Derailment and fire in Quebec

[dibber25]

 

So Nantes is the choice of crew change point for a number of reasons. (If you look at a map, you'll see there is really nothing beyond Megantic until you get to Jackman or Brownville Jct.

And while all of that is worth looking at and no doubt will be, the real issue is that the infrastructure at Nantes did not provide any redundancy in safety so that if the primary means of securing a train (brake systems) failed to do its job, for whatever reason, then there was no second layer of protection.

So, referring to my previous posts, Nantes should have been set up to do the job, and invested in to provide the facilities necessary to stable the train safely while an extended crew change took place. Surely any risk assessment worth its salt would have indicated the necessity for modest changes to the loop, security and staff facilities so that the job could be accomplished efficiently and safely? It really isn't rocket science. And, yes, I'm certainly one Brit who is a firm believer in catch or trap points - because they work and because we learned long ago that in certain locations they are a desirable safety back-up feature. 

What happens next? I suspect that, after the clear-up, MMA will resume running these oil trains over this route long before the TSB Report is published. The big question will be, will they make any, or enough, improvements to ensure that the chances of such an accident are reduced in future, or will reluctance to change and a willingness to blame individuals for wider failings, rule the day?

[Adrian Wintle]

My apologies if I have missed the point somewhere in the preceding 11 pages, but why did the train have to be parked at all? If it was a regular stopping point, why was there not a second driver waiting to take the train on its way, while the first one went to rest? Stationary trains don't make money - especially when they have to burn fuel just to stay still!

Best wishes

Eric

 

I did mention it earlier in passing: It is possible that they could only clear the train across the border in normal working hours (or doing so outside of those hours might be an additional charge), so there might have been a necessity to have the train lay over. (I don't know this for sure, but it wouldn't be out of character for the region, although the road crossing near Lac-Megantic is 24h). I'm not even sure where they would do a clearance/inspection for the train.

 

Adrian

[Gerald Henriksen]

I also feel that the tit-for-tat arguments that 'you have accidents in the UK, too' are not relevant.

I didn't intend for as a tit-for-tat.

 

Rather I was attempting to point out that it doesn't matter how you instruct the crew about a speed restriction (whether it be through the signal system, signs next to the track, paper instructions, or whatever) if that crew ignores it/forgets about/etc.

 

Ultimately, as long as a human controls the speed of the train we rely on that human to obey the speed limits, and when they don't bad things happen regardless of what signal system is in use.

 

Of course if they can ever get PTS working then that signal system you don't like will have an advantage, because the signal system will be by default (because it is already part of the signal system) able to decide whether a train is going to fast or not.

 

 

I also feel that there's an attitude - even evident in some of the posts - that 'we do things our own way, we've loads of experience, mostly we get it right, and we're quite happy that we don't need to make any changes or learn from anyone else'.

I wouldn't go so far as to say no changes are needed, certainly as I mention below the TSB feels things need to change but the lack the ability to force the issue.

 

Certainly from a Canadian perspective on something like PTS we are stuck in waiting for whatever develops in the US because it really needs to be a common system.

 

 

No safety-critical changes were even suggested in the Burlington report and I suspect that none will be after this, either.

Having read the report this morning, I think that is very unfair to the TSB.

 

They (yet again) said there was a need for some sort of automatic system (whether PTS or something else) to prevent signal systems from being ignored, and pointed out that this has been an ongoing issue for the TSB (R00-04) that Transport Canada and the railways have not acted on.

 

They indicated that VIA was not fully aware of the medical issues that may have impacted the ability of their employees to do their job.

 

They brought up the lack of cab voice recorders, which you have dismissed.  However, given that in this accident everything was functioning correctly - the signals all worked, there were no defects with the train - the TSB was unable to come up with a cause of the crash (beyond the obvious issue of the train going too fast) because the TSB has no idea what was going on in the cab.  This lack of knowledge limited the ability to recommend changes beyond what has already been done (and ignored).

 

 

As for the what happens with the report that comes out with this, time will tell.  But there is the added political dimension of Quebec vs Canada which will liven things up.

