Points - Open/Closed?

[Trog]

I was on an Engineering job once and asked the Signalman if he could reverse the points of the local crossover so I could move a machine from one line to the other, and he did not have a clue what I meant by reverse the points.

 

This was however the shift where I was called down to see the Area Civil Engineer on the Monday morning to explain why I had not given up the possession at the end of the work. Fortunately my explanation that I had not been the PIC was accepted as a valid reason for this. The track chargeman who was the PIC and the signalman having put my name down as being the PIC without telling me. I think the pair of them were inexperienced as I had walked them both through where the protection was to go, and I believe that the track chargeman at least did not have a clue as to where he was and where the three routes on site were to and from.

[Edwin_m]

1 hour ago, johnw1 said:

Point position is defined in two stages. First is Normal or Reverse, that is then followed by which switch is closed when the points are Normal ie Left Hand Switch Closed (LHSC) or Right Hand Switch Closed (RHSC). The switch closed when the points are deemed to be Normal is dependant on the layout and signalling arrangements.

There have been a couple of fairly scary near-misses in recent years when this has gone wrong during installation of new wiring, and the point control and detection have both ended up being wired the wrong way round.  

[Oldddudders]

6 minutes ago, Edwin_m said:

There have been a couple of fairly scary near-misses in recent years when this has gone wrong during installation of new wiring, and the point control and detection have both ended up being wired the wrong way round.  

This could have been even nastier if something had been on the down fast line at the time.

 

https://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/docsummary.php?docID=768

 

As Duty SM I'd already been on duty 12 hrs, so clearing this up was not what I or anyone else needed. 

[DY444]

2 minutes ago, Edwin_m said:

There have been a couple of fairly scary near-misses in recent years when this has gone wrong during installation of new wiring, and the point control and detection have both ended up being wired the wrong way round.  

 

Not just recently.  I recall an incident at Hither Green after the commissioning of the new signalling there during the London Bridge PSB scheme in the mid-70s.  A drawing office error wasn't picked up with the result that the wiring of a crossover in the relay room didn't match the layout on the ground and a derailment ensued.

[DY444]

5 minutes ago, Oldddudders said:

This could have been even nastier if something had been on the down fast line at the time.

 

https://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/docsummary.php?docID=768

 

As Duty SM I'd already been on duty 12 hrs, so clearing this up was not what I or anyone else needed. 

 

That's the one

Edited December 6, 2020 by DY444

[The Stationmaster]

2 hours ago, Trog said:

I was on an Engineering job once and asked the Signalman if he could reverse the points of the local crossover so I could move a machine from one line to the other, and he did not have a clue what I meant by reverse the points.

 

This was however the shift where I was called down to see the Area Civil Engineer on the Monday morning to explain why I had not given up the possession at the end of the work. Fortunately my explanation that I had not been the PIC was accepted as a valid reason for this. The track chargeman who was the PIC and the signalman having put my name down as being the PIC without telling me. I think the pair of them were inexperienced as I had walked them both through where the protection was to go, and I believe that the track chargeman at least did not have a clue as to where he was and where the three routes on site were to and from.

Alas all too common in terms of folk not getting things right - and I suspect in some respects now it is worse than it usually was in the past.  The Margam fatality Report makes very worrying reading not so much in the errors which led directly to the fatalities but in respect of what seems like a major disconnect between the paper wielders remote from the real railway and those actually doing the job.  Masses of procedures - not helped in my view by the Rule Book 'Handbook' extracts extractions - written at high level with seemingly little regard of the amount of stuff which has to be read, hoper fully absobed, and required to be understood, by those actually dealing with the job on the ground.

 

OK so I have long held that masses of paper pumped out from the top end of an organisation is more representative of a failure in safety management rather than a contribution to it but it is very clear from the Margam Report that there are two very distinct worlds out there for, in this instance, civil engineering staff.   where a letter containing two or three sentences was once considered adequate it is now several pages of 'procedure document' to say what could be put in those few sentences.

[DY444]

2 hours ago, The Stationmaster said:

Alas all too common in terms of folk not getting things right - and I suspect in some respects now it is worse than it usually was in the past.  The Margam fatality Report makes very worrying reading not so much in the errors which led directly to the fatalities but in respect of what seems like a major disconnect between the paper wielders remote from the real railway and those actually doing the job.  Masses of procedures - not helped in my view by the Rule Book 'Handbook' extracts extractions - written at high level with seemingly little regard of the amount of stuff which has to be read, hoper fully absobed, and required to be understood, by those actually dealing with the job on the ground.

