Class 800 - Updates

[Geoff Endacott]

It's not just the Class 800s which are short formed due to lack of staff.

 

http://www.realtimetrains.co.uk/train/S73184/2017/12/24/advanced

 

Geoff Endacott

[Ron Ron Ron]

Posted on RailUK Forums tonight.....

 

 

 

Was on the 08.30 Padd-Bristol this morning - ran on diesel mode throughout (i.e. not on electric mode to Maidenhead).

 

Broken OLE bracket on the Down Main at Southall - the thing that started the problem with 1B05. Bi-modes in diesel, electrics max 50mph.

 

Was this a failure of OHLE that should have been modified or replaced?

 

 

.

Edited December 23, 2017 by Ron Ron Ron

[Ron Ron Ron]

Also from the same place, posted late on Thursday evening.....

 

 

 

The initial fault was an ADD (automatic drop device) activation on the IET units. This is usually indicative of an OHL fault. Trains had to be cautioned on all lines until they were examined by OHL engineers. At that time of morning the disruption would have been significant.

 

Once both units were panned Down; they were then unable to take power in Diesel or Electric mode; this was further complicated by them not being able to obtain brake release from either the 57, or the 3rd 800 that were both sent to rescue. There was no fault transference; the 3rd 800 didn’t have any issues; it simply wasn’t capable of moving a 10 car with brakes locked hard on (understandably!).

Edited December 23, 2017 by Ron Ron Ron

[The Stationmaster]

Posted on RailUK Forums tonight.....

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Was this a failure of OHLE that should have been modified or replaced?

 

 

.

 

Very pertinent question Ron.  What might well be relevant is that some of the headspan equipped sections are now being not only by more trains as teh number of Class 80X trips increases but also by trains which, at Southall,  are running at a speed 25% greater than that of the trains which have used them up until now.

[caradoc]

Was it ever confirmed that there actually was an OLE defect ? The ADD I am familiar with consists of an air supply passed under the pantograph carbons, arranged so that if the carbons are dislodged or damaged, whether due to an OLE fault or a pan defect, the pan will lower. The procedure should then be to stop and examine the pan for any damage. Surely there would be an indication on the 800s of which pan had the ADD activation, or did both ? Regardless, an ADD activation should not have affected the ability to run in diesel mode, although if the pan was damaged and had become foul to gauge or the OLE the train would be stuck.

[jim.snowdon]

Was it ever confirmed that there actually was an OLE defect ?

There was, although it was quite minor and there was no observable damage to the pantographs that would have prevented the train from proceeding.

 

Jim

[modfather]

Was it ever confirmed that there actually was an OLE defect ? The ADD I am familiar with consists of an air supply passed under the pantograph carbons, arranged so that if the carbons are dislodged or damaged, whether due to an OLE fault or a pan defect, the pan will lower. The procedure should then be to stop and examine the pan for any damage. Surely there would be an indication on the 800s of which pan had the ADD activation, or did both ? Regardless, an ADD activation should not have affected the ability to run in diesel mode, although if the pan was damaged and had become foul to gauge or the OLE the train would be stuck.

The add also has an over height dump valve on the 800 leading to a choked exhaust that lets the pan sharply drop away from the wire then damps the travel to rest.

[The Stationmaster]

The add also has an over height dump valve on the 800 leading to a choked exhaust that lets the pan sharply drop away from the wire then damps the travel to rest.

 

I think overheight detection resulting in auto lower is a standard fitting on UK pantographs, certainly on the modern ones.  The ADD on the Class 800 however seems to be considerably more sophisticated than a simple overheight arrangement.

[jim.snowdon]

I think overheight detection resulting in auto lower is a standard fitting on UK pantographs, certainly on the modern ones.  The ADD on the Class 800 however seems to be considerably more sophisticated than a simple overheight arrangement.

An interesting contrast with the arrangements on the US Northeast corridor, where it is not uncommon to gap the wiring at lift bridges and simply coast through with the pantographs at maximum height before picking up the wire again on the other side.The contact wire is simply ramped up to beyond maximum height on the approach, and back down again on the other side of the gap.

 

As it is, the arrangements on the class 800 do seem to be getting unnecessarily complicated (or is it just another case of with the increased computing power available, simply dropping the pantograph and giving the driver an indication is no longer enough?) For that matter, whilst auto-drop is a sensible enough precaution against further damage, how much value is there in sensing that the pantograph has gone beyond maximum allowed height? Or is it another case of automating something simply because it could be done, not whether it was actually needed?

