Abermule accident centenary

[corneliuslundie]

Today is the centenary of the Abermule accident which caused big changes to the way single lines were run. Abermule Community Association has created a short U-Tube item.

Jonathan

[corneliuslundie]

There is also a short video film of clearing up after the accident

Jonathan

[Andy Kirkham]

I can never forget LTC Rolt's chilling line - "Without troubling to remove it from its pouch, the driver placed it in his cab. It was his death warrant."

[D9020 Nimbus]

One wonders how many times drivers did just that — but had been given the correct token.

 

I don't think this accident made a lot of difference to single-line working — I suspect most other railways had the token machines in the signal box and interlocked with the signals. The Cambrian would soon become part of the GWR — the most safety-conscious of the "Big 4”. I notice that the GWR had a tendency to alternate between sections controlled by tablet and ones which used a miniature staff — perhaps an additional safeguard.

 

This was the only head-on crash involving passenger trains in the UK on a line controlled by token apparatus. I don’t think any other safety system has as good a record over such a long time.

 

Three years earlier, the same railway had a crash between two goods trains where the signalmen had somehow issued two tokens for the same section (Parkhall). Apparently the early-20th century equivalent of hacking into the token machine…

 

I remember being at a conference in Aberystwyth at Easter 1991. The locals were discussing the Abermule accident as if it had just happened…

[corneliuslundie]

And from our local paper
https://www.countytimes.co.uk/news/19039514.plaque-unveiled-memory-abermule-train-collision-victims-100th-anniversary/

Jonathan

[Tony Davis]

• You probably already know, but, just in case, there is a documentary about the accident on S4C clic/BBC iplayer. 

[wombatofludham]

The S4C programme dates from 1998 and was shown again last night on S4C.  It didn't really go into a lot of detail (although the revelation that the death of Lord Vane-Tempest who was a director of the Cambrian Railways, probably saved his cousin Winston Churchill from bankruptcy after he inherited a sizeable sum of money from Vane-Tempest, who was single when he died, was interesting).  I can however recommend the book "Deadly Tablet" by David Burkhill-Thomas, which I found a particularly engrossing look at the crash.

[Michael Hodgson]

On 26/01/2021 at 14:10, D9020 Nimbus said:

One wonders how many times drivers did just that — but had been given the correct token.

 

I don't think this accident made a lot of difference to single-line working — I suspect most other railways had the token machines in the signal box and interlocked with the signals. The Cambrian would soon become part of the GWR — the most safety-conscious of the "Big 4”. I notice that the GWR had a tendency to alternate between sections controlled by tablet and ones which used a miniature staff — perhaps an additional safeguard.

 

I always thought one of the risks of entering section with the wrong token was when automatic exchange apparatus was used.  You picked up the token at speed so you were already in the block before you got a chance to look at it.   

 

I don't think locking starters with the instrument was widespread until rather later.  I wouldn't say the GWR was any more or less safety-conscious than other railways - that's more a matter of attitude of particular groups of individual workers, and familiarity can breed contempt.  My impression of the GWR is that they tended to favour key token over the older tablet and staff instrument types.  Key token instruments are certainly easier to use.  However the GWR did colour code their tokens as an additional reminder, and anyway the various configurations had different shaped holes in the middle - but unfortunately both of these safeguards fail if the driver doesn't bother looking at them.   Other companies sometimes used to use key token between stations but tablet for long section working when an intermediate station was switched out.

[NCB]

I read, can't offhand remember where, that subsequently Indian signal boxes had a warning "Remember Abermule" pinned up.

[corneliuslundie]

Someone mentioned that last night at the HMRS Bletchley Group Zoom meeting, though I cannot remember whether it was India or another distant country. He said that they had been admiring the token apparatus in the signal box but when he said Abermule the signalman's face dropped. They knew all about it. And there was a notice.

Jonathan

[Michael Hodgson]

It was one of those disasters that every conscientious signalman knows about, along with Abbots Ripton, Quintinshill and Welwyn Garden City.  To do a safety critical job well you need to appreciate how easily accidents can happen, especially where human nature is  a factor.  Abermule was one where many railwaymen said "there but for the grace of God ..."

[Sandpiper]

On 26/01/2021 at 13:20, Andy Kirkham said:

....."Without troubling to remove it from its pouch, the driver placed it in his cab. It was his death warrant."

 

On one of the token sections I used to work, one of the signallers often put the token in the pouch back to front so the inscription could not be read. I often wondered if it was a little test for drivers and whether he checked with his colleague at the next box to see if the driver had taken the token out of the pouch.

 

I always took it out so I could check the inscription and then put it back in the correct way round.

