RAIB report -- Blowback on Oliver Cromwell

[martin_wynne]

http://www.raib.gov.uk/cms_resources/120919_B042012_Wood_Green.pdf

[PaulRhB]

A nice concise and sensible report, obvious distraction to the crew by reacting correctly to another potentially very serious problem. Glad they were only slightly injured due to a good reaction by the driver. Remove the priming or the closeness to the tunnel when it happened and there'd have been no incident, bad luck part of the reason. The note about obscured vision due to the 47 is a good point too.

[The Stationmaster]

Remarkably quick for an RAIB report (even though it is a small one) but I'm not impressed - there is no mention of which dampers were open or shut (which can have an effect when double-heading) and normal practice is to open the blower before closing the regulator, especially when approaching a tunnel. I don't regard the presence of a diesel on the front as a reason for not knowing where they were and that they were nearing a tunnel - this section of the route is peppered with tunnels and all have fairly distinctive approaches, especially on a steam engine, and Wood Green is probably the most distinctive of the lot lying so close as it does to Bounds Green depot and the flying junction - even if you're looking sideways you can't miss it before you get to it.

 

Blowbacks are nasty and there are specific steps to avoid them but due to circumstance they can still occur however in this case I don't think all the pertinent issues have been addressed and one of them is the matter of route knowledge and frequency of working over which seems to have been totally ignored

[ROY@34F]

I agree with Stationmaster , especially regarding dampers . In my day at KX and Grantham , when approaching a tunnel , the damper would be closed , the blower full on ,or almost , and if coasting downhill , as in the last 20 miles or so to KX, the driver would have a whisp of steam on , and his hand on the regulator ready to give it a bit more if flames started to lick out of the firebox door , as did often happen . also , obviously don't stand anywhere near the line of fire , literally .

In this incidence the engine should have been working heavier uphill anyway , although the priming would be a problem of course , but how full was the boiler with water ? I rather think the diesel sounded to be doing too much of the work , leaving the steam engine with little to do , and a roaring fire into the bargain , partly perhaps the reason for too high a water level . Even so , I feel the driver should have known where he was , and had the blower well on , and also made sure the fireman had the damper/s closed . As Stationmaster says , I don't accept visibility because of the diesel in front , which in itself seems odd to me . I'm sure in steam days a steam engine always worked behind the diesel if the situation arose , for fire purposes . Have I dreampt this , or getting a bit " past it" ?

Regards , Roy.

[Glorious NSE]

I don't accept visibility because of the diesel in front , which in itself seems odd to me . I'm sure in steam days a steam engine always worked behind the diesel if the situation arose , for fire purposes .

 

It does explain why in the report, it wasn't the original plan but can be chalked up to 'trying not to stop the job' I think...

[Kenton]

I rather think the diesel sounded to be doing too much of the work , leaving the steam engine with little to do , and a roaring fire into the bargain , partly perhaps the reason for too high a water level.

 

When I read this, I was puzzled. To me. in ignorance, this seemed to be an odd arrangement. Especially with the steam loco "powered up". Not only obscuring visibility almost entirely but also changing the dynamics of air flow. Would it not be more usual for the diesel to bring up the rear and assist (as per banking). I thought leading was only usual in recovery operations. It would have been easier to detach when required to allow the rest of the train to continue. Also shouldn't the correct procedure have been to make safe the fire (close the doors) before warning the driver?

[PhilH]

I agree with Stationmaster , especially regarding dampers . In my day at KX and Grantham , when approaching a tunnel , the damper would be closed , the blower full on ,or almost , and if coasting downhill , as in the last 20 miles or so to KX, the driver would have a whisp of steam on , and his hand on the regulator ready to give it a bit more if flames started to lick out of the firebox door , as did often happen . also , obviously don't stand anywhere near the line of fire , literally .

