Runaway Australian iron ore train deliberately derailed

[dullsteamer]

https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2018/rair/ro-2018-018/

 

Nobody involved comes out looking very good.

 

Mark.

[melmerby]

Locomotive 4472 was destroyed. The NRM won't be pleased!

 

According to the report, everything went wrong that could go wrong.

[woodenhead]

12 minutes ago, dullsteamer said:

 

Nobody involved comes out looking very good.

 

Mark.

How do you come to that conclusion.

 

There do appear to be some systemic issues that need addressing - but there is no criticism of the driver who reported the issue, kept in contact with control, was applying handbrakes as fast he probably could - he even saw the issue and continued with the safety critical application of hand brakes.  The maintenance team clearly got something mixed up to be applying brakes on the wrong train and there are things to put right there.

 

Control also warned other trains on the route to stop so the drivers could get to safety and once it was clear the train wasn't going to stop by itself they made a measured decision to derail it.

 

Another NRM whip round for 4472

[hmrspaul]

How can brake applications be above 100 per cent. There is a quote of triggering an automated 120 per cent ECP emergency brake application

and The 120 per cent emergency brake application was active

and The controller instructed that 101 per cent handbrakes8 were required to secure a loaded train

 

The FIRE system displayed the level of brake command input as a percentage (%TBC)12, typically a number between 0 and 100 per cent or as 120 per cent:

•0% = Release

•10% = Minimum Service

•100% = Full Service/Penalty application

•120% = Emergency.

 

A quick conversion, it got to just over 100mph!

 

Paul

[Titan]

22 hours ago, hmrspaul said:

How can brake applications be above 100 per cent. There is a quote of triggering an automated 120 per cent ECP emergency brake application

and The 120 per cent emergency brake application was active

and The controller instructed that 101 per cent handbrakes8 were required to secure a loaded train

 

The FIRE system displayed the level of brake command input as a percentage (%TBC)12, typically a number between 0 and 100 per cent or as 120 per cent:

•0% = Release

•10% = Minimum Service

•100% = Full Service/Penalty application

•120% = Emergency.

 

A quick conversion, it got to just over 100mph!

 

Paul

 

The 100% refers to full service application. If more braking force is applied than that, then the resulting effect will be more than 100% of full service brake. Similarly, if the handbrakes are capable of being applied more strongly than the service brake, then it is possible to apply 101% handbrakes.

 

I do wonder if it set the record for greatest amount of kinetic energy in a man made moving object? 42,000 tonnes at 100mph may well be more K.E. than a supertanker at its maximum speed...

 

Edit:

 

Just did a rough and ready calculation, it had about twice the K.E. of the worlds largest supertanker, running fully loaded at full speed...

Edited April 6, 2019 by Titan

[34theletterbetweenB&D]

The obvious technical shortcoming in the braking systems is that if the power brake systems fail, the prospect of a single driver having enough time to get even the 134 wagons of the standard trainload manually braked sufficiently to hold the train when standing on a gradient seems 'improbable'.

 

18 hours ago, Titan said:

...I do wonder if it set the record for greatest amount of kinetic energy in a man made moving object? 42,000 tonnes at 100mph may well be more K.E. than a supertanker at its maximum speed...

Because velocity is squared in the K.E. calculation, the 26,000mph of the fastest of the Apollo moonshots comfortably beats it, even though the command, service and lunar modules only amount to a few tons.

[34theletterbetweenB&D]

My reminder to check in at the ATSB's anticipated final report date went 'ping'. Mmmm. Final report date now pushed back to Q2 2020. Investigation level 'complex', still examining evidence and analysing. (I am not overly surprised, as the initial assessment was that the driver had followed procedure, which should have left the train safe while he was manually applying the wagon brakes.)

 

https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2018/rair/ro-2018-018/

[34theletterbetweenB&D]

Went for a follow up look, final report date now Q4 2020, but a preliminary report is now available.

 

The driver of the train that ran away appears to be in the clear, followed procedure after the train was automatically stopped by a safety system  when the 'end of train' could no longer be detected on the lead loco, and he identified the fault that is the (almost certain) cause of this, while moving along the train setting handbrakes.

 

The attempted preventive action that was ineffective on the evidence so far is that a maintenance gang went setting handbrakes on a relatively nearby empty train on the 'East' line. Since control knew the location of the train requiring this intervention was on the West line, the reason for that needs to be understood.

[34theletterbetweenB&D]

Drafting the final report is underway.

 

Time yet to sing a few more verses of 'The Runaway Train'...

[34theletterbetweenB&D]

https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2018/rair/ro-2018-018

 

Read it and weep. An overlay to the brake system wasn't properly integrated, leading to potential for driver error in the event of a fault condition in the overlay system. Failure to apply 'KISS' in short.

[kevinlms]

22 hours ago, 34theletterbetweenB&D said:

https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2018/rair/ro-2018-018

 

Read it and weep. An overlay to the brake system wasn't properly integrated, leading to potential for driver error in the event of a fault condition in the overlay system. Failure to apply 'KISS' in short.

Almost a repeat of the Canadian Lac Megantic run away, except only a derailment of iron ore cars and not oil tankers.