Quintinshill collision 1915.

[sn]

There is an interesting animation of the traffic movements at this page...

 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quintinshill

 

..leading up to the 1915 Quintinshill rail disaster. One thing that's always fascinated me about the accident is how Meakin and Tinsley the signalmen 'forgot' about the down local standing on the fast. The track diagram however suggests that the local train may have been obscured by the train of coal empties standing in the up loop. Oddly, I've never heard this mentioned as a contributing factor. Anyone got any thoughts on this.?

[Guest Max Stafford]

Interesting feature. It's still amazing today to observe how a combination of complex manouevres and a couple of daft errors led to such a terrible accident. Shunting the local onto the up main just seems like one hell of a risky move, even to this amateur!

 

Dave.

[John_Hughes]

Interesting feature. It's still amazing today to observe how a combination of complex manouevres and a couple of daft errors led to such a terrible accident. Shunting the local onto the up main just seems like one hell of a risky move, even to this amateur!

 

Dave.

 

Perfectly legitimate in the circumstances, and apparently something that regularly happened with this train at Quintinshill; but it seems that they didn't sprag the signal levers to remind them of what they'd done, and so forgot about the train just at the moment when it mattered.

 

The real problem was that the people concerned didn't have their minds on the job, one of them having turned up late for work and so was (illegally!) busied in copying the earlier train movements into the register off a bit of paper, while some others seem to have been reading the paper and talking about the war. What a way to run a railway!

 

A few years ago my wife and I stopped off for lunch at the (excellent) pub in the village and found that they had a fine collection of memorabilia of the accident on display in the bar.

[Happy Hippo]

There is an interesting animation of the traffic movements at this page...

 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quintinshill

 

..leading up to the 1915 Quintinshill rail disaster. One thing that's always fascinated me about the accident is how Meakin and Tinsley the signalmen 'forgot' about the down local standing on the fast. The track diagram however suggests that the local train may have been obscured by the train of coal empties standing in the up loop. Oddly, I've never heard this mentioned as a contributing factor. Anyone got any thoughts on this.?

 

 

The accident report states that there was good visibility from the box.

 

One interesting fact is that the fireman of the local train in accordance with rule 55 did visit the box and signed the register, but he failed to get assurance from the signalman that the signals protecting his train had had their levers collared to prevent them from being pulled off accidently.

 

Regards

 

HH

[The Stationmaster]

Shunting trains 'across the road' was common practice in many places and was a perfectly safe and acceptable part of everyday railway working - provided that it was done properly. It used to be done regularly at one of my 'boxes in the 1970s and sometimes involved shunting over a train of tank cars carrying motor spirit (i.e petrol).

 

As John has already noted the main problem at Quintinshill was laxity in the working and distraction pf the Signalmen from their proper duties. That has long been a theme in railway 'accidents' and can even occur in this day & age - even with all the modern safety devices (and sometimes even because of such devices).

 

As for writing details into a Train Register Book off scraps of paper it wouldn't surprise me if it still sometimes happens. I caught a pair of my Signalmen doing it back in the late 1970s for the simple, and totally stupid as far as I was concerned, reason that they wanted their changeover time in the TRB to agree with their timesheets - a nonsense which was easily resolved by formalising their unofficial changeover time but showing the rostered changeover on the timesheet. I wonder if that simple method of ending a potentially dangerous practice would be acceptable on today's railway?

[Fat Controller]

Perfectly legitimate in the circumstances, and apparently something that regularly happened with this train at Quintinshill; but it seems that they didn't sprag the signal levers to remind them of what they'd done, and so forgot about the train just at the moment when it mattered.

 

The real problem was that the people concerned didn't have their minds on the job, one of them having turned up late for work and so was (illegally!) busied in copying the earlier train movements into the register off a bit of paper, while some others seem to have been reading the paper and talking about the war. What a way to run a railway!

 

A few years ago my wife and I stopped off for lunch at the (excellent) pub in the village and found that they had a fine collection of memorabilia of the accident on display in the bar.

My wife uses Quintinshill as one of the examples in lectures she gives on human factors in railway and industrial accidents- she'll be interested in the Quintinshill animation, as she's just done a similar one for the E* debacle before Christmas. One thing that comes to light from a lot of studies she's looked at is how incidents are concentrated in certain periods within the day- the very early morning being one, and shift changes being another.

