Top ten events of BR between 1948-52

[LMS2968]

It might not be realised that crossing the local from Up Slow to Up fast was the scheduled move; it wasn't that Signal Armitage decided himself to do it to allow it pass the (coal?) train ahead on the Up Slow.

[Right Away]

Perhaps, not a “milestone” event, but Arthur Peppercorn, last CME of the LNER, passed away in 1951.

Edited November 19, 2020 by Right Away

[rodent279]

I think the impact on rail safety of the introduction of the all steel MK1 coach is often overlooked. Had the stock at both Harrow and Lewisham been all MK1's or derivatives, then the number of deaths would have been lessened, possibly drastically, although both would still have been major accidents, with many casualties.

Edited November 19, 2020 by rodent279

[Pandora]

The dropping of  the LNER project for a fleet of 25 diesels for the ECML London to Newcastle passenger service,including new depots at London and Newcastle,  it was one of three modernisation  projects for the LNER  to be carried over into BR ownership,  the others being the  Woodhead line and the  London to  Shenfield suburban electrification.

Edited November 20, 2020 by Pandora

[The Johnster]

7 hours ago, rodent279 said:

I think the impact on rail safety of the introduction of the all steel MK1 coach is often overlooked. Had the stock at both Harrow and Lewisham been all MK1's or derivatives, then the number of deaths would have been lessened, possibly drastically, although both would still have been major accidents, with many casualties.

Good point with which I agree, but it must be remembered that the concurrent Thompson and Bullied stock was constructed in similar fashion; all-steel construction with centrally mounted 'buckeye' buffer couplings and bow ends for crash resistance.  The largest number of any single type of coach built at this period was the ex-LMS Stanier with flat ends and screw couplings, which were a pre-war design and not really up to 'best practice' scratch by 1948.  It must also be mentioned that BR mk1 non- gangwayed stock was no great improvement in terms of crash resistance. 

Edited November 20, 2020 by The Johnster

[rodent279]

5 hours ago, The Johnster said:

Good point with which I agree, but it must be remembered that the concurrent Thompson and Bullied stock was constructed in similar fashion; all-steel construction with centrally mounted 'buckeye' buffer couplings and bow ends for crash resistance.  The largest number of any single type of coach built at this period was the ex-LMS Stanier with flat ends and screw couplings, which were a pre-war design and not really up to 'best practice' scratch by 1948.  It must also be mentioned that BR mk1 non- gangwayed stock was no great improvement in terms of crash resistance. 

Is that because the non-gangwayed stock was not bow-ended?

 

I hadn't realised that the Bullied and Thompson stock was also all steel with buckeyes. Was it also all welded?

 

Looking at it from where we are now, 30+ years post-Clapham and the other spate of late 80's/early 90's accidents involving MK1 slam door stock, I think our view of such stock is a little tainted-but it was a vast improvement in safety terms on the steel underframe/wooden body construction that dominated the stock inherited by BR.

[JohnR]

16 hours ago, Steamport Southport said:

 

Around Merseyside and area to places like Warrington, possibly Preston and including North Wales. All depends on funding.

 

It's a fantastic system. Great for acceleration. I doubt you could really call any of the Merseyrail system a Metro. It's all ex mainlines apart from a tiny bit in the city centre and to Birkenhead. Your talking about the Birkenhead to London route, CLC Liverpool to Manchester and ex L&YR mainlines to Southport and Preston.

 

It's certainly not obsolete.

 

 

Jason

 

At the risk of going off-topic, there is now also some consideration being given to the logical extensions in the southern region, Uckfield, South Downs, Ashford-Hastings.

 

[Titan]

18 hours ago, Steamport Southport said:

 

Perfect for suburban services though. Which is what it was mostly used for.

 

25KV was ideal for main lines, but not for densely used services which were stop and start. Also would have been next to useless on systems such as Merseyrail (probably the most important suburban service outside the capital).

