Derailment and fire in Quebec

[dibber25]

The trend over quite a lot of years now has been to try and engineer out human error, the ultimate development of such a philosophy in a railway context would be an unmanned fully automated system as per some metro systems (perhaps retaining a driver/operator as a passenger assurance and final stop precaution). The issue with this is that it doesn't eliminate human error, it just moves it to the software development and system assurance phases, and if you encounter a scenario outside any considered by the software development program then software doesn't have a seat of the pants mode. Another issue with automation is it de-skills operators so that if it fails then you tend to find that operations can be degraded to a much greater extent than you might expect as the skills and experience (and almost certainly the manning levels!!) to take everything back in hand just aren't there anymore. This has been identified as an issue by airlines with pilot flying skills and it is something that was very obvious in power plants. In some operations there has been a move to reduce automation to try and balance the advantages of automation with maintaining a reversionary human operator capability if needed. Equally there has also been a lot of movement towards fully automated plants and systems. 

In terms of accident investigation and risk management, that is one area where the UK still leads the world IMO. We may have lost a lot of our manufacturing and we may now rely on imported trains, power plants etc but in terms of accident investigation and controlling risks we are still world class. I attend several international forums for maritime safety and whilst the safety performance of UK shipping could be improved when I look at the performance of other administrations (an I do not just mean emerging countries) it can be quite shocking. I was employed by a German electricity generating company and when I visited German plants I always felt a bit edgy at the way they were operated as they were way behind the British plants in safety culture, or at least that was the opinion I formed.

Absolutely! We have long been leaders in accident investigation and in dealing not only with the causes but in putting forward ways of preventing such accidents in future. As a result, our infrastructure and operating practices changed and developed accordingly. This accident would have been avoided if investment had been made in proper layover facilities at Nantes, if the practice of stabling trains on main tracks was eliminated, and if the turnout at the lower end of the siding track (where the train ought to have been stabled) had been equipped with a trap point and sand drag. Whilst that would have required investment, it would have been peanuts compared to what the actual cost has been, on top of the loss of 47 innocent lives. It seems, however, that the blame has been laid at the door of an inept, shoe-string railway operation and that little has been proposed to prevent such operations in future. Proper risk assessment and a professional safety case BEFORE a major new traffic flow is operated should be a matter of course and it would have identified the shortcomings in the MMA's operation. The TSB has put the ball firmly in Transport Canada's court. Whether they'll run with it is another matter entirely. 

[Talltim]

The MMA's locos are up for auction

http://www.adamsauctions.com//live/docu ... 0Flyer.pdf

 

The auction page shows the final prices http://www.adamsauctions.com/servlet/Search.do?auctionId=302. Its worth having a look at the locos, many are in bad shape.

This one amused me

Item #5:

MMA 3609, GE C-30-7

This locomotive is missing many parts and components and has excessive wheel slip. The unit is missing the following parts: Prime Mover, T.M. Dynamic Brake Grids, Radiators, AC Main Alt, Air Compressor, Brake Valves, and the Front Door. The front truck of the unit has a 2 axle truck, and the rear has a 3 axle truck. Manufacture Year: 1978

 

 

The Morristown and Erie has bought four of the locos

GP7u #23

Built as ATSF GP7 #2741 (serial #16385, built 8/1952)

Rebuilt to GP7u #2175 11/1979 (chop nose, new cab, Dash 2 electronics)

Sold to National Railway Equipment Company before 10/1988

Resold to BAR #23 in 1991

To MMA #23 10/2002

To M&E #23 8/5/2014

 

GP7u #24

Built as ATSF GP7 #2845 (serial #17706, built 12/1952)

Rebuilt to GP7u #2023 10/1981 (chop nose, new cab, Dash 2 electronics)

Sold to National Railway Equipment Company before 10/1988

Resold to BAR #21 in 1991

To MMA #21 10/2002

To M&E #21 8/5/2014

(to be renumbered M&E #24)

 

GP7 #25

Built as BAR #568 (serial #9941, built 11/1950)

Renumbered BAR #68 in 1953

To LMS #100

To MMA #100 10/2002

To M&E #100 8/5/2014

(to be renumbered M&E #25)

 

GP9 #26

Built as BAR #79 (serial #19556, built 6/1954)

To MMA #79 10/2002

To M&E #79 8/5/2014

(to be renumbered M&E #26)

Edited August 20, 2014 by Talltim

[Adrian Wintle]

It looks like <$40K for locos for scrap or parts, $40K-$90K for old locos that might run again, with the high end of that being the ones that were actually working (although working B39s seem to have been in the $40K-$50K range), and >90K for the ones that are basically operational and have sell-on potential (the F40s).

