R A Riddles - your thoughts.

[Peter Kazmierczak]

Are we expected to purchase these books immediately? Or nip down to our library and order them out of hours?

 

Or maybe we are to be admonished for not having the intelligence to have them in our personal libraries already?

 

One thing seems to be certain - that is until we do one or more of these noble activities, the gospel according to E S Cox appears to be a closely guarded secret, known only to the "chosen ones"?

Here you go Jonny..... The Gospel according to Cox.......................

 

"The establishment of BR coincided with a Government White Paper on capital investment which deferred the prospects of large-scale electrification. Much spade work required to be done before even a unified system of current supply for the whole country could be agreed. Of diesels, there were at take-over date, only 49 shunters and one main-line locomotive in stock , LMS 10000. The shunters were standardised, but no one in his right mind was prepared to base any policy of main-line diesel traction at that time upon so slender a foundation as a single locomotive which had only been running four weeks before the end of 1947.

It was thus fixed in the minds of the triumvirate that there should be a standard series of new locomotives for the new railway and that they should be steam."

 

The "Triumvirate" referred to being Riddles, Cox and Bond. 

 

Wonder which particular White Paper Cox refers to? More delving methinks.....

[Peter Kazmierczak]

The White Paper was the one on Capital Investment - see Hansard 18th December 1947 for House of Commons debate on it (available online).

[Old Gringo]

For information:

 

AFAIK, Ernest Stewart Cox (1900 - 1992) wrote six books in quick succession, following his retirement and all were published by Ian Allan.

 

1. Locomotive Panorama, Volume One, 1965, autobiographical, hardback, reprinted in paperback.
2. Locomotive Panorama, Volume Two, 1966, autobiographical, hardback, and later paperback.
3. British Railways Standard Steam Locomotives, 1966, (edit: and apparently paperback at excessive prices!! see Jonny's previous post 74).
4. Chronicles of Steam, 1967.
5. World Steam in the Twentieth Century, 1969.
6. Speaking of Steam, 1971.

 

I've read somewhere that by 1971, he had failing eyesight and so we didn't have the benefit of any more 'insider' information on British steam locomotive development.

 

However, according to Ottley's Bibliography, he did write a couple of papers too:

(3116/3146) "British Railways' experience with Diesel and Electric Traction" read at Witwatersrand University, Johannesburg on March 22nd, 1961, pp32, a copy is held in the British Museum.
and (6788) "A Modern Locomotive History, ten years development on the LMS, 1923-1932", a paper read to the Institute of Locomotive Engineers, on January 2nd, 1946, pp46 and published as a Railway Observer Supplement, 1946. Again, a copy is held in the British Museum.

[Peter Kazmierczak]

For information:

 

AFAIK, Ernest Stewart Cox (1900 - 1992) wrote six books in quick succession, following his retirement and all were published by Ian Allan.

 

1. Locomotive Panorama, Volume One, 1965, autobiographical, hardback, reprinted in paperback.

2. Locomotive Panorama, Volume Two, 1966, autobiographical, hardback, and later paperback.

3. British Railways Standard Steam Locomotives, 1966.

4. Chronicles of Steam, 1967.

5. World Steam in the Twentieth Century, 1969.

6. Speaking of Steam, 1971.

 

I've read somewhere that by 1971, he had failing eyesight and so we didn't have the benefit of any more 'insider' information on British steam locomotive development.

 

However, according to Ottley's Bibliography, he did write a couple of papers too:

(3116/3146) "British Railways' experience with Diesel and Electric Traction" read at Witwatersrand University, Johannesburg on March 22nd, 1961, pp32, a copy is held in the British Museum.

and (6788) "A Modern Locomotive History, ten years development on the LMS, 1923-1932", a paper read to the Institute of Locomotive Engineers, on January 2nd, 1946, pp46 and published as a Railway Observer Supplement, 1946. Again, a copy is held in the British Museum.

John,

The passage I put up was from his "BR Standard Steam Locomotives" book (p31-32).

[The Stationmaster]

John,

The passage I put up was from his "BR Standard Steam Locomotives" book (p31-32).

 

The two volumes of 'Locomotive Panorama' also have quite a bit on the development of the Standards and involvement of the various works and individuals in design as well as which components were developed or copied from the practices of certain members of the Big Four.

 

But above all let us not forget the context in which these various books were written and, in some cases, why they were written.  'Locomotive Panorama' is largely a straightforward, and very readable, account of Cox' life as a loco engineer and - as one might expect, simply recounts facts.  I have not read his book on the Standards but I suspect it will be little different in approach - no need to justify but a need to explain.