 

750V obsolete? Is that why they are building new trains and considering extending it....

 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Rail_Class_777

 

 

Jason

 

It seems that you have the right answer for the wrong reasons.  It was not the density of service or the stop start nature of suburban services that was the issue, more that in a dense urban environment you have a disproportionate number of bridges compared to open route.  So much so that the extra costs and compromises for the bridges on 25Kv outweigh the advantages and savings in not having so many substations etc. 

 

In fact third rail has some serious issues on dense stop/start services that 25Kv does not suffer from at all. Due to the very high currents drawn whilst accelerating on third rail, there are real problems with current leakage as thousands of amps tries to find its way back to the substations.  This can cause issues like accelerated corrosion of metallic structures nearby due to electrolytic action, to affecting signaling equipment, with at least one accident caused by three trains accelerating simultaneously in the same section causing the return voltage on the rails to rise to a sufficiently high level that it back fed a signalling relay and caused a set of points to change.

 

25Kv with its low currents can handle far more power than third rail without issue, which is exactly what you need when you want fast acceleration with many trains on a dense service.

 

Unfortunately mixing 3rd rail and 25Kv OLE has its own issues. Yes it can be done, but to make the most of it you need expensive dual system trains, and any existing 3rd rail only units become restricted in their use.  This is particularly an issue where extensions are concerned. If you extend a service that goes from A to B such that it now terminates at C, but with a different system, rather than just adding a few extra 3rd rail units you now need to replace every train on that service with dual system units. Earthing and bonding for third rail, 25Kv and signalling where they overlap can be done but has its own issues too.

[rodent279]

Wasn't there a gas main that exploded up in Manchester, which was traced to suspected electrolytic corrosion from nearby electrified railways?

[The Stationmaster]

18 hours ago, The Johnster said:

AWS was a major advance and is still at the core of operations today; the isolation of it in the cab of the HST invovled in the 1997 Southall collision.  It's lack was certainly highlighted by the BoT report and the press at the time of the Harrow and Wealdstone crash, which had been caused primarily by a train not responding to a searchlight distant signal showing yellow (it is possible that strong hazy sunlight glare played a part in this).  The media don't let go on something like this when they've got the bit between their teeth and the rate of installation of AWS became a feature of their reporting of more accidents in the 50s, notably Lewisham.  It was coincidental that the planned trials of the system began within a very short time of the Harrow accusation, but the reporting made it look like a response, which it wasn't. 

 

Press reporting of the Harrow and Wealdstone accident also highlighted the action of the signalman who had pathed a local commuter train on to the up main to pass another similar train in the up slow platform, as if he'd taken a terrible and unauthorised risk in placing it in the path of an oncoming express and was thus partially to blame for the carnage, but he had acted within the rules, local instructions, and correctly according to an instruction to give morning commuter traffic priority over late running up expresses; the local train was adequately protected by the searchlight distant and the home signals at danger, but the driver sighted them far too late to slow the train sufficiently to lessen the appalling impact of the initial rear end collision.  In fact he may not have braked until he saw the local occupying the up main platform ahead of him, by which time he'd probably already spotted the approaching down train.

 

AWS, had it existed, might well have alerted the driver of the up Perth train to the yellow aspect of the distant and the train would have pulled up normally at the home signal, but this is conjecture.  AWS works most effectively in conjunction with MAS signalling where it gives a visual and audible signal confirming the aspect of each and every signal, not just the distants (or signals acting as distants showing yellow aspects, there are no distants, homes, or starters in MAS signalling).  GW type ATS, which can be regarded as a predecessor to AWS but worked in a different way, only ever worked in conjunction with semaphore or searchlight distant signals, and never applied to stop signals. 

 

A similar situation with press/media reporting of accidents arose in the late 90s with the media seizing on the lack of cab signalling and automatic train stops, with the same discussion of how the introduction of such is constrained by costs, which it is, but ignoring the technical difficulties. 