 

 

. This accident would have been avoided if investment had been made in proper layover facilities at Nantes, if the practice of stabling trains on main tracks was eliminated, and if the turnout at the lower end of the siding track (where the train ought to have been stabled) had been equipped with a trap point and sand drag.. 

 

There were cars already in the siding, so the train couldn't have been put there. There was a derail at the end of the siding, so no real need of any other facilities on the siding.

 

There was no real issue with stabling the train on the main line if proper precautions had been taken* and if the train (particularly the lead loco) had been mechanically sound.

 

They wouldn't have had to stable a train at Nantes if the trackwork was in better shape so that the crew didn't run out of time.

 

This wasn't an accident of a single failure. It was a bunch of minor problems that, on their own, shouldn't have led to the accident. The corporate culture appears to have led to most of them occurring. Ultimately, the botched repair on the lead loco (and failing to replace/repair the lead loco) led to the fire, which lead to the loco being shut down. The decision not to start another loco meant that the air leaked down. Failing to set sufficient handbrakes (and/or set them properly) meant that the train could move on its own when the airbrakes leaked off. Failure to maintain the trackwork meant that the train was stopped at Nantes which meant that, when the braking issues occurred, the train had a long slope to roll down.

 

I wouls agree that fact that they were regularly stabling trains at Nantes could have led to a manual derail switch being cut into the main line there, at minimal cost which, if set (see corporate culture again), could have derailed the train when it started moving.

 

*set an appropriate number of handbrakes, ensure that the air source is maintained, put a portable derail on the track ahead of the train.

 

Adrian

Edited August 20, 2014 by Adrian Wintle

[The Stationmaster]

It looks like <$40K for locos for scrap or parts, $40K-$90K for old locos that might run again, with the high end of that being the ones that were actually working (although working B39s seem to have been in the $40K-$50K range), and >90K for the ones that are basically operational and have sell-on potential (the F40s).

 

 

 

There were cars already in the siding, so the train couldn't have been put there. There was a derail at the end of the siding, so no real need of any other facilities on the siding.

 

There was no real issue with stabling the train on the main line if proper precautions had been taken* and if the train (particularly the lead loco) had been mechanically sound.

 

They wouldn't have had to stable a train at Nantes if the trackwork was in better shape so that the crew didn't run out of time.

 

This wasn't an accident of a single failure. It was a bunch of minor problems that, on their own, shouldn't have led to the accident. The corporate culture appears to have led to most of them occurring. Ultimately, the botched repair on the lead loco (and failing to replace/repair the lead loco) led to the fire, which lead to the loco being shut down. The decision not to start another loco meant that the air leaked down. Failing to set sufficient handbrakes (and/or set them properly) meant that the train could move on its own when the airbrakes leaked off. Failure to maintain the trackwork meant that the train was stopped at Nantes which meant that, when the braking issues occurred, the train had a long slope to roll down.

 

I wouls agree that fact that they were regularly stabling trains at Nantes could have led to a manual derail switch being cut into the main line there, at minimal cost which, if set (see corporate culture again), could have derailed the train when it started moving.

 

*set an appropriate number of handbrakes, ensure that the air source is maintained, put a portable derail on the track ahead of the train.

 

Adrian

No need to bother about the air source - simply apply sufficient handbrakes to hold the train and then CHECK that they are holding the train before leaving it.  That is such an incredibly basic piece of railway work that it is a very telling indictment of the company that their staff weren't trained to do it and that 'workarounds' (such as using the air brake) were seemingly acceptable.

