Derailment and fire in Quebec

[hmrspaul]

It would be interesting to know how many Class 2 railways are allowed one-man operation. I understand that CP and CN were refused permission for single-manning. I'm trying to imagine a long shift, driving at 15mph (or is it 25mph?) I've seen both speeds quoted as the maximum on the MMA. Hour after hour, on your own, crawling along like that, into the evening. Into the dark. Doing pretty much what you've always done, without thinking too much about it.....

In addition to asking about the wisdom of single-manning, particularly in those sort of circumstances I'd be asking about a number of practices which seem to be OK in Canada, but about which I have grave doubts.

1 Leaving a train 'parked up' on the main line for an extended period.

2 Security-wise, leaving a train parked in an unsecured area (Canadian lines have no fences etc and two people were arrested recently for allegedly plotting to attack cross-border railways)

3 Dramatic increases in traffic (28,000% in oil by rail in five years) without, apparently any upgrading of some of the routes taking this extra traffic.

4 The use of old, umpteenth-hand locomotives on heavy trains of hazardous material. (Any picture of an MMA train with 5 or 6 locos will have 4 or 5 different liveries and locos that are in excess of 30 years old)

5 The lack of provision of catch or trap points on loops, even those where there is an obvious danger of vehicles running away down hill.

6 From a PR perspective, the lack of an action plan in the event of an emergency. Who is authorised to say what to the press, to prevent mis-information, conjecture and the kind of reaction which Burkhardt seems to have received.

CHRIS LEIGH

Chris

 

They may be mentioned later, but also what of the physical work involved, after these long boring shifts, of having to climb up on to the end platforms of umpteen wagons to apply the brakes. I have the impresson that relatively elderly people can be employed in the States.

 

Paul

[dibber25]

Then what are you suggesting? MMAs track is either safe in terms of their use, or it is not.

 

Fundamentally unsafe or fundamentally safe is a different question to the qualified assertion 'safe in terms of their use'. I don't think I referred anywhere to whether the track was 'safe' or 'unsafe' or even 'fundamentally unsafe'. I think I referred in general terms to track which was in poor condition - perhaps I should have qualified that by adding 'in poor condition for the tonnage' of trains which it is carrying'. (age & weight of rails, type and condition of sleepers, depth and cleanliness of ballast etc). It is clearly poor by the standards of Class 1 main lines otherwise the overall speed limits would surely be higher. If you run light trains at low speeds it will be safe enough, if run heavier trains it is likely to be less safe and if you run very heavy trains it will be even less safe, as each one of those trains will be impacting on that safety margin and reducing it very gradually. 

I don't think I've suggested anywhere in my comments that the track condition might have caused the derailment. I've only referred to track condition in relation to the general lack of investment in equipping this railway to carry regular, very heavy trains, with a better margin of safety than it had.

 

 

[Glorious NSE]

Chris, I don't know how you can even assert 'in poor condition for the tonnage' of trains which it is carrying' - it is either good enough to support the trains at the speed they are allowed to run ('safe'), or it is not good enough to do that ('not safe') - I haven't seen anything yet to credibly suggest that their track was not good enough...

 

Looking at it, the Canadians use the same basis classification of tracks as the Americans do, so if the safety authorities had thought there were major issues there it could have been downgraded further!

[dibber25]

Don't really think I can be bothered to split hairs any further. It's a long time back now, but I think my original comments were actually related to the need to assess railways as to whether they required further investment to carry heavy new traffic flows efficiently and safely. To me, if you have to crawl hesitantly over track at negligible speed, that raises a question as to how fit that railway is to carry that traffic. However, the general view seems to be that everything on the MMAR was fine. So be it. 

[dave1905]

 

 

In addition to asking about the wisdom of single-manning, particularly in those sort of circumstances I'd be asking about a number of practices which seem to be OK in Canada, but about which I have grave doubts.