 

Bonavia, in my limited experience of his writings, seems to write from a very different sort of perspective in which facts are related in a manner which either supports his views or in order to dismiss the views or actions of others - i.e. I am left with a feeling of self justification and this perhaps not entirely surprising in view of his background in the theoretical rather than the practical.  All industries need people who are able to address and put forward 'blue horizon' thinking but they need to be tempered by the wisdom of experience (i.e. the dinosaurs as many have called them) and achievable practicality.  It is always a simple matter to 'attack' someone for not doing something - especially in a  large and complex organisation such as the state owned railway industry - but it can be a lot harder to explain to a lay person why such a course is (or was not) practical at the time.

 

we can - to draw a couple of parallels - all say our rail network should be electrified but the pace of doing so depends on numerous practicalities ranging from the availability of finance through the availability of the wherewithal to actually do the work or build the trains.  Similarly we can as readily say the entire railway industry should be state owned - while steadfastly ignoring or being in ignorance of not only the way it would be organised (hardly a new question) or the manner in which such organisation should be constructed and, critically, resourced by human beings with the knowledge and experience to actually carry out the tasks they are entrusted with.  Oddly in 1948 the latter was there in a profusion of top quality people but there was in reality little idea about how the top level of the organisation should be constructed and experience proved that what was done was not right, especially for the situation which began to emerge as the 1950s rolled onwards.

 

Edit some punctuation

[jonny777]

Although, as 'bike2steam' has mentioned, all major decisions concerning the future motive power for BR were made at government level. Therefore, as a member of the BTC Bonavia would be much closer to that level than Riddles who could only produce plans and proposals for consideration.

 

It seems pretty obvious that Hurcomb of the BTC and Missenden of the RE were not on the best of social terms with each other, and this seemed to lead both organisations to dig their heels in, which probably did not help in decision making.

[Peter Kazmierczak]

I feel that Hurcomb (at the BTC) was often portrayed as a somewhat dry and dusty old Civil Servant, when it was actually he who was pushing the RE to get a move on with things, He was particularly frustrated a the length of time the RE got to producing a policy on future motive power.

 

Missenden was, of course, not the first choice to lead the RE, as Milne (ex-GW) couldn't take on the post at the terms and conditions offered.

[Poggy1165]

There's a very important point half-concealed within the text above, about Britain spending very large sums of American aid on maintaining unsustainable foreign commitments "for reasons of prestige".

 

Only eleven years after a war which we had certainly not won, despite lining up with those who had, our supposed allies in America made it quite clear to the world that our ability to sustain such a position was quite at an end. Only six years after that, our last major colony received its independence and we had concluded our last colonisl war of any consequence (the Malayan Emergency), to no obvious benefit. Our African Dominions were embarking on their long, slow slide into fundamental change. We spent prodigious sums on a nuclear deterrent whose use was never realistically defined, much of which technological development was handed over to hostile powers by a series of traitors.

 

I've never understood how any of this contributed to "prestige".

Successive governments during this period attempted to maintain the illusion that Britain was a first-class power. In retrospect, this is almost laughable.

 

Of course, in those days politicians rarely got into senior positions until their late 50s or early 60s, and often remained in office much longer, so there were plenty of people around in high places who still recalled the Edwardian 'glory days' when Britain had been (at least on the face of it) the most powerful nation on earth.

 

There are still vestiges of this attitude to be seen to this day. It is usually expressed in terms like 'punching above our weight'. Essentially a yearning for a bygone era when the political leaders of the UK were giants on the world stage.

 

By comparison, setting up an efficient railway system was seen as small potatoes.

[jjb1970]

I think that the argument has to be considered on two levels.

 

On a strictly technical level I really see no sensible argument for continuing to develop new steam designs in the late 1940's. Steam was obsolescent, woefully inefficient, labour intensive and with the best will in the world to the likes of Porta and Wardale was onlyever going to be marginally improved.

 

On a socio-economic level, under the circumstances of the immediate post-nationalisation era I think steam locomotives were pretty much the only policy BR could realistically have pursued.

[jonny777]

I know it is with the benefit of hindsight, but imagine if the diesel railcar introduction had been abandoned in favour of new build steam push-pull services.

 

Goodness knows what that would have done for BR finances later in the decade.