[jjb1970]

The oft quoted comment of Trevor Kletz that "if you think safety is expensive, try having an accident" should be a mantra of anybody involved in operation and maintenance of anything with a potential to go horribly wrong. As the Stationmaster has said, a good SMS does not need to add a lot to operations in terms of cost or time, it codifies good practice and perhaps almost as importantly it enforces some discipline and forward planning. I always had complaints about the way the electricity permit to work system (still pretty much the old CEGB safety rules) from some quarters about how the process made things take longer. My answer was always "no it doesn't, it is your poor planning that is making your own problems", if work is planned and organised it does not take any longer, nor any additional man power to do it safely and by the book than to just do stuff on the hoof and hope for the best. Also, if you do get some persistent issues causing work to be done at short notice it concentrates the mind to identify underlying problems and instigate a full fix rather than just stick bandages on something not fit for purpose if people are going through the whole work planning process constantly without the temptation to just send a fitter out constantly to bodge stuff. 

[The Stationmaster]

The oft quoted comment of Trevor Kletz that "if you think safety is expensive, try having an accident" should be a mantra of anybody involved in operation and maintenance of anything with a potential to go horribly wrong. As the Stationmaster has said, a good SMS does not need to add a lot to operations in terms of cost or time, it codifies good practice and perhaps almost as importantly it enforces some discipline and forward planning. I always had complaints about the way the electricity permit to work system (still pretty much the old CEGB safety rules) from some quarters about how the process made things take longer. My answer was always "no it doesn't, it is your poor planning that is making your own problems", if work is planned and organised it does not take any longer, nor any additional man power to do it safely and by the book than to just do stuff on the hoof and hope for the best. Also, if you do get some persistent issues causing work to be done at short notice it concentrates the mind to identify underlying problems and instigate a full fix rather than just stick bandages on something not fit for purpose if people are going through the whole work planning process constantly without the temptation to just send a fitter out constantly to bodge stuff. 

It is quite an interesting exercise trying to use the CEGB  'Permit To Work' system on a railway line - the idea of padlocking to protect doesn't sit all that well with modern signalling control methods  (It is even more 'interesting' writing a procedure which is 'railway safe' but is also readily understood by those used to 'Permit To Work', especially when uppity NR 'Signallers' start standing on their dignity - and ignoring one of their own Instructions about how to work around one of their procedures!)

[jjb1970]

Ah yes, the interface between the two safe systems of work could be quite..interesting...

[Gary H]

The Stationmaster, on 20 Aug 2014 - 17:11, said:

No need to bother about the air source - simply apply sufficient handbrakes to hold the train and then CHECK that they are holding the train before leaving it.  That is such an incredibly basic piece of railway work that it is a very telling indictment of the company that their staff weren't trained to do it and that 'workarounds' (such as using the air brake) were seemingly acceptable.

A very valid point there, air leak off can happen on anything but its made me wonder. Do these shortline railroads / class 2's (call them what you will)  have any kind of regulation in the fitness to run and general conformity of their locomotives?

I do get the impression that any 'outfit' can buy a locomotive that barely runs and stops and then get paid to haul a train from A to B without any safety case. All of the power involved in this disaster were hand-me-downs of 4 or 5 times and were well past their best! The old C30-7's especially were not that good 20 years ago!!

I wonder how they would fair with a Network Rail traction inspector!!

It reminds me of a cowboy operator buying a scrap line locomotive, putting a set of battery's on it, checking some levels and going to work!

[Adrian Wintle]

No need to bother about the air source - simply apply sufficient handbrakes to hold the train and then CHECK that they are holding the train before leaving it.  That is such an incredibly basic piece of railway work that it is a very telling indictment of the company that their staff weren't trained to do it and that 'workarounds' (such as using the air brake) were seemingly acceptable.

 

I get the impression that leaving the train running and the air brakes engaged avoided having to do a full brake test the next morning, something that may be problematic with a single crew member. It wasn't so much a workaround for properly securing the train, it was a workaround to avoid having a second crew member - presumably the cost of the fuel to keep one loco running was less than the cost of a second employee being available to do the brake test.