1 Leaving a train 'parked up' on the main line for an extended period.

2 Security-wise, leaving a train parked in an unsecured area (Canadian lines have no fences etc and two people were arrested recently for allegedly plotting to attack cross-border railways)

 

On a major railroad there are numerous trains probably 10-20 at any given time parked on line without crews.  Trains are parked because the customer can't take the train, maintenance is being done on the track, the train may have had a mechnical problem, the there may be a shortage of crews or locomotives, a yard may not have space to handle the train.  All sorts of reasons.  This doesn't include all the times a train is parked for shorter times with a crew on them (mostly to make train meets.)  But if you have 5 trains of chemicals stretched out over 1000 miles of railroad destined for export by ship and the ship fails its inspection, guess what, you now have 5 trains you have to park someplace  over a 1000 mile route for as long as it takes to get the ship cleaned or find a replacement ship.  Happens fairly frequently. Those trains end up in sidings out on line, at or close to crew change points normally.  When a big service interruption occurs (derailment on a major line, hurricanes, floods or blizzards) its possible to get 50-75, maybe even 100 trains having to be held in sidings without crews until the routes open up.  When something big happens or if there is a maintenance curfew, yes trains may end up holding on the main track.  On double main track territory, there are no sidings so when you hold trains, they are going to stack up on the main.

 

Virtually all of the NA rail network is "unsecured" in the sense that pretty much only intermodal ramps are surrounded by chain link fences with barbed wire and guards at the gates.  Every place else (includng some industries) are more or less "unsecured" unless you consider 3 strands of barbed wire on a right of way fence "secured". 

 

I wonder if the people wanting all this security and derails and such have tumbled to the fact that it would have to be on the main track as well as the siding.  Based on what I've read on this forum there was going to be a train parked on the main track in any case.  The location the train was tied down was a crew change point and there was a westbound train coming.  If the eastbound train parked in the siding instead of the main, and the engineer tied up for rest, then when the westbound train showed up it would have to park on the main (because the other train was in the siding) until the engineer was rested.  Any way you slice it, with a low volume operation, you risk not having a crew rested and a 50-50 shot at a train being parked on the main track.

[Ozexpatriate]

I think that the issue of rail safety should be a national one . There needs to be a debate at government level and legislation to ensure that when major new traffic flows are taken on, (by any transport mode) there is adequate risk assessment and investment in infrastructure to ensure that the routes be used can be operated safely.

Chris you made a number of interesting observations on the notion of North American attitudes to safety which do vary from those in Britain.

 

Here you raise another interesting point. Rail safety should be a national issue, but whose? Canada's or the United States' or both? I know you intended this to be about Canada, but the influence of Canada's southern cousins is almost overwhelming here. The operator in question spanned the border and it's holding company is headquartered in Illinois, and of course this accident happened in Quebec, adding yet another dimension.

 

Given the willful blind eye turned to many aspects of industrial safety versus profit in the US, this accident is not likely to change anything in the US which I suspect will make things more difficult in Canada to see any material progress here.

 

Interestingly the US NTSB maintains a wishlist - what they call their most wanted list of transportation safety legislation. For railways, the one thing they believe will have the greatest impact on railroad safety is Positive Train Control and it seems unlikely that would have addressed this accident. None of the NTSB's 'most wanted' is a hot topic in the festering political climate in DC.

[Gerald Henriksen]

  I wonder what the situation would be if MM&A were to bite the bullet and admit liability?  It would certainly save time and legal bills.

 

Not really.

 

MMA essentially only has 2 hopes, that the police investigation turns up something external (which would seem to be very unlikely), or that the TSB investigation finds some external factor(1) that either removes MMA, or mostly removes MMA, from the blame (which would also seem unlikely).

 

So given MMA is done for anyway, and for all intents and purposes doesn't have any worthwhile assets, there isn't going to be a lot of time and legal spent on MMA.

 

The time and money will be with the insurance companies, regulators, and trying to bring the higher up sources of assets like Rail World into the equation.

 

(1) - the oil tankers did not belong to MMA, so it is I would guess theoretically possible that if the tank cars weren't maintained properly, specifically their hand brakes, that might at least somewhat remove MMA.