There was another big train crash with a fire during WW1, in 1917 near St Jean-de-Maurienne, due this time to inadequate braking:-

http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Catastrophe_ferroviaire_de_Saint-Michel-de-Maurienne

What the Wikipedia article doesn't say is that the trainload of British troops who had been held safely behind a signal, and who were praised for their help in rescuing the few survivors, were from a Scottish regiment.

[Guest stuartp]

As for writing details into a Train Register Book off scraps of paper it wouldn't surprise me if it still sometimes happens. I caught a pair of my Signalmen doing it back in the late 1970s for the simple, and totally stupid as far as I was concerned, reason that they wanted their changeover time in the TRB to agree with their timesheets - a nonsense which was easily resolved by formalising their unofficial changeover time but showing the rostered changeover on the timesheet. I wonder if that simple method of ending a potentially dangerous practice would be acceptable on today's railway?

 

I caught two of mine leaving lines for each other in 1992. We had a brief discussion on the differences between (and consequences of) mutual exchanges of duty sanctioned by management and falsifying TRBs, and the practice stopped.

 

Quintishill is a good example of why those engaged in Rule 55 / Section K (or whatever it is now) need to know not only what they have to do but why they're doing it.

[John_Hughes]

To quote the old Canadian Pacific regulation 205, These records must be made at once, and never from memory or memorabilia.

 

Of course, had there been track circuiting at the location then Quintinshill could never have happened, a fact which I believe was noted in the official accident report. The trouble is that the more safeguards are provided, the more people rely on them because they consider them to be foolproof; in the real world, hardly any system can't be subverted by the idle, the malign or the plain stupid.

[70022Tornado]

And here is a copy of the official report

 

http://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/documents/BoT_Quin1915.pdf

 

Link to the £Railway Archieve

 

70022Tornado

[The Stationmaster]

And here is a copy of the official report

 

http://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/documents/BoT_Quin1915.pdf

 

Link to the £Railway Archieve

 

70022Tornado

 

Far more interesting must have been the letters which the Board of Trade wrote to 'the Railways' following the collision regarding the use of various reminder appliances (not just lever collars but also on block instruments) etc. The GWR considered issuing a requirement for the state of block instrument indications to be recorded in the Train Register Book when Signalmen changed over but decided not to implement it.

 

However what did happen (nationally as far as I can establish) was a much greater formalisation and expansion of the checks to be made by Station Masters and Inspectors when visiting signalboxes. Overall there seems to have been far less impact on Rules & Regs and supervision arising from the Quintinshill collision than was the case with the various Midland Railway collisions on the S&C c.1911 and the later single collision at Abermule on the Cambrian.

[62613]

There was another (double) collision and fire in 1915, at Tyne Dock Junction on the line between Newcastle and South Shields - yet again the signalman forgot he had a train in section, and cleared his signals for another train to run into it. This time it was a light loco that had 'dropped off' a goods train it had banked up from the dock; he wasn't helped by the fact that that driver was supposed to change the loco headlamp, and this he had failed to do, thus confusing the signalman.

[the penguin of doom]

The magnitude of this disaster is reflected in the fact that when I joined the railway in 1994 and learned block signalling at Crewe, they were still using this collision to illustrate the point.

 

The simple facts are, the placing of a steel ring over the relevant lever would have avoided the collision. I never forgot this lesson and always made sure I knew where the rings were, should they be required....

 

Cheers.

 

Sean.

[martin_wynne]

The simple facts are, the placing of a steel ring over the relevant lever would have avoided the collision. I never forgot this lesson and always made sure I knew where the rings were, should they be required....

One can imagine what must go through the mind of a signalman who goes to pull a lever and finds a collar on it. A heart-stopping "what if?" moment, I should think.

 

Martin.

[The Stationmaster]

One can imagine what must go through the mind of a signalman who goes to pull a lever and finds a collar on it. A heart-stopping "what if?" moment, I should think.

 

Martin.

 

Not normally that bad Martin . Provided you are used to working with them and are in command of what you are doing the main thing which is likely to happen is to think 'why am I touching this lever when I know there is a reason not to; does that reason still exist?' Much the same as working with reminder flaps on block instruments (which are excellent fittings on the [G]WR 1947 pattern instrument although perhaps never fully exploited by many Signalmen).