 

OK so I have long held that masses of paper pumped out from the top end of an organisation is more representative of a failure in safety management rather than a contribution to it but it is very clear from the Margam Report that there are two very distinct worlds out there for, in this instance, civil engineering staff.   where a letter containing two or three sentences was once considered adequate it is now several pages of 'procedure document' to say what could be put in those few sentences.

 

I've always believed there's an optimum point for the level of complexity in safety processes where maximum effectiveness is achieved.  Go beyond that and it becomes too unwieldy and, either deliberately or accidentally, people cut corners and/or miss key things.  Also attempts to comply with all the documentation requirements on site creates time pressure which then in turn increases the likelihood of safety lapses.  Mountains of documentation often suggests a back office box ticking/backside covering culture; ie cover all conceivable bases and it won't be our fault if there's an accident.

 

As an aside I also think the loss of corporate memory/local knowledge/general railway knowledge is a major problem.  For instance I find it incomprehensible that errors are regularly made with basic fundamentals of on-track safety such as which line is which at a given location.

 

Edited December 6, 2020 by DY444

[JeremyC]

I've seen the use of the phrase opening or closing of points (to a siding or loop) in accident reports. The reports I'm thinking of are older ones (before circa 1900)

From evidence given to the enquiry into the Abbotts Ripton accident of 1876 "I heard the signalman there order us to shunt, and saw the points opened for us to do so......

https://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/docsummary.php?docID=934

Edited December 10, 2020 by JeremyC
Link added

[96701]

On 06/12/2020 at 11:38, The Stationmaster said:

Alas all too common in terms of folk not getting things right - and I suspect in some respects now it is worse than it usually was in the past.  The Margam fatality Report makes very worrying reading not so much in the errors which led directly to the fatalities but in respect of what seems like a major disconnect between the paper wielders remote from the real railway and those actually doing the job.  Masses of procedures - not helped in my view by the Rule Book 'Handbook' extracts extractions - written at high level with seemingly little regard of the amount of stuff which has to be read, hoper fully absobed, and required to be understood, by those actually dealing with the job on the ground.

 

OK so I have long held that masses of paper pumped out from the top end of an organisation is more representative of a failure in safety management rather than a contribution to it but it is very clear from the Margam Report that there are two very distinct worlds out there for, in this instance, civil engineering staff.   where a letter containing two or three sentences was once considered adequate it is now several pages of 'procedure document' to say what could be put in those few sentences.

Sorry, I'm not going to accept that. How many staff were bowled over when you worked in the industry? Deaths and near misses on the railway (and probably any other industry) always comes as a complete surprise to managers.

 

My railway experience includes life before Personal Track Safety certification and before high visibility vests were brought in. I was new to the office, when an OLE techy needed to test a new height and stagger gauge that involved looking down an eye hole, finding the contact wire and rotating a small wheel until the contact wire met up on the split screen that you were looking at. He decided that the best place to try this out was on a curve on the West coast Main Line somewhere near Oxenholme.

 

There I was looking down the eye hole when I heard the rails sing. As I grabbed the gauge and stepped into the cess, an electric loco came hammering around the corner. Another 2 seconds, and I would have been one of those who died in the name of "work".

 

We are now in the position of trying to measure compliance to standards. The standard is perfectly fine if people not only apply it to the letter, but more importantly, the principle. There have been many near misses where people on site have willfully avoided applying the standard, there have been near misses where people have miss-interpreted the standard through poor briefing and mentoring.

 

Yes, I agree that we have a way to go before management can be assured that people are applying a well written standard robustly and correctly, but I will not accept a return to the "old ways".

[96701]

Sorry, back on topic, Points or Turnouts are Normal or Reverse. Switches are open or closed. 

 

More training info https://youtu.be/ZuR5QTlfOzk

[adb968008]

On a tangent, the scissors at Bury interchange (4 points), always move all 4 together.

They are all set to crossover in all 4 directions, or all set to go straight/paralell.

 

not sure what is classed as open or closed there.

Edited December 10, 2020 by adb968008

[Michael Hodgson]

41 minutes ago, adb968008 said:

On a tangent, the scissors at Bury interchange (4 points), always move all 4 together.

They are all set to crossover in all 4 directions, or all set to go straight/paralell.

 

not sure what is classed as open or closed there.

You can't have flank protection on a scissors, but that still sounds an unusual choice.

If the interlocking  is such that one crossover only can be set at the same time,  you can have a converging collision. 

On the other hand if both crossovers are set the collision would be on the diamond, one train will be routed through the other.  I would have thought that the consequences of this would be rather more serious unless there are other complications to the layout.

 

You might save a lever by putting it all on the one, but four points ends is going to be a heavy pull - if it's mechanical.

