Question about WW2 naval vessels

[The Stationmaster]

On 10/07/2019 at 22:57, Kingzance said:

I would argue that Singapore was doomed as soon as any enemy chose to come down the Malayan peninsular as all the island’s defences faced seaward. The top brass at home and the senior officers of Repulse and Prince of Wales knew they had no chance without a carrier escort. That deployment was real “stiff upper lip” but resulted in a massive loss of life and together with the fall of Singapore, the end of dominance in the Far East. Remember too that HMS Exeter was lost in battles around Indonesia but I think that was down to her coming across Japanese Heavy Cruisers that outgunned her. Pearl Harbour was in my mind the first big carrier offensive, Taranto involved just one carrier, as did the Bismarck incident in which we nearly had a tragic blue-on-blue with HMS Sheffield and Ark Royal’s aircraft.

Actually many of the big guns on Singapore Island could be trained round onto the Johore Strait - but semi-armour piercing shells weren't much use against land targets especially infantry.

 

The loss of HM Ships 'Prince of Wales' and 'Repulse' was obviously a tragedy but the simple fact is that they were overwhelmed by air attack and didn't have the power to do much about it once steering way had been lost or power was lost plus their AA outfit was not exactly up to the level of threat facing it.  As far as the loss of Malaya and Singapore was concerned I seriously doubt their presence actually made any difference apart from adding to the losses.  They never found the Japanese ships landing  troops and supplies and even if they had they would have been too late to stop the landing or impact on the Japanese speed of advance down the Malay peninsula.    Sending them to Singapore was really a grand gesture which had no deterrent value at all and not much military value without proper air support and reconnaissance.

 

HMS Exeter, already damaged in the first Battle of the Java Sea was sunk by a Japanese Heavy Cruiser force in the second Battle of the Java Sea while trying  to get from Surabaya to Ceylon

 

The most effective British naval force in the Far East had probably been the 4th  Submarine flotilla based on Hong Kong but it, along with various escort vessels, had been withdrawn westwards (most 4th fFlotilla boats went to Colombo initially) long before the Japanese attacked the British colonies

[Kingzance]

My father, an RAF armourer, was based at Alore Star as the IJA came down the peninsula. The day before his airfield was overrun, he had been operated on in the base hospital for a problem with his appendix. Somehow he survived over three years in Changi jail but never forgave his captors, wasn't happy that I had Sony hi-fi equipment and had recurrent bouts of malaria for the rest of his life. He also barely spoke about any of it.

[Ozexpatriate]

10 hours ago, Fenman said:

Unlike Ramsay, he wasn’t almost single-handedly developing whole new fields of warfare (combined ops and overwhelming amphibious invasions of previously unimaginable scale).

Overlord was certainly well executed and it took an enormous amount of planning. To imply Ramsay did this "almost single-handedly" I think is a stretch.

 

Before D-Day, in the European theatre there were large assaults like Operation Torch (which involved multiple simultaneous invasions) in North Africa in November of 1943; and Operation Shingle (the Anzio landings) in January 1944.

 

In the Pacific theatre, the US conducted amphibious assaults beginning with Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands in August 1942. While  some of the more famous assaults (like Iwo Jima and Okinawa) occurred well after D-Day there were many amphibious operations in 1943.  Important lessons were learned (or at least should have been learned) in the disastrous Tarawa assault of November 1943.

 

One hopes that Ramsay was informed by some of the lessons learned in many of these assaults.

 

Edited July 12, 2019 by Ozexpatriate

[Fenman]

1 hour ago, Ozexpatriate said:

Overlord was certainly well executed and it took an enormous amount of planning. To imply Ramsay did this "almost single-handedly" I think is a stretch.

 

Before D-Day, in the European theatre there were large assaults like Operation Torch (which involved multiple simultaneous invasions) in North Africa in November of 1943; and Operation Shingle (the Anzio landings) in January 1944.

...

One hopes that Ramsay was informed by some of the lessons learned in many of these assaults.

 

 

One would certainly hope so, since Ramsay himself planned most of those (for political reasons ABC’s name was printed on the plans for Husky (the invasion of Sicily - the start of the campaign against the “soft underbelly”))!