In this incidence the engine should have been working heavier uphill anyway , although the priming would be a problem of course , but how full was the boiler with water ? I rather think the diesel sounded to be doing too much of the work , leaving the steam engine with little to do , and a roaring fire into the bargain , partly perhaps the reason for too high a water level . Even so , I feel the driver should have known where he was , and had the blower well on , and also made sure the fireman had the damper/s closed . As Stationmaster says , I don't accept visibility because of the diesel in front , which in itself seems odd to me . I'm sure in steam days a steam engine always worked behind the diesel if the situation arose , for fire purposes . Have I dreampt this , or getting a bit " past it" ?

Regards , Roy.

 

You have to read the things, the answer is usually in there somewhere

 

'The diesel locomotive was left on the front of the train in order

to both save time uncoupling it at Finsbury Park and to provide assistance to

the steam locomotive, reducing the risk of its exhaust causing lineside fires

(the weather had been dry during the previous week) and reducing its water

consumption (the water supply in the tender had to last an extra two hours).

 

That's why the diesel was in front and doing most of the work.

 

I don't understand why he pulled it up to mid gear after shutting the regulator, nor why he didn't open the drain cocks before doing anything else (when the thing primed).

[Happy Hippo]

Being wise after the event but the solution would have to have used the 2 way radio a lot earlier on to tell the 47 driver the situation with the boiler, and get him to throttle back and let Cromwell do the shoving.

 

You'll waste more water blowing off than you do actually running

 

Regards

 

Richard

[ROY@34F]

Sorry if I'm confusing things Gents. But in paragraph 4 of the report , the diesel was left on the front of the train to save uncoupling at finsbury park , suggesting the steam engine coupling in the front of the diesel . But paragraph 19 talks about the diesel impeding the view of the steam engine crew .!? Yes , I agree , opening the drain cocks should have been done also , although it does admittedly seem all the problems happened almost simultaneously , but surely , the driver , before easing the regulator , should have opened the blower considerably first , which would of course prevented the blowback .

Regards , Roy .

[PaulRhB]

Remarkably quick for an RAIB report (even though it is a small one) but I'm not impressed - there is no mention of which dampers were open or shut (which can have an effect when double-heading) and normal practice is to open the blower before closing the regulator, especially when approaching a tunnel.

I think they cover the brief nature in that they admitted normal procedures weren't followed up front and it was more a quick report of why not as to an investigation of what actually happened. West Coast crews are never going to be 100% familiar with the route as they cover such a variety differing jobs compared to local men, one of the costs of a fragmented railway. DBS crews generally have an advantage here as they are running steam on routes they do every day in diesels. Do the firemen have to have route knowledge on these workings, I think the standard only says driver now.

As I read it they put it down to the diesel on the front as not helping with the view, which is just a casual factor. It does say the procedures are known and applied on preserved lines too.

[Glorious NSE]

Sorry if I'm confusing things Gents. But in paragraph 4 of the report , the diesel was left on the front of the train to save uncoupling at finsbury park , suggesting the steam engine coupling in the front of the diesel

 

No, both loco's were on the front when it arrived at Finsbury Park, and the diesel was left on the front of the train to head towards Peterborough rather than running round in the carriage sidings and taking it back to Kings Cross (incurring further delay) to start the train which had been the original plan....

[The Stationmaster]

In steam days - as Roy says above - it rapidly became official practice to put the steam engine inside a diesel (except when clearing the line in an emergency and there was no choice. The reason for marshalling this way round was mainly to avoid damage to the diesel from either falling coal or on water troughs after a number of such instances had occurred - so working with the steam engine inside is not novel although in respect of this incident it was clearly a consequence of circumstance.

 

As far as road knowledge is concerned I would not accept any argument that 'the men don't work over the route frequently' because that need is even more important on a steam engine than it is on locos which have oodles of power available at a flick of the controller and needn't worry too much about gradients or - as this incident shows - tunnels. Bluntly there is no real excuse for the men on the Brit not knowing exactly where they were and that they were approaching a tunnel and I am surprised, and concerned, that RAIB regard it as 'a factor' (albeit one which is not heavily emphasised).

[Bon Accord]

You have to wonder if the crew subconsciously permitted themselves to be distracted/relax and so devote all their attention to the priming issue simply because there was a diesel up front powering the train, and they therefore (subconsciously) didn't have to keep as firm an eye on the road as they would have done if the roles were reversed.

