Moreton-on-Lugg Level Crossing Accident

[martin_wynne]

The Moreton-on-Lugg accident report has been published today:

 

http://www.raib.gov....ton_on_Lugg.pdf

 

(New topic started because the original topic is suspended: http://www.rmweb.co....-removed-topic/ . Mods please move this if that topic is reopened.)

 

edit: 17-Aug-2011 updated link.

 

regards,

 

Martin.

[The Stationmaster]

Thank you for that link Martin As some of us have known since the incident it was not just a tragedy for the injured and bereaved but also for the Signalman whose momentary laps (and that is how I regard it despite all the fancy analysis in this Report) and very considerable subsequent anguish has left him with something which is unlikely to ever leave his mind.

 

One thing which does concern me tho' is the apparent detachment of expertise and responsibility within Network Rail operations 'organisation' where those carrying out operational risk assessment on, say, level crossing signalling are detached from the local management who - it appears from this Report, are the people who accept it on behalf of the operations function. I am absolutely appalled at the apparent total removal from such processes of a carefully informed operations review of the scheme and its discussion at that level with the signalling design function and people at a more local operations level. I am equally appalled that such work appears to get the final go-ahead from local operations folk many of whom - I know for a fact - have absolutely no knowledge at all of the skills required to assess such schemes or to appreciate and understand all the factors involved - no amount of (detached) risk assessments in the world can take the place of that knowledge base.

 

And it makes me even more aware of the reasons why I shall shortly be doing some signalling assessment work that NR staff apparently felt they were unable to do.

[Edwin_m]

The report certainly seems pretty exhaustive*. All the human factors stuff looks a bit over the top - there will always be a risk of distractions however much you analyse a conversation about sheep! But I'm now beginning to think it was slyly taking aim at the sheer number of rules to remember and the perceived importance of keeping the paperwork up to date in case of being audited.

 

 

*unlike the Carrbridge one last week which seems to miss some key issues - but that's probably another thread.

[martin_wynne]

Hi Mike,

 

I have driven over that crossing many times. Like I imagine most motorists using the crossing, I always believed that it would be impossible for the barriers to be raised while a train was occupying the approach track circuits.

 

To find now that there are 54 level crossings including Moreton where there is no approach locking fitted, and that a lone signalman working a long 12-hour shift can mistakenly throw back the signals and raise the barriers while a train is approaching the crossing, is really horrifying. Reading the report of the distractions he faced and the awful consequence of a momentary lack of attention you can't but feel for him and the anguish he will feel for the rest of his life.

 

Everywhere we go nowadays we can see ludicrous over-the-top Health & Safety rules, warnings and installations. Yet something as basic and blindingly obvious as providing approach locking at a level crossing has apparently been overlooked. It also seems that the signalman on realising his error had no means to do anything about it, and could only watch the terrible events unfold. Would it not be possible to fit a panic button which instantly causes the road lights to flash fast and sounds a loud horn? That may not have prevented this accident but it may prevent others.

 

regards,

 

Martin.

[Edwin_m]

Now that's interesting Martin - there I was thinking and posting that this report covered all the angles, when the 12-hour shift, apparently on a regular basis, is mentioned but not commented on at all!

[Fat Controller]

Now that's interesting Martin - there I was thinking and posting that this report covered all the angles, when the 12-hour shift, apparently on a regular basis, is mentioned but not commented on at all!

I believe that the 12 hour shift is the norm amongst Network Rail signallers- certainly, those of my former colleagues who went to the IECC at Ashford work them.

[The Stationmaster]

The report certainly seems pretty exhaustive*. All the human factors stuff looks a bit over the top - there will always be a risk of distractions however much you analyse a conversation about sheep! But I'm now beginning to think it was slyly taking aim at the sheer number of rules to remember and the perceived importance of keeping the paperwork up to date in case of being audited.

 

 

Knowing RAIB Reports I doubt it Edwin. The first thing I'd have recommended is taking out the TRUST terminal - absolutely no use at all when the bloke has got block working and knows where the train are in terms of being in or approaching the section. All sorts of distractions in that kind of job but adding useless 'toys' shouldn't be one of them - he's not a junction or regulating 'box so he has no need at all for a TRUST terminal and the basically useless distraction it might bring.

[The Stationmaster]

Hi Mike,

 

I have driven over that crossing many times. Like I imagine most motorists using the crossing, I always believed that it would be impossible for the barriers to be raised while a train was occupying the approach track circuits.