 

By “single-handedly” I did not mean he worked on his own: simply that he was THE go-to planner for Allied amphibious op’s. 

 

Having entered the room a total sceptic, a US admiral came out of his first meeting with Ramsay (a briefing on the developing plans for D-Day), telling his aide that he had just met the most brilliant military brain he had ever encountered. 

 

Ramsay was reputedly the only staff officer who could persuade Montgomery to change his mind. Monty rated Ramsay so highly that when introducing him to his own staff at briefings, he affectionately called him “General Ramsay”. 

 

The only time they seriously disagreed on strategy was when Monty argued for the push to Arnhem while Ramsay wanted to prioritise Antwerp. Monty won the argument but lost the battle; and they then went to Antwerp (which unfortunately the Germans had strengthened while Monty was on his misadventure). For the rest of the European war, 2/3rds of all men and materiel for the western front shipped through Antwerp. 

 

Paul

Edited July 12, 2019 by Fenman

[jjb1970]

On the question of air power the finest naval air arm in the world (at least until Midway crippled it) was that of the Imperial Japanese Navy. Their carriers were excellent ships and perhaps more importantly the aircraft they carried and the air crews were outstanding carrier operable designs for their time. The 1st Air Fleet (Kido Butai) was the finest naval strike force afloat in 1941 and much of 1942. One of the remarkable aspects of the Eastern war is that the Japanese appear to have been so badly under estimated by the British and American's in 1941.

[jjb1970]

A Royal Navy officer who was a very remarkable individual and who has not received the recognition he deserves (IMO) was Max Horton. His exploits in WW1 and the Baltic were full on boys own type stuff and in WW2 he was an extremely competent and capable commander of submarines and then the Western Approaches.

[jjb1970]

On the subject of RN submarines, I'd recommend the following book:

 

https://www.amazon.co.uk/No-Room-Mistakes-Geirr-Haarr/dp/1848322062/ref=sr_1_1?keywords=no+room+for+mistakes&qid=1562972486&s=gateway&sr=8-1

 

It's not actually about RN submarines but rather Allied submarines in Northern waters in the first part of WW2 but the reality is that the story of RN boats pre-dominates.

 

The RN submarine arm came out of WW2 with a bit of an unfair reputation I think. Unlike the German navy their boats were not operating in such a target rich environment and there was little opportunity for them to replicate the high profile impact of the U Boats yet the RN submarine arm served our country well and was a well handled and effective force.

 

 

[brianusa]

56 minutes ago, jjb1970 said:

On the question of air power the finest naval air arm in the world (at least until Midway crippled it) was that of the Imperial Japanese Navy. Their carriers were excellent ships and perhaps more importantly the aircraft they carried and the air crews were outstanding carrier operable designs for their time. The 1st Air Fleet (Kido Butai) was the finest naval strike force afloat in 1941 and much of 1942. One of the remarkable aspects of the Eastern war is that the Japanese appear to have been so badly under estimated by the British and American's in 1941.

I don't know if they did or not!   The Japanese had prepared for war more or less ten years beforehand while the British and Americans were trying their best to obviate it.  Add to the fact that the British were still in WW1 mode and the USA was in favour of neutrality but there were some who had anticipated hostilities for many years in advance.  The authorities didn't want to hear about this and so stuck their collective heads in the sand until it was almost too late.  Chamberlain was happy to wave his infamous piece of paper while Roosevelt had to appease the neutral opposition.  As much as we don't like it, the USA with its  immense production capabilities was the worlds salvation.  God know what would happen now!

      Brian.

[Ozexpatriate]

2 hours ago, jjb1970 said:

On the question of air power the finest naval air arm in the world (at least until Midway crippled it) was that of the Imperial Japanese Navy. Their carriers were excellent ships and perhaps more importantly the aircraft they carried and the air crews were outstanding carrier operable designs for their time. 

There's no question that the Japanese aircraft were superior to anything any other Navy operated in 1941. The next generation of USN aircraft, beginning with the F6F in 1943 changed that balance.

 

I don't know if the 'converted battlecruiser' hull carrier designs of the IJN (in the Pearl Harbor / Midway task forces) were superior to the purpose built hulls of the USN (Yorktown class) and the RN (Illustrious Class). Of course Sōryū and Hiryū were purpose-built carriers and Shōkaku and  Zuikaku were built after the expiration of the Washington Naval treaty in 1936. 

