Fowlers Compound Pacific and the Lemon 4-8-0

[kevinlms]

I agree but the Claughtons and Hughes 4-6-0s had also been found wanting. As said at the start of this thread, Fowler had proposed a 4-6-2 shortly after he succeeded Hughes and it had been approved by the Locomotive Committee. The process even got as far as cutting out the frames for the first loco before the operating people scuppered it. Various reasons have been given for the cancellation (need to build new turntables, lack of confidence in Fowler, Anderson throwing his weight around), I guess we will never know.

The LNWR were actually older designs & I didn't say they were excellent. Fact is no locos were suitable for the heaviest or fastest express passenger trains of the WCML and the LMS needed something desparately to meet increasing competition from the LNER, who had no qualms about building large numbers of locos to modern designs.

[34theletterbetweenB&D]

Yes, but the Compounds simply weren't up to the job in regards to the heavier trains, especially on the WCML. By 1927 (only 4 years on), the LMS were desperate enough to get 50 large 4-6-0s built at short notice by a private company - obviously the Royal Scot class. It is important to note that the Compounds were in fact still under construction at the time. So something clearly amiss!

 Especially when it is remembered that Crewe, Horwich and the other three groups predecessors were all standardising on six coupled power for principal express work from before the grouping. The direct competition for the route North was busy about superseding an atlantic (a design with as much sustained high speed power output potential as an UK express 4-6-0) with a pacific before the grouping, and won the lottery that was the engineering direction of the rival group.

 

At least Crewe and Horwich knew that something of higher power capability was required and were trying to make progress. It is a permanent regret that Crewe especially  was unable to pursue an independent course in its own tradition, and 'find its own way' to a good maximum power design. The Claughton wasn't a million miles off the pace, the boiler could supply the power potential, needed some valve and cylinder design refinement to get fully home.

[John_Miles]

At least Crewe and Horwich knew that something of higher power capability was required and were trying to make progress. It is a permanent regret that Crewe especially  was unable to pursue an independent course in its own tradition, and 'find its own way' to a good maximum power design. The Claughton wasn't a million miles off the pace, the boiler could supply the power potential, needed some valve and cylinder design refinement to get fully home.

 

The evidence shows that Crewe had failed to move with the times. Their engines, including the Claughtons, were expensive to run (see Stamp's statistics for proof) and unreliable. One of the reasons for Stanier's appointment was that Fowler had failed to sort Crewe out, especially the quality of the machines they produced. As to Horwich, the only one of their designs that was a success in the 20thC was the Crab. The Hughes 4-6-0 was a failure, his Baltic tanks were outclassed by the Fowler 2-6-4s and the 0-8-0s were dismal.

[brack]

The East coast companies as a group were more advanced than the west coast. Not just the great northern pacifics, but ravens electrification plans (and his, less successful pacific). NER freight locos in general were robust well engineered designs which outlasted pretty much everything that came after them, whilst there were several successful 4-6-0 designs from different lner constituents which lasted well. Pre grouping 460s from the LMS constituents were not a good selection, with the Highland's (including the river class) probably the best of them but hampered by being few in number compared to those turned out by lines further south.

[kevinlms]

The evidence shows that Crewe had failed to move with the times.

Funny you should say that, because certainly Midland locomotives had hardly kept up with the times. The best thing about the 4F's & 4-4-0's were that they were cheap to run, because they had been built for the 'short & often' services.

[runs as required]

Whilst this may well have been the case for the P1 it was not so for the Garratts which were built to replace double headed 0-6-0s on a specific duty, hence saving crew costs, a duty which they carried out for many years.

Keith

So bearing-wise were the LMS Garretts any worse than the the 4F ?

These were always, I understood, a poorly conceived locomotive compared to Collett or Gresley 0-6-0s.

 

dh

[John_Miles]

So bearing-wise were the LMS Garretts any worse than the the 4F ?

These were always, I understood, a poorly conceived locomotive compared to Collett or Gresley 0-6-0s.