 

To find now that there are 54 level crossings including Moreton where there is no approach locking fitted, and that a lone signalman working a long 12-hour shift can mistakenly throw back the signals and raise the barriers while a train is approaching the crossing, is really horrifying. Reading the report of the distractions he faced and the awful consequence of a momentary lack of attention you can't but feel for him and the anguish he will feel for the rest of his life.

 

Everywhere we go nowadays we can see ludicrous over-the-top Health & Safety rules, warnings and installations. Yet something as basic and blindingly obvious as providing approach locking at a level crossing has apparently been overlooked. It also seems that the signalman on realising his error had no means to do anything about it, and could only watch the terrible events unfold. Would it not be possible to fit a panic button which instantly causes the road lights to flash fast and sounds a loud horn? That may not have prevented this accident but it may prevent others.

 

regards,

 

Martin.

 

To be honest Martin I'm surprised it's only 54 - because any crossings which still have gates also don't have approach locking. And quite honestly I seriously question the value (per life etc) cost of adding it although I understand that various organisations are running round in headless chicken mode suggesting it should be installed here there and everywhere - including on a narrow gauge railways with a speed limit of 5 mph approaching such a crossing The value of approach locking has to be considered against - first of all - the risk and incidence of gates etc being prematurely opened for road traffic and I suspect (albeit not from a full history over the last 50 years) that such incidents are comparatively rare and in most cases have occurred at crossings with gates, possibly including some without protecting signals. We next have to look at the operational impact of such locking and in that caseI think it fair to assume the usual 2 minute delay for such a lock - would that be operationally acceptable in relation to rail movements or indeed acceptable to motorists waiting at the crossing (who are bound to be affected by it sometimes).

 

The next area is one of expertise in such matters and the simple answer is that he's retired (although working as a consultant) and in the meanwhile all sorts of folk with little direct knowledge or experience are trying to make decisions which seem to be mainly based on keeping their own necks off any potential block - and not taking much account of either commonsense or economics. Starting with just how would you arrange such locking? Lot so f questions and none - it seems - getting the sort of sensible consideration in official circles they deserve at present.

 

As for 12 hour shifts - long been going on and f you want to keep trains running I think it's unavoidable unless lots of folk are paid good money to sit on their backsides for 75% of the time.

[Adrian Wintle]

Living in a country where all the crossings are automatic (either AHB or just lights) and, potentially, also train controlled*, I found it interesting that the concept of manually controlled crossings still persists in the UK.

 

*GO Transit trains (and presumably others) have the ability to trip crossings by radio - this is used when the station stop is just before the crossing. The crossing operates automatically as the train approaches the station, but then reverts to clear while the train is stopped. The radio command is used to operate the crossing to allow the train to depart the station.

 

Adrian

[Edwin_m]

It is worth remembering that MCB crossings like this one are considerably safer than the automatic types, because the signals are not cleared until the barriers are down and the person supervising the crossing has confirmed that the tracks are clear. This allows full-width barriers to be used and largely eliminates the dangerous road driver behaviour seen at automatic crossings whether of the half-barrier or no-barrier type. I've been reading a lot of accident reports recently and I can't think of any others caused by the lack of approach locking on barrier crossings, so as Mike is saying it's quite likely that any money could be better spent improving safety elsewhere.

 

This is one of the reasons why the UK scores well in international comparisons of crossing safety, but badly in international comparisions of crossing costs. The other penalty is much longer road closure times, since the crossing is normally closed when the train is far enough away to run through on green signals.

 

To avoid Mike's two-minute delay extending road closure times, you'd need to prove that the train had gone past the crossing and immediately allow the barriers to raise, so the two minutes would only apply if the signal was put back to danger with no train having gone by. You could probably do this with a single detector somewhere beyond the crossing, even though traditional approach locking release normally requires a operation of several detectors. Even so it's a difficult modification.

[The Stationmaster]

 

To avoid Mike's two-minute delay extending road closure times, you'd need to prove that the train had gone past the crossing and immediately allow the barriers to raise, so the two minutes would only apply if the signal was put back to danger with no train having gone by. You could probably do this with a single detector somewhere beyond the crossing, even though traditional approach locking release normally requires a operation of several detectors. Even so it's a difficult modification.