[dibber25]

On a major railroad there are numerous trains probably 10-20 at any given time parked on line without crews.  Trains are parked because the customer can't take the train, maintenance is being done on the track, the train may have had a mechnical problem, the there may be a shortage of crews or locomotives, a yard may not have space to handle the train.  All sorts of reasons.  This doesn't include all the times a train is parked for shorter times with a crew on them (mostly to make train meets.)  But if you have 5 trains of chemicals stretched out over 1000 miles of railroad destined for export by ship and the ship fails its inspection, guess what, you now have 5 trains you have to park someplace  over a 1000 mile route for as long as it takes to get the ship cleaned or find a replacement ship.  Happens fairly frequently. Those trains end up in sidings out on line, at or close to crew change points normally.  When a big service interruption occurs (derailment on a major line, hurricanes, floods or blizzards) its possible to get 50-75, maybe even 100 trains having to be held in sidings without crews until the routes open up.  When something big happens or if there is a maintenance curfew, yes trains may end up holding on the main track.  On double main track territory, there are no sidings so when you hold trains, they are going to stack up on the main.

 

Virtually all of the NA rail network is "unsecured" in the sense that pretty much only intermodal ramps are surrounded by chain link fences with barbed wire and guards at the gates.  Every place else (includng some industries) are more or less "unsecured" unless you consider 3 strands of barbed wire on a right of way fence "secured". 

 

I wonder if the people wanting all this security and derails and such have tumbled to the fact that it would have to be on the main track as well as the siding.  Based on what I've read on this forum there was going to be a train parked on the main track in any case.  The location the train was tied down was a crew change point and there was a westbound train coming.  If the eastbound train parked in the siding instead of the main, and the engineer tied up for rest, then when the westbound train showed up it would have to park on the main (because the other train was in the siding) until the engineer was rested.  Any way you slice it, with a low volume operation, you risk not having a crew rested and a 50-50 shot at a train being parked on the main track.

As I understand it, Nantes was the regular spot where trains tied up for long periods during crew changes. If there were to be two trains there simultaneously on a frequent basis then, guess what, you need two sidings on which to park them. Safety costs. In this case 'unsafety' is going to cost a whole lot more. However, it's clear that different countries have very different standards and 'the people wanting all this security and derails' are setting an absurd standard to which North America can't aspire. Sad but fair dos - a runaway on a mainline doesn't happen very often and if you invoke the cost/benefit formula (even the one used in the UK) you probably won't potentially save enough lives to make the expense worthwhile. Nevertheless, just because it's not likely to be affordable, doesn't mean it's wrong to look at it. I'd have some sympathy for MMAR if they could show me that such safety features had been considered and dismissed on cost/benefit grounds. I wouldn't like it. I certainly wouldn't agree with it but at least I'd know that someone thought about the subject. 

[Ozexpatriate]

(1) - the oil tankers did not belong to MMA, so it is I would guess theoretically possible that if the tank cars weren't maintained properly, specifically their hand brakes, that might at least somewhat remove MMA.

I can see the net being cast to include the manufacturer of the tankers and whomever leases these cars.

 

Who 'owned' providing the whole service of the train from North Dakota to New Brunswick? MM&A operated only the section from Montreal. I assume someone else (CP?) operated the train from North Dakota to Montreal and that someone else "owned the service" (and may not actually own the cars).

Edited July 15, 2013 by Ozexpatriate

[Gerald Henriksen]

 

 

Ever since EB's statement I've been worried that the engineer is going to be the fall guy, with not even a union to stand up for him.

 

 

Surprisingly, the engineer does have a union.  Apparently the MMA workers are represented by the United Steelworkers Union.

[dibber25]

Chris you made a number of interesting observations on the notion of North American attitudes to safety which do vary from those in Britain.

 

Here you raise another interesting point. Rail safety should be a national issue, but whose? Canada's or the United States' or both? I know you intended this to be about Canada, but the influence of Canada's southern cousins is almost overwhelming here. The operator in question spanned the border and it's holding company is headquartered in Illinois, and of course this accident happened in Quebec, adding yet another dimension.

 

Given the willful blind eye turned to many aspects of industrial safety versus profit in the US, this accident is not likely to change anything in the US which I suspect will make things more difficult in Canada to see any material progress here.