 

At least where rural DMUs were introduced there was an initial boost in passenger numbers until the novelty of sitting in bus seats but paying rail prices wore off, and the rattles began to materialise along with the exhaust fumes.

[Sheffield]

I suggest we owe E S Cox a great debt for his writings, as they were aimed at the enthusiast, and gave an interesting insight into the LMS and BR, particularly as he included details of costs. But it does seem necessary to have a degree of caution, as he was adept at taking suitable facts to present the case he wished to make. I have wondered if his rise up the managerial greasy pole was helped by his ability to write a convincing report with impressive details that nevertheless managed to say what his bosses wanted it to say.

When we discuss BR's finances I think we have to remember the political and social dimensions. As a nationalised industry it was directly under the influence of politicians and Civil Servants. In the 1960s railways were largely considered in such circles to be in managed  decline, and the question was how could they be run down and mostly done away with without offending the voters too much. To most politicians the railways just meant letters of complaint from Joe Public in their post boxes, and to Top Civil Servants the railways meant London commuter trains. And of course many people still remembered rail travel in the war, which did not endear them to the railways. 

[The Stationmaster]

I suggest we owe E S Cox a great debt for his writings, as they were aimed at the enthusiast, and gave an interesting insight into the LMS and BR, particularly as he included details of costs. But it does seem necessary to have a degree of caution, as he was adept at taking suitable facts to present the case he wished to make. I have wondered if his rise up the managerial greasy pole was helped by his ability to write a convincing report with impressive details that nevertheless managed to say what his bosses wanted it to say.

 

 

Hardly relevant within the working situation I would say.  If you are asked to produce a paper supporting a particular course of action that is what you would do, if you were asked to report on something you would inevitably have to show both good and bad (and indifferent) or else you would be criticised for producing an inadequate report - thus quite a  difference between a paper or submission document and a report.  And if you submitted a skewed or biased report there would be among those considering its contents sufficient familiarity with the subject to question, for example, the omission of data or even the value of the figures you were presenting.

 

Also, usually inevitably any document you prepared for higher management, even to the order of your immediate boss to suit his case, would usually be subject to peer comment and would be retained for future reference (or even criticism if it contained errors).  But there is no doubt at all that incorrect base information could get into documents and might not be found out until later - however normally I doubt if important decisions were made on the basis of such information.  

 

An interesting area in this respect was BR's development of large mechanised marshalling yards in the Modernisation Plan - and the fact that most of them were dead if not totally buried with little more than a decade or two after commissioning.  So what went wrong?  Were the yards the wrong thing to build - although several of them probably paid back their cost in savings within their lifetime - or were they built in the wrong places (at least one arguably was), or were they simply overtaken by change and weren't suitable for the new order?  The latter is undoubtedly the answer for almost all of them but at the time they were conceived and authorised who could predict the massive decline in British industry or the growth of road transport for a large chunk of freight?

 

The problem always has been, and always will be to keep the railway running and to hopefully improve its ability to handle traffic on the basis of what you know and what can be reasonably forecast when the decision is made.  And never dismiss - as you said - the political and socio-political angle.  A good example of that is the current London Bridge and Thameslink works - most of which started life way back in the 1990s as Thameslink 2000, that being the year in which it was intended to be commissioned.  When it finally is commissioned it might well be out of date and inadequate - but it will be nearly 20 years late and that delay owes little or nothing to the railway industry.  Similarly Crossrail, when commissioned, will bear but a limited resemblance to the scheme that was dumped in 1994 and would have been in operation for a decade or more by now, and not serving Heathrow Airport.  But back then it was a scheme conceived on different lines and with different aims (such as the closure of Marylebone - would it now be criticised for that?).

[Poggy1165]

Indeed, transport needs have shifted massively in the period since the war, and I doubt anyone in a senior position at the birth of BR could have envisaged what we have (and what we need) in 2016. Indeed, I should imagine that in 1948 they would have envisaged a long-term future for pick up goods trains, to say nothing of the need to shift vast tonnages of coal, steel and fish.

 

In another place earlier this week I was involved in a quiet discussion about the old LNWR route from Manchester to Bolton. Its closure at the time (1954) was entirely sensible as it would have been seen as an unnecessary duplicate route in an area with excellent bus (and indeed trolleybus) alternatives as well as the competing ex L&Y route. Now, given the shift in population, the chaotic road system around Manchester and bus services that are pretty much useless to commuters, it would be an extremely valuable asset as a railway or a modern tramway. But it would cost an awful lot of money to put back, and as we are not London there is no chance of the money being found any time soon. But how can one blame the decision-makers of 1954? I doubt our present transport needs could have been guessed in 1974 or even 1984.