 

I think 'difficult' would be an understatement on some crossings Edwin, If you take Moreton-On-Lugg as an example the first question which comes to mind is how far back do you extend the approach locking - especially on the Down Line where it is not at all unlikely that the signal immediately in rear of the crossing isn't locked with the crossing in any case? The next step then is possibly going to be a demand for a level crossing to be taken into account when giving 'Line Clear' instead of - as at present - ignoring it for block working purposes; that would lead to longer 'closed to road' times and could equally constrain railway operations.

Regrettably the whole thing seems to have turned into the all too typical sort of overkill that get's bandied about when slightly less than wise heads are let loose in an area which requires a lot of careful thought. As I said, one narrow gauge railway has already been approached regarding provision of approach control on a level crossing where the rail speed is 5mph - truly it all seems to have got rather out of hand.

[Edwin_m]

I don't think it's quite that bad, I'm not suggesting comprehensive ALR so there'd be no need to look back, merely a simpler form of the train in section proving that is used to release approach locking in colour light practice as the train passes onto the route. But I do agree it's not straightforward and not likely to be justified especially as a retrofit.

[Captain Kernow]

I believe that the 12 hour shift is the norm amongst Network Rail signallers- certainly, those of my former colleagues who went to the IECC at Ashford work them.

12 hours is not the norm in most manual boxes I know of, particularly as there are still a number I know of that close at night. It does seem to be more common in panel boxes and larger installations, however.

[James]

12 hours is not the norm in most manual boxes I know of, particularly as there are still a number I know of that close at night. It does seem to be more common in panel boxes and larger installations, however.

In the Hull area, where most boxes close for the night, most shifts are nine hours with an average of four shifts a week - off hand I can think of some manual boxes where there average week is three twelve hour shifts.

[Jim the Tram]

I must admit as a railway layman it did surprise me that the interlocks weren't in place but as others have said given the low incidence it appears to be a non-issue. Although tragic for those concerned.

 

As for 12 hours shifts, still very common in the NHS. My wife used to & still would be doing (if she hadn't have left) a 12.5 hours shift running a ward, frequently with no breaks whatsoever & not even something to drink.

[PaulRhB]

The Western Region Signallers seem to like 12 hour shifts the most which was tied in with the Cardiff dispute. Wessex is mostly 8hr shifts with 12 hrs on Sunday's (when it's quieter anyway) to make changing shifts work better. Various local agreements also mean there are 7,9 and 10hr shifts in some boxes.

The EU has ruled against 12hr shifts so they aren't likely to survive any resignalling.

Moreton on Lugg was a tragic mistake and as boxes are updated or resignalled they will be updated to the new standard but like all the demands for AHB's to be full barriers it just won't happen quickly due to costs. I was told a rough figure for a crossing including all the risk assessments, design and installation is nearly 1/2 million per boom!

[The Stationmaster]

The Western Region Signallers seem to like 12 hour shifts the most which was tied in with the Cardiff dispute. Wessex is mostly 8hr shifts with 12 hrs on Sunday's (when it's quieter anyway) to make changing shifts work better. Various local agreements also mean there are 7,9 and 10hr shifts in some boxes.

The EU has ruled against 12hr shifts so they aren't likely to survive any resignalling.

Moreton on Lugg was a tragic mistake and as boxes are updated or resignalled they will be updated to the new standard but like all the demands for AHB's to be full barriers it just won't happen quickly due to costs. I was told a rough figure for a crossing including all the risk assessments, design and installation is nearly 1/2 million per boom!

 

That figure sounds about right to me - in fact if anything possibly a bit on the low side. But before all this goes too far I think the industry must stop to draw breath and really assess the value of doing this sort of work compared with other things the money could be spent on. (And as an aside some of my money went this week on the first 'Continental Modeller' I have bought in about 10 years - and it was money well spent I thought).

[James]

Knowing RAIB Reports I doubt it Edwin. The first thing I'd have recommended is taking out the TRUST terminal - absolutely no use at all when the bloke has got block working and knows where the train are in terms of being in or approaching the section. All sorts of distractions in that kind of job but adding useless 'toys' shouldn't be one of them - he's not a junction or regulating 'box so he has no need at all for a TRUST terminal and the basically useless distraction it might bring.

Assuming TRUST is actually working!

[DJH584]

I appreciate that I am taking the thread off topic but this is one observation I wish to make:

 

Personally, I have never seen the point in using half barriers. All that gives is the opportunity for a stupid idiot driving a vehicle to dive around them and endanger innocent lives.