 

Adrian

[Gerald Henriksen]

The oft quoted comment of Trevor Kletz that "if you think safety is expensive, try having an accident" should be a mantra of anybody involved in operation and maintenance of anything with a potential to go horribly wrong.

 

The problem of course is that those making the decisions seem to never face consequences for what happens.

 

How many senior people at MMA have faced charges?  0.

[dave1905]

Leaving the air cut in is not a work around, its SOP on all railroads.  There is no reason not to have the air cut in, it creates no safety risk and reduces the chances of injury due to having crews do a full initial terminal air brake test.  That's regardless of the crew size.  They would have followed the same procedure whether there was a single engineer or a 1950's full crew. 

 

The risk is relying on the train air brakes to hold the train.  That's a work around.

 

The FRA has safety rules that address the SAFETY appliances (headlights, grab irons, electrical insulation, air brakes function, handbrake function, etc.) but there is no requirement for the units to be "reliable" as far as it concerns the ability to haul freight.  The state makes you have headlights and seatbelts in your car but doesn't prevent you from owning a lemon of a car.  Also remember the US and Canadian roads are under different regulations.

[Gerald Henriksen]

A very valid point there, air leak off can happen on anything but its made me wonder. Do these shortline railroads / class 2's (call them what you will)  have any kind of regulation in the fitness to run and general conformity of their locomotives?

I do get the impression that any 'outfit' can buy a locomotive that barely runs and stops and then get paid to haul a train from A to B without any safety case. All of the power involved in this disaster were hand-me-downs of 4 or 5 times and were well past their best! The old C30-7's especially were not that good 20 years ago!!

I wonder how they would fair with a Network Rail traction inspector!!

It reminds me of a cowboy operator buying a scrap line locomotive, putting a set of battery's on it, checking some levels and going to work!

 

Well, given that the shortlines (or more specifically pretty much every railroad except passenger) in North America all run on their own track, they become their own regulator as to what can run on the tracks with (as we have seen) minimal government oversight.

 

Regulation doesn't even necessarily prevent the problem either - American Airlines flight 191 crashed in Chicago in 1979 because of incorrect repair procedures done to save money.

 

At the end of the day you have a railroad that was barely surviving, in an area of both countries that are economically troubled, where what would be considered bad practices occurred because doing things right was outside the available budget and there was no one around to say otherwise.

 

As much as many on here want to focus the blame on MMA, there is lots of blame to go around including some not mentioned in the report - ie. property taxes on the rail lines that encourage the railroads to minimize infrastructure.

[bok]

Please be kind in your comments about this incident.

 

I have known many of the folks involved including senior management of the MM&A and many of you have no idea of the words you speak. Unless you have worked almost 50 years as a railroader as I have in both operations as a locomotive engineer,conductor and safety/operating rules manager most of your idle conversation is speculation at best and here say at most.

I don't like to mention my years of experience as a standard but when model railroaders and rail fans project themselves as "experts" when in fact most are only hobbyists their opinions and ideas are generally nothing more than gossip and highly disregarded by people in the industry.

 

It matters not that most of you live in foreign countries and basically don't understand modern, heavy-haul, freight operations of the US but you still can ask questions for clarification rather than make bold statements based on speculation often which can hurt others. I will be happy to answer any of your questions which I can.

 

I don't deny that many mistakes were made which led to this incident on many fronts but piling on gossip just makes it worse for all.

 

Barry 

[Adrian Wintle]

most of your idle conversation is speculation at best and here say at most.

 

 

Since we are now commenting on the findings in the TSB report, that isn't a correct statement. Unless, of course, you think those findings are speculation.

 

Some of the commenters are railroaders, and others have a fair amount of experience in other industries where similar loss of life could occur if a selection of factors aligned. In my former career we came close to losing more people than died in Lac Megantic due to some incorrect assumptions (in both the specifications and the development) and a single minor defect (a cold solder joint).

 

Adrian

[Talltim]

Most of us are amateurs (although there is no reason why an amateur can't know more than a professional), but some have involvement in exactly the sort of safety management that seems to have been lacking at the MMA (not my speculation, what it says in the report).