[Wheatley]

It's power operated and any collision will be between trams about 10 feet off the platform end at a terminus, either way it will be low speed. I suspect it's been done to simplify the controls to a binary 'all normal' or 'all reversed', there being no need for anything more complex. 

[Edwin_m]

Indeed, flank protection isn't really a thing on tramways.  

[jim.snowdon]

5 hours ago, Wheatley said:

It's power operated and any collision will be between trams about 10 feet off the platform end at a terminus, either way it will be low speed. I suspect it's been done to simplify the controls to a binary 'all normal' or 'all reversed', there being no need for anything more complex. 

A typical arrangement on a proper tramway (Metrolink is a bit of a hybrid) would be for only the incoming facing point (which selects where the tram goes) to be motorised. The remaining three would be simply spring points as the routes out of the platforms are all unique.

 

5 hours ago, Edwin_m said:

Indeed, flank protection isn't really a thing on tramways.  

Correct, and when I was talking to audiences about the signalling on Croydon Tramlink, I would usually introduce the subject by saying that there is only one safety-critical element, the driver. Everything else is line of sight.

 

Metrolink is a bit of a hybrid as it is line of sight operation in the city centre and, I believe, on all of the extensions from Eccles onwards, but the sections out to Bury and Altrincham are signalled, albeit not to full heavy rail standards.

 

Jim

[The Stationmaster]

17 hours ago, 96701 said:

Sorry, I'm not going to accept that. How many staff were bowled over when you worked in the industry? Deaths and near misses on the railway (and probably any other industry) always comes as a complete surprise to managers.

 

My railway experience includes life before Personal Track Safety certification and before high visibility vests were brought in. I was new to the office, when an OLE techy needed to test a new height and stagger gauge that involved looking down an eye hole, finding the contact wire and rotating a small wheel until the contact wire met up on the split screen that you were looking at. He decided that the best place to try this out was on a curve on the West coast Main Line somewhere near Oxenholme.

 

There I was looking down the eye hole when I heard the rails sing. As I grabbed the gauge and stepped into the cess, an electric loco came hammering around the corner. Another 2 seconds, and I would have been one of those who died in the name of "work".

 

We are now in the position of trying to measure compliance to standards. The standard is perfectly fine if people not only apply it to the letter, but more importantly, the principle. There have been many near misses where people on site have willfully avoided applying the standard, there have been near misses where people have miss-interpreted the standard through poor briefing and mentoring.

 

Yes, I agree that we have a way to go before management can be assured that people are applying a well written standard robustly and correctly, but I will not accept a return to the "old ways".

Please read what I said Phil.  I talked about the complexity of procedures and the nasses of paper used to say some very simple things which come down from on high and teh disconnect by getting that 'right' in ppaerwork terms and what peopl at teh front end are actually having to do and what they do or don't have time to do.  And odd though it might sound to you some folk who I know are at teh sharp end of today's railway agreed with me.

 

In BR days thinsg were different because although a lot of the 'instructional' stuff in terms of paperwork and procedures were far simpler (and there was in reality shorter lines of communication and more importantly understanding between those who used them and those who wrote them).  The big failing was in training - by which I don't mean ticks on a sheet of paper saying it has been briefed in - and many people taking an uncorrected attitude that various things did not apply to them.   That part of the culture has I think been changed but there is instead a disconnect and the Margam Report shows that 9without calling it that) all too clearly with far too many examples apart from what led directly to the fatalities.

 

Another problem is that lineside safety has now very often been reduced to briefing and all too often people are working, sometimes in complex areas, at places they have never seen the skies over previously.  That is a change which, to be honest, no amount of site briefing will ever deal with because it is only by familiarity with a place and familiarity with the way infrastructure varies that you learn about teh safest way to work and move in any particular area.    

 

If I can write (and have written on several occasions) a personal safety section of a Rule Book in far fewer words than the RSSB Book and Handbooks and various procedures which makes it simpler to train in and easier to remember (the latter being the critical thing) why can't everybody achieve such levels of simple presentation?  And thank goodness nobody has been injured or killed where Rule Books (and safe working procedures for particular jobs) I have written are in use.  

 

But regrettably on the national network somebody was killed in a depot in the Midlands because he was not aware of a very basic track safety rule that applied when walking about in a depot - because it wasn't in the section of the Rule Book which applied to his job.  Because like much of the procedural stuff the important things can become lost in documents which are far too big and complex to be supplied universally and read by everyone to whom basic safety rules apply.  Mind you the Rule Book in many respects suffers an even worse disconnect than anything else because it is prepared by an outside organisation and is isn't subject to proper review by people who will be using its contents before it is published (and is extremely difficult to get corrected when it is wrong).  I would hope that procedures published by NR are at least subject to proper widespread review at the level at which they are apllicable before publication.