 

dh

The availability of the Garretts was reasonably good and there is a post above saying they had better availability than the 9Fs.The histories written by people who worked on Garretts mostly complain about their appetite for coal and there are stories of them having to stop now and then while the fireman and driver shoveled a few tons of coal into the firebox. I don't recall seeing any statistics about their tendency to hot boxes (the LMS collected statistics about almost everything) but see my post above about the 4Fs. They were no worse in terms of hotboxes than other engines and for instance a lot better than the Super Ds. The main problem with the 4Fs seems to have been they required a skilled fireman to get them to steam well

[runs as required]

The other question I have about small engines vv the East coast and GW 'big' engines is:  was the Derby small engine lobby in anyway linked to a 'little and often' aspiration?

That is to say shorter more frequent trains running to a regular interval clockface timetable?

The WCML virtually up to the 25KV electrification went in for very few heavy trains - eg the Royal Scot and the 2pm 'Corridor' (was that the origin of the mid-day Scot?).

 

dh

[lanchester]

The other question I have about small engines vv the East coast and GW 'big' engines is:  was the Derby small engine lobby in anyway linked to a 'little and often' aspiration?

That is to say shorter more frequent trains running to a regular interval clockface timetable?

The WCML virtually up to the 25KV electrification went in for very few heavy trains - eg the Royal Scot and the 2pm 'Corridor' (was that the origin of the mid-day Scot?).

 

dh

If the idea about 'little and often' is right, then it is really rather curious because it was basically the Midland Railway that started the late 19th century trend towards much heavier trains because they introduced Pullman cars, sleepers, dining cars and of course by abolishing 2nd class, effectively upgraded 3rd to 2nd class standards and therefore weights. So you might have expected them to be 'big engine' advocates? They appear to have decided in the '80s that they couldn't compete on speed (over the S&C, and then on by GSWR or the Waverley route) so would compete on comfort - they didn't get involved in the 'races to the North', for example.

 

I suppose in fairness the 4-4-0 Compounds were pretty powerful for the time - probably more than the only slightly later NER R class - and the NER R1 4-4-0 wasn't too good, nor were their early 4-6-0s (why did everyone have problems with 4-6-0s?) and the Atlantics, although to die for, were really best at relatively light trains on a level racetrack. But the NER, and GNR, LNWR etc were at least trying to go more powerful, even if they didn't totally succeed - the Midland just seems to have given up. Very curious.

[OFFTHE RAILS]

nor were their early 4-6-0s (why did everyone have problems with 4-6-0s?) 

May I suggest that the GWR had very little trouble with 4-6-0s !!

Ian

[lanchester]

May I suggest that the GWR had very little trouble with 4-6-0s !!

Ian

Fair do's although even Churchward didn't get his Saint springing fully formed from the head of Zeus! Three prototypes (100, 98 and 171 if I recall) plus several Atlantics for comparison (and 171 was converted to Atlantic for a while). Parallel v taper boiler, changes in valve gear - and actually it was the high pressure (225psi) boiler and superior valve gear that won the day, but that might well have been true of an Atlantic. As it was I suppose Churchward had the opportunity provided by the GWR's programme of 'cut-off' lines offering the possibility of accelerating services, so perhaps the Directors were prepared to pay for trials that on another railway would have been seen as wasteful. 

 

I accept that the GWR had 'very little trouble' with 4-6-0s; nonetheless it took the best part of a decade for them to be really sure?

[runs as required]

May I suggest that the GWR had very little trouble with 4-6-0s !!

Ian

As I understand, unlike most other lines, the GW eventually had a board that could afford to give their engineers scope to experiment (from the Armstrongs down to Churchward).

The superiority of the Churchward  4-6-0 only emerged after long comparisons against French and Swindon equivalent Atlantics. And that was with Welsh coal, others had to opt for the US wide firebox over a truck.

2

But going back to Anderson, I thought his Derby regime had a ruthless approach to locos relative to train weights and double-heading was always required where once the LNW would have thrashed.