Johnster  will you please check facts before you post stuff?   

1. Inspecting Officers' Reports had for a good many years before the Harrow collision been advocating the widesptread adoption of ATC at Distant Signals.  The comment in that respect in the Harrow Report was nothing new but because of the nature of the triple collision and the high casualty toll it received far more press attention particularly as the trials of BR AWS were so near in time in respect of the investigation and Report.

2. The Up Distant Signals at Hatrrow No1 were not searchlight signals but multi-lens signals with two yellow aspects (one being the auxiliary) and one green - the standard LMS/LMR arrangement for colour light distant signals for good few years.

3.What strong sunlight?  The morning was foggy - a subject which occupied much of the investigation as a possible cause for missing the Distant Signal

4. Signalman Armitage at Harrow No.1 was atrociously, and ignorantly, criticised in the press at the time and you are repeating that with your ill-advised repetition of their nonsense.   Armitage's actions were 100% in accordance with the Rules & Regulations and Regulating Instructions and the local train was - as already noted - booked to cross to the Up Fast at Harrow No.1.  Armitage did nothing wrong and took no ill advised action whatsoever as the Report made absolutely clear.  In fact the inspecting Officer went to considerable lengths with additional calculations to prove that Armitage had not done the things he was being ignorantly alleged to have done - no doubt in order to ally the sort of rubbish the press was peddling  and which you have repeated without bothering to dismiss them as they ignorant nonsense they were.  

5.  And where did you dig up or invent the nonsense you come up with about GWR ATC (latterlt renamed as AWS of course)?  Of course it was used with MAS (although mainly in BR days) and it was very obviously also used with twin lens distant signals.  And that was still very much the case in the days when you and I were working on the railway. 

 

Regrettably the sort of ignorant treatment he received from the press severely undermined his health leading to mental problems which dogged him for years after the collisions and meant he could no longer work as a Signalman.

 

AWS might have prevented the collision - we will never know - but it is interesting to note that there have been occasional instances where it has not prevented collisions.  For example the Southall West Jcn collision where an HST ran into the back of the stationary Malago Vans on the Up Main Line, completely demolishing one GUV and badly damaging another was very definitely neither avoided not mitigated by AWS which was admitted by both Drivers in the cab of the HST to be in full working order ands which they had ignored at both the double and single yellow signals.  

 

It was a classic example of what might possibly have happened at Harrow that morning and which some former enginemen recognise as what some of us have termed the '(we're) never checked here' syndrome meaning exactly what it says - that was a place where they always got a clear run.  But we will never know what caused Driver Jones to miss the Distant Signal and, seemingly. the Outer Home at Harrow that morning.

[caradoc]

21 hours ago, Steamport Southport said:

......such as Merseyrail (probably the most important suburban service outside the capital).

 

 

Off-topic, sorry, but I must take issue with that; Surely Glasgow has the most extensive, and therefore most important, suburban service outside London !

[The Johnster]

4 hours ago, The Stationmaster said:

Johnster  will you please check facts before you post stuff?   

1. Inspecting Officers' Reports had for a good many years before the Harrow collision been advocating the widesptread adoption of ATC at Distant Signals.  The comment in that respect in the Harrow Report was nothing new but because of the nature of the triple collision and the high casualty toll it received far more press attention particularly as the trials of BR AWS were so near in time in respect of the investigation and Report.

2. The Up Distant Signals at Hatrrow No1 were not searchlight signals but multi-lens signals with two yellow aspects (one being the auxiliary) and one green - the standard LMS/LMR arrangement for colour light distant signals for good few years.