 

I have however seen less experienced folk grabbing hold of a lever with a collar on it and trying to work the catch handle and looking surprised that they can't - so that was a simple device doing its job properly. So yes, the lever collar (or even using a flag stick, which was a common alternative) is an excellent device provided you remember to use it as intended.

 

And another excellent use for the GWR pattern collar is as - as they were indeed sometimes called - 'a Signalman's eggcup' (large eggs of course ) however I think Mrs Stationmaster would not be happy to see me doing that with one on our kitchen table .

[GC Jack]

I would like to re-open this thread.

 

I am in the process of doing considerable research into Quintinshill.

 

More than any other the accident has attracted wild speculation and myths.

 

What I would like at this stage to know if anyone can give me details of the frame and the block indicators. Were they two or three position instruments?

 

Any photos of the interior of the box would be very welcome. I hope at some time to publish the findings of my research......they may be some surprises to come!!

 

Jack

[Adrian Wintle]

What I would like at this stage to know if anyone can give me details of the frame and the block indicators. Were they two or three position instruments?

 

There is a fairly detailed description of the block instruments in the report that is linked above.

 

Adrian

[GC Jack]

Thanks Adrian,

 

I have this report and hadn't checked that!! I am still a bit puzzled by the description it would appear to have three positions which one would be the normal position? The normal position in other block instruments is not line clear. Here it says train off line. Is that a safeguard position?

 

Jack

[The Stationmaster]

As I read the Report (quickly) they would appear to be 2 position block instruments working on what almost amounts to an open block principle in that the instrument is only placed to Train On Line when the section is occupied and the rest of the time the signal style indicator is 'off; indicating that there is no train in the section. However it appears that the block working was on the (by then) normal principle of closed block with trains being offered and accepted before signals were lowered (n.b I haven't read that far to check the detail).

But all of this is, in reality, fairly irrelevant to what actually took place at Quintinshill that morning and as for the causes of the collision there is basically no reason at all for any sort of speculation whatsoever because the only area in doubt, and which officially always remained unproven one way or the other, was exactly who did or didn't do what as far as Tinsley and Meakin were concerned. The simplest and most blatant error was the failure to Block Back before the local train was put across the road (as I believe it was expressed in that part of the world) and the failure to use lever collars - and that was fairly clearly down to Meakin as he was the Signalman in charge when the local train was crossed over and it is very clear that it was his decision to cross that train. The slackness in applying Rule 55 was also a contributory factor compounded by great slackness in applying Rule 55. What has never become clear, and never will of course, is who actually accepted the troop train but if it was Tinsley he was in some respects walking into a trap set for him by Meakin although that hardly excuses him forgetting the very train he had arrived on!

[GC Jack]

Hi Station Master,

 

I don't want to question your analysis....which is the accepted version of the events but......

 

I have spent hours researching this accident going through records at the archives office and there are causes for speculation and questioning.

 

The use if the signal collar was clearly down to Meakin, but apart from that there remains doubt. Meakin handed over to Tinsley in the middle of a movement - the coal empties. He carefully explained to Tinsley the state of play where all of the trains were and again reminding Tinsley of the train he had just travelled on.

 

Meakin was criticised in the Coroner's Court for handing over to Tinsley in the middle of a movement his reply was "I would never get finished if that was so". He was correct in that answer and broke no rules.

 

If we accept that version of events.....and the Coroner did.....then it was all down to Tinsley from then on. Leaving many questions as to guilt....Had Meakin had an effective advocate, rather the very weak Sandeman at his trial he may have stood a better chance of acquital.

 

There is conflicting evidence as to rule 55. The fireman claims in one version to have spoken to Tinsley directly to remind him, the other claims that Tinsley spoke to him - either way Tinsley received another reminder. The use of the collar was a problem on the Caledonian and it appears from other evidence that it was a bit random and there may be some questions around the Company liability as to proper box inspections. Certainly staion master Thorburn should have been held to some account as it was his responsibility to inspect Quintinshill box... He got away with that one.

 

Tinsley's actions are a mystery, he had been observed by a trainee in Quintinshill as an ultra cautious man whose work was immaculate. He was no rookie signalman started work in Dumfries as a pointsman with 15 years service behind him. He was a career railwayman and a block post on the West Coast Mainline would have been a sort after job - the Caledonian would have been careful in their choice. Yet he made mistake after mistake that day.

 

Incidentally I will be checking the blocking back rule as it applied to Quintinshill, If anyone can tell me where the clearing zone was at Quintinshill that would be helpful. The position of the local in relation to the clearing zone is important as it effects the need to block back.