 

 

Just a tightening of the rules to try and ensure that people do what they are supposed to. To me, that means that Canadian rail safety is stuck in a rut, with TSB reports saying far more about the psychology of why human beings make mistakes, than about the technology to defend against those mistakes.

Because the TSB has already repeatedly called for the technology, only to be ignored.  Which means they are left with the unenviable task of also trying trying to find solutions that don't involve significant financial expenditures.

 

 

I'm sorry, but I am utterly convinced that traffic increases of the kind involved here require investment in improvements to infrastructure and equipment, maybe other aspects as well - who pays, is a different issue (government, railroads, oil companies - but someone needs to).

 

I won't argue that there doesn't need to be infrastructure improvements, but I really don't know.  However, other than the lack of something to prevent runaways at Nantes, infrastructure doesn't appear to an issue in Lac-Megantic.

 

Otherwise, perhaps it IS best that investment goes into pipelines, (although that's not something I actually believe) and that railways which prove unable, for whatever reason, to carry traffic safely, should close.

Pipelines are by all accounts the best/safest way (with the proviso that applies to everything else that they are maintained and run properly).

 

However pipelines are also significant investments and will never entirely replace oil by train given that the new sources of oil popping up in North America are nowhere near either refineries or pipelines.

 

 

[pH]

The big question will be, will they make any, or enough, improvements to ensure that the chances of such an accident are reduced in future, or will reluctance to change and a willingness to blame individuals for wider failings, rule the day?

 

I presume that's a rhetorical question?

[The Stationmaster]

 

Ultimately, as long as a human controls the speed of the train we rely on that human to obey the speed limits, and when they don't bad things happen regardless of what signal system is in use.

 

Of course if they can ever get PTS working then that signal system you don't like will have an advantage, because the signal system will be by default (because it is already part of the signal system) able to decide whether a train is going to fast or not.

 

 

I can remember back before I left the Western Region - so over 20 years ago - being shown the  data record of one of the first APT trials on an HST and the way it managed the speed profile including checking braking/deceleration for permanent restrictions of speed and braking towards signals at danger; and it was absolutely remarkable how well it matched (and could correct) the correct profile.  Trials with various freight trains produced very poor results because of differences in loads and types of locos tested - it is seriously difficult to match idealised curves for such trains, but that was over 20 years ago.

 

Relatively simple technology can inject a measure of supervisory control - BR AWS (Automatic Warning System) gives a warning and, if no action is taken, a brake application for adverse signals and for some permanent restrictions of speed while TPWs can do the same and a bit more thereby preventing the majority of SPADs (Signal Passed At Danger) while various continental systems such as the French TVM can do the same notwithstanding that it is basically late 1960s technology.  ERTMS will of course gradually provide increasing levels of sophistication once the bugs are ironed out although it can prevent an integration challenge for older traction.

 

So it is possible, in some cases relatively inexpensively as with TPWS, but it all costs money - that is unavoidable - although in many instances the savings can pay for the kit by avoiding expensive incidents.

[edcayton]

I didn't intend for as a tit-for-tat.

 

 

 

 

, there were no defects with the train - 

 

 

 

.

 

 

 .

 

It looks to me like you did.  How on earth can you say at this stage that there were no defects with the train? One of the bloody loco's  caught fire if nothing else! and they haven't had chance to investigate yet.

 

Ed

[highpeak]

So it is possible, in some cases relatively inexpensively as with TPWS, but it all costs money - that is unavoidable - although in many instances the savings can pay for the kit by avoiding expensive incidents.

Which somewhat leads to the next chapter in this sad tale: what is this going to cost? We've seen the cost in life and the soul ripped out of a community, the bills will now come due for MM&A/Rail World, and perhaps the wider rail industry.

Ed Burkhardt said they had a lot of insurance, but whether the coverage limit is going to end up exceeded is hard to say. I am sure lawyers will be working out which jurisdiction will give their clients the best shot. The accident may have happened in Quebec, but Rail World's headquarters are in Chicago, MMA&A in Maine.

Even if the insurance covers the liability, it's an open question as to what would happen for future coverage.