[Froxfield2012]

Whatever the rights and wrongs of the development, I, for one, am grateful that Riddles continued with new steam locomotives.  Despite the derisive "Town Hall" nickname on the Western (they had steps up the front!), the Standards made good pictures in the last days of steam.  In my view, the Britannias were particularly photogenic: especially so when turned out by Cardiff Canton.  And then there is the law of unintended consequences.  The Heritage Railway industry, I am sure, benefitted greatly from the availability of relatively new machinery for motive power.  (As it did from the work of OVS Bulleid producing "new" Pacifics).

[jonny777]

Here you go Jonny..... The Gospel according to Cox.......................

 

"The establishment of BR coincided with a Government White Paper on capital investment which deferred the prospects of large-scale electrification. Much spade work required to be done before even a unified system of current supply for the whole country could be agreed. Of diesels, there were at take-over date, only 49 shunters and one main-line locomotive in stock , LMS 10000. The shunters were standardised, but no one in his right mind was prepared to base any policy of main-line diesel traction at that time upon so slender a foundation as a single locomotive which had only been running four weeks before the end of 1947.

It was thus fixed in the minds of the triumvirate that there should be a standard series of new locomotives for the new railway and that they should be steam."

 

The "Triumvirate" referred to being Riddles, Cox and Bond. 

 

 

 

Here we have an example of someone dismissing the whole idea in one sentence. Of course no one in their right mind would base a policy of main line diesel traction on the few months of data from 10000.

 

But no one was asking him to do that.

 

The question that the Hurcomb/Bonavia letter asked was whether a small trial of diesel traction in a certain dedicated part of the country had been abandoned? And the RE did not reply to this for 8 months.

 

Even then, when they did bother to reply they did not answer the question. They just kicked it into the long grass by appointing a committee to look at the comparisons of various traction alternatives. The original letter posing the question was sent in April 1948 and the committee reported in October 1951; by which time the standard steam class construction was in full swing.

 

I obtained a tatty second hand copy of BR Standards by Cox, and from reading that I get the impression that Riddles, Bond and Cox saw the new BR as a blank canvas, and a way for them to show the world just what could be done with a simple to maintain, two cylinder steam locomotive. An exercise in ego massaging, if you will - but sadly the world had moved on.

 

If the RE had had any intention to even consider a small diesel trial, they could have easily included 10000 in the locomotive exchanges against steam traction of an equivalent DBHP. This would have not only shown the public and management what could be achieved when the financial situation eased, but would have let loco crews from all regions sample the new diesel.

 

As I have mentioned before, for whatever reasons you might wish to believe, the LNER had invited (and received) tenders from those UK companies who were interested in constructing ~1600hp diesel locomotives. All it needed was for BR to be a little bit canny and invite these companies to construct their own prototypes for main line evaluation (much as Lion, Falcon and Kestrel were many years later), and they could have a lengthy testing session to iron out problems which would become so expensive ten years later.

 

That they did not do this is almost a crime in my opinion; but not only did they not do this, they seemed to dismiss the whole idea. I believe this turned back the UK railway development clock by 15 years.

[The Stationmaster]

Indeed, transport needs have shifted massively in the period since the war, and I doubt anyone in a senior position at the birth of BR could have envisaged what we have (and what we need) in 2016. Indeed, I should imagine that in 1948 they would have envisaged a long-term future for pick up goods trains, to say nothing of the need to shift vast tonnages of coal, steel and fish.

 

In another place earlier this week I was involved in a quiet discussion about the old LNWR route from Manchester to Bolton. Its closure at the time (1954) was entirely sensible as it would have been seen as an unnecessary duplicate route in an area with excellent bus (and indeed trolleybus) alternatives as well as the competing ex L&Y route. Now, given the shift in population, the chaotic road system around Manchester and bus services that are pretty much useless to commuters, it would be an extremely valuable asset as a railway or a modern tramway. But it would cost an awful lot of money to put back, and as we are not London there is no chance of the money being found any time soon. But how can one blame the decision-makers of 1954? I doubt our present transport needs could have been guessed in 1974 or even 1984.