 

There are many unanswered questions here Mike, not least concerning the trial and indeed the aftermath.

 

Jack

[beast66606]

imho the big mistake was not using collars, one on the home board would (probably) have prevented the signals being cleared, the acceptance point is academic, it was probably the starter or bridge or something vague rather than a known 440yds. I cant imagine the home being 440yds from the local so 3-3 should have been sent.

I'm not sure there is that much mystery surrounding the crash.

[The Stationmaster]

Hi Station Master,

 

I don't want to question your analysis....which is the accepted version of the events but...…

I have spent hours researching this accident going through records at the archives office and there are causes for speculation and questioning.

 

The use if the signal collar was clearly down to Meakin, but apart from that there remains doubt. Meakin handed over to Tinsley in the middle of a movement - the coal empties. He carefully explained to Tinsley the state of play where all of the trains were and again reminding Tinsley of the train he had just travelled on.

 

There should in that respect be no need for any doubt whatsoever - Meakin stated in his evidence that he decided to cross the local train and he set the road for it and that he gave TOS for it. So he should applied the Regulations and Blocked Back at the earliest opportunity and he should have placed a lever collar on the Up Home Signal before he shunted the local - end of story. Tinsley was nowhere near the 'box when Meakin made that decision and Meakin said quite clearly in his evidence that he had done some other work after the local had been crossed over. In his evidence Tinsley said he alighted from the engine of the local as it was crossing over (i.e after after the Up Home lever should have had the collar applied).

 

Meakin was criticised in the Coroner's Court for handing over to Tinsley in the middle of a movement his reply was "I would never get finished if that was so". He was correct in that answer and broke no rules.

 

Personally I would take little or no notice of anything said in Coroner's Court (which knows as much about railway signalling Regulations and signalbox handover practice as I know about astrophysics, i.e. nothing of any use). What I might take notice of from such a Court is any direct responses to known questions but to be honest I would pay attention to what came out at Lt Col Druitt's Inquiry which would be seeking answers to informed questions without any hint of bias as could happen in Coroners' Courts.

 

As regard that sort of handover it depends entirely on the way the men worked together and there is no right or wrong answer provided a proper handover is made - which it clearly was not.

 

If we accept that version of events.....and the Coroner did.....then it was all down to Tinsley from then on. Leaving many questions as to guilt....Had Meakin had an effective advocate, rather the very weak Sandeman at his trial he may have stood a better chance of acquital.

 

That is where we enter the realms of some speculation and where we will never know the true course of what happened - there were two Signalmen in the 'box, there were other people in the 'box and there was no doubt all sorts of conversation flowing to & fro let alone Tinsley copying stuff into the TRB and clearly a lack of a proper handover (in itself difficult as the TRB wasn't up to date and couldn't be checked against the blocks) and Meakin no doubt looking to be off home. Tinsley stated in evidence that he accepted the troop train and there was nothing in the state of the block instrument which reminded him not to do that.

 

But what was never discovered is which of them cleared back for the up empties train and of course it never will be - one supposition I could make, based on experience, is that they did know who it was but decided to forget in order to avoid placing responsibility on one another. If I were a betting man I would be inclined to put my money on Meakin because he stated that he accepted the down express at 6.33 and the coal empties were knocked out at 6.34 while Tinsley stated the first bell signal sent by him was at 6.38 putting the down express on line. But difference in clocks can make a difference of as much as 2 minutes and the 6.34 time was not off Quintinshill's clock so that could almost as equally put Tinsley in the picture. But whoever it was who cleared back for the empties Meakin should have immediately drawn attention to the need to Block Back as he had blocked the Up road and was still in the 'box.

 

And whatever the understanding of Regulations was or wasn't on the part of advocates at a trial (it's usually pretty lousy from what I have seen and read transcripts of) what was undeniable was that Meakin's shortcomings in applying the Rules & Regs very firmly set the scene for disaster - if he had done his job properly the first collision would not have occurred and, in consequence, neither would the second. Whether such an shortcoming amounts to criminal negligence is a very different matter and one on which I have my own views - which have no place in this debate.