3.What strong sunlight?  The morning was foggy - a subject which occupied much of the investigation as a possible cause for missing the Distant Signal

4. Signalman Armitage at Harrow No.1 was atrociously, and ignorantly, criticised in the press at the time and you are repeating that with your ill-advised repetition of their nonsense.   Armitage's actions were 100% in accordance with the Rules & Regulations and Regulating Instructions and the local train was - as already noted - booked to cross to the Up Fast at Harrow No.1.  Armitage did nothing wrong and took no ill advised action whatsoever as the Report made absolutely clear.  In fact the inspecting Officer went to considerable lengths with additional calculations to prove that Armitage had not done the things he was being ignorantly alleged to have done - no doubt in order to ally the sort of rubbish the press was peddling  and which you have repeated without bothering to dismiss them as they ignorant nonsense they were.  

5.  And where did you dig up or invent the nonsense you come up with about GWR ATC (latterlt renamed as AWS of course)?  Of course it was used with MAS (although mainly in BR days) and it was very obviously also used with twin lens distant signals.  And that was still very much the case in the days when you and I were working on the railway. 

 

Regrettably the sort of ignorant treatment he received from the press severely undermined his health leading to mental problems which dogged him for years after the collisions and meant he could no longer work as a Signalman.

 

AWS might have prevented the collision - we will never know - but it is interesting to note that there have been occasional instances where it has not prevented collisions.  For example the Southall West Jcn collision where an HST ran into the back of the stationary Malago Vans on the Up Main Line, completely demolishing one GUV and badly damaging another was very definitely neither avoided not mitigated by AWS which was admitted by both Drivers in the cab of the HST to be in full working order ands which they had ignored at both the double and single yellow signals.  

 

It was a classic example of what might possibly have happened at Harrow that morning and which some former enginemen recognise as what some of us have termed the '(we're) never checked here' syndrome meaning exactly what it says - that was a place where they always got a clear run.  But we will never know what caused Driver Jones to miss the Distant Signal and, seemingly. the Outer Home at Harrow that morning.

My information is not incorrect in as much as it is based on the account given by LTC Rolt in 'Red for Danger' (a book which should in my view be issued as a matter of course to all those working in the railway industry); IIRC he describes the distant as a colour light signal which I took to mean a searchlight; the effect as presented to an approaching driver is much the same.  Rolt states that the weather had been misty but that at the time of the collision the mist had dissapated giving way to a bright hazel the Perth train's driver was looking almost directly into a sun not far above the horizon and the glare would have been considerable, and may well have had a greater effect on him because he was nearing the end of a long night shift in which he had worked from Euston to Crewe; the delayed Perth was his back working, but this is supposition and based on my own experience sighting colour light signals in such conditions.

 

I did not repeat the press' incorrect and unwarranted criticism of the signalman except in the sense of pointing out that it was incorrect and unsubstaniated.  I stated unequivocally that Armitage acted completely correctly and in accordance with rules and instructions, but did not know at the time I wrote this that the movement of the up local from slow to fast lines was a booked normal procedure.  He had a grandstand view of the horror, which would have affected anyone, and no doubt suffered PTSD as a result; the press attack on him was scurrilous and shameful, and never AFAIK apologised for.  He was fully vindicated at the Board of Trade inquiry but that must have been of little comfort to him.  i have my own mental health issues and sympathise with Armitage fully; he was unfairly treated and suffered despite the inquiry's strenuous and creditable attempt to clear his name.   I suspect that you 'scanned' rather than assiduously read my post; I am guilty of this myself on occasion!

 

We will, as you rightly say, never really know why Driver Jones did not respond to the distant signal or the outer home, and there may have been any number of contributing factors to this failure, or a combination of them.  I have suggested but not stated glare and eyestrain through fatigue, but some other footplate incident may have disturbed his view of the outer home, which had he responed to it would have made the collision far less serious and possibly avoidable.  You have raised the possibility of the 'never checked here before' syndrome, another conjecture but quite plausible, and I have witnessed a minor collision caused by this myself (long after the end of my railway career, incidentally).  Railwaymen like to work to a routine and do each job in the same way every time, and become stressed when working is 'out of course'.  In this scenario, a major factor in the accident is the late running of the up Perth (I am not aware of the cause of this but am aware that the WCML did not have the world's best reputation for timekeeping, and that this may have been a long term cultural issue).  The lateness could be regarded as part of the reason that Jones's eyes were probably fatigued and strained by the sun's glare in the haze which he would not have had to encounter had his train been running to time, and which may have been a factor in his missing the outer home, as well as the possibility that he'd never before encountered adverse signals at Harrow and Wealdstone when working the up Perth, one of his link jobs. 