 

Interestingly the US NTSB maintains a wishlist - what they call their most wanted list of transportation safety legislation. For railways, the one thing they believe will have the greatest impact on railroad safety is Positive Train Control and it seems unlikely that would have addressed this accident. None of the NTSB's 'most wanted' is a hot topic in the festering political climate in DC.

Yes, I guess I'd be getting off topic, and insulting if I suggested that life was more valued in some countries than others. But it's a peculiar paradox because although there appears to be less desire to protect people from an accident like this in North America than in the UK,, I can guarantee that the insurance claim pay-outs for a life in the US or Canada would be far, far higher than those in the UK. Yet I feel that the kind of safety considerations that the British would impose on an operation such as this would be seen in North America as a namby-pamby, softy approach to protecting people from things which are pretty unlikely to actually happen. I guess it's the difference between the 'belt and braces' approach now applied to everything in the UK and the 'fly it by the seat of your pants' outlook which still appeals to the majority in North America. For the benefit of those who lost loved ones or property in this tragedy, something different needs to come out of it, otherwise how will anyone live in Lac Megantic or any one of numerous rail-side towns knowing that they are relying, night after night, on one person never making a mistake?

[Gerald Henriksen]

 

I wonder if the people wanting all this security and derails and such have tumbled to the fact that it would have to be on the main track as well as the siding.  Based on what I've read on this forum there was going to be a train parked on the main track in any case.  The location the train was tied down was a crew change point and there was a westbound train coming.  If the eastbound train parked in the siding instead of the main, and the engineer tied up for rest, then when the westbound train showed up it would have to park on the main (because the other train was in the siding) until the engineer was rested.  Any way you slice it, with a low volume operation, you risk not having a crew rested and a 50-50 shot at a train being parked on the main track.

 

MMA had 2 long sidings (for all intents and purposes) at Lac-Megantic.  On the north (west) side of town there is one at Nantes, and then south (east) there is another one (this is the one the local reporter videoed a tank train left unattended on either the Saturday or Sunday).  If you look at satellite images it is up the hill after the rail line curves away from the lake.

 

But the other possible issue is (and it is difficult to be certain because the satellite imagery isn't clear enough) but it certainly appears one or both of these siding have at least in the past been used to store rail cars which would make the siding unavailable for a train if true.

[Gerald Henriksen]

Who 'owned' providing the whole service of the train from North Dakota to New Brunswick? MM&A operated only the section from Montreal. I assume someone else (CP?) operated the train from North Dakota to Montreal and that someone else "owned the service" (and may not actually own the cars).

 

I believe the train operated CP as you mentioned, then to MMA, and then to New Brunswick Southern to take it to the Irving Oil refinery.

 

Given the Iriving Oil has publicly stated it wasn't their oil at the time, then it was either still owned and was being shipped by the oil producer/something else in North Dakota.

 

The surviving tank cars are NATX registered, which a quick look now appears to be General Electric Railcar Services.

[Glorious NSE]

However, the general view seems to be that everything on the MMAR was fine. So be it. 

 

Chris - no, i'm not saying 'everything was fine' 

 

I am saying that there's nothing yet to prove that the way they ran their railroad was any different to any other North American railroad. Rolling stock, no different, loco maint schedules, no different, track design, no different, track maintainence specs, no different....

 

Except for the crewing, the MMA is fundamentally no different to any other railroad in North America, you keep asserting that they should never have had this traffic, and seemingly you have no facts to back that opinion up other than 'it just shouldn't'. 

 

I do agree, and i've said umpteen times in the thread if you can be bothered to read it that I think there's bigger questions to ask, but to ask those bigger questions you need to look beyond the MMA being what it is.

 

If you want me to say their operation was not up to normal North American standards then show me how that is the case?

 

 

 

For railways, the one thing they believe will have the greatest impact on railroad safety is Positive Train Control and it seems unlikely that would have addressed this accident. None of the NTSB's 'most wanted' is a hot topic in the festering political climate in DC.

 

But the US has mandated (i.e. - forced the railroads to implement) PTCs introduction, so that's hardly the US government doing nothing about it.