 

 

There is conflicting evidence as to rule 55. The fireman claims in one version to have spoken to Tinsley directly to remind him, the other claims that Tinsley spoke to him - either way Tinsley received another reminder. The use of the collar was a problem on the Caledonian and it appears from other evidence that it was a bit random and there may be some questions around the Company liability as to proper box inspections. Certainly staion master Thorburn should have been held to some account as it was his responsibility to inspect Quintinshill box... He got away with that one.

 

Hardly surprising that there should be confusion with so many folk in the 'box and, of course, possibly a touch of the age old emnity between enginemen and Signalmen. In this incident Rule 55 was no more than the 'braces' of a 'belt & braces' safety system - and the belt should have been put on a long time before anyone was involved in carrying out Rule 55.

I think I have probably carried out more formal/official - call them what you will - signalbox visits than most folk and I cannot for the life of me see how someone can check if lever collars are being used properly if there is no call for them to be in use during such a visit. I don't know the frequency of visits required at Quintinshill so it is hard to judge the extent to which they should have revealed collars in use so I hardly think the Station Master 'got away' with anything - there was simply no hard evidence to suggest in any way that he did. And how on earth you can tell if lever collars are used when Rule 55 is carried out unless you are there to see it I do not know; I have seen over the years dozens of 'Rule 55' entries in signalbox TRBs but I have only once been in a signalbox when someone arrived to carry out the equivalent of that Rule.

 

Tinsley's actions are a mystery, he had been observed by a trainee in Quintinshill as an ultra cautious man whose work was immaculate. He was no rookie signalman started work in Dumfries as a pointsman with 15 years service behind him. He was a career railwayman and a block post on the West Coast Mainline would have been a sort after job - the Caledonian would have been careful in their choice. Yet he made mistake after mistake that day.

 

I can't understand that comment at all. The big mistake that Tinsley made was copying entries into a TRB as a result of changing over at an unauthorised time, the only mistake he could conceivably have made after that was accepting the troop train. There is a possibility that the also erred in not putting on a Block Back if he knocked out for the Up empties but in that Meakin should carry equal - if not greater - responsibility for failing to point that out to him, especially as he was still in the 'box (and might well have been the person who knocked out on the Up?). Tinsley took full responsibility for accepting the troop train and that was a terrible error but hardly in the 'mistake after mistake' category.

 

Incidentally I will be checking the blocking back rule as it applied to Quintinshill, If anyone can tell me where the clearing zone was at Quintinshill that would be helpful. The position of the local in relation to the clearing zone is important as it effects the need to block back.

 

 

The Up Home Signal was only 204 yards in rear of the 'box and the crossover was, I believe, almost opposite. But as it was quoted in evidence at the Inquiry there is no doubt that a Block Back should have been put on!

 

There are many unanswered questions here Mike, not least concerning the trial and indeed the aftermath.

Jack

 

I don't really think so Jack. In all circumstances such as these - but particularly in this case because of the high death toll and its nature - there is bound to be a considerable 'hue & cry' among the public and the newspapers, they want someone nailed for what happened. I know very little about Scottish Law so can't pass any judgement on how it works but if anyone was looking to nail somebody Tinsley and Meakin were very clearly in the frame as a result of their trail of errors of both commission and omission. Whether or not anything they did made them 'criminally negligent' is something else entirely as I have said before and whatever our views might be on that we cannot undo what happened.

[GC Jack]

Hi Mike,

 

Thank you for your comprehensive response.

 

As I appear to hit a raw nerve with you on this let me explain a little more where I am coming from.

 

I and a fellow researcher a well known Military historian and author are looking again at this accident in light of some evidence we have found.

 

Our research is going a lot wider than just what happened in the box that day, but we are carefully scrutinising that evidence in very great detail. As any researcher will tell the "the devil is in the detail" and so it has proved so far. There are issues that concern us with who did what what in the box and thank you..... you have already helped me with that.

 

To explain partly where we are going.

 

We are not seeking to deny that the signalmen caused the accident, its clear and beyond doubt.

 

I agree with your term that someone wanted to nail both them.....That someone was just about everyone actually.

 

Was there a miscarriage of justice?....even by the standards of the day.......from what we know so far probably, It was a trial in the court of media and public opinion.

 

The inquiries, even by the standards of the day were not very thorough it was an open and shut case and nobody questioned it. Poor Tinsley had even been arrested before proper evidence was bought against him.

 

Was there evidence of corparate responsibility...It would appear so, but we have work to do on this, why for example was the expertise of Hugh Urquhart dismissed??