 

dh

[The Stationmaster]

Fair do's although even Churchward didn't get his Saint springing fully formed from the head of Zeus! Three prototypes (100, 98 and 171 if I recall) plus several Atlantics for comparison (and 171 was converted to Atlantic for a while). Parallel v taper boiler, changes in valve gear - and actually it was the high pressure (225psi) boiler and superior valve gear that won the day, but that might well have been true of an Atlantic. As it was I suppose Churchward had the opportunity provided by the GWR's programme of 'cut-off' lines offering the possibility of accelerating services, so perhaps the Directors were prepared to pay for trials that on another railway would have been seen as wasteful. 

 

I accept that the GWR had 'very little trouble' with 4-6-0s; nonetheless it took the best part of a decade for them to be really sure?

 

I always thought there are 10 years in a decade.  No 98, the first GWR 4-6-0 to embody all of Churchward's idea, appeared in 1903, and in 1906 Churchward decided to go for 4-6-0s for future build although No 40 came out arranged as a 4-4-2 to allow direct comparison with the French engines.  So the decision to standardise on the 4-6-0 arrangement, after trials of the 4-4-2 arrangement took well under a decade.  The full development of the 4-6-0s really took place over the period from 1903 onwards with boiler development being the longest part of the development, not the idea of a 4-6-0 as the best wheel arrangement.

 

But of course even in their early years one of Churchward's 4-6-0s could pull two of a certain other company's engines backwards.

 

Simple fact was that Derby got stuck in a rut - possibly due to strict adherence to the Midland railway bridge curve (or fear of moving forward from its impositions) and with limited growth in engine size once the compounds had arrived, which meant a regular need for assistant engines on relatively lightweight trains on the likes of the S&C.  And early LMS motive power policy once Hughes had gone was well & truly stuck in that rut and hardly aided by anderson effectively running his own motive power policy while Fowler had his (if either could be called a policy).   Meanwhile all the other companies were rapidly drawing ahead in developing larger more powerful engines to gradually developing standards of design although all took a while to catch up with the GWR's lead which had been established two decades previously.

 

The decision to build Midland types for LMS pasennger work was based more on cost than anything else - Derby's engines were not expensive to build and they were much cheaper to maintain than Crewe or Horwich engines although if they had ever been flogged to the extent LNWR engines were the picture might have been different.

[Sheffield]

If the LMS was wrong to adopt Midland designs for its first locomotives what else should it have done? Or indeed what else could it have done?

In 1923, like BR in 1948, on the locomotive front the LMS had to do two things. Firstly it had to build to pre-group designs for immediate needs, and secondly it had to commence the development of its own standard range of locos for general use. The most pressing need was for a large express loco so perhaps that is where the second task should have started. The existing L&YR 4-6-0 was not adequate, and we can not be serious in suggesting that the LNWR Claughton was a suitable choice. It has been suggested it was based on the GWR 4-6-0 after one was tried on the LNWR. If that is true some one at Crewe was not paying attention when that lesson was being given. Their steam circuit was not good and their mechanical design was awful.  

To select the Midland designs for immediate builds was surely the correct thing to have done. Trials showed them to be the most effective and efficient, and to have the best detail design. Most importantly they fitted the new LMS composite load gauge. but the foremost of these Midland designs, the Compound and the 4F, were simple developments of Johnson/Deeley designs, and had little Fowler design influence. I think this point is important in what followed.

Although it was inconceivable that the newly formed LMS should go "outside" for its CME I suggest the selection of George Hughes and, worse, Henry Fowler for the position was a serious mistake. Hughes when he insisted in remaining at the end of an obscure branch line put himself at a disadvantage in the internal politics and jockeying for positioning that takes place in a newly formed large organisation. It also made it more difficult for him to control and direct loco design. Further his ideas on boiler pressure were a handicap to the creation of an effective range of new standard locos. When Fowler took over the position was even worse, as he seems to have been completely incapable of controlling and guiding the design process in the way it clearly needed.

