Mishap on GCR

[roythebus]

The KESR does not normally use scotches on stock berthed in the platform unless the vehicle is unbraked, but then the rules do not allow such stock to be berthed there longer than necessary during a shunt move.

[PenrithBeacon]

Hi,

 

In theory no great loss, but it could be indirectly. ...

The issue isn't the loco but the carriages.

 

Regards

[M51625]

I think the GCR are lucky to have only the damge they have. If the shunting at Loughborough wasnt happening that day the 37 would have had a clear road set all the way into platform 2, this platform is the usual stabling point for the dining train, first coach would have been an RFO, second coach the RKB and third would be another RFO, having seen the impact along the rake of coaches it would not have been available for sometime.

 

I suggest that a significant continued revenue loss could have made this incident much worse to the GCR, as it happens they still have a lot of damage to fix but essential operations including dining train income can continue.

 

Regards

[Bomag]

 first coach would have been an RFO, second coach the RKB and third would be another RFO, ...

 

 

GCR is going some if they have restored E3 and cloned it in the last 12 months!

 

From a pedantic coach lover.

[Boris]

I think the GCR are lucky to have only the damge they have. If the shunting at Loughborough wasnt happening that day the 37 would have had a clear road set all the way into platform 2, this platform is the usual stabling point for the dining train, first coach would have been an RFO, second coach the RKB and third would be another RFO, having seen the impact along the rake of coaches it would not have been available for sometime.

 

I suggest that a significant continued revenue loss could have made this incident much worse to the GCR, as it happens they still have a lot of damage to fix but essential operations including dining train income can continue.

 

Regards

Never mind that they have been lucky not to have sustained more damage to more important vehicles, they are lucky that nobody was hurt or killed, that's the important thing here.  The lives of the staff are way more important than any coach, wagon or loco.

[phil-b259]

I hate to disagree with you, Phil, but the actions of the bobby are definitely part of the signalling system, which is what I meant. I think the rest of my post indicated that the mechanical part worked as designed. It was the human part of the system which failed.

 

While human person (i.e. the signalman) is an important part of the process - the signalling system in my book means things like the block system and a proper interlocking. OK they may pull the levers but they are still subservient to the system not masters of it - and the same is true in the latest IECC, the timetable driven ARS might well try and set a route by if the signalling system proves its dangerous the request is ignored. In the first case I mentioned at the GCR it was quite clear that the signalling system was doing its job - i.e. the points had not moved thus the signals wouldn't clear. Of course there are other factors we don't know about from the video e.g.- track circuit failures - broken signal wires etc but what it all comes down to is the 'signalling system' was working correctly at the time by preventing the move from taking place and a human being took the deliberate decision to bypass the system and forego all the protection against errors the said system provides.

 

Ultimately human beings don't count as a 'signalling system' and their deficiencies when they were used as such have been laid bare right from the earliest days of rail transport. Hence the decisions over the years to lock them into a specific system which rigorously controls what they can and cannot do by mechanical and electrical means.

[Supaned]

and ultimately Phil's post above highlights some of the issues of interested amateurs operating kit designed to be used by professionals. I don't doubt that there are a lot of folks involved in preserved railways who know what they are doing , and are more than capable of working safely and following laid down rules and procedures. Unfortunately , there are also some who despite being brimming with enthusiasm , can't. 

 

And before anyone thinks this is a post "knocking" amateurs, a while back when I was working on a preserved diesel at a railway to remain nameless , we nearly had an incident when the signalman set the route incorrectly for a loco running round it's train (error number 1) , and the driver of the steam loco involved (who I believe was a former professional main line driver) , took that routing , and with the regulator in the roof charged obliviously towards a line of stabled stock.  Eventually the driver noticed the frantic waving and handsignals and stopped in time , but it just shows that it can happen at any time.

[37114]

Looking at some of the photos of the crash the 37 Handbrake wasn't on, so would be difficult for it to have failed. Having applied the handbrake on a 37,  I can vouch it involves numerous turns of the handbrake wheel to get it to properly apply, and it is the last couple of turns that count as you are effecitviely taking the slack in the chains up with the first 80% of the turns. We were given an overview of the 37113 incident which was due to the Handbrakenot being fully applied and was believed to be because of the above.