 

Very true - interestingly - as part of the contribution to dealing with the Serpell investigations I spent a sizeable chunk of 1984 developing and proving major track rationalisations for the WR.  Some, a couple, actually became schemes - one for (internal) political reasons and the other for practical reasons because it offered a good payback against fairly limited investment costs.  The first (singling Bradford Jcn - Bathampton) never happened because it was never meant to happen but somewhere a fully costed investment paper exists as does the minuted approval and authorisation for development of the scheme: will future researchers actually understand what those documents really mean if they stumble across them?

 

The second (parallel single lines from Norton Junction to Worcester Shrub Hill) was authorised, part funded, and some work was actually done but work ceased, and it was eventually cancelled, because of lack of funds and it was a low priority scheme.  Already somebody has written in a  book that it was a daft idea but maybe he never bothered to research 6 months of actual train running in the busiest part of the year to see what effect it would have had on punctuality (answer - virtually nil).  It was an idea of its time - since then I have carried out, mainly in a consultancy role two other reviews both of which proposed far more doubling (i.e. not more singling) of the Oxford worcester line and particularly including the section between Evesham and Norton Junction/Worcester Shrub Hill.  In other words something I devised and developed to meet the conditions of 1984 had been rendered outmoded by the dawn of the 21st century.

 

The situation is really very simple you have no choice but to work within the conditions of the present and the foreseeable future, and very often the latter might only be guesswork or an averaging of the guesses of various people.  Hindsight is a marvellous thing; foresight is a lot more difficult to put your finger on, especially when you are surrounded by contemporaneous pressures which can direct a particular course or having to look at something in a particular way.

[TheSignalEngineer]

Mike, the last paragraph reminds me of the situation on what is now the Chiltern Line back in the early 1980s. With the single line sections and Block Switches it was possible at quiet times to reduce the capacity on the Down between Princes Risborough and Leamington Spa to just five trains at any one time.  If Banbury North and Fenny Compton were switched out the effective Block Posts were Princes Risborough, Bicester Station (loop on single line),  Aynho Junction (no Block Switch provided), Astrop IBS, Banbury South (no Block Switch), Leamington Spa North (fringe to Saltley and Coventry). The Up direction was marginally better as the IBS at Fosse Road could still be used.

[Urthra]

Going back a bit to the question, what would have come of a beeching report in 47....

 

I think beeching would have looked at an industry that had maintained a credible performance level after 30 years of near-frozen pricing, extensive war damage, and at least five years with no capital expenditure budget.

He may well have concluded that "carry on as you were!" would bring great results, albeit needing higher pricing and a sensible amount of investment, based on the logic that since the railway did relatively well in adversity, it ought to prosper with a little help.

 

Or, he might have thought of the friends he had in the road interests, and concluded that there was no point wating a penny on the wreck of the railways.

[Peter Kazmierczak]

Going back a bit to the question, what would have come of a beeching report in 47....

 

I think beeching would have looked at an industry that had maintained a credible performance level after 30 years of near-frozen pricing, extensive war damage, and at least five years with no capital expenditure budget.

He may well have concluded that "carry on as you were!" would bring great results, albeit needing higher pricing and a sensible amount of investment, based on the logic that since the railway did relatively well in adversity, it ought to prosper with a little help.

 

Or, he might have thought of the friends he had in the road interests, and concluded that there was no point wating a penny on the wreck of the railways.

 

I didn't know that Beeching had any particular friends "in the road interests".

 

Of course a certain Transport Minister had a lot of financial interest in road construction..........

[Sheffield]

Beeching did what he was paid to do, and he did it quite well. If there was anything wrong with what he did it was because what he was asked to do was wrong.  There was no mention of social need or public service in his remit.

The railways have been badly served by politicians since Victorian times.

As regards Ernie Marples, there are plenty of stories about his honesty and straightforwardness. 

[TheSignalEngineer]

As regards Ernie Marples, there are plenty of stories about his honesty and straightforwardness.

You may think that but I couldn't possible comment. (Except that he was glad enough of the railway to do a runner using the Night Ferry, allegedly)

[RJD]

Did Dr. Beeching make the decision to sell off British Railways land rather than use long term leases?   

[petethemole]

I don't know that but it's not widely realised (?) that all railway land was subject to local rates and keeping it would have been a financial burden.

[The Stationmaster]

I don't know that but it's not widely realised (?) that all railway land was subject to local rates and keeping it would have been a financial burden.

 

Does that only apply to non-operational land?  If it applies to everything I'm surprised we've got any railways at all!

[petethemole]

I used the past tense as I don't know if that's still the case but It used to be. Rates were paid to each parish the railway passed through, presumably these were later transferred to districts or counties.