 

These are suppositions and kite flying on both our parts.  IIRC the GW type ATC ramps that I encounterd on the raiway in the 70s were all associated with semaphore signalling and distants, some colour light (Tram Inn for example, approach lit on occasion as well) and BR type AWS with MAS signalling, but it's a long time ago and my memory may not be as accurate as i think it is...

[LMS2968]

I think you have mixed up two incidents from 'Red for Danger'; I've just dug out my copy to check. L.T.C. Rolt, in his description of Harrow, states,". . . No. 46242 which had passed a colour light distant and two semaphores at Danger in patchy fog . . ." There is no mention of a bright haze.

 

I think you've remembered parts of the derailment at Bourne End on 30 September 1945 when 6157 went through the 20 m.p.h. crossover (Fast to Slow?) at about 50. Again, a colour light distant was involved. "It was a fine, clear morning with some haze, and the low sun was shining directly into his (the driver's) eyes." In this case there was also some ambiguity in the meaning of a Double Yellow indication, which was discussed in the report.

[JeremyC]

16 hours ago, The Johnster said:

Good point with which I agree, but it must be remembered that the concurrent Thompson and Bullied stock was constructed in similar fashion; all-steel construction with centrally mounted 'buckeye' buffer couplings and bow ends for crash resistance.  The largest number of any single type of coach built at this period was the ex-LMS Stanier with flat ends and screw couplings, which were a pre-war design and not really up to 'best practice' scratch by 1948.  It must also be mentioned that BR mk1 non- gangwayed stock was no great improvement in terms of crash resistance. 

As far as I know neither Thompson or Bulleid stock were all steel. The bodies were steel paneling on a wooden frame. The underframes were steel  fitted, on vestibule stock, with buckeye couplers. 

Edited November 20, 2020 by JeremyC

[62613]

17 hours ago, The Johnster said:

Good point with which I agree, but it must be remembered that the concurrent Thompson and Bullied stock was constructed in similar fashion; all-steel construction with centrally mounted 'buckeye' buffer couplings and bow ends for crash resistance.  The largest number of any single type of coach built at this period was the ex-LMS Stanier with flat ends and screw couplings, which were a pre-war design and not really up to 'best practice' scratch by 1948.  It must also be mentioned that BR mk1 non- gangwayed stock was no great improvement in terms of crash resistance. 

I think Gresley introduced the buckeye on the GNR in 1906, along with all-steel underframes; but only for gangwayed stock.

 

[DY444]

On 19/11/2020 at 15:10, The Johnster said:

Because a) we’re stuck with it and b) it has it’s uses in underground/metro systems where tunnel headroom is an issue.  On the Southern Region, the extension of a suburban network to Brighton and Portsmouth might be arguably appropriate pre WW2, but the Kent Coast and Bournemouth schemes were undertaken at a time when 25kv was an established standard, and not only should but could IMHO have been used for these schemes. 
 

Where are they considering extending it?

 

The reason the Kent Coast and Bournemouth weren't done at 25kV was simple.  It was hugely expensive.  The 3rd rail already existed as far as Gillingham, Maidstone, Sevenoaks and Sturt Lane so extending it was considerably less expensive than the alternatives.