[Michael Hodgson]

Just now, Michael Hodgson said:

There was no obligation on the driver to remove it from the pouch, only to verify that he had the right token.  If he could do that without removing it from the pouch, why bother?  Even though you take it out of the pouch it shouldn't really matter which way round you put it back as long as the starters are locked with instruments.  The signalman does have to remove it, since he has to put it through the instrument before he can clear the signal to send another train.

 

I think it was against signalman's instructions to put it in the pouch in such a way that that he couldn't read it.   Certainly bad practice, precisely because it tended to increase the risk of another Abermule.  A driver should never be given the wrong token in the first place; he is justified in being indignant if it does happen.  His check is a safeguard mitigating risk in the event of signalman error, and of course he is the first to be killed if he does meet a train coming the other way.  That should be a good enough incentive for any driver to check he's got the right token - and for his fireman to do so too!  Most accidents involved more than one breach of rules or point of failure.   Driver and signalman should insist that the token is always be handed over by the signalman or other authorised person, as involving a third party creates an unnecessary risk of misunderstandings.  Abermule was down to "sloppy working" or a casual attitude to safety rules, albeit with everybody doing what they could to expedite train working.

 

[Edwin_m]

2 hours ago, Michael Hodgson said:

There was no obligation on the driver to remove it from the pouch, only to verify that he had the right token.  If he could do that without removing it from the pouch, why bother?  Even though you take it out of the pouch it shouldn't really matter which way round you put it back as long as the starters are locked with instruments.  The signalman does have to remove it, since he has to put it through the instrument before he can clear the signal to send another train.

I think the point is that if the token was put in the pouch the wrong way round, the driver would have to take it out of the pouch to verify it.  Which may distract from other important duties such as observing the signal.  If they don't do that then one layer of defence is lost.  The interlock with the starter wouldn't prevent all possible accidents, for example if two trains were passing and the signalman gave each driver the wrong token so both starters were free.  It's then possible that he would realise the error, recover the token from the train not yet departed and in a state of flusterment replace it in the machine and accept a train into the occupied section.    

[Sandpiper]

On the route I was referring to, the shape of the token and the design of the pouch meant the token had to be removed from the pouch to check the inscription if it had been put in the wrong way round. Having taken it out, putting in back in the wrong way round again would be a bit of an odd thing to do.

 

I would suggest that putting it back in the correct way round would be good practice on the part of the driver. Putting it back in the wrong way round again would be just as sloppy as the signaller putting it in the wrong way round in the first place, unless as I suggested, it might simply have been the signaller setting a little test for the driver.

[Edwin_m]

22 minutes ago, Sandpiper said:

it might simply have been the signaller setting a little test for the driver.

If the driver saw it was the wrong way round they might think it wasn't worth bothering with taking it out, considering the other things they would be doing at the time.  So the test is something of a self-fulfilling prophecy.  

[APOLLO]

On 26/01/2021 at 13:20, Andy Kirkham said:

I can never forget LTC Rolt's chilling line - "Without troubling to remove it from its pouch, the driver placed it in his cab. It was his death warrant."

 

Rolt's book "Red for Danger" is a classic, and is one of my favourite books. The cover is a bit foreboarding also, but the text is very considerately written.

 

Another "classic" single line head on accident fully described was the one at Radstock on the old Somerset & Dorset railway.

 

 

Brit15

 

Brit15

[The Johnster]

A feature of the Abermule accident was that it took the combined negligence and inattention of every railwayman at Abermule, except the stationmaster who was o er the pub for lunch so could hardly take any moral high ground.  It is proof that even a system as good as this was, and make no mistake looking at it from a modern high tech viewpoint and dismissing it’s apparent crudity, this was and still is a very good system, can be defeated by a bunch of idiots working in close harmony, and this lot were a perfect storm. 
 

It is a chilling warning to all railwaymen, not just signalmen, of how a laxity on attitude to safety and familiarity-bred complacency can lead to your undoing.  I’m sure that when the train left Abermule and disappeared into the section, everybody was quite happy that they'd done their jobs and all was well.  
 

Remember Abermule. 

[phil-b259]

On 29/01/2021 at 06:38, Sandpiper said:

 

On one of the token sections I used to work, one of the signallers often put the token in the pouch back to front so the inscription could not be read.

 

 

When volunteering as a signalman on the Bluebell I have had a locomotive crew inspector ask me to do precisely that so he could check that the crew did comply with the rule book and make sure they had the correct token.

[phil-b259]

1 hour ago, The Johnster said:

It is proof that even a system as good as this was, and make no mistake looking at it from a modern high tech viewpoint and dismissing it’s apparent crudity, this was and still is a very good system....

 

 

 

Apart from the lack of interlocking between the token machine and the starting signal!

 

Had that been in place Abermule would never have happened because even if the driver gets handed the wrong token the starting signal giving permission to set off will not be able to be cleared unless the section ahead is free of trains.

