Carmont derailment - report today

[martin_wynne]

RAIB has today published its report into the Carmont (Stonehaven) derailment:

 

 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/607058eee90e076f4cfc84f9/IR012021_210413_Carmont.pdf

 

 

[Carl]

To be clear, this is the interim report, and there are some things which are subject to ongoing investigation.

[Oldddudders]

The Beeb website leads on this with the certainty that the signaller had no reason to think the line was blocked, which is important for the public to understand. Indeed the driver knew he'd passed this point not so long before going in the other direction, and it was fine. Those responsible for the integrity of the line's formation may not be feeling so comfy. 

[martin_wynne]

52 minutes ago, Oldddudders said:

Indeed the driver knew he'd passed this point not so long before going in the other direction, and it was fine.

 

Had the facing-point clips for the crossover been kept in the signal box (or on the train), the long delay before the train could return might have been avoided, and the landslip may have not yet happened.

 

[Grovenor]

Does the report make that point? It does seem ridiculous to me to provide an emergency crossover and not provide the signaller with the means to use it.

If the management really don't think signallers can be trained to apply clips then they should fit the points with FPLs.

 

[Oldddudders]

At one time the station porter, later termed Leading Railman, would have been passed out as competent to apply point clips, reporting to the signalman. He would also have been competent to act as handsignalman and undertake other Rule Book duties. Privatisation compartmentalised staff within the industry. Fine when it all works, infinitely less flexible when things go wrong. 

[iands]

54 minutes ago, martin_wynne said:

 

Had the facing-point clips for the crossover been kept in the signal box (or on the train), the long delay before the train could return might have been avoided, and the landslip may have not yet happened.

 

IMO it would be impractical to provide point clips on every loco and DMU/EMU operating on the network (not to mention an extremely expensive exercise) . At certain locations, in times gone by, point clips used to be locked in lineside locs (like signalling locs but empty of equipment, bar the actual point clips). Not sure if this is still "current practice" around the network, but evidently not at Carmont. 

[PerthBox]

2 hours ago, martin_wynne said:

 

Had the facing-point clips for the crossover been kept in the signal box (or on the train), the long delay before the train could return might have been avoided, and the landslip may have not yet happened.

 

 

The clamps and scotches were in the signalbox but the early shift signaller was not passed out on securing points, hence why the MOM (two actually, one from Aberdeen and one from Dundee, who arrived just before the train left) had to attend. I expect we'll be reading more about the RAIB's thoughts on that in the final report.

 

In any case it's pointless asking 'what if' - the accident happened and that's that.

Edited April 19, 2021 by PerthBox

[martin_wynne]

54 minutes ago, PerthBox said:

The clamps and scotches were in the signalbox

 

Thanks. I know only what is stated in the report:

 

42  A Network Rail Mobile Operations Manager (MOM) was tasked (at 07:40 hrs)
to travel to Carmont with the equipment for temporarily securing the crossover
to allow the passage of train 1T08.

 

Martin.

[PerthBox]

36 minutes ago, martin_wynne said:

 

Thanks. I know only what is stated in the report:

 

42  A Network Rail Mobile Operations Manager (MOM) was tasked (at 07:40 hrs)
to travel to Carmont with the equipment for temporarily securing the crossover
to allow the passage of train 1T08.

 

Martin.

 

Yep. However, it's an interim report and there's a balance to be found between simplification for the public and pedantic accuracy.

 

The fact is that appropriate equipment to secure the points was located in the signabox but the early shift signaller was unable to use it. That's been glossed over by RAIB presumably because it doesn't really make any material difference to the events or add anything to the findings; whether or not it'll figure in the final report remains to be seen. There are a number of other small aspects in the interim report's narrative leading up to the accident that have been simplified, glossed over somewhat or omitted entirely but they are all very minor details in the grand scheme of things. None of it changes the context of what happened and some of these may well yet be addressed in the final report.

Edited April 19, 2021 by PerthBox

[johnofwessex]

PARA 53. well done to the contractors staff

[rab]

3 hours ago, martin_wynne said:

 

Had the facing-point clips for the crossover been kept in the signal box (or on the train), the long delay before the train could return might have been avoided, and the landslip may have not yet happened.

 

Hindsight is a wonderful thing.

[PerthBox]

12 minutes ago, johnofwessex said:

PARA 53. well done to the contractors staff

 

Well done also to the NR MOM who went into the wrecked coaches to look for any injured/trapped passengers, then assisted with the efforts to put out the fire.

[caradoc]

4 hours ago, Oldddudders said:

At one time the station porter, later termed Leading Railman, would have been passed out as competent to apply point clips, reporting to the signalman. He would also have been competent to act as handsignalman and undertake other Rule Book duties. Privatisation compartmentalised staff within the industry. Fine when it all works, infinitely less flexible when things go wrong. 

 

I agree, and it could be incredibly frustrating if a points failure occurred at, for example, Gourock, where in the past the Station Supervisor was competent to operate and secure points rather than wait for a MOM to come from Paisley or Glasgow, however there is no station at Carmont and if there was, it would almost certainly be unstaffed. The report does make the point that part of the delay in securing the crossover was flooding affecting the roads in the area and therefore the MOM's arrival.

 

One thing alluded to in the report, but not actually stated, was the pressure Route Control (NR and Scotrail) were under with numerous other incidents prior to Carmont, including the E&G washed away by a canal breach. The number of staff in place to deal with the multiple incidents is not actually that great.

 

 

[Grovenor]

So the signaller should have been passed out on point clips, its not exactly rocket science, a module in the training for that would be stretched to take two hours and training to take charge of a box involves far more difficult tasks.