 

Of course it is easy to make comparisons with the standards of today.......eg the recent case of Ladbrooke Grove the driver would have been held entirely responsible.... and had Clapham been investigated in the way that Quintinshill was the electrician would have been charged with manslaughter.

 

Are there further questions about the Caledonian's actions, i.e. the re-empoyment of the two men, compensation claims and other payments that need to be checked yes there are.

 

Do the reasons given for Tinsley's loss of memory stack up .....well there are many others who have looked into this and have quetioned all them and found them wanting.

 

Take the take the entering up the records and the late shift change, this had been going , supposedly unnoticed by officials for two years, yet most employees in the area knew about it , why didn't the stationmaster stop it?? Actually Meakin would have put details of local that Tinsley forgot about on the piece of paper he gave him - a further reminder.

 

I don't agree with you that the matter should be left to rest, if there has been an element of unfairness or even wider.....which continues today, then it needs to be investigated

 

Jack

 

PS. The Caledonian had discovered by inspection of signal boxes that there was a random and casual use of signal collars in general. They sent a recent circular to staff as to their proper use. The stationmaster would have been aware of this...it was his duty and that of the Area Inspector to enforce the Company directive. As I said he got away with that one. Neither he or the Area Inspector were ever questioned about that circular.

[beast66606]

I'm afraid and despite you ignoring my answer* that I totally disagree and I don't think conjecture this long after the incident will prove anything.

 

* of course I don't know anything about signalling

[The Stationmaster]

Hi Mike,

 

Thank you for your comprehensive response.

 

As I appear to hit a raw nerve with you on this let me explain a little more where I am coming from.

I and a fellow researcher a well known Military historian and author are looking again at this accident in light of some evidence we have found.

Our research is going a lot wider than just what happened in the box that day, but we are carefully scrutinising that evidence in very great detail. As any researcher will tell the "the devil is in the detail" and so it has proved so far. There are issues that concern us with who did what what in the box and thank you..... you have already helped me with that.

 

No raw nerve with me Jack - just the basic fact that we will never know certain critical facts because they went to their graves with Tinsley and Meakin - and that is to assume that they knew them. Having over the years investigated all sorts of minor, and occasionally a bit more major, incidents such as derailments and having even been a direct witness in one occasion I can tell you from experience that to assume that someone directly involved could not actually recall precisely what happened is far from unusual for all sorts of reasons. I was asked at a DoT Inquiry 'what colour was the handlamp showing?' and to this day I haven't got the faintest idea if it was red or white (it should have been read) and two other witnesses didn't know either, probably because our minds were all on something else.

 

I have been in signalboxes where changeovers were going on and anyone of two or three of us who were present could have knocked out for a train or accepted one - it would quite often be he who was nearest the block bell at the time, equally I don't think I have ever seen a Signalman walk away from a blockshelf after sending a signal in one direction when he would very soon be sending one for the other (and sometimes sending it before he should in order to avoid coming back to the shelf a minute later). All of that is the difference between real life and what people might like to think is real life, simple as that.

 

 

To explain partly where we are going.

 

We are not seeking to deny that the signalmen caused the accident, its clear and beyond doubt.

I agree with your term that someone wanted to nail both them.....That someone was just about everyone actually.

Was there a miscarriage of justice?....even by the standards of the day.......from what we know so far probably, It was a trial in the court of media and public opinion.

The inquiries, even by the standards of the day were not very thorough it was an open and shut case and nobody questioned it. Poor Tinsley had even been arrested before proper evidence was bought against him.

Was their evidence of corparate responsibility...It would appear so, but we have work to do on this, why for example was the expertise of Hugh Urquhart dismissed??

 

As it happens I strongly disagree with prosecution in cases like this and while Signalmen carry heavy responsibility and their actions could kill people I don't think that threat should be held over their heads. This was an extremely rare prosecution and I think we are more than agreed that it was, for want of a better term, a vengeance trial (and one in which I doubt even an advocate who truly understood what was involved could have got them off).

 

Considering it was wartime Lt Col Druitt's Inquiry was clearly thorough but we have to remember that what he was inquiring into was a very simple event, albeit with confusing statements. It all boiled down to a Signalman failing to carry out the Rules and leaving a trap into which either he or his mate leapt; nothing unusual in that except the fact that it resulted in a collision involving a very heavily laden train followed by a second train running into the wreckage and the whole then compounded by the inevitable fire - which was a consequence of trains having high pressure gas lighting. Double collisions are not unique but fortunately they have been very rare and have almost always been a matter of either bad timing or bad luck; the numerous ones which haven't happened over the years have been the results of good luck, of a few seconds going the right way instead of the wrong way.