 

Jim

[modfather]

It is in order to bring a pan down before it tears down chunks of infrastructure. I can't remember the tolerance but it gets surprisingly high before it drops.

 

The 800 pan still has a positive air feed

through both carbons and an indication I the cab. I can't recall how it opened the vacuum circuit breaker though. Thankfully I'm 8 months clear of the shambles!

Edited December 25, 2017 by modfather

[jim.snowdon]

Usually, it's the infrastructure that wins, without any effort. Equally, if the reason for the pantograph's unexpected rise is due to dewirement, it will have started destroying the OLE, and itself, before it has started coming down.

 

Auto drop in the event of carbon damage is undoubtedly worth while; whilst auto drop in the event of reaching maximum height is patently feasible, I wonder if there has ever been any analysis of how often the latter has proved useful, or simply done because it could be and seemed to be a good thing.

 

What is clear is that auto drop should not disable the train to the extent that it did, let alone result in the train reconfiguring itself.

 

Jim

[St. Simon]

What is clear is that auto drop should not disable the train to the extent that it did, let alone result in the train reconfiguring itself.

Regardless, an ADD activation should not have affected the ability to run in diesel mode, although if the pan was damaged and had become foul to gauge or the OLE the train would be stuck.

 

There hasn't been any evidence that the ADD activation was the direct cause of the failure to run in diesel mode, the TMS fault was probably present when the train left Paddington.

 

At the moment, we are just jumping to conclusions as to the link between the ADD and TMS, which I actually think might be complete coincidental.

 

Simon

[Covkid]

There hasn't been any evidence that the ADD activation was the direct cause of the failure to run in diesel mode, the TMS fault was probably present when the train left Paddington.

 

At the moment, we are just jumping to conclusions as to the link between the ADD and TMS, which I actually think might be complete coincidental.

 

Simon

 

 

I agree.

It looks to me as though this very very complex train is starting to put the operators through the mill in daily operation. May be wrong but think the operations of 800s up until now have involved three different phases. The first phases has involved GBRf drivers working with HItachi to produce mileage based fault free running, mostly on diesel, but also in a limited way on AC too on the ECML. The diesel operations have progressed on the WR and have involved staff training and some AC running between Paddington and Maidenhead.

 

The third phase has seen IETs enter timetabled service with GWR but still restricted mostly to diesel operations apart from Paddington - Maidenhead. This is with GWR staff including guards who have probably only got their stick mitts on them in the last nine weeks. They will probably be receiving very little faults and failures saupport because these things are brand new and in passenger service just weeks. It also seems as though regular door versus platform operations are a recent feature. Perhaps we have expected these very complex Hitachi products to work perfectly straight out of the box, with the minimum of user skills - users who hithertoo mostly used slam door stock and no TMS style computerised trains. 

 

Big repect to the GWR, VTEC, FHT and TPE staff who have to learn operate the new trains in all conditions, especially if in the future some might be DOO. 

Edited December 26, 2017 by Covkid

[Arun Sharma]

There hasn't been any evidence that the ADD activation was the direct cause of the failure to run in diesel mode, the TMS fault was probably present when the train left Paddington.

 

At the moment, we are just jumping to conclusions as to the link between the ADD and TMS, which I actually think might be complete coincidental.

 

Simon

Post hoc ergo propter hoc.

 

The Romans did have a way with words didn't they? - and 2000 years later we can still jump to the same conclusions!

Edited December 26, 2017 by ted675

[APOLLO]

Post hoc ergo propter hoc.

 

The Romans did have a way with words didn't they? - and 2000 years later we can still jump to the same conclusions!

 

Nuquam magna occidens mechanicus constanta perforatai rectum.

 

Brit15

Edited December 26, 2017 by APOLLO

[jim.snowdon]

There hasn't been any evidence that the ADD activation was the direct cause of the failure to run in diesel mode, the TMS fault was probably present when the train left Paddington.

 

At the moment, we are just jumping to conclusions as to the link between the ADD and TMS, which I actually think might be complete coincidental.

 

Simon

It might well be, and we aren't going to know; those who do know will be constrained not to make such information public, not least for the potential legal/contractual consequences that might result. if it is no more than coincidence, then it is an unfortunate one, but the events after the train stopped would be a matter of serious concern were I in the operator's position.

 

I agree.