 

Yes you could still end up with the wrong token arriving at the far end of the section having been carried through by a driver who doesn't check, but that train won't end up having a head on crash with something coming the other way.

 

 

[phil-b259]

On 29/01/2021 at 13:07, Edwin_m said:

The interlock with the starter wouldn't prevent all possible accidents, for example if two trains were passing and the signalman gave each driver the wrong token so both starters were free.  It's then possible that he would realise the error, recover the token from the train not yet departed and in a state of flusterment replace it in the machine and accept a train into the occupied section.    

 

Yes it would!

 

Interlocking token machines with starting signals makes sure that the signals protecting the single line at BOTH ENDS must be proved to be at danger / 'on' before it is possible to withdraw a token at either end. Interlocking with token machines isn't just confined to allowing the starter to be pulled you know!

 

If you work through all the permutations, if interlocking is applied between the starting signal and the token machines then the worst that can happen is the wrong token gets carried through the wrong section. No other train can enter said section due to the interlocking so no head on collision can happen without people ignoring signals!

 

It should also be noted that for a long time it has been a rule book requirement to advise drivers that a signal is to be replaced to danger (except for emergencies) precisely because they may have been distracted by other duties and may not have noticed. However  if the signalman requires the token to be retrieved then lets be honest its going to be an unusual enough occurrence for the driver to ask why giving the perfect opportunity for the signalman to tell the driver the starting signal has been replaced to danger.

 

There also is the little matter of the Guard - so if in the scenario you have outlined, having given back the tablet the driver decides to set off past the starting signal at danger (which its going to have to be if the token machine is properly interlocked with the signals) because the signalman now wishes to accept a train rather than send one, then the Guard should activate the continuous brake and stop the train.

[PatB]

IISTR reading (possibly in one of OS Nock's books) that there had also been a serious single line crash in India resulting from a signalman burgling his token machine to obtain a tablet for an occupied section. Perhaps that also has a bearing on Indian's railways keeping such things front-of-mind for the staff. 

 

Abermule is an excellent example of a system, so good that it appears foolproof to its users, allowing them to come to believe that it actually is. And it probably works as such for some time. Whilst there is now way of knowing for sure at this remove in time, it is highly likely that the individual actions of the staff at Abermule were matters of some habit, and also that such actions took place at other stations remote from higher authority. It is of some testament to the robustness of the electric token system that, in spite of inevitable human failings, it has worked as well as it has for as long as it has. 

 

Some years ago, some of Australia's single line network was being converted from token working to radio control (sorry, I don't know the exact details, as I'm not well versed in signalling technology). There was a degree of reluctance to embrace the new system by the rail unions. Inevitably this was portrayed in the media as typical Union obstruction ism, which I considered deeply unfair. Token systems have offered safe single-line work g for generations. It is hardly surprising that railwaymen, with a rather direct interest in the safety of the system, might be doubtful about abandoning it, for something without more than a century's pedigree. Especially one which lacks the tangible, physical assurance of having that token in the cab. 

[phil-b259]

12 minutes ago, PatB said:

 

Some years ago, some of Australia's single line network was being converted from token working to radio control (sorry, I don't know the exact details, as I'm not well versed in signalling technology). There was a degree of reluctance to embrace the new system by the rail unions. Inevitably this was portrayed in the media as typical Union obstruction ism, which I considered deeply unfair. Token systems have offered safe single-line work g for generations. It is hardly surprising that railwaymen, with a rather direct interest in the safety of the system, might be doubtful about abandoning it, for something without more than a century's pedigree. Especially one which lacks the tangible, physical assurance of having that token in the cab. 

 

 

 

Scotland has used a Radio based token system since the mid 1980s without any problems https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radio_Electronic_Token_Block

 

I suspect the Australian system is the same...

 

Edited February 28, 2021 by phil-b259

[PatB]

12 minutes ago, phil-b259 said:

 

 

 

Scotland has used a Radio based token system since the mid 1980s without any problems https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radio_Electronic_Token_Block

 

I suspect the Australian system is the same...

 

Yes, but Australia does have a strong Not Invented Here tendency in all areas of society, which is awkward, given how little is invented (or, at least, commercialised) here. And a 20 year (at the time) history doesn't quite have the clout of a 100 year one.

[kevinlms]

On 29/01/2021 at 21:35, Michael Hodgson said:

Abermule was down to "sloppy working" or a casual attitude to safety rules, albeit with everybody doing what they could to expedite train working.

I have to agree, that it was totally sloppy working by all. If ONE of them had done their job properly, the accident almost certainly wouldn't have occurred. You have to wonder how long dodgy following of the rules had gone on for. Such as unauthorised use of the token, where clearly, the closest person took possession.

 

They failed totally to 'expedite train working'.

 

 

Quintinshill was another example of total lack of following rules.