Now of course that wouldn't be strictly 'cricket' either, but I suppose some could look upon the crew sympathetically with a notion of "there but for the grace of god go I" - they weren't the train engine, they were 'inside', they had a potentially serious problem so perhaps they lost their situational awareness in an effort to rectify that problem.

I am a little bit surprised there was no mention of drain cocks being opened.

[Bon Accord]

As far as road knowledge is concerned I would not accept any argument that 'the men don't work over the route frequently' because that need is even more important on a steam engine than it is on locos which have oodles of power available at a flick of the controller and needn't worry too much about gradients or - as this incident shows - tunnels..

 

Unfortunately, I suspect that is going to be a rather permanent problem due to the fragmented nature of todays railway, the resulting small number of main line steam operators and the equivalent small number of crews, most of whom operate far and wide on the network as opposed to being dedicated to one particular patch.

The report doesn't mention it, but should there not have been a Traction Inspector on the footplate at the time, or is that perhaps no longer a requirement?

[lonesome_whistle]

DB Schenker always have a traction inspector on the footplate (their firemen are always from the driving grade also - although not necessarily passed to drive steam) but WCRC do not have a requirement for a traction inspector as part of their crew. 70013 was being operated by WCRC at the time of this incident.

[The Stationmaster]

DB Schenker always have a traction inspector on the footplate (their firemen are always from the driving grade also - although not necessarily passed to drive steam) but WCRC do not have a requirement for a traction inspector as part of their crew. 70013 was being operated by WCRC at the time of this incident.

Interesting - and presumably covered by a WCRC risk assessment (although at least it saved a potential injury in this case). I wonder if they are now likely to be coming up on the ORR Inspectors' radar?

[PaulRhB]

As far as road knowledge is concerned I would not accept any argument that 'the men don't work over the route frequently' because that need is even more important on a steam engine than it is on locos which have oodles of power available at a flick of the controller and needn't worry too much about gradients or - as this incident shows - tunnels. Bluntly there is no real excuse for the men on the Brit not knowing exactly where they were and that they were approaching a tunnel and I am surprised, and concerned, that RAIB regard it as 'a factor' (albeit one which is not heavily emphasised).

Not an excuse for it Mike it's just a reality that's shown up a few times when there have been problems. Knowing how wide a route knowledge some of these drivers sign and the fact they struggle to keep it all signed up, that comes from talking to crews when Fragonset was around, means they aren't any more experienced than new drivers in reality on some routes. Add the complications of infrequent trips on steam and you have more potential for distraction causing simple tasks to be slowed.

Not perfect but a reality of so few steam passed crews.

[PhilH]

Why, in this day and age, would a traction inspector be any more au fait with the working of a steam loco than the accredited crew?

[RedgateModels]

I wonder if they are now likely to be coming up on the ORR Inspectors' radar?

 

Idle speculation? but yes, of course (I should know ....)

[lonesome_whistle]

Why, in this day and age, would a traction inspector be any more au fait with the working of a steam loco than the accredited crew?

 

Simply because they are not just any traction inspectors. Most of the men that DB employ in this role are former steam men that work on a part-time basis to cover this work. It's not for me to mention names but they are a good bunch. Technically, I believe they are there to liaise with the owner's representative but there is certainly no harm in having an extra pair of experienced eyes looking over operations.

 

Going back to the original subject of this thread, and leaving aside any partisanship for a moment, blowbacks have always happened, mostly they were avoidable, but sometimes a set of circumstances arises where, perhaps due to a moment's distraction as in this case, they do still occur. It's easy to be wise after the event but I've always taken the approach when reading accident reports that it's a case of 'there but for the grace of God' and we should be grateful that at least there were no significant injuries in this case.

 

A quick glance of the Railway Archive website would suggest that only three accident reports featuring blowbacks have been published and two of those in the last half dozen years. In years past a blowback involving a locomotive crew wouldn't have normally come to the attention of the Railway Inspectorate unless it had endangered passengers in some way. Talk to most former footplatemen though and it's apparent that they were not that unusual.