I have no doubt whatsoever that the driver of a train is severely traumatised if his/her loco collides with and, subsequently kills the occupants of a vehicle the driver of which decided to be stupid and dive around the half barriers.

Somebody has quoted that it would cost about half a million pounds to replace each half barrier fitment with full barriers.

Someone else has suggested that they would rather see the money being spent elsewhere.

What price do you put on human life and severe mental trauma? Is half a million pounds too much?

Tell that to the relatives of those that they lost and tell that to the poor sodding train driver whose loco ploughed into them. Cold comfort for both sides.

 

As regards the report on the Moreton collision.

 

Twelve hour shifts are a killer. I know - I've had to work them - seven days on the trot. Fifteen hour days are worse, I've also worked them.

If there isn't a lot going on, boredom is the killer and that leads to mistakes - which can be fatal.

 

It is noticeable from the pictures in the report, a lot of stuff has been retrofitted to a signal box that still requires human intervention to pull levers and, using an antiquated method, to indicate line status.

Mike has made mention of the TRUST computer and suggests that it be got rid of.

Surely that device is designed to assist the signalman in doing his/her job?

 

What should be got rid of is the train register book (TRB).

Given these days of computerisation, there really is no need for it. When it comes to booking on, each signal box operator can be given a cotag to access a box when they come on duty which is then recorded. Train movements are already recorded by computer - as can the sidings and the level crossing barriers at Moreton.

Yes I know it is open to abuse but then so is the TRB - Quintinshill being the case in point.

 

So to summarise:

 

Surely any investment has to be in getting rid of the half barriers and replacing them with full width in the interests of safety and the sanity of the unfortunate driver and his/her passengers.

Couple that with proper modernisation of signal boxes, decent working hours - after all getting up at 3.45 am to be at work at 6.00 am and then work 12 hours is no fun, been there done that - and would we not have a safer railway system?

 

Just my two pennorth from a layman.

 

Regards

 

David

[martin_wynne]

Personally, I have never seen the point in using half barriers. All that gives is the opportunity for a stupid idiot driving a vehicle to dive around them and endanger innocent lives.

Hi David,

 

Automatic half-barrier crossings are worked automatically by the trains. If they were full barriers it would be possible for a vehicle or pedestrians to get trapped between them.

 

Full barriers can only be used where there is a signaller watching the road traffic, possibly by CCTV.

 

regards,

 

Martin.

[PaulRhB]

Personally, I have never seen the point in using half barriers. All that gives is the opportunity for a stupid idiot driving a vehicle to dive around them and endanger innocent lives.

Somebody has quoted that it would cost about half a million pounds to replace each half barrier fitment with full barriers.

As Martin says they allow cars to escape where there is no signalman observing the crossing. What the question should be is why would you jump a red light at a railway and not at a road junction where traffic can cross at 90degrees at high speed? People who jump the barriers suffer from some bizarre misconception that the train will be minutes away. AHB's tend to be down for a matter of seconds before and after the train passes. At stations where trains stop next to an AHB we even have to select stopping or non stop so they are down for minimal time and it's audited by HMRI.

The cost was 1/2 million PER BOOM 10 years ago so you were looking at around 2 million then for full barriers.

 

Mike has made mention of the TRUST computer and suggests that it be got rid of.

Surely that device is designed to assist the signalman in doing his/her job?

 

What should be got rid of is the train register book (TRB).

Given these days of computerisation, there really is no need for it. When it comes to booking on, each signal box operator can be given a cotag to access a box when they come on duty which is then recorded. Train movements are already recorded by computer - as can the sidings and the level crossing barriers at Moreton.

TRUST only records at timing points for the timetable such as stations and junctions so there is no recording at boxes on plain line that only control block sections and crossings.

Commercial factors drive the Trust system as it's used to attribute delays due to errors such as wrong regulation or slow trains. To put in track circuits to drive trust automatically would require expensive resignalling so we are still left with manual input at most absolute block locations. The electronic system is backed up with the train register as that doesn't throw a wobbly when the power fails or the server crashes and on absolute or tokenless block it's then the only record of where the trains are. On track circuit block we don't have to record on the TRB because there's also track circuits to show where the trains are.

 

Couple that with proper modernisation of signal boxes, decent working hours - after all getting up at 3.45 am to be at work at 6.00 am and then work 12 hours is no fun, been there done that - and would we not have a safer railway system?