On a different note, something that hadn't occurred to me before reading the report was that top mounted pressure release valves don't really work when the tank car isn't upright! They leak oil onto the fire which is raising the pressure. I would also imagine that the oil comes out a lot slower than vapour would.

[highpeak]

 

 

Regulation doesn't even necessarily prevent the problem either - American Airlines flight 191 crashed in Chicago in 1979 because of incorrect repair procedures done to save money.

 

 

The crash of AA flight 191 was in many ways as much a failure of the regulatory body (the FAA) as the fault of AA maintenance procedures.

In its report on the accident the NTSB stated: "Contributing to the cause of the accident were the vulnerability of the design of the pylon attach points to maintenance damage; the vulnerability of the design of the leading edge slat system to the damage which produced asymmetry; deficiencies in Federal Aviation Administration surveillance.and reporting systems which failed to detect and prevent the use of improper maintenance procedures; deficiencies in the practices and communications among the operators, the manufacturer, and the FAA which failed to determine and disseminele the particulars regarding previous maintenance damage incidents; and the intolerance of prescribed operational procedures to this unique emergency." http://libraryonline.erau.edu/online-full-text/ntsb/aircraft-accident-reports/AAR79-17.pdf

The change in maintenance procedures made by AA (and subsequently adopted by other DC-10 operators such as Continental) saved about 200 man-hours of labor but also reduced the number of electrical, hydraulic and fuel disconnects from 79 to 27, which could be viewed as a safety benefit. AA consulted with the manufacturer about the procedure and requested information from Douglas to help design their revised procedure. Douglas told AA that they could not either approve or disapprove the change. Douglas did not notify the FAA of what AA was proposing, nor were they required to.

Continental noticed a mounting flange fracture during an engine/pylon removal using the AA procedure in late 1978 and early 1979, but were unsure as to the requirement to notify the FAA or other operators of their findings, and in the event considered it simply a failure of their maintenance staff to correctly follow the procedure and did neither.

There are some interesting parallels between the Megantic disaster and the AA191 wreck. I don't know what Transport Canada's mandate is, but the FAA is and has been for a long time a conflicted regulatory body due to its dual mandate to regulate and promote the air industry; if you read enough NTSB reports you come to the conclusion that the latter too often overrides the former.

[jjb1970]

At the risk of sounding brutal, if this railroad was not capable of operating safely then it should not have been operating. How much would it have cost to avoid this disaster? Securing this train properly would have had a minimal cost impact. Safety isn't optional, and if the railroad managers were career 50 year rail men then that in my view makes it much worse as they should have known better. Unless they try the "we didn't know" defence, which is just as bad. Managers are paid to manage within their areas of responsibility, they should know what happens outside their office and if they can't be bothered to find out then in my book they're culpable for not discharging their responsibilities. You don't have to be a professional in any industry to recognise bad practice and management, I suspect very few people here have much understanding of shipping but you don't need to be a marriner to appreciate the bad management and operation that led to disasters like the Herald of Free Enterprise and Costa Concordia. Nobody (unless they're suicidal or a murderer) sets out to create a disaster like this but the fact that these incidents are not caused by malicious intent does not make them right or acceptable. Being hard up or operating in a deprived area is not an argument for not operating safely, end of.

[Glorious NSE]

No need to bother about the air source - simply apply sufficient handbrakes to hold the train and then CHECK that they are holding the train before leaving it.  That is such an incredibly basic piece of railway work that it is a very telling indictment of the company that their staff weren't trained to do it and that 'workarounds' (such as using the air brake) were seemingly acceptable.

 

I agree - being a little picky i'm not sure it proves that he was never trained to do it correctly, but the loco data proves it definately wasn't done correctly on the day, and the fact that some other crews also say they'd have done it the same way points to a much wider safety failing within the MMA, and one that's much more significant than having some ropey old diesels and some poor track.