 

At a certain point what could be brought to bear was the most significant factor. We could assess a lot of features like speed, and nuanced 'survivability' considerations related to aviation fuel and armament storage, but before the angled flight deck of the Midway class, the armoured flight deck is surely a key difference in mission readiness and survivability - at the expense of aircraft carried.

 

1 hour ago, brianusa said:

The Japanese had prepared for war more or less ten years beforehand while the British and Americans were trying their best to obviate it.  Add to the fact that the British were still in WW1 mode and the USA was in favour of neutrality but there were some who had anticipated hostilities for many years in advance.  The authorities didn't want to hear about this and so stuck their collective heads in the sand until it was almost too late.

Despite US foreign policy of neutrality and the tiny, reduced US Army troop levels, equipping the US Navy the Army Air Corps with more up to date aircraft had not been ignored in the same way the RAF and Fleet Air Arm was in the UK during the 1930s.

 

The impact of the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 and the Second London Naval Treaty of 1936 had a lot to do with Allied Naval readiness by 1941. Adherence (or not) to these treaties greatly influenced what was commissioned and afloat in 1939-1941 and probably had a greater influence on readiness than the politics of appeasement or the Monroe Doctrine.

 

Edited July 13, 2019 by Ozexpatriate

[spikey]

Do any of you chaps by any chance know of a book dealing in any depth with the art and science of naval gunnery?  I've always been fascinated by the techniques and equipment used to lob a large amount of steel from one moving ship to another with the intent of causing the foe discomfort, but I've never managed to find a decent book on the subject.   

 

[Roddy Angus]

1 hour ago, spikey said:

Do any of you chaps by any chance know of a book dealing in any depth with the art and science of naval gunnery?  

 

Have a look at "Naval Firepower: Battleship guns and gunnery in the dreadnought era" by Normal Friedman, it might be what you are after.  It only covers big guns but he does have a separate book on anti-aircraft weapons.

 

Best wishes

 

Roddy

[The Stationmaster]

11 hours ago, Ozexpatriate said:

There's no question that the Japanese aircraft were superior to anything any other Navy operated in 1941. The next generation of USN aircraft, beginning with the F6F in 1943 changed that balance.

 

I don't know if the 'converted battlecruiser' hull carrier designs of the IJN (in the Pearl Harbor / Midway task forces) were superior to the purpose built hulls of the USN (Yorktown class) and the RN (Illustrious Class). Of course Sōryū and Hiryū were purpose-built carriers and Shōkaku and  Zuikaku were built after the expiration of the Washington Naval treaty in 1936. 

 

At a certain point what could be brought to bear was the most significant factor. We could assess a lot of features like speed, and nuanced 'survivability' considerations related to aviation fuel and armament storage, but before the angled flight deck of the Midway class, the armoured flight deck is surely a key difference in mission readiness and survivability - at the expense of aircraft carried.

 

Despite US foreign policy of neutrality and the tiny, reduced US Army troop levels, equipping the US Navy the Army Air Corps with more up to date aircraft had not been ignored in the same way the RAF and Fleet Air Arm was in the UK during the 1930s.

 

The impact of the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 and the Second London Naval Treaty of 1936 had a lot to do with Allied Naval readiness by 1941. Adherence (or not) to these treaties greatly influenced what was commissioned and afloat in 1939-1941 and probably had a greater influence on readiness than the politics of appeasement or the Monroe Doctrine.

 

The British use of a fairly heavily armoured flight decks certainly impressed the USN in the Far East.  Apparently they were amazed that HMS Indefatigable was able to resume full flying operations only 30 minutes after a kamikaze struck the flight deck and base of the island while HMS Formidable was only out of action for not much over 5 hours after being hit on the flight deck by a kamikaze and the bomb it had released just before crashing into the carrier.  Compared with the wooden flight decks of some US carriers and the relatively thin steel flight decks of the latest ones such as the Essex Class vessels the RN carriers were able to cope fairly well with kamikaze attacks in particular.