[LMS2968]

I think we can agree to disagree on our interpretations of what constitutes what as far as the system is concerned, Phil. Otherwise, I don't think we're miles apart on what actually happened.

[The Stationmaster]

I think we can agree to disagree on our interpretations of what constitutes what as far as the system is concerned, Phil. Otherwise, I don't think we're miles apart on what actually happened.

We can indeed but what we shouldn't overlook is that when the mechanical or electrical part of the signalling system is not functioning correctly or is misapplied then the human element becomes a critical part of the system.  Authorising a movement past a signal at danger means that the Signalman has not only got his normal role as [part of] the train detection system but he is also taking on the role of the interlocking system because it  might not necessarily be carrying out its normal and proper function.

 

Let's not forget that the Rule Book, in its countless versions and variations over the years makes exactly that provision for the involvement of the human - from the essential basic of making sure a block section is clear by observing that the previous train has passed through complete with tail lamp (part of 'normal' working) to the situation where he authorises moves past signals at danger, clips points because an FPL will not bolt, and right through to actually becoming the block system itself under Time Interval Working (good old ABR25.a.iv working as it once was).  In all of these cases, and others, the system will either not function or will not function safely without the actions of the human element and - as the GCR run-through showed - it pays us not to ignore that.

[EddieB]

From the report in "Steam Railway" it would appear that 37198 was attached to the TPO carriage (W80301) which it propelled into a rake of green Mk 1 coaches standing on the running line.  RAIB investigators were on site around two hours after the crash.  The railway is "saying little" about the incident, other to confirm that the 37 was left with its wheels scotched.  The TPO was the main casualty, with one bogie sheared from its pivot and its vestibule crushed by the impact.

 

Around 70 photographers booked on a photo-charter (including a German party that flew over from Düsseldorf) over the following two days were left out of pocket for travel and accommodation after the line remained closed.

 

I can only echo the sentiments expressed that it is fortunate that the incident didn't result in any injuries (or worse).  Even (or especially) if the railway was closed on the day it happened, there could easily have been volunteers on site not expecting any stock movements.  Beyond that, better to wait for a report to be released before speculating over contributory factors.

[Mark Saunders]

and ultimately Phil's post above highlights some of the issues of interested amateurs operating kit designed to be used by professionals. I don't doubt that there are a lot of folks involved in preserved railways who know what they are doing , and are more than capable of working safely and following laid down rules and procedures. Unfortunately , there are also some who despite being brimming with enthusiasm , can't. 

 

And before anyone thinks this is a post "knocking" amateurs, a while back when I was working on a preserved diesel at a railway to remain nameless , we nearly had an incident when the signalman set the route incorrectly for a loco running round it's train (error number 1) , and the driver of the steam loco involved (who I believe was a former professional main line driver) , took that routing , and with the regulator in the roof charged obliviously towards a line of stabled stock.  Eventually the driver noticed the frantic waving and handsignals and stopped in time , but it just shows that it can happen at any time.

 

Quite often it takes two to make an accident, one to make a mistake and the other not noticing the mistake!

 

Mark Saunders

[Boris]

The way our operations manager describes railway operating as a game of Kerplunk, if you leave all the straws in the balls stay where they should be, pull enough out and something ends up on the floor.

[PhilH]

 

 

Unfortunately , there are also some who despite being brimming with enthusiasm , can't. 

 

I'm not going to jump up and down on this one....but I bet there aren't many of those currently carrying out safety critical jobs on modern day heritage railways.

[Boris]

I'm curious about this runaway and mention of the set being scotched, unless a third party has removed them something strange has indeed occurred there, unless somebody has done the favourite NYMR trick of putting the chocks up the uphill side of the wheel set?

[royaloak]

If it rolled that distance, it could end up at quite a speed. Who on earth would be daft enough to try to run to stop it?

 

To give you some idea of inertia, on the Portsmouth Direct line, leave Haslemere on the up with a 8VEP/etc., shut off at 45mph by the overbridge about a mile from the station (just at the top of the bank). Do not apply power at all. The train will roll at up to 90mph beyond Witley, brake for the 60 at Godalming and Farncombe, and the train will still roll into Guildford. That is a lot of inertia. I know, I've done it and was shown that by one the older generation of drivers back in 1981.