 

Other interesting thoughts from reading the report:

 

Neither the MMA, nor the other railroads' takes on the handbrake rules seem to note that applying the handbrakes on the loco's can result in less braking power than doing it on the freightcars, whilst I agree the checks if done correctly should make sure it's secure either way, it strikes me that the configuration of the train (with 5 loco's, an RC caboose, and an empty boxcar before you get to the heavy loaded tanks) meant that you've wasted a lot of potential braking power by handbraking lots of vehicles things that have relatively little braking power...it did make me wonder whether the same result would have happenned if he'd applied the same number of handbrakes starting with the first loaded tankcar?  

 

The second one - that the report doesn't see safety of these kinds of trains on shortlines and regionals is an inherent problem, in fact, in some ways it's arguably safer. Yes the MMA had poor track and poor loco's - but in normal operation the lower speeds involved in their operations mitigate the results of any accident.

If you took the identical train into the same place in normal operation and it derailed at it's normal 10mph in the middle of town, (for whatever reason,) the chances are the result for the town would be no release of product, just annoyance from the residents that their town is cut in half by a stranded train for a few hours.

If you took the same train, and ran it on a well maintained class 1 railroad at it's allowed line speed (59mph?) and there was a derailment in the heart of one of the many, many towns and cities it passed through, (for whatever reason, even one entirely outside the railroad's control,) then the result is likely to look rather more like Lac Megantic.

 

I think it makes the point quite well that whilst better tank car design may not prevent any release in such a large incident, better tank car design is going to seriously reduce how much product does get released when such a thing happens...

[Talltim]

 

The second one - that the report doesn't see safety of these kinds of trains on shortlines and regionals is an inherent problem, in fact, in some ways it's arguably safer. Yes the MMA had poor track and poor loco's - but in normal operation the lower speeds involved in their operations mitigate the results of any accident.

If you took the identical train into the same place in normal operation and it derailed at it's normal 10mph in the middle of town, (for whatever reason,) the chances are the result for the town would be no release of product, just annoyance from the residents that their town is cut in half by a stranded train for a few hours.

If you took the same train, and ran it on a well maintained class 1 railroad at it's allowed line speed (59mph?) and there was a derailment in the heart of one of the many, many towns and cities it passed through, (for whatever reason, even one entirely outside the railroad's control,) then the result is likely to look rather more like Lac Megantic.

 

Thats a kinda six of one - half a dozen of the other type thing. If the track was better and the train was travelling faster, there would be more flexibility as to suitable locations for crew hand-overs and fewer of them (and thus times when the train be left unattended) I do get your point tho.

The other thing of course is that oil is not a time sensitive traffic. The only cost saving for running the trains faster is on the amount of equipment required to provide the same frequency of deliveries. Having slower trains can also act as a moving storage facility.

Edited August 21, 2014 by Talltim

[jjb1970]

I think the keys are operational management (ie. staff training, safe systems of work, maintenance etc) and asset state. Running an oil train at low speed on decent track with decent equipment and using competent staff may well be a risk mitigator as undoubtedly an oil train de-railing or impacting a stationary object is less likely to result in a catastrophe at 10mph than at 59mph. However low speed is not a substitute for good management and asset condition.

Edited August 21, 2014 by jjb1970

[Glorious NSE]

The other thing of course is that oil is not a time sensitive traffic. The only cost saving for running the trains faster is on the amount of equipment required to provide the same frequency of deliveries. Having slower trains can also act as a moving storage facility.

 

Your class 1s aren't going to want to be running lots of trains at 10mph down their main lines, it would stuff up their line capacity, tie up crews and power, etc etc...

 

Admittedly we're talking extremes, and the reality is going to be somewhere in the middle, as a well maintained and profitable regional isn't likely to want to be running anything at 10mph for long distances either. The majority of the ones I follow appear to build and maintain for 40mph - at least where they can justify the investment.