 

The big benefit of the angled flight deck was in allowing for higher landing speed of jet aircraft - which seems to be the main reason why the RN invented it although it also made near simultaneous take-off and landing a realistic proposition but it also gave considerable advantages to deck handling as a barrier was no longer necessary and the risk of a misjudged landing crashing into a deck parked aircraft ahead of the barrier was eliminated.   

 

While the Japanese were undoubtedly way ahead of the other navies in the late 1930s their carrier design was still relatively dated compared with the advances seen in the illustrious class vessels but in that respect the RN was ahead of everybody.  The big advantage the Japanese had was in highly capable aircraft designs and making best use of them with a very sophisticated air launched torpedo.  And of course many of the aircraft carriers available in 1939/40 were on converted hulls -  the Japanese were not alone in that respect.

[jjb1970]

Any Friedman book is worth buying, I consider him the pre-eminent writer in his subject areas and his knowledge of warship design and related subjects such as fire control is excellent. He is one of the few writers outside of professional marine engineering and naval architecture text books who can write about the design of ships and their engineering systems without making me want to get a red pen out. He has written a series of books about British warship design which are basically the definitive works on the subject (although I think that David Brown's works are also essential for anyone with an interest in the subject. Friedman has a volume on British submarines being published. His book on gunnery and fire control is the best work on the subject I have read and the only one outside of professional texts that actually explains the fundamental differences between the Dreyer analytical system and the Pollen synthetic system and why the synthetic approach was superior. Although the book avoids equations and intimidating maths I think it is fair to say that a degree of comfort with basic scientific principles is helpful when reading it. Although I find Friedman to be very accessible he doesn't reduce things to ladybird book of ships level and he eschews emotive and flowery words. I find his style to be tight and well structured but some find him boring. Either way, if anyone has a real interest in the subjects he covers then Norman Friedman stands in a class of his own. 

[jjb1970]

On carriers it is interesting that both the RN and USN arrived at the combination of an armoured flight deck and open hangar as the optimum solution in WW2. The RN Malta class would have had American style open hangars if they had been built. 

[spikey]

43 minutes ago, The Stationmaster said:

... The big benefit of the angled flight deck was in allowing for higher landing speed of jet aircraft - which seems to be the main reason why the RN invented it although it also made near simultaneous take-off and landing a realistic proposition but it also gave considerable advantages to deck handling as a barrier was no longer necessary and the risk of a misjudged landing crashing into a deck parked aircraft ahead of the barrier was eliminated.

 

It also benefitted the intrepid aviator by eliminating the possibility of the ship being driven over him, should he have the misfortune to drop off the sharp end.

 

Mention of this brings back memory of the day towards the end of flying training when we were treated to a talk (they didn't have "presentations" then) by a likeable cove from the Fleet Air Arm, whose mission was to encourage the likes of us to put our names down for his lot in due course.  I for one never fancied the idea on account of I had enough trouble finding my way back to and landing on a runway that hadn't moved since I left it earlier.  That, and I liked the idea that nobody could sink it while I was away.

 

PS Thanks for the book recommendation gents.  Much appreciated.

Edited July 13, 2019 by spikey

[34theletterbetweenB&D]

6 hours ago, spikey said:

Do any of you chaps by any chance know of a book dealing in any depth with the art and science of naval gunnery?    

And also. Once it had the wondrous title of 'Priddy's Hard Weapons Museum', which could scarcely be equalled considering the subject. Now more mundanely https://www.nmrn.org.uk/our-museums/explosion-museum-naval-firepower

 

 

9 minutes ago, spikey said:

It also benefitted the intrepid aviator by eliminating the possibility of the ship being driven over him, should he have the misfortune to drop off the sharp end.

 

Mention of this brings back memory of the day towards the end of flying training when we were treated to a talk (they didn't have "presentations" then) by a likeable cove from the Fleet Air Arm, whose mission was to encourage the likes of us to put our names down for his lot in due course.  I for one never fancied the idea on account of I had enough trouble finding my way back to and landing on a runway that hadn't moved since I left it earlier.  That, and I liked the idea that nobody could sink it while I was away...

My future FiL considers that the whole reason he survived as a newly on board naval pilot in 1945 was the outbreak of peace while he and his comrades were getting ready for pacific deployment. In his case the 'likeable cove' had left them in no doubt that writing a will, and even more importantly a final letter for your family, was right up there among their priorities.