 

As for corporate responsibility I would say little or none. The Rules & Regulations existed to prevent what happened but they were not correctly applied, gas lighting of trains had been condemned for years but it still existed, and there was no direct evidence brought out at the Inquiry to suggest that supervision of Signalmen was lax from a safety viewpoint. Were things covered up or not disclosed? - well possibly but don't forget that you are looking here at a whole sequence of inquiries, first that by the Caledonian Railway, then that by Lt Col Druitt (the one most likely to find anything hiding under a stone) and then the Coroner's Inquest (in my view hardly technically reliable), plus what was spread across newspapers which no doubt influenced the court trial (if any influence were necessary).

 

 

Of course it is easy to make comparisons with the standards of today.......eg the recent case of Ladbrooke Grove the driver would have been held entirely responsible.... and had Clapham been investigated in the way that Quintinshill was the electrician would have been charged with manslaughter.

 

As I said, I don't agree with prosecution however I have no doubt that the Driver of the Thames Train involved at Ladbroke Grove got off lightly in terms of what was said at the Inquiry and indeed so did his employer (although the ultimate fine of his employer told a more realistic story). The simple fact on that occasion was that various parties were out to nail Railtrack to a wall - so they did (with some good reason). Clapham was investigated by an amateur in that Mr Justice Hidden was involved, again with an agenda in view of what came out in his recommendations, but in terms of what went wrong he need hardly have been involved as that was known within a very short time of the collision occurring.

 

 

 

Are there further questions about the Caledonian's actions, i.e. the re-empoyment of the two men, compensation claims and other payments that need to be checked yes there are.

 

 

Nothing at all unusual there - what was rare was the prosecution and sentence. In any other respects I doubt if Tinsley and Meakin had any difference in their subsequent employment from that of many other railwaymen involved over the years in similar errors (and sometimes I have known of promotion following after men 'have got off the road' including Signalmen going on to higher graded 'boxes). The difference was - in the old (pre recent privatisation) days that punishment was supposed to be based on the way in which the man had erred, not the full consequences of that error. Tinsley and Meakin were involved in a serious Rules & Regs irregularity and if it had come to light and no collision had occurred they would still probably have been reduced in grade or taken out of the 'box - and that was, in effect, what happened when they came out of prison.

 

 

Do the reasons given for Tinsley's loss of memory stack up .....well there are many others who have looked into this and have quetioned all them and found them wanting.

 

I find nothing at all unusual or suspicious in that - he gave his evidence at the Inquiry and fully accepted his responsibility for accepting the troop train. if there was confusion over anything then - as I've said above - I find it quite typical of such situations. Our memories can do funny things even if there was no confusion and they can shut things out. In reality the only real and critical point of contention in evidence was who knocked out for the up empties and the weight of evidence - albeit with the now unanswerable question of difference of times - suggests to me that it was most likely Meakin, as does the fact that Meakin reset the road after the empties had gone into the loop. Mind you strange that no one seems to have thought to ask the Kirkpatrick Signalman who he thought it had been - maybe 'someone' did and it was thought politic not to make it public?

 

 

 

Take the take the entering up the records and the late shift change, this had been going , supposedly unnoticed by officials for two years, yet most employees in the area knew about it , why didn't the stationmaster stop it?? Actually Meakin would have put details of local that Tinsley forgot about on the piece of paper he gave him - a further reminder.

 

I had it going on right under my nose for about 4 months and it had been going on under the noses of my then colleagues for at least 18 months longer than that. How are we supposed to know something like that is happening unless, like me, you catch the culprits red-handed? If the Stationmaster had set out to catch them the word would likely be out and he wouldn't - I've known that happen more than a few times although it has always, I think, been when there have been suspicions or strong hints of Signalmen 'entertaining lady visitors'.

 

As far as the details of the note are concerned we don't know - usually stuff would be written down as a series of time in column order on the piece of paper with nothing to emphasise any unusual situations (and this one was quite usual) - it would simply become a mechanical act of copying and filling in the blank lines above the current entries. Yes it could well have contributed - but mainly as a result of a poor/non-existent handover and concentrating on the wrong thing; and that still does not answer the question of Meakin failing to apply the most elementary safety measure of all, popping a lever collar on the Up Home Signal or reminding his colleague to Block Back (or Blocking Back himself if it was he who knocked out for the Up empties).