It looks to me as though this very very complex train is starting to put the operators through the mill in daily operation. May be wrong but think the operations of 800s up until now have involved three different phases. The first phases has involved GBRf drivers working with HItachi to produce mileage based fault free running, mostly on diesel, but also in a limited way on AC too on the ECML. The diesel operations have progressed on the WR and have involved staff training and some AC running between Paddington and Maidenhead.

 

The third phase has seen IETs enter timetabled service with GWR but still restricted mostly to diesel operations apart from Paddington - Maidenhead. This is with GWR staff including guards who have probably only got their stick mitts on them in the last nine weeks. They will probably be receiving very little faults and failures saupport because these things are brand new and in passenger service just weeks. It also seems as though regular door versus platform operations are a recent feature. Perhaps we have expected these very complex Hitachi products to work perfectly straight out of the box, with the minimum of user skills - users who hithertoo mostly used slam door stock and no TMS style computerised trains. 

 

Big repect to the GWR, VTEC, FHT and TPE staff who have to learn operate the new trains in all conditions, especially if in the future some might be DOO. 

Yes, it may be a very very complex train, although a good question would have to be why it should be so complex. Nor, is it the first electric train that Hitachi have produced for the UK market, even though it might be their first dual-mode electro-diesel train. How does it's performance thus far equate to that of the Class 395 units, which were Hitachi's first for the UK market? Nonetheless, however complex it may be within the black boxes, the staff, in particular, the drivers should not be expected to have degrees in train control electronics, nor a tame technician permanently on-board. It is the responsibility of the train's manufacturer to consider the fault finding process, including the provision of controlled means to allow the train to be moved, even if under restrictive conditions. That includes how to safely rescue a train that is completely disabled, bearing in mind that to the customer, sitting on a dead train for hours whilst a technician is sought is not going to be amused. By the same token, it should not take the train operator hours to work out that the train is disabled and sort out some means of rescueing the passengers.

 

Jim

[jjb1970]

Hitachi's commissioning process seems to be having a few problems (and there is a definite sense of schadenfreude in some quarters at Hitachi's problems I think), they have to meet their contractual obligations and it's their job to make sure they do that. On the other hand I wish I had a pound for every asset written off as rubbish because of commissioning and teething issues. I think every newbuild ship or power plant I was ever involved with was the worst ship or power plant ever built for a period during hand over and entry into service. Most of them (though not all) settled down and performed admirably once they got through their initial issues.

[Zomboid]

Things like this working straight out of the box are certainly the exception rather than the rule. It's not great, and everyone would sooner this phase wasn't a part of the sequence, but it's also totally normal...

Hitachi have an extra learning curve being relatively new to the UK market, but I've no doubt that they'll deliver a train that performs as it was specified to do. And that there will probably be another awkward and disruptive problem before that happens.

[royaloak]

Things like this working straight out of the box are certainly the exception rather than the rule. It's not great, and everyone would sooner this phase wasn't a part of the sequence, but it's also totally normal...

Hitachi have an extra learning curve being relatively new to the UK market, but I've no doubt that they'll deliver a train that performs as it was specified to do. And that there will probably be another awkward and disruptive problem before that happens.

It shouldnt be normal for all the faults to be ironed out after the trains enter service, thats what all the shakedown trials and mileage accumulation runs should be for, of course not using any of the high cycle things such as doors or testing the air con with a full load of passengers on a very humid/damp day might be seen as a bit of a boo boo.

[Ken.W]

I wonder if they tried switching them off and then back on again.

Probably weren't allowed to.

 

When we learned the 91s, there's a switch on the LV cubicle that effectively re-boots the computer, which we were told drivers were not to use, as Maintenance needed to be able to download the computer to see what the fault was.

Very quickly however, when we were having major problems and things weren't behaving as they should, that switch was the first thing the Maintenance Controller was telling us over the phone to use!

 

I doubt however that GW have this option, as in this case they're not actually 'their' trains, and there's all sorts of contracts in between as to who does what

[jamie92208]

Perhaps they should have looked at a paper that was presented to the Institution of Civil Engineers in 1909 by Dalziel and Sayers. Towards the end of it is this quote

 

"The mileage lost during the 15 months ending 30th September 1909, through electrical defects of any kind whatever, due to power-house, line , or cars, amounted to 212 miles and the cars have made 99.63 per cent of the total mileage they were called upon to do."

 

The paper was about the very first High Voltage AC electrification in the UK at Lancaster. in 12 months they designed and built the whole system from scratch and had it operating. There is a delay minute attribution table and one of the incidents was a fireman going onto the tender to trim coal whose sodden flat hat made contact with the overhead (6.6Kv). Fortunately for him it earthed via the collar of his Ulster which was equally sodden, then through his boots into the coal and he woke up next morning in hospital with a headache.