James Anderson is often portrayed in popular history as a meddling ex Midland man who held back progress. I suggest the opposite is true. It is Anderson we have to thank for the Royal Scots. In the discussions  during the trial of the GWR Castle he showed he was quite prepared to accept long travel valves, high superheat and other modern refinements provided he could have a straight forward 3 cylinder 4-6-0 capable of handling the trains as the Castle had shown they could be handled. I think he had already got the measure of Henry Fowler, and intervened to avert the disaster that Fowler seemed to want to create. That Fowler was happy to see his own design stopped, and the design of the replacement placed outside of his control gives an indication of the man, and his views and capabilities with loco design. Most other men would have been reaching for their pens to write their resignation letters. Fowler did little for the Midland, and damage to the LMS as regards loco design.

I suggest the LMS did the correct thing in selecting Midland designs for the initial builds. It then failed to properly follow them up with a range of more modern designs for general use. For that we should blame Hughes and Fowler, not Anderson.

[unclebobkt]

       May I suggest that the GWR had very little trouble with 4-6-0s !!

  Ian

 

        Maybe the GWR. was like Rolls-Royce - problems stayed strictly 'Indoors.'!

 

  Although I did remember reading that the GWR's. Board of Directors asked why his locomotives were more expensive to build than those of other lines?

  'Because one of mine can pull two of their machines backwards.' was the reply.

 

      

[runs as required]

....I  suggest the LMS did the correct thing in selecting Midland designs for the initial builds. It then failed to properly follow them up with a range of more modern designs for general use. For that we should blame Hughes and Fowler, not Anderson.

But didn't the Horwich Crab show the way forward?

 

It seems to me that the old pre-Grouping works were in-bred and treated their progeny go off to other railways rather like football teams view their players transferring these days.

The LMS might have done better to procure some 'outsider' locos from private builders (and refrained from meddling in their details). Contemporary colonial railways did well in this way; East Africa had to rebuild the former German Tanganyika railway and integrate it with Kenya/Uganda. A lot of Horwich practice was transferred to remote areas like Tabora. 

 

Don't also forget that Britain's CMEs came a long way in drawing up a 'standard' range of locos before Government suddenly opted for the Grouping despite the experience of a unified system through the Great War.

 

dh

[Sheffield]

But Churchward was not paid to design locos to pull other firms' locos backwards, He was paid to provide locos to pull GWR trains. It was well know that Swindon was more expensive than other railway works, a situation that continued into BR days.

Churchward seems to have been the most clear thinking open minded of the Loco Superintendents/CMEs of the time, if not since. He produced a range of excellent locos, but it did come at a price and it was not surprising that the Directors questioned him. Later he was brought under the control of the General Manager and seems to have lost interest in further development. He is said to have told his staff that they might like to look else where for continued interesting work. I have wondered if this was just because he thought he had done enough, or because of pressure and perceived lack of appreciation from above.

[Sheffield]

No I don't think the Horwich Crab showed the way forward. It is generally considered a successful design, but the cylinder arrangement necessary because of Hughes ideas on boiler pressure hinted at the difficulties that would have been encountered in producing the larger versions that the LMS needed.  And buying outside builders designs when they had inherited all those large loco works and design staffs would have been unthinkable, as well as more expensive. It is difficult to see how the LMS could have done other than they did do, but it was still, with hindsight, wrong, largely because Fowler was not competent at what he was required to do..  

[34theletterbetweenB&D]

...why did everyone have problems with 4-6-0s?...

 Or to phrase this question another way; why was it so difficult to move on from the 4-4-0 (and 4-2-2) types which had generally so adequately served the UK's railways from the mid Victorian period until the early 1900s? (Observations by foreign visitors on the relative smallness of UK locomotives at the turn of the century are well attested: and yet these were running some of the fastest railway services anywhere in the world.)