[PerthBox]

6 minutes ago, Grovenor said:

So the signaller should have been passed out on point clips, its not exactly rocket science, a module in the training for that would be stretched to take two hours and training to take charge of a box involves far more difficult tasks.

 

It's all so obvious in hindsight, isn't it. Who on the 11th of August would honestly have thought that an 2 hour delay in getting a set of points secured would indirectly lead to a disasterous crash with the loss of three lives?

[Kris]

Having read the report, I suspect that the biggest recommendations to come out will be about the maintenance and inspection of drainage features. 

[martin_wynne]

26 minutes ago, PerthBox said:

 

It's all so obvious in hindsight, isn't it. Who on the 11th of August would honestly have thought that an 2 hour delay in getting a set of points secured would indirectly lead to a disasterous crash with the loss of three lives?

 

No-one could have known that, and it may not have made any difference -- for all we know the landslip may have occurred just 5 minutes after the train passed the site the first time.

 

What is not hindsight, but common sense, is that a remote crossover might be needed to be used quickly in an emergency. Having no means to do so because there is no-one in the signal box or on the train who can fix a set of point clips seems to be an obvious oversight in the operational planning.

 

Martin.

[caradoc]

The key phrase being 'might need to be used'; It would be interesting to know when the Carmont crossover was last used for a passenger train, before the accident.

 

[Railfreight1998]

31 minutes ago, caradoc said:

The key phrase being 'might need to be used'; It would be interesting to know when the Carmont crossover was last used for a passenger train, before the accident.

 

Not for a considerable time; Laurencekirk and Stonehaven, both less than 10 minutes away, have working crossovers.

[PerthBox]

1 hour ago, martin_wynne said:

 

What is not hindsight, but common sense, is that a remote crossover might be needed to be used quickly in an emergency. Having no means to do so because there is no-one in the signal box or on the train who can fix a set of point clips seems to be an obvious oversight in the operational planning.

It’s not the case that ‘no one’ working at the signal box is able to secure points. I’m not trying to defend Network Rail but we shouldn’t draw the conclusion that this is part of a bigger problem; my experience (and you’ll just have to believe me here) suggests there’s no issue with signallers’ competence to secure points at mechanical signal boxes in an emergency, at least not in the Scotland North operations area. It’s unfortunate that this signaller was not competent to do so but it’s just another small hole in the swiss cheese leading up to the accident. Anyway I’m sure RAIB will explore it fully in the final report if they think it is a contributory factor.

Edited April 19, 2021 by PerthBox

[PaulRhB]

1 hour ago, Grovenor said:

So the signaller should have been passed out on point clips, its not exactly rocket science, a module in the training for that would be stretched to take two hours and training to take charge of a box involves far more difficult tasks.

It hasn’t been part of Signalling Competency for several years now as it was identified through other incidents that to maintain competence you need to do it regularly and that just doesn’t happen now if you’re in a box.

To secure points you need to be passed as a point operator and with valid Full PTS. 

When I started they were all part of Signalling and I had kept the majority of auxiliary operating tickets until last year because I did secondments that made the case for training days viable but still struggled to keep them valid. It meant quite a lot of extra tests for each plus the PTS and you don’t get paid extra for having them as a Signaller. I kept them mainly because I enjoyed getting out still but Covid has suspended mine as my on track medical is now out of date. 

 

1 hour ago, martin_wynne said:

Having no means to do so because there is no-one in the signal box or on the train who can fix a set of point clips seems to be an obvious oversight in the operational planning.

We rely on MOM’s on these duties and in most cases not rushing to do it increases safety! This was an extreme case and the storm itself can make road access slow. We’ve had to clear and saw through trees to respond in the past. 

 

7 hours ago, martin_wynne said:

long delay before the train could return might have been avoided, and the landslip may have not yet happened.

Even if this train had got through it could have happened immediately in front of another train. 

[iands]

At the risk of causing a drift off topic, the use of the word emergency in association with "crossover" is a bit misleading, implying (as per a dictionary definition) that there is a "dangerous situation requiring immediate action".

 

Yes there was a dangerous situation (a landslip just north of Ironies Bridge), and immediate action was taken by the Carmont signaller issuing an emergency call to the driver of 1T08 via the GSMR and the train was brought to a stand. The fact that the Carmont signaller had not been passed as competent to clamp/scotch points, or that the MOM had had difficulties reaching Carmont due to flooded roads etc., may well prove to be irrelevant, as the interim report says, there is no way of telling when the landslip that 1T08 ran in to had actually occurred. The landslip could have happened 5 minutes before 1T08 arrived, it could have happened 5 minutes after the last north bound train had passed the site, or anytime in between.

 

All that said, I think we should await the full report for more and conclusive details.

[Oldddudders]

Training costs. Certificated training, where the certification expires, costs even more. The safety 'value' added by ensuring everyone's competence is either up to date or lapses, has to be balanced against cost, and the operational benefit of having a versatile workforce, within the budget. None of this might have saved those lives anyway, as said above.

 

I see no shame attaching to any operations staff in all this, but no doubt considerable regret.  

[Michael Hodgson]

14 hours ago, iands said:

At the risk of causing a drift off topic, the use of the word emergency in association with "crossover" is a bit misleading, implying (as per a dictionary definition) that there is a "dangerous situation requiring immediate action".

 

Taking exception to the term emergency crossover as not being an emergency is like taking exception to the expression Danger Signal on the grounds that the signal itself isn't dangerous.  Well not unless it's like the one shown in another thread that had been constructed in the four-foot.