 

Just to add this was the first 15 months from making the overhead live in early 1908. They only started construction in 1907. Dalzeil and Sayers were the project managers reporting to Richard Deeley who had the full backing of the Midland Board who were the client in modern day terms.

 

Jamie

Edited December 27, 2017 by jamie92208

[jim.snowdon]

It shouldnt be normal for all the faults to be ironed out after the trains enter service, thats what all the shakedown trials and mileage accumulation runs should be for, of course not using any of the high cycle things such as doors or testing the air con with a full load of passengers on a very humid/damp day might be seen as a bit of a boo boo.

Statistically, there are always likely to be a number of component failures very early in the life of a new piece of equipment and the whole purpose of pre-handover test operation is a contractual method for loading the consequent risk onto the manufacturer. Nothing wrong in that, provided the equipment is able to be put through its normal duty cycle. Where things can go wrong is when novelty is introduced, usually by way of "innovation", when there is little understanding of how something new behaves in the real world, which can be very different to the test bed. Then, if it is operationally critical, not only is extensive prototype testing essential, but it becomes sensible to engineer its installation so that there is either redundancy or "get you home" facilities, as one thing you cannot really do on a railway is stop whilst you send for an Engineer to try and identity/resolve what has gone wrong. Even less so on an aeroplane where even stopping is not an option.

 

Jim

[Fenman]

... Hitachi have an extra learning curve being relatively new to the UK market ...

 

That reads to me a bit like you're making excuses for Hitachi. Their 395s have been in actual service in the UK for more than 8 years, and weren't we told one of the reasons the IEP trains would be so brilliant was because they were using all of Hitachi's experience (hence having pocket doors, despite them not being optimal for high speed trains - they were allegedly more reliable)?

 

Hitachi is supposed to be a highly experienced, world-class, engineering-led company. It certainly isn't shy about boasting with full-page colour ads in the industry press, highlighting their (to me vacuous) slogan "Inspire the Next" (what on earth is that supposed to mean?).

 

Despite all those decisions to use sub-optimal equipment (because it was apparently more reliable), and all those months spent testing, Hitachi seems to have missed what appear to be some pretty important issues.

 

I guess they'll get it right in the end. It seems like a rum old way to launch a new product, though.

 

Paul

[The Stationmaster]

Things like this working straight out of the box are certainly the exception rather than the rule. It's not great, and everyone would sooner this phase wasn't a part of the sequence, but it's also totally normal...

Hitachi have an extra learning curve being relatively new to the UK market, but I've no doubt that they'll deliver a train that performs as it was specified to do. And that there will probably be another awkward and disruptive problem before that happens.

 

Particularly with a train which is heavily software reliant such as this one with the TMS seemingly involved in monitoring/controlling all sorts of things. True there may well be other faults which emerge for whatever reason but the critical item at the centre of it all will be the TMS and what it is or isn't doing plus the things which are now having to deal with large numbers of passengers.  Experience seems to show that even with mileage accumulation pre-delivery what happens when a train enters public service can show up all sorts of things because that is really the only time when the whole software and train's other equipment is put to the test.  The only way to mitigate that is extensive 'shadow running' mileage accumulation including carrying passengers on other than regular timetabled services but that will delay service introduction and might not be acceptable for that reason even if it delivers other advantages, and even then everyday service will create things at a greater frequency than is usually possible even with shadow running.

 

Let's not forget too that the TMS is inevitably going to contain the fault guide (I'd be very surprised if it doesn't on a train this modern) and that too might find shortcomings in regular service operation.  I get the impression, rightly or wrongly, that the pace of introduction of these trains into GWR squadron service Is happening too quickly in view of the reported/perceived level of various shortcomings but no doubt the rush is on because of their place in the HST cascade and maybe contractual commitments.  But whatever - the software will, on past experience of complex train software, take time to be got right as might the validation and sensitivity of various sensor inputs.  But that will no doubt cost money and we are back then to the contract situation.

 

I think too that Zomboid is right about Hitachi being 'new' to the UK - not new of course in the way that they already have the 395s in operation but new in respect of the fact that they have a new factory and that they are new to the demands of GWML operation which is placing different requirements from the 395 operation on what the train is required to do.

[96701]

I bet this sort of thing doesn't happen to Japanese Railways.