[The Johnster]

Captain W E Johns, who wrote the Biggles books, was pretty grimly realistic about this in those set in the the First World War; new pilots were given a less than 48 hour life expectancy once they were posted to the front and most were killed on their first sortie.  For this reason they were further hampered by being given the worst aircraft, as the squadron didn't want to lose the good ones.  If you survived that, you had a fair chance of being as good as the German trying to shoot you down.  A learning curve not so much steep as precipitous.  The Germans presumably had the same problem; there was little training in combat flying because they were still inventing it...

[jjb1970]

I wonder how many lives could have been saved by issuing aircrew with parachutes in WW1, quite aside from the ethical matter of saving lives it was dreadfully inefficient to throw away so many pilots and observers. 

[PatB]

6 minutes ago, jjb1970 said:

I wonder how many lives could have been saved by issuing aircrew with parachutes in WW1, quite aside from the ethical matter of saving lives it was dreadfully inefficient to throw away so many pilots and observers. 

 

Particularly since a significant cause of pilot deaths at the time was structural failure of the aircraft, rather than the direct results of combat. When the wings fall off (metaphorically speaking), the only realistic option with some chance of survival is to bail out. Nothing to do with cowardice etc.

[Joseph_Pestell]

59 minutes ago, jjb1970 said:

I wonder how many lives could have been saved by issuing aircrew with parachutes in WW1, quite aside from the ethical matter of saving lives it was dreadfully inefficient to throw away so many pilots and observers. 

 

Not very many, I think. The planes were flying mostly at low altitude, less than is necessary for a parachute to deploy. And ejector seats had not been invented.

[Guest Jack Benson]

Hi,

 

Just a question, how many of those contributing to this excellent and entertaining thread have either served in the RN or have any practical experience in Naval Aviation?

 

I ask, as a well known contributor to a similar thread on WT claimed to have landed/launched from a steam driven RN carrier despite the fact that to be a cats/wires aviator requires a minimum age of at least sixty four plus. 

 

Cheers

 

Jack

 

 

Edited July 14, 2019 by Jack Benson
practical has two c's

[mow]

Going slightly off topic re carrier operations, this is the obituary of a pilot who landed a Swordfish floatplane on Ark Royal in 1940. 

 

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/military-obituaries/naval-obituaries/5990551/Lieutenant-Commander-Ben-Breese.html

[PatB]

3 hours ago, Joseph_Pestell said:

 

Not very many, I think. The planes were flying mostly at low altitude, less than is necessary for a parachute to deploy. And ejector seats had not been invented.

Dunno about that. I've always been under the impression that WW1 combat pilots would gain as much altitude as possible before flying over the front, both to avoid ground fire and to gain an advantage over any opponents who happened to be around, and so many engagements would start at anything up to 12-15,000 feet (pretty much the limit without oxygen for the pilot or supercharging for the engine) and spiral down, sometimes as far as ground level. Depending at what point the plane was crippled there'd be a reasonable chance of exiting and surviving (if not subsequently shot at).

 

And then there were, as I noted previously, the myriad structural and mechanical failures which also killed pilots in some numbers, and which could happen at any time and altitude.

[brack]

4 hours ago, jjb1970 said:

I wonder how many lives could have been saved by issuing aircrew with parachutes in WW1, quite aside from the ethical matter of saving lives it was dreadfully inefficient to throw away so many pilots and observers. 

And back to railways. See Mr ER Calthrop. I believe the RFC report on his parachute was that whilst successful it might "impair the fighting spirit of pilots"... certainly by the end of ww1 the powers that be relented and used calthrop's parachute design, but mostly for dropping agents.

[Frond]

3 hours ago, Joseph_Pestell said:

 

Not very many, I think. The planes were flying mostly at low altitude, less than is necessary for a parachute to deploy. And ejector seats had not been invented.

 

Sorry I disagree on two counts.

 

Most  WW1 air operations were conducted at relatively high altitude - it was not uncommon for pilots to suffer from the extreme cold and lack of oxygen associated with height. Secondly parachutes can be effective even when used close to the ground, paratroopers routinely jump from as low as 800 feet in practice and in actual combat it would be down to half that - the less time you are dangling helplessly in the air the better!