And in the meantime, it would be interesting to know what MM&A's revenues look like. It might be a while before the Moosehead Sub. is open for business. Looking for human remains in a crime scene might take a while, and I would imagine the only party wanting this done quickly is the railroad. Irving can route their oil (oops, other people's oil being delivered to them) in different ways so the only thing they lose is a bit of leverage in playing different sets of railroads off against each other to get the lowest possible transport costs. Not that this relentless cost cutting has any bearing on the mess the class IIs find themselves in, you understand.

I would say the odds on MM&A surviving are slim to none, and Slim was seen looking for his coat and hat. There's an interesting thread starting on railroad.net speculating on what the future might hold for the road and the Moosehead Sub http://www.railroad.net/forums/viewtopic.php?f=47&t=151119

Some sort of derail setup looks pretty inexpensive right now.

 

Addendum: "[Quebec provincial police Inspector]Forget described the search as being like an "archeological dig," that will likely take weeks of digging through rubble, involving specialized crews." http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/story/2013/07/14/coroner-7-named-lac-megantic-coroner.html

 

Edited July 14, 2013 by highpeak

[Talltim]

In that Railroad.net forum thread, who are they referring to when they talk about green EMDs?

[highpeak]

The green team is New Brunswick Southern, a subsidiary of JD Irving (who are related by blood but not in a corporate sense to Irving Oil). http://www.jdirving.com/
http://www.rrpicturearchives.net/showPicture.aspx?id=1421009

New Brunswick Southern operates from St John to Vanceboro (well, half way along the bridge), Eastern Maine operates from Vanceboro to Brownville Jct where they meet MM&A. The other significant interchange is at Mattwamkeag with Pan Am.

JD Irving also operates Maine Northern which runs mostly on the former MM&A (ex-BAR) lines that MM&A sold to the State of Maine.

The red team of course would be CP if they chose to return to their old haunts.

 

Edit: it was a damned sight less complicated when I was more actively railfanning! And we all thought it was a big deal when we suddenly saw D&H engines at Rigby!

Edited July 15, 2013 by highpeak

[Gerald Henriksen]

It looks to me like you did.  How on earth can you say at this stage that there were no defects with the train? One of the bloody loco's  caught fire if nothing else! and they haven't had chance to investigate yet.

 

Ed

 

Perhaps if you cared to read the message you would learn that we were talking about the VIA Rail crash in Aldershot (Burlington) on February 26th 2012, where indeed the one and only VIA locomotive did not catch fire.

[Glorious NSE]

Of course if they can ever get PTS working then that signal system you don't like will have an advantage, because the signal system will be by default (because it is already part of the signal system) able to decide whether a train is going to fast or not.

 

I think that's the key point ref Burlington - there *is* a system to enforce the existing signalling, eventually it *has to* work as the US has mandated it to be installed. Once that's in place CN and CP will *have to* use it on their lines in the US and so will *have to* be familiar with it and will have installed the kit on a fair proportion of their fleet, and it just becomes a case of mandating which bits of Canada should have it.

 

The bits where you have lots of passenger traffic mixed in is a no-brainer IMHO...

[The Stationmaster]

Which somewhat leads to the next chapter in this sad tale: what is this going to cost? We've seen the cost in life and the soul ripped out of a community, the bills will now come due for MM&A/Rail World, and perhaps the wider rail industry.

 

Some sort of derail setup looks pretty inexpensive right now.

 

 

(I've shortened your post to save space but retain a link to it).  This of course is where it could indeed put MM&A on the skids but the people who are really going to continue to suffer while it's all argued out are the townspeople, especially the victims, in Lac Megantic and that is in my view wrong - notwithstanding aid promised by the Govt.  I wouldn't be at all surprised that with such massive costs involved - even in a Canadian settlement, let alone a US court - the insurers will look to minimise their exposure by looking for negligence on the part of MM&A, thus interminable and expensive debates will roll on.  I wonder what the situation would be if MM&A were to bite the bullet and admit liability?  It would certainly save time and legal bills.

