Strange SPAD at Chalfont & Latimer?

[martin_wynne]

Am I reading this right (from RAIB today)?

 

After a SPAD and automatic train stop, the driver resets the brake and carries on regardless? Into a near-miss.

 

https://www.gov.uk/government/news/signal-passed-at-danger-and-subsequent-near-miss-at-chalfont-latimer-station

 

Martin.

[SHMD]

I think you are.

 

This one will be interesting.

 

 

Kev.

[uax6]

Its a bit more than that, I've seen the internal LT reports, but it was so long ago I can't remember what they said now, other than the air was taken off the frame to remove the unit...

 

How many locations outside LT still use air to move points and signals?

 

Andy G

[Jeremy Cumberland]

The actions of the driver suggest he was completely oblivious to having passed the signal at danger and that he thought he was dealing with a train fault.

[caradoc]

Glasgow Central station area, and Perth, still have pneumatically operated points, although at the former many have been converted to motor operation. It was always interesting at Central when the compressors failed or there was a major air leak ! 

 

[iands]

Obviously we will need to await the RAIB report for the full facts, but others (other than just the driver) could be involved with the movement after the SPAD. I'll not comment further until then, but will be interesting to read the full report. 

[Pete the Elaner]

No safety system can prevent stupidity like this.

[martin_wynne]

No.2 on the RAIB bullet list is "Chiltern Railways’ arrangements regarding the training, competence and fitness of its train drivers".

 

So there is a strong hint of where they expect the investigation to go.

 

Martin.

[St. Simon]

2 hours ago, Pete the Elaner said:

No safety system can prevent stupidity like this.

How do you know it was stupidity? There might have been a perfectly logical reason for the drivers actions, just unfortunately in this instance they may have been wrong 

 

We have been give a very small piece of the puzzle, so don’t immediately go down the ‘stupidity’ route.

 

2 hours ago, martin_wynne said:

No.2 on the RAIB bullet list is "Chiltern Railways’ arrangements regarding the training, competence and fitness of its train drivers".

 

So there is a strong hint of where they expect the investigation to go.

 

Martin.

Not necessarily, all these sorts of incidents have to investigate the competence regimes, regardless of whether the final analysis shows problems or not. It maybe that they have some information about such policies, but in the end, it may not necessarily be related to the incident.

 

Simon

[simontaylor484]

Reading the press release this morning (im just an enthusiast with no rail experience). It does seem a strange situation as to what has happened since the SPAD. Im sure the report will be interesting reading. At least no one was injured

[caradoc]

We cannot and should not make assumptions or pre-judge the report, but the RAIB statement is crystal-clear on what happened, to be established is the reason(s) why.

[Boris]

Fascinating

[adb968008]

I wonder what was going through the tube drivers mind seeing this unit come towards him, stopping just 23m short.

 

Edited July 8, 2020 by adb968008

[adb968008]

15 hours ago, Jeremy C said:

The actions of the driver suggest he was completely oblivious to having passed the signal at danger and that he thought he was dealing with a train fault.

It could be an interesting explanation.

[NorthEndCab]

17 hours ago, Jeremy C said:

The actions of the driver suggest he was completely oblivious to having passed the signal at danger and that he thought he was dealing with a train fault.

 

I’d agree, but the first thing you must do, before anything else  when stopped out of course is contact the signaller, which doesn’t appear to have happened here for whatever reason. At least not according to that statement.

 

As ever, we don’t have the full picture and will have to wait for the report. 

[martin_wynne]

This wording strikes me as odd, I've read it several times trying to make sense of what the RAIB are suggesting:

 

 "Shortly afterwards, the train driver reset the automatic brake equipment and the train continued"

 

All by itself? Was it downhill?

 

It reminds me of those signs in supermarkets "the pickled onions have moved to aisle no. 9". Not me guv.

 

Martin.

Edited July 8, 2020 by martin_wynne

[PaulRhB]

There’s a lot of info missing that’s then been taken here to say it’s the driver. It doesn’t say he did or didn’t contact anyone before resetting it and that may be part of the investigation. 
I’ve had drivers save it from being an incident by questioning an instruction from two other levels of their fleet. 

There are at least three scenarios I can think of for this incident and different people responsible depending on that. Miscommunication as well as none at all are both possible from what’s said. 
 

As usual wait for the report, there’s too much left hanging by these interim statements because of the legal implications to use them as a suggestion even though I agree they can read that way. 

 

[Mike_Walker]

4 hours ago, martin_wynne said:

This wording strikes me as odd, I've read it several times trying to make sense of what the RAIB are suggesting:

 

 "Shortly afterwards, the train driver reset the automatic brake equipment and the train continued"

 

All by itself? Was it downhill?

 

It reminds me of those signs in supermarkets "the pickled onions have moved to aisle no. 9". Not me guv.

 

Martin.

There is a 1 in 105 falling gradient from JT6 towards Chalfont & Latimer. However, to reset the tripcock on a Chiltern 165 you press the "uncouple" button which has a protective flip-up cover and will only activate with both the PBC and direction selector in the neutral or off positions. It is therefore extremely unlikely the train restarted itself.

 

Like others, I can think of several possible scenarios causing this incident but whilst we now know what happened we must await the RAIB report to find why and who did/did not contact who. This was an initial press release by the RAIB an therefore has to be brief (vague) in what it says.

[Nearholmer]

24 minutes ago, Mike_Walker said:

but whilst we now know what happened

 

Having read this thread, and the links, I personally wouldn't claim to have the faintest idea what happened.

 

The bare-bones summary poses a huge number of questions about what exactly happened, and the first one of that huge number to leap to my mind was the very same thing that Paul RhB raises above.

[caradoc]

What happened is that the route was set and signalled for one train, another train passed a protecting signal at danger, ran through points and was diverted through another set of points head-on towards the first train, but fortunately no collision occurred. The issues the RAIB report focusses on give a fair indication of the direction the investigation will take. 

 

[96701]

This sounds similar to the events that led to the Ladbrook Grove crash except in those days, nothing stopped a train after passing a red signal. It would appear that the driver missed the red and didn't appreciate why the train stopped.

[johnofwessex]

Going back a few years wasnt there an incident on Chiltern when a driver isolated TPWS?

[PaulRhB]

5 minutes ago, johnofwessex said:

Going back a few years wasnt there an incident on Chiltern when a driver isolated TPWS?

I don’t know about that one but there have been rule changes to clarify the difference between temporary and full isolation and the conditions that apply. Temporary isolation for authorised passing a signal and associated TPWS only lasts a short period and automatically resets. 

[Tony Davis]

I used to be a Supervisor at Chalfont & Latimer (Back in the 90's) so I'm watching this with interest. I found out about it first on the Raildate newsletter and a link from there brought me to an article that gave another link to a UK gov site which sends out (any) updates to the incident.

 

 

[w124bob]

I've seen a diagram which seemed to show the LT unit signalled across the path of the 165, what struck me was why. The safer mode of operation looked to, be get the 165 into the station then set the route for the LT. Whats the normal operational set up here, was one of the trains late or do LT take priority and is it signalling with no TPWS but LT tripcock or both? I'm not familiar with the area but am ex footplate, somethings just don't add up here.If there are errors on the part of the Chiltern driver, it seems to be look like mulitple failures of operating procedures.

Thankfully the bare facts and timeline are relatively easy to put together with modern data recorders, it'll be the "whys" which can take time particularly if there are corporate issues to look at. 

Edited July 12, 2020 by w124bob