Yes in an ideal world it would be safer but where are we going to find the billions of pounds to cover the risk assessments, design, equipment and installation? Risk assessment prove in court that you have justified your cost savings, or not. The other three points also involve a lot of money spent on ensuring that they are as safe as possible to prevent accidents and blame in court as a result. Unfortunately it's a sort of pre insurance that they need to protect the railway from get rich quick cowboys which would try to supply sub standard equipment. Mistakes still happen especially with such complicated systems but there are a lot of very good ones out there but they take time to install due to cost.

I work mostly 8 hour shifts but with a regular changing shift you still get tired but I see no way to make it easier on the body if we are to keep trains running 24 hours a day. It's evolved as the best compromise between work and domestic life for railwaymen. A 8-4, 4-12 and 12-8 pattern doesn't fit so well with school runs.

[James]

the train register as that doesn't throw a wobbly when the power fails or the server crashes

Or when wetaher affects the signal for satelite dishes which many boxes have.

 

Maybe the train registers seemed old fashioned but they work so there's no need to change them is there?

[PaulRhB]

Going back to the report I think the signalman was using his TRUST terminal well to judge if he had time for the other crossing to be used. His error was at his actual location where he gained the unfortunate misconception that the train had passed him probably down to his brain making connections due to the other events happening which caused the distraction. I've worked two boxes at level crossings and if people in cars perceive they've been waiting too long they start revving engines, beeping horns or shouting abuse despite the fact that extra delay may be caused by a slower than usual train or station duties. That said I've also had good support from other road users when one road raged driver started spouting off.

The signalman was identified as thinking he had left them down and was causing unnecessary delay to traffic so he quickly reacted in opening the gates without checking everything as usual due to the distraction. The fact that he didn't lose it after that and still dealt with the tragedy as he should I believe shows he was a capable person who made one tragic error and I feel very sad for him and all the victims as a result.

[beast66606]

Personally, I have never seen the point in using half barriers. All that gives is the opportunity for a stupid idiot driving a vehicle to dive around them and endanger innocent lives.

 

Martin and Paul have already answered this, HB allow an escape when the crossing is not monitored.

 

 

Somebody has quoted that it would cost about half a million pounds to replace each half barrier fitment with full barriers.

Someone else has suggested that they would rather see the money being spent elsewhere.

What price do you put on human life and severe mental trauma? Is half a million pounds too much?

 

To be honest yes, and generalising, the solution is simpler, the crossing could be locked with the signal controls, such that the barriers have to be down before any signals can be cleared, and can only be raised when all signals are at danger - try this and wait for the chorus of complaints about the crossing being shut to the road for too long.

 

Tell that to the relatives of those that they lost and tell that to the poor sodding train driver whose loco ploughed into them. Cold comfort for both sides.

 

The cold comfort is only applicable when an accident (sadly) occurs, complaints about barriers being down for too long are permanent

 

It is noticeable from the pictures in the report, a lot of stuff has been retrofitted to a signal box that still requires human intervention to pull levers and, using an antiquated method, to indicate line status.

Mike has made mention of the TRUST computer and suggests that it be got rid of.

Surely that device is designed to assist the signalman in doing his/her job?

 

The railway survived without TRUST for many years, it's useful in regulating boxes but other boxes don't really need it, which is the point Mike was making.

 

What should be got rid of is the train register book (TRB).

Given these days of computerisation, there really is no need for it. When it comes to booking on, each signal box operator can be given a cotag to access a box when they come on duty which is then recorded. Train movements are already recorded by computer - as can the sidings and the level crossing barriers at Moreton.

Yes I know it is open to abuse but then so is the TRB - Quintinshill being the case in point.

 

Sorry but this demonstrates how little you understand about working a signal box (or even a simple crossing box), as others have pointed out.

 

Surely any investment has to be in getting rid of the half barriers and replacing them with full width in the interests of safety and the sanity of the unfortunate driver and his/her passengers.

 

The safest solution is a bridge ... but I'm not going to pay for a bridge everywhere just to save motorists a few minutes of queueing.

 

Couple that with proper modernisation of signal boxes, decent working hours - after all getting up at 3.45 am to be at work at 6.00 am and then work 12 hours is no fun, been there done that - and would we not have a safer railway system?

 

I firmly believe we have a safe railway as it stands.

[The Stationmaster]

 

As regards the report on the Moreton collision.