[dibber25]

I think that the issue of rail safety should be a national one . There needs to be a debate at government level and legislation to ensure that when major new traffic flows are taken on, (by any transport mode) there is adequate risk assessment and investment in infrastructure to ensure that the routes be used can be operated safely. That does NOT mean simply reducing the line speed so that poor infrastructure will last a bit longer. The lead needs to be taken by Transport Canada and there needs to be greater independent expertise brought in. That debate needs also to look at where the investment comes from, since it is unlikely that the railways will necessarily be able to source all of it. Those who benefit, including the government and the oil companies in this case, and maybe communities where there are major employment benefits, should stump up the money. A decently equipped, safe parking place for crew changes at Nantes would not have been prohibitively expensive to provide. It would certainly have been cheap compared to the costs of this tragedy - insurance payouts will in no way make up for lost lives.

[Adrian Wintle]

I think that the issue of rail safety should be a national one . There needs to be a debate at government level and legislation to ensure that when major new traffic flows are taken on, (by any transport mode) there is adequate risk assessment and investment in infrastructure to ensure that the routes be used can be operated safely.

 

Which would then beg the question of what constitutes a 'major new traffic flow', and who would judge that? If you normally have 50+ tank cars in a train (mixed with other stuff, like a lot of current trains I see on CN), does extending that to a full train of tank cars constitute a 'major new traffic flow' or is that just an extension of the existing situation.

 

However, they did do a very gradual phase-in of 'twin 53' trailers on the highways, so this is working to some extent in some transport modes.

 

Adrian

[Glorious NSE]

That does NOT mean simply reducing the line speed so that poor infrastructure will last a bit longer.

 

Chris - every railway in the world will tailor their speed limits to what is safe, the UK has track rated from 186mph right down to 5mph, none of those speeds mean the track is 'fundamentally unsafe'.

 

Any railway anywhere in the world I hope will limit trains speed/weight to what the track and it's structure will handle.

 

In the case of MMA, their '10mph track' on this occasion appears to have handled a train doing up to 63mph....I think that suggests the track used in this case was not 'fundamentally unsafe' for trains travelling at their normal speeds!

 

I wonder what the situation would be if MM&A were to bite the bullet and admit liability?  It would certainly save time and legal bills.

 

Haven't they effectively done so, by suggesting it's their own employee who was at fault.

[dibber25]

I think if you based your 'major new traffic flow' on a figure of 'XXX thousand tons per annum between A&B' then your risk assessment might well be that a main line already handling trains of similar weight and with capacity available would not require additional investment. Your expert advisors would need to say at what level a traffic flow reached that point  - possibly new tonnage as a percentage of existing tonnage. (From what I see of MMAR, the oil trains must have been a very significant increase in the tonnage being carried.) A secondary railway with only a small number of trains and already operating at restricted speeds would require assessment as to what improvements are required. I'm sure Mike would know, but I seem to recall that when coal started to be imported through Avonmouth for Didcot power station, among the infrastructure improvements was the provision of extended loops between Swindon and Didcot. That was so that coal trains could be looped out of the way of HSTs.

[petethemole]

"Haven't they effectively done so, by suggesting it's their own employee who was at fault."

 

My worry is that this is not so much admitting liability on behalf of the company, as an attempt to do the opposite by placing the blame entirely on the employee. If he can be shown to be negligent, despite (presumably) following what had become a normal procedure, could the company wriggle out of a liability suit?  Ever since EB's statement I've been worried that the engineer is going to be the fall guy, with not even a union to stand up for him.

 

Pete
 

[dibber25]

Chris - every railway in the world will tailor their speed limits to what is safe, the UK has track rated from 186mph right down to 5mph, none of those speeds mean the track is 'fundamentally unsafe'.

 

Any railway anywhere in the world I hope will limit trains speed/weight to what the track and it's structure will handle.

 

In the case of MMA, their '10mph track' on this occasion appears to have handled a train doing up to 63mph....I think that suggests the track used in this case was not 'fundamentally unsafe' for trains travelling at their normal speeds!

 

 

Haven't they effectively done so, by suggesting it's their own employee who was at fault.