 

Extensions are possible for Wokingham - Ash, Shawford Junction - Reigate, Hurst Green - Uckfield and Ore - Ashford.  In a sane world each would be no-brainers given the extensive extant electric network surrounding them but when it comes to rail transport we don't live in a sane world.  People who should know better such as Chris Gibb, roared on by the unaccountable and frankly laughable outfit that is the ORR, claim that electrifying those gaps at 25kV AC would cost the same as doing it in DC.  That wasn't true at the time of Kent Coast and Bournemouth and it isn't true now.

[rodent279]

Reviving this topic, one other BR success story was the B4 bogie, & its derivatives, although strictly speaking the first prototype B4's came along a couple of years after 1952, in around 54-55. IMHO a quality of ride that has only been significantly bettered by the BT10.

[Nearholmer]

On 19/11/2020 at 11:52, The Johnster said:

IMHO the biggest failure of the nationalised railway was the continuation of the Southern’s 750v third rail system, already looking obsolete in 1948 and not suitable for main line passenger or heavy freight work.  It should have been progressively replaced and extended with 25kv OHLE. 

Except for a couple of very significant factors:

 

- 25kV 50Hz electrification was still in its infancy in 1948. The leaders in the field were a group of Alsatian engineers, and the BTC was very much awaiting the outcome of their tests and trials (its all very clearly described in a BTC report written at the time); and,

 

- the Kent Coast electrification, first on the list for SR/BR(S), included so much mileage of tight tunnels that even now, with 60+ years of technical progress, the thought of converting it to 25kV leaves engineers and economists with furrowed brows.

 

Whether it might have been wiser to use 25kV to Bournemouth is a different question, but in 1948-52 nobody was into the detailed planning of that (it was No.2 on the list, but unaffordable by a nationalised industry).

 

 

 

[Nearholmer]

On 21/11/2020 at 09:21, DY444 said:

The reason the Kent Coast and Bournemouth weren't done at 25kV was simple.  It was hugely expensive.  The 3rd rail already existed as far as Gillingham, Maidstone, Sevenoaks and Sturt Lane so extending it was considerably less expensive than the alternatives.

And, in 1948-52, 25kV was not yet quite a viable alternative.

Edited March 26, 2021 by Nearholmer

[phil-b259]

On 19/11/2020 at 16:21, The Johnster said:

 AWS works most effectively in conjunction with MAS signalling where it gives a visual and audible signal confirming the aspect of each and every signal, not just the distants (or signals acting as distants showing yellow aspects, there are no distants, homes, or starters in MAS signalling).

 

No it most certainly does NOT!

 

AWS is fundamentally a system designed around Semaphore signalling (which doesn't have yellow, or double yellow aspects to contend with.

 

AWS cannot distinguish between red, yellow or double yellow aspects - and as any half knowledgeable train planner on the souther region will tell you, the density of traffic means trains MUST end up getting double yellows on successive signals. That crates a situation where cancelling the AWS becomes a 'on autopilot' type reaction and has lead to a number of crashes where the driver does not react and simply cancels the warning without slowing down or stopping when encountering adverse signal aspects.

 

The Southern region did a lot of research into ways of getting the relevant information (i.e. whether the signal ahead was R, Y or YY) into drivers cabs but was eventually forced to stop by a combination of the BR board demanding regular AWS and the costs of the proposed southern system.

 

Fortunately Ireland was not so easily discouraged and their CAWS* system is thus what a proper MAS oriented warning system SHOULD be like - not one based around semaphore signalling like BR AWS

 

* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Continuous_Automatic_Warning_System

 

 

[phil-b259]

On 21/11/2020 at 09:21, DY444 said:

 

The reason the Kent Coast and Bournemouth weren't done at 25kV was simple.  It was hugely expensive.  The 3rd rail already existed as far as Gillingham, Maidstone, Sevenoaks and Sturt Lane so extending it was considerably less expensive than the alternatives.