 

 

I don't agree with you that the matter should be left to rest, if there has been an element of unfairness or even wider.....which continues today, then it needs to be investigated

Jack

 

 

But in all seriousness I ask 'what unfairness?' Unavoidably Meakin and Tinsley bore the responsibility in some measure or another because both failed to do what was required of them and, regrettably in my view, they were gaoled in consequence of the public reaction to their errors. The incident occurred during wartime when there was considerable pressure on the men working on that route but that should only be regarded as a mitigation in awarding punishment and not as an excuse. It is remarkable in such circumstances that Lt Col Druitt achieved the completeness of Inquiry that he did.

And finally it is interesting to set Quintinshill in the overall context of railway operational safety in its time - and that makes it little more than a byline. The Hawes Junction collision, December 1910, and Coke Ovens collision in early in 1911 together with the Abermule single line collision in 1921 prompted questions to be asked of the Railway companies by the Board of Trade in respect of various operational safety matters. (among other things they prompted questions about lever collars and their use). I can find no trace of anything similar following Quintinshill, which is hardly surprising - it was just one of a number of incidents in 1915 where simple errors by Signalmen resulted in collisions involving passenger injuries or fatalities. The only GWR reference I can find is to 'a suggestion' made in June that signalboxes be provided with rubber stamps to ensure that details of the state of block instruments etc were brought fully to attention at changeover times, it resulted in nothing beyond a brief trial. And as far as Rule 55 is concerned in 1917 a (completely unrelated) proposal on the GWR that a member of traincrew carrying out Rule 55 should sign the TRB was dismissed as of no importance; the proposal arose after a dispute between a Signalman and a Fireman when the latter was carrying out Rule 55.

Oh as regards the PS on lever collars I will repeat what I said before - the Stationmaster etc could remind staff but they can only deal with such a shortcoming if they see it taking place. Although occasionally credited with such powers by some of my staff I regret that neither I nor anyone else in a similar position who I have known is omnipotent; we could not deal with someone if there is no evidence, all we could do is 'remind' them of what they should do.

[GC Jack]

Well Mike,

 

Thank you for your thoughts. Perhaps you could enlighten me as to your professional railway service?

 

It is always good when doing research to have someone to give feedback and constructive critisicm otherwise you can fall into the trap of believing your own propaganda as it were and so again thanks.

 

You clearly have strong views on this particular accident and that in itself is interesting. You will no doubt be aware that many others share your views and that my colleague and I have been told by many that we are wasting our time in researching it.

 

However, have you read the book by J.A,B. Hamilton on the crash? If you have then you will know that Hamilton asked similar questions, but surprisingly does little research to answer them.

 

As I said in my last response, the causes of Tinsleys lapses have been questioned by many people. I think though that in every case they were trying to explain the unexplainable, how a conscientous man with an impeccable record could cause such a crash. I know you take the view that Meakin set him up for it Mike, which I don't entirely accept, sorry ( and neither did the court, as he got 3 years and Meakin 18 months) he still appeared to be totally incompetent.

 

Although you dismiss the Coroner's court ( I know many railwayman do) I think you would find it interesting reading and disturbing. It was on the Coroner's findings that these men were convicted not Col. Druitt's Inquiry.

 

Was Col. Druitt entirely impartial?..He did not believe Station Master Thoburns testimony that he knew nothing. (Tinsley lived right by the Gretna Station and been changing shifts irregularly for two years) Thoburn had been for there 15 months. Gretna signalmen knew all about it as did all who came into Quintinshill. Yet Col. Druitt did not subject him to any real cross examination.

 

We have started to look into Col. Druitt's history, a strong and distinguished (in the Boer War) military officer with a no nonsense public school background. Over 200 of his military colleagues had just been senslessly killed by the careless and sloppy actions of two members of the working class, of military age, in a reserved occupation and getting out war service. Read his summing up in light of that.

 

Am I right in thinking that you feel this matter is totally "done and dusted" and that you think our efforts are pointless and that you would not be happy to assist with professional expertise??? Is that your position???

 

If that is the case fair do's lets let the matter rest there. and agree to differ.

 

Many thanks for your help and comments,

 

Jack