Did I use the words 'fundamentally unsafe' regarding track? I apologise if I did, it's not a phrase I like, nor would I intend to use it about any Canadian railway. It would be a very extreme criticism to call any railway fundamentally unsafe and I would certainly not feel competent to make such an assertion, so I apologise if it slipped in. (See also the link further back to a story suggesting that 92% of the track in Maine is inadequate to carry a 286,000lb tank car.) I do think that the circumstances in which this train was allegedly left were fundamentally unsafe, but that has nothing to do with the condition of the track or the speed limits. What I do believe - based at least partly on my following of what happened on Vancouver Island - is that there is a tendency, instead of upgrading the infrastructure to cope with the trains, to 'downgrade' the trains by reducing speeds and introducing other measures such as idler cars to cope with poor infrastructure (not just track but bridges and other structures with arrears of maintenance). And yes, I know that we have track rated from 186mph downwards. Most of our higher speed limits are related to signalling distances and systems and the lower ones to curvatures, gradients and sub-structure, not to the condition of the track itself, other than perhaps on minor freight-only branch lines. I cannot think of any where we have very heavy trains travelling at very low speeds because the track is not in an adequate state to carry them at a higher speed. Finally, surely the derailment proved that the track could NOT handle a train of that weight doing 63mph? 

[ZiderHead]

It could be that it is entirely the engineer's fault. Presuming that it isnt his fault is no more valid than presuming it is, either are just guesswork at this stage.

[dave1905]

I think that's the key point ref Burlington - there *is* a system to enforce the existing signalling, eventually it *has to* work as the US has mandated it to be installed. Once that's in place CN and CP will *have to* use it on their lines in the US and so will *have to* be familiar with it and will have installed the kit on a fair proportion of their fleet, and it just becomes a case of mandating which bits of Canada should have it.

A line with the traffic such as the MMA would probably not meet the criteria requiring PTC to be installed if it was located in the US.

 

And by the way, in the US, mandated rail safety improvements are predominately paid for by the railroads (such as the billions of dollars it will take to install PTC).

Edited July 15, 2013 by dave1905

[Glorious NSE]

 

 

Did I use the words 'fundamentally unsafe' regarding track? I apologise if I did, it's not a phrase I like, nor would I intend to use it about any Canadian railway. It would be a very extreme criticism to call any railway fundamentally unsafe and I would certainly not feel competent to make such an assertion, so I apologise if it slipped in.

 

Then what are you suggesting? MMAs track is either safe in terms of their use, or it is not.

 

 

 

(See also the link further back to a story suggesting that 92% of the track in Maine is inadequate to carry a 286,000lb tank car.)

 

I did read that. My questions were:

 

1. Is that 92% of routes, or 92% of all track, the two would give a very different impression.

2. If that does mean routes, then are they ones that 286k cars actually use? 

3. If the 92% is running line, and has 286k cars, and unit hazmat trains, why are the FRA letting that happen, as to my understanding that breaks their rules?

 

 

 

I cannot think of any where we have very heavy trains travelling at very low speeds because the track is not in an adequate state to carry them at a higher speed.

 

Pretty confident we have plenty of places where we have either longstanding TSRs or 'permanent' restrictions.

 

 

 

Finally, surely the derailment proved that the track could NOT handle a train of that weight doing 63mph? 

 

Not so far as I can tell Chris. It plainly did not derail on any of MMAs plain track, or it would not be sat piled up in the middle of Lac Megantic!

 

The train derailed when traversing a 10mph turnout, the turnout appears to have been 10mph due to its configuration and not due to maintainence, there is reference elsewhere to Lac Megantic yard having been a 10mph location even when this was a 40mph railroad.

 

I don't believe you'd find a track engineer anywhere in the world that would suggest you could safely negotiate a 10mph turnout at 60+

[The Stationmaster]

I think if you based your 'major new traffic flow' on a figure of 'XXX thousand tons per annum between A&B' then your risk assessment might well be that a main line already handling trains of similar weight and with capacity available would not require additional investment. Your expert advisors would need to say at what level a traffic flow reached that point  - possibly new tonnage as a percentage of existing tonnage. (From what I see of MMAR, the oil trains must have been a very significant increase in the tonnage being carried.) A secondary railway with only a small number of trains and already operating at restricted speeds would require assessment as to what improvements are required. I'm sure Mike would know, but I seem to recall that when coal started to be imported through Avonmouth for Didcot power station, among the infrastructure improvements was the provision of extended loops between Swindon and Didcot. That was so that coal trains could be looped out of the way of HSTs.