 

Extensions are possible for Wokingham - Ash, Shawford Junction - Reigate, Hurst Green - Uckfield and Ore - Ashford.  In a sane world each would be no-brainers given the extensive extant electric network surrounding them but when it comes to rail transport we don't live in a sane world.  People who should know better such as Chris Gibb, roared on by the unaccountable and frankly laughable outfit that is the ORR, claim that electrifying those gaps at 25kV AC would cost the same as doing it in DC.  That wasn't true at the time of Kent Coast and Bournemouth and it isn't true now.

 

Its got nothing to do with cost!

 

Network Rail, the ORR and HSE are all opposed to exposed conductor rail due as it represents a serious hazard to staff and trespassers. Broadly speaking they believe the power supply should be out of reach by people (which means overheads) or failing that covered in plastic like the DLR system.

 

As a result installing any more conventional 3rd rail was effectively banned from the late 1990s - and thats why it has been stated that 'filling the gaps' like Ashford to Ore would need to be done with 25KV overheads.

 

I understand that recently there has been a suggestion that the ORR might accept short discontinuous bits of 3rd rail that are only live when a train is in close proximity combined with battery power as a possible way forward - though this in itself is problematic as it would only be a matter of time before someone gets them confused with the rest of the 3rd rail network which is of course permanently energised.

[Nearholmer]

9 minutes ago, phil-b259 said:

The Southern region did a lot of research into ways of getting the relevant information (i.e. whether the signal ahead was R, Y or YY) into drivers cabs

Yep, SRAWS, I remember having a tiny role in some tests of the system, using a test train based at Strawberry Hill, where we were intent on foisting yet more (blue) aspects on drivers, in an attempt to get effective control over the speed of trains through carriage washers.

[Nearholmer]

3 minutes ago, phil-b259 said:

Its got nothing to do with cost!

I read DY444 to be talking about the 1950s and 1960s, and it certainly had a huge amount to do with costs.

 

In fact, everything always does, even now, it’s just that more sophisticated ways of understanding the human and financial costs of deaths and injuries exist now than existed then, so that greater weight is given to worker-safety than was the case c60 years ago.

[rodent279]

16 minutes ago, phil-b259 said:

 

No it most certainly does NOT!

 

AWS is fundamentally a system designed around Semaphore signalling (which doesn't have yellow, or double yellow aspects to contend with.

 

AWS cannot distinguish between red, yellow or double yellow aspects - and as any half knowledgeable train planner on the souther region will tell you, the density of traffic means trains MUST end up getting double yellows on successive signals. That crates a situation where cancelling the AWS becomes a 'on autopilot' type reaction and has lead to a number of crashes where the driver does not react and simply cancels the warning without slowing down or stopping when encountering adverse signal aspects.

 

The Southern region did a lot of research into ways of getting the relevant information (i.e. whether the signal ahead was R, Y or YY) into drivers cabs but was eventually forced to stop by a combination of the BR board demanding regular AWS and the costs of the proposed southern system.

 

Fortunately Ireland was not so easily discouraged and their CAWS* system is thus what a proper MAS oriented warning system SHOULD be like - not one based around semaphore signalling like BR AWS

 

* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Continuous_Automatic_Warning_System

 

 

Interesting. So the issue is that BR AWS can't effectively distinguish between a proceed aspect and a stop aspect?

[LMS2968]

37 minutes ago, rodent279 said:

Interesting. So the issue is that BR AWS can't effectively distinguish between a proceed aspect and a stop aspect?

Basically, yes. To AWS the signal is either Off (green) or On (double Yellow, Single Yellow or Red); it cannot differentiate between these three.

 

What it does do is give warning that a signal is coming up usually in 200 yards, very useful in poor sighting conditions. In thick fog in a M.A.S. area, the warning buzzer tells the driver that he is about to meet an adverse signal and alerts him to make a very careful look out to see what aspect is displayed, easier than trying to maintain a constant vigil over several miles of track between signals. But he has to see the aspect; the AWS does not tell him.