[The Stationmaster]

At the risk of sounding brutal, if this railroad was not capable of operating safely then it should not have been operating. How much would it have cost to avoid this disaster? Securing this train properly would have had a minimal cost impact. Safety isn't optional, and if the railroad managers were career 50 year rail men then that in my view makes it much worse as they should have known better. Unless they try the "we didn't know" defence, which is just as bad. Managers are paid to manage within their areas of responsibility, they should know what happens outside their office and if they can't be bothered to find out then in my book they're culpable for not discharging their responsibilities. You don't have to be a professional in any industry to recognise bad practice and management, I suspect very few people here have much understanding of shipping but you don't need to be a marriner to appreciate the bad management and operation that led to disasters like the Herald of Free Enterprise and Costa Concordia. Nobody (unless they're suicidal or a murderer) sets out to create a disaster like this but the fact that these incidents are not caused by malicious intent does not make them right or acceptable. Being hard up or operating in a deprived area is not an argument for not operating safely, end of.

That, I think, absolutely sums it up.  Safety is basically simple, it rarely costs very much extra once you have your procedures established and the point about the responsibility of managers is very well made - that is why they are there and that is why they are paid to manage.  

Similarly your further point, and I quote - 'I think the keys are operational management (ie. staff training, safe systems of work, maintenance etc) and asset state.' - is very pertinently made, if you can't get those things right you shouldn't be running a railway, or indeed any other sort of industrial or transport process. 

 

I'm afraid that Bok's comments are - in some respects - a little worrying and betray something of a 'not invented here' syndrome which can affect all sorts of things and opinions (and not just in the USA/Canada of course).  Safety and safe working methods should be absolutely basic in any railway operation anywhere - if you don't start from that premise and if you don't continue to keep it as a basic part of your operating procedures  a 'Lac Megantic incident' is simply looking for its time to occur.  Securing any train properly when it is left unattended, on any line but especially on a running line on a gradient, is so basic that to get it wrong and not to do the job properly must inevitably lead to big questions about the competencies and management of the organisation in which it happened, all the way to the top.

 

Incidentally I have been involved in railway operating, at many levels including latterly specialisation in operational safety, both within the main UK industry and subsequently in private industry and consultancy roles (on several different gauges) in the UK and Austalia for in excess of 40 years.  So I do happen to know a bit about safety management and safe operation of railways (including the operation of the heaviest freight trains running daily in Britain) - which is something which the official report has concluded could clearly not be said of the MMA.

[trisonic]

I hope that there actually is a US version of “Mike” over here (I’m pretty certain that there is but he probably works for one railroad). Crude Oil transport (mostly from Bakken)  certainly seems to my untrained/amateur eye  to be the fastest growth market in railroading due to the rush for energy self-sufficiency  coming from the Government in the USA, right now. It’s driving their whole policies in the Mid-East (and farther afield).

 

Best, Pete.

[Adrian Wintle]

I hope that there actually is a US version of “Mike” over here (I’m pretty certain that there is but he probably works for one railroad). Crude Oil transport (mostly from Bakken)  certainly seems to my untrained/amateur eye  to be the fastest growth market in railroading due to the rush for energy self-sufficiency  coming from the Government in the USA, right now. It’s driving their whole policies in the Mid-East (and farther afield).

 

Best, Pete.

 

And the growth of the rail traffic of oil has a lot to do with the resistance to new pipelines (and to re-purposing old ones). The oil is being produced and needs to get to market - if you don't want a pipeline, then it is going by rail.

 

Although it is Alberta bitumen rather than North Dakota Bakken oil, the ongoing resistance to approving the Keystone XL pipeline has driven the growth of oil-by-rail. Similarly, the resistance to the Enbridge Line 9 (Sarnia->Montreal) reversal (actually re-reversal) has kept oil trains running through southern Ontario.

 

The rise of domestic oil has allowed for the re-activation of some refineries, which has driven some job growth (e.g. Delaware City, DE), so there is more than just the drive for energy self-sufficiency that is affecting political decisions.

 

Adrian

[jjb1970]

As well as self sufficiency the change in energy costs for North American industry is helping job creation by offsetting some of the labour cost disadvantage relative to emerging economies. Unfortunately the UK has politicians that think pumping up energy costs for industry is sensible, it might actually be sensible if we had a genuine plan for weaning ourselves off fossil fuels and/or imported energy but when we pay inflated prices and policy is a mess it is not good.