 

Twelve hour shifts are a killer. I know - I've had to work them - seven days on the trot. Fifteen hour days are worse, I've also worked them.

If there isn't a lot going on, boredom is the killer and that leads to mistakes - which can be fatal.

 

There are now - since Clapham - fairly stringent restrictions on working hours and rest and 12hours working has been around for a very long time without killing anybody, RhB has said the railway has developed its working practices over many years and it seems to have usually worked well. And there remains the simple problem of coverage - if staff go sick or take time off at short notice is NR supposed to keep a pile of qualified and relatively expensive folk on a shelf to be used on odd occasions or does it do the traditional thing? It's always been a difficult question but provided someone gets adequate rest between shifts I don't think it's necessarily too onerous.

 

 

It is noticeable from the pictures in the report, a lot of stuff has been retrofitted to a signal box that still requires human intervention to pull levers and, using an antiquated method, to indicate line status.

Mike has made mention of the TRUST computer and suggests that it be got rid of.

Surely that device is designed to assist the signalman in doing his/her job?

 

I really can't see what value a TRUST computer has to a signalbox where it doesn't matter what order trains are running in or whether they are late, early, or cancelled because that signalbox can't really do anything with them - they approach, they pass, and they are gone. The Signalman knows the exact state of the railway he is concerned about from his block instruments and his knowledge of how long trains normally take in his sections and that is the information he needs to safely manage farm etc crossings. TRUST is a rather imprecise tool in that it will only tell you how a train was doing at particular places (even less precise where there is manual entry) and that is not what this man needed to know - at the most it would be a question of ringing the next 'box to see if a particular train is about, the rest of the information is in front of him.

 

 

What should be got rid of is the train register book (TRB).

Given these days of computerisation, there really is no need for it. When it comes to booking on, each signal box operator can be given a cotag to access a box when they come on duty which is then recorded. Train movements are already recorded by computer - as can the sidings and the level crossing barriers at Moreton.

Yes I know it is open to abuse but then so is the TRB - Quintinshill being the case in point.

 

Quintinshill is indeed case in point as it shows what can happen when a TRB is not used properly. If a Signalman is making his entries currentlly and keeping his TRB up to scratch against the blocks he knows exactly what trains are where in the area which concerns him - the information is at his finger tips and because he wrote it down it is that bit more likely to stick in his mind. Always in my experience a good measure of a Signalman's competence in a mechanical 'box was to walk in the door and immediately look at the book, the state of the frame, and the blocks - doing the latter as you wiped your feet and getting the state of the frame in your mind as you walked from the door to the book. if everything tallied, or there was a very good reason why it didn't, you were more than halfway there to knowing that the chap on duty was on top of the job in hand.

 

And I really don't see quite how a some sort of data logging system - which gives a display of the last few lines of entry - could be made to work without an awful lot of money being spent on development. In my experience all Signalmen ring (the block bells) slightly differently, sufficiently for an experienced person to know who is working them at adjacent 'boxes during a 'box visit, so how would a system cater for that - or even for occasional line faults which can result in odd ringing? How does it distinguish between a train being asked and out of section being given and keep those signals on the relevant line in the electronic book? Signalman are responsible intelligent people doing an important job and if they can't be trusted to keep a basic record of what they are doing how would they feel - what could it do to their sense of responsibility?

 

Couple that with proper modernisation of signal boxes, decent working hours - after all getting up at 3.45 am to be at work at 6.00 am and then work 12 hours is no fun, been there done that - and would we not have a safer railway system?

 

Just my two pennorth from a layman.

Regards

David

 

 

And very soundly considered I think David but just how much would it all cost? And if money is spent on that what won't it be spent on elsewhere? Surely the priority in signalling has to be directed toward achieving the best optimum outcome for waht you spend? That means modern signalling firstly on the busiest routes and then spending what's left doing the best for the money available on the other pieces of the railway - is an electronic train register really more important than, say, providing TPWS in terminal platforms or a more advanced form of ATP on lines where trains run at high speed in all weathers? What happened at Moreton-On-Lugg was truly tragic but it was an extremely rare event on Britain's railways; in recent years far, far more people have been killed on legitimate unprotected pedestrian crossings over the railway than have been killed by any sort of error on the part of a Signalman (or Signaller as they are now, somewhat confusingly to my mind, known) - so is it more important to spend money on those sort of crossings and replacing them with bridges at something over a million quid a go? It would theoretically save more lives.