Which is exactly how it is done on Desiros now!

 

the more things change, the more they stay the same.

[melmerby]

Looking at some of the photos of the crash the 37 Handbrake wasn't on, so would be difficult for it to have failed. Having applied the handbrake on a 37,  I can vouch it involves numerous turns of the handbrake wheel to get it to properly apply, and it is the last couple of turns that count as you are effecitviely taking the slack in the chains up with the first 80% of the turns. We were given an overview of the 37113 incident which was due to the Handbrakenot being fully applied and was believed to be because of the above.

That description of a handbrake on "relatively" modern piece of railway equipment suggests to me that locomotive designers were still in the stone age in some repects!

 

Why wasn't something like a flexible cable (as on a road vehicle) used or some means of "locking" the gearset on one of the motors? Either would produce a more effective parking brake.

 

Keith

[Dagworth]

That description of a handbrake on "relatively" modern piece of railway equipment suggests to me that locomotive designers were still in the stone age in some repects!

 

Why wasn't something like a flexible cable (as on a road vehicle) used or some means of "locking" the gearset on one of the motors? Either would produce a more effective parking brake.

 

Keith

And a device that locked the gears would result in some fairly nasty damage the first time someone tried to move the loco with the handbrake on. The old adage of Keep It Simple is worth millions

 

As for a cable, a loco weighs a couple of hundred times what a car does...

 

 

Andi

[Talltim]

It sounds like they could have kept it even simpler on the class 40s by not fitting the handbrake...

[The Stationmaster]

That description of a handbrake on "relatively" modern piece of railway equipment suggests to me that locomotive designers were still in the stone age in some repects!

 

Why wasn't something like a flexible cable (as on a road vehicle) used or some means of "locking" the gearset on one of the motors? Either would produce a more effective parking brake.

 

Keith

'Relatively' modern?  The first EE Type entered traffic in 1961 - I remember it, copped it at Liverpool Street - and that is 53 years ago so design work probably started around 55 years ago.  So effectively the loco is a child of the late 1950s and if you ask any youngster of today about the 150s they'll probably think of it as history, or in some cases, as ancient history. So hardly 'modern' by any measure in my view, notwithstanding various mods and refits done since the loco was new.

 

In reality what we call 'the handbrake' on a diesel is in reality a parking brake - it serves no other braking function (and didn't even manage that properly on the EE Type 4 of course although as several of us have already said the Type 3s weren't known for having ineffective handbrakes in the way the Type 4s were.  No doubt the Report, when it emerges from RAIB, should identify exactly what happened - until then we really don't know all the facts beyond that a collision occurred.

[melmerby]

And a device that locked the gears would result in some fairly nasty damage the first time someone tried to move the loco with the handbrake on. The old adage of Keep It Simple is worth millions

 

As for a cable, a loco weighs a couple of hundred times what a car does...

 

 

Andi

The gears could be interlocked with a device that would not allow any attempt at movement (maybe like on an automatic gearbox)

 

You can get big cables!

 

Keith

[melmerby]

'Relatively' modern?  The first EE Type entered traffic in 1961 - I remember it, copped it at Liverpool Street - and that is 53 years ago so design work probably started around 55 years ago. 

As somebody who was around before the BR Standards were built, it's "modern" technology to me!

 

Didn't steam locos have half decent parking brakes?

 

Keith

[PhilH]

As somebody who was around before the BR Standards were built, it's "modern" technology to me!

 

Didn't steam locos have half decent parking brakes?

 

Keith

No!

[griffgriff]

The BBC filmed a rail accident for an episode of Casualty (oh yes another one)  on the GC earlier this year... perhaps they thought the cameras were still rolling.(oops bad pun)

[Andy W]

As somebody who was around before the BR Standards were built, it's "modern" technology to me!

 

Didn't steam locos have half decent parking brakes?

 

Keith

Not if they were built for the LNWR for certain - read E.S.Cox on the subject. There's also a book by J.M.Dunn who ended his career as a shedmaster at, I think, Llandudno Junction, who claimed that the brake linkages were prone to falling off and even when attached got out of adjustment so rapidly that the brake blocks rarely touched the wheels.