 

The answer is pretty simple, and the specs of these locos reveal it: they were all the same design in essentials. 'What worked' had been discovered and well developed, and every works could turn them out. When it came to a larger loco the major decision on the boiler was the form of the grate, ashpan and draughting, either fitting this in around the obstruction of an extra driving axle, or finding another way. Questions of barrel and tube length, the structural form of the longer frame, superheat or not, valve gears and events, were also significant.

 

Two design shops tackled this in what turned out to be the right way with long term good outcome: by looking overseas for the engineering practise that was delivering successful larger capacity locomotives. That was Swindon under Churchward, and Doncaster under Ivatt and Gresley. The sad fact was that the UK railway's capacity for innovation in steam design had largely atrophied since the 1860s, to just fiddling around with details. A whole generation of home grown locomotive engineers who only knew same old,same old. That may seem harsh, but the evidence is there to be seen. If an exception is required, Stratford's S69 (B12) the only truly successful UK inside cylinder 4-6-0.

[Allegheny1600]

Gentlemen,

While I do find this discussion most fascinating, it's probably getting away somewhat from the OT so I've started a new discussion here: http://www.rmweb.co.uk/community/index.php?/topic/109550-steam-loco-building-design-in-the-uk-and-abroad/?p=2249317

Hope that's okay!

Cheers,

John.

[The Stationmaster]

But Churchward was not paid to design locos to pull other firms' locos backwards, He was paid to provide locos to pull GWR trains. It was well know that Swindon was more expensive than other railway works, a situation that continued into BR days.

Churchward seems to have been the most clear thinking open minded of the Loco Superintendents/CMEs of the time, if not since. He produced a range of excellent locos, but it did come at a price and it was not surprising that the Directors questioned him. Later he was brought under the control of the General Manager and seems to have lost interest in further development. He is said to have told his staff that they might like to look else where for continued interesting work. I have wondered if this was just because he thought he had done enough, or because of pressure and perceived lack of appreciation from above.

 

Basically Churchward's work was done - he had produced a range of standard designs to cover virtually all of the GWR's needs other than shunting (where it had plenty of engines already in stock) and the detail of designs had been carefully thought out, evaluated and tested before being put into mass production.  Swindon undoubtedly produced expensive engines but the initial cost was repaid in the mileages they were able to work and in operational economy while the Collett regime largely set about refining the basic work of Churchward to further improve mileages and reduce overhaul costs.

 

And don't forget that what Crew regarded as a suitable fitting tolerance for many components was regarded by Swindon as scrapping levels of wear.

 

However none of this solves the rut that Midlandisation sunk LMS engine design into and let's not overlook that there was movement between companies and there were some good people about, the sort of folk whose transfer of experience and knowledge might have set Derby Drawing office alight if they had the chance.  But it took Stanier to do that several years later.  And by a quirk of fate it was Horwich and Crewe trained men who rose to the top in the newly formed BR CME's organisation - men whose careers had finally moved forward once the Fowler regime was buried.  Simple situation was that once Hughes had gone and Fowler had taken over LMS loco development became moribund and stuck in Derby's hidebound thinking and - with few exceptions - the only truly progressive designs came from outside builders.

[kevinlms]

But didn't the Horwich Crab show the way forward?

 

It seems to me that the old pre-Grouping works were in-bred and treated their progeny go off to other railways rather like football teams view their players transferring these days.

The LMS might have done better to procure some 'outsider' locos from private builders (and refrained from meddling in their details). Contemporary colonial railways did well in this way; East Africa had to rebuild the former German Tanganyika railway and integrate it with Kenya/Uganda. A lot of Horwich practice was transferred to remote areas like Tabora. 

 

Don't also forget that Britain's CMEs came a long way in drawing up a 'standard' range of locos before Government suddenly opted for the Grouping despite the experience of a unified system through the Great War.

 

dh

Agreed the Horwich Crab, showed the way forward, but then it was ignored! Many more 4F's were built AFTER the introduction of the Crab's.

