient for MR days were not equal to the rough and tumble of LMS handling. Quality of materials went down with economic pressure from commercially-minded managers and oil became poor. All this can be false economy from an engineering point of view; cheapness does not really pay. However, I sometimes wonder if critics of bearing sizes ever had a go at designing themselves!”

The LMS attempted to save money by substituting cheaper lubricating oil, which caused the bearings to run hotter. This in turn gave rise to another problem, also prompted by its penny-pinching. The Midland along with other pre-grouping companies used for its most highly loaded bearings e.g. locomotive big ends and axleboxes a white metal alloy having a high tin content but which contained no lead. Leaded white metal was reserved for lower loaded bearings. The presence of lead formed a eutectic with the tin, by which is meant that the resulting white metal alloy will melt at a lower temperature than the melting points of the pure constituents. The LMS adopted leaded white metal presumably under the influence of George Hughes who had used leaded white metal on the Lancashire & Yorkshire - yet ironically E S Cox reported in his paper on locomotive axleboxes, the L&YR had had problems with hot ’boxes!

As a consequence of these two cost saving exercises by the LMS, not only did the company increase the likelihood of its axleboxes running warmer through substituting a poorer oil, but it then actively encouraged the affected bearings to fail by lining them an alloy that softened and melted at a lower temperature.

It should be appreciated that a ‘hot ‘box’ was an ailment, which could afflict all locomotives although those engines whose axleboxes were the most heavily loaded meant they were more sensitive to the factors that could prompt heating viz insufficient lubrication, incorrect oil, badly made trimmings, presence of dirt or sand, misalignment etc, because they had less reserve. During the Second World War, the LNER developed its ‘W’ oil at the request of Sir Nigel Gresley in response to the high number of hot boxes that company experienced under wartime conditions. The LMS adopted ‘W’ oil in 1943 applying it to four important classes fitted with highly loaded bearings viz the Standard 4F 0-6-0 and 7F 0-8-0, plus the ex-LNWR G1 and G2 0-8-0 classes.

Before concluding I would like to refer you to a memorandum dated 9^th June 1931 and addressed to Syndham Symes - it was reproduced in full in LMS Journal issue N°7. In it the author, one E S Cox, reported that in 1930 the Standard Class 7 0-8-0 suffered 53 hot boxes out of 120 engines, which is the equivalent of one hot box per engine every 27.2 months. Figures for the ex-LNWR G1 and G2 0-8-0 classes, also appeared and although they carried similar sized bearings the difference in their performance was startling. For the Gs class, out of 60 engines there were 22 hot boxes, giving one every 32.7 months – little different from the ‘Austin Sevens’. However, it is the G1, which is the most revealing, out of 401 engines, there were 40 hot boxes. The equivalent of one hot box per engine every ten years, which put these inside cylinder engines on a par with the 1939 figures E S Cox proudly stated (and others have repeated) was the mean performance of all of the taper-boiler classes plus the ‘Royal Scots’, which by then also carried Stanier ’boxes. In other words, it was perfectly possible to obtain what LMS engineers considered to be axlebox perfection from an engine fitted with ‘under sized’ bearings.

 

Edited January 19, 2019 by Crimson Rambler

[LNWR18901910]

Move over, Ferrari!

 

 

Sorry, folks. Had to resize the originals due to this 10MB thing... (So much for my 580th post!) Anyway, here she is in her anglo-amalgamated glory!

 

The decals and numbering have yet to be applied as well as finishing items and such.

Edited February 12, 2019 by LNWR18901910
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[LNWR18901910]

Well, for what appears to be my 600th post, I thought I'd share you all more progress on the Yankee Mogul.

Well, it's coming along nicely. One or two more thing to add to it would be the lamp-irons as well as possibilty of a locomotive crew inside.

 

The I made the decals myself by designing on image making/editing software, printing and cutting out andthen sticking on carefully. I chose the running number 2513 because it would represent the year 1913 by which time the class was all wihdrawn March that year and they were all gone during the Great War.  :'( *

Still, let us not dwell on such sad moments...

 

The locomotive runs well in both directions and it totally compliments my collection of Vintage Pre-Grouping Trains from the Turn of the Century. And yes, my 19" Goods is nearly complete - expect some updates soon.

 

[LNWR18901910]

And here it is on the day the replica GWR Saint 'Lady of Legend' has launched and steamed, here is the Yankee Mogul completed at last!

The Yankee Mogul is finally complete and now it has lamp-irons, cab-steps and final touches! I think this would be a great companion to the Midland 1000 Class Compound 4-4-0 (if I had one) and another project for the roster of Pre-Grouping Vintage Trains from 1890 to 1910.

 

Next, I turn my attention to the LNWR 19" Goods 4-6-0 soon to be completed with all the right parts (I hope)! I wonder what my next project after that can be (maybe an SECR D Class 4-4-0 or a GWR Saint Class 4-6-0)... Best see what the future holds!

[TrainzBrainz23]

What about the GNR Yankee Mogul?

[LNWR18901910]

9 hours ago, TrainzBrainz23 said:

What about the GNR Yankee Mogul?

This thing?

Yes, it does have potential, but it may take some time, money, paitence and effort. There are some things that need to be taken into account; strength, character, detail and accuracy. The best rolling stock to run with it is period-accurate stuff (LNER Clerestory coaching stock re-branded in GNR livery, GNR freight stock or private owner wagons complimented with GNR brake van).

 

(Loco drawing courtesy of rlkitterman from DeviantART)

[MossdaleNGauge]

Here’s my attempt at a Midland Railway Baldwin, with a few compromises to not look too closely at.

[MossdaleNGauge]

And it moves!