You have two points in there Chris and they're slightly different.

 

Firstly as regards the Avonmouth - Didcot coal scheme (for which I did all the basic planning and devised all the new and altered track layout plans) what I was doing was endeavouring to ensure there was sufficient capacity to get into the timetable sufficient train paths to move the specified tonnage at the required rate.  That meant having a terminal track layout and signalling which would allow it to be loaded at the necessary pace and in the required quantities with trains being turned round as efficiently as possible; devising the size of train to be used (including making sure it would fit key infrastructure led constraints on length); and specifying the infrastructure enhancements which allow sufficient number of 60 mph loaded coals trains to be pathed among 125 mph passenger services and even the then putative proposed Swindon - Peterborough passenger service (to be worked by Class 158 units).  So that is one element.

 

The other element - which was a standard BR practice and divided routes into a series of categories - is to assess the amount of maintenance a route will require to handle a particular type and tonnage of traffic.  All routes were classified for maintenance costing from that base and obviously adding annual passing tonnage would impact on maintenance levels, and therefore costs, all other things being equal.  And that, in effect, is I suppose what we would be talking about for the MM&A - if you run more tonnage you do more damage to the track therefore it needs extra maintenance or some other mitigation to take account of that tonnage.  You can - to some extent - mitigate by reducing train speeds but the inevitable fact is that increased passing tonnage will cause damage (=additional maintenance) whatever the speeds although there can be step changes in maintenance need as speed rises in some circumstances.  And having worked closely with a track engineer, in my post 'big railway' life, on exactly such assessments for the WCML it was very clear that the principal cost driver was passing tonnage although axle loading and speed could be contributory factors, particularly axle loading.

 

But in the end it all depends whether you want a proper, safe working life out of your infrastructure asset or whether you're happy to bash it to pieces for as long as it lasts and then walk away from it.  Burkhardt's view in Britain was that many freight only lines were excessively maintained (in fact they weren't as it happens) so it might be possible to see where he's coming from on this question?

[Glorious NSE]

A line with the traffic such as the MMA would probably not meet the criteria requiring PTC to be installed if it was located in the US.

 

The references to PTC were in response to Chris's referencing of the Burlington ON passenger train derailment, which was not on MMA anyhow

 

EDIT - have they diluted the requirement then, the original reporting was it would be required on 'Any line with passenger or HAZMAT traffic'.

 

And by the way, in the US, mandated rail safety improvements are predominately paid for by the railroads (such as the billions of dollars it will take to install PTC).

 

Yep, i'm aware of that...

Edited July 15, 2013 by Glorious NSE

[dave1905]

EDIT - have they diluted the requirement then, the original reporting was it would be required on 'Any line with passenger or HAZMAT traffic'.

 

 

 

The criteria isn't "hazmat" per se, its TIH, PIH, some radioactive and some explosives (what in the US is called rail safety sensitive material or RSSM).  Crude oil is not RSSM, but it is hazmat, a flammable liquid. 

[dave1905]

Then what are you suggesting? MMAs track is either safe in terms of their use, or it is not.

 

1. Is that 92% of routes, or 92% of all track, the two would give a very different impression.

2. If that does mean routes, then are they ones that 286k cars actually use? 

3. If the 92% is running line, and has 286k cars, and unit hazmat trains, why are the FRA letting that happen, as to my understanding that breaks their rules?

 

Most places I've seen with a restriction on 286 cars it not a restriction on the track itself, but on the bridges.  The track can handle the weight fine, its the loading on the bridge structures.  Since the track was rated for 40 mph, I would be very supprised if the track structure (rail and ties) couldn't support 286 cars.  Even some 263 lines can handle 286 loads if the train is speed restricted over the bridge/bridges to reduce the dynamic loads.

 

If the turnout was 10 mph then it really doesn't matter whether the cars were 286 or 263 or empty, they weren't going to negoiate a train going 63 mph.