 

The 'meddling' by Derby was a key component of how the Garratt's could have been better. Even little things ought to have been changed after found wanting on the first 3, but repeated on the 2nd batch of 30 (the biggest single order ever) for Garratt's. The tank filler holes, didn't match up the the water column spacing of whatever distance it was for double-headed 0-6-0's. A simple task of matching the column spacing, would have stopped the requirement to fill one tank up, then move the loco forward, fill the 2nd tank.

This problem was never fixed, even though simple to modify.

[kevinlms]

 

However none of this solves the rut that Midlandisation sunk LMS engine design into and let's not overlook that there was movement between companies and there were some good people about, the sort of folk whose transfer of experience and knowledge might have set Derby Drawing office alight if they had the chance.  But it took Stanier to do that several years later.  And by a quirk of fate it was Horwich and Crewe trained men who rose to the top in the newly formed BR CME's organisation - men whose careers had finally moved forward once the Fowler regime was buried.  Simple situation was that once Hughes had gone and Fowler had taken over LMS loco development became moribund and stuck in Derby's hidebound thinking and - with few exceptions - the only truly progressive designs came from outside builders.

That sums it up pretty well IMO. Fact was in 1927, the LMS was about to launch a new train with upgraded coaching stock, to a better schedule - the Royal Scot, but had no suitable single loco to haul it! The Claughtons & Hughes 4-6-0's had been found wanting, but while there were large fleets of brand new Compounds & 2P's, these weren't even tried, as known to be too small.

 

What is also forgotten, around that time the LMS policy was to increase the timetabled speed of many of their services. OK it was a bit of a publicity stunt, but still a lot of trains had their timing cut, so that they reached the average speeds of just over 60mph. For this they needed more powerful locomotives, not just those 'cheap to run'.

[Sheffield]

A lot of things could have been done to the Garratts to improve them, but were not. But that comment could apply to a number of other pre Stanier designs, but he did not seem to be interested in such things. I think the story of the Garratts is as much a criticism of Stanier and those who followed him as of those involved in the original design.

There were a number of people on the design staff of the LMS in Hughes' and Fowler's days who were able to produce reasonable locomotives, such as the 2-6-4Ts. What was lacking was firm direction and guidance from the CME to ensure the best current practice was identified and applied. That was not the fault of this vague term "Midlandisation". it was the fault of the man at the top of Loco engineering, and perhaps his chief assistant. Even if the operators initially wanted small locos they could have been developments of the MR designs incorporating current best practice not copies of them.  

E L Diamond showed in 1926 how the Compound could be much improved but Fowler rejected the proposals. In Montford Deeley's time the Compound was a good design, but by LMS days things were moving on.

[34theletterbetweenB&D]

A lot of things could have been done to the Garratts to improve them, but were not. But that comment could apply to a number of other pre Stanier designs, but he did not seem to be interested in such things...

 I have read that criticism of Stanier before, and believe that while there is some good sense in it, this may have been politically inexpedient for Stanier during his first years with the LMS, and then subsequently impossible through force of circumstance.

 

Consider that he was not 'unopposed' when appointed, inevitably there would be some critical of his work. How to overcome this? Basically do such a good job that you cut the ground out from under the feet of any opposition. What he had to hand were a bunch of designs in concept which he knew to be proven, and once in service in significant numbers would win the day for him. Better to get on and do that than get bogged down in fighting for a detailed re-appraisal of an existing design; which inevitably must use those concerned in creating that design,  as they alone know its detail. For a start designers typically hate being made to revisit what they worked on to make necesary improvements; (puppy having nose rubbed in dirt) they will then always claim when the revised design then does better then the original that this proves what good designers they were. Better by far to let the failure remain so, contrasting with the better new introductions.

 

Stanier really didn't have that long in the LMS CME's chair either. He wasn't in the UK to design the later pacifics, he was in India (Machine Tool Commission?) at the government of the day's behest. Then came a war, and that really was the end of his LMS career: far too useful a man to be spared from the high level responsibility various that was placed on his shoulders.