[Ozexpatriate]

But the US has mandated (i.e. - forced the railroads to implement) PTCs introduction, so that's hardly the US government doing nothing about it.

Nationwide?

The NTSB speaks only of California (with 10,000 miles of exemptions) and the Amtrak northeast corridor.

 

I wouldn't be surprised to learn that much of UP, BNSF, CSX and Norfolk Southern's major routes are already controlled this way (it makes a lot of operational sense).

Edited July 15, 2013 by Ozexpatriate

[Glorious NSE]

Nationwide?

 

All passenger lines, and any carrying (as per Daves post above) certain hazmat.

[dave1905]

Nationwide?

The NTSB speaks only of California (with 10,000 miles of exemptions) and the Amtrak northeast corridor.

 

I wouldn't be surprised to learn that much of UP, BNSF, CSX and Norfolk Southern's major routes are already controlled this way (it makes a lot of operational sense).

 

Nationwide route had to be identified.  Except for a few "proof of concept" areas, PTC is not in operation and has never been used in the US.  It will take years to implement the system at a cost of $10 billion dollars.

[dibber25]

Chris - no, i'm not saying 'everything was fine' 

 

I am saying that there's nothing yet to prove that the way they ran their railroad was any different to any other North American railroad. Rolling stock, no different, loco maint schedules, no different, track design, no different, track maintainence specs, no different....

 

Except for the crewing, the MMA is fundamentally no different to any other railroad in North America, you keep asserting that they should never have had this traffic, and seemingly you have no facts to back that opinion up other than 'it just shouldn't'. 

 

I do agree, and i've said umpteen times in the thread if you can be bothered to read it that I think there's bigger questions to ask, but to ask those bigger questions you need to look beyond the MMA being what it is.

 

If you want me to say their operation was not up to normal North American standards then show me how that is the case?

 

 

 

 

But the US has mandated (i.e. - forced the railroads to implement) PTCs introduction, so that's hardly the US government doing nothing about it.

No, I'm not saying they should never have had that traffic. What I'm saying is that, in my view, there should have been some investment in the railway to carry that traffic. It was a big increase in total tonnage and individual train weight on what appears to be a tired railway with low overall speeds presumably for some good reason  I would have expected that some of the money from what is (or certainly should be) a lucrative contract, is ploughed back into the infrastructure. What I see is a railway with a use-it-up-and-throw-it-away philosophy. Grab the traffic, run it as slow as you must in order that the trackbase and the track hangs together for as long as possible and shovel every penny of the income onto the bottom line. With any luck the railway will hang together until the traffic runs out, then you sell it and move on. I don't doubt that it complies with the required standards, the CP or CN main lines, it ain't, so the standards must differ and I guess that's why it's a class 2 railway. 

[highpeak]

 

I believe the train operated CP as you mentioned, then to MMA, and then to New Brunswick Southern to take it to the Irving Oil refinery.

MM&A hands over to Eastern Maine at Brownville Jct who take the train to Vanceboro, NBSR takes it to St. John.

 

A picky point really because both EMRY and NBSR are wned by JD Irving. EMRY has no rolling stock or motive power other than some MOW equipment, their only real assets are the track and right of way.

 

JD Irving are owned by relatives of the Irvings who own the oil refinery, but there is no corporate connection between the two Irving businesses.

[PhilH]

I'm not sure I see how anyone not directly involved with the US or its railroads , ie most of us who live in the UK, is qualified or entitled to pass judgement on what should or should not be happening over there. 

 

A horrible, tragic event of course, possibly as a direct result of the way they do things, but I don't think there are many of us over here who really understand the scope of either the operation or the problems involved in running trains over railroads with financial constraints in a land of such epic proportions.

 

Lessons have to be learnt, and, of course, hindsight is always 20/20, but it is difficult to see how things can be done in any other way.

 

Pipelines, new roads, upgrading railroad infrastructure? Anyone got any money?

[Ozexpatriate]

 Anyone got any money?

Oil companies have lots of money.

 

Fortune 500: - top 10 only

2 Exxon Mobil

3 Chevron

4 Phillips 66

9 Valero Energy

 

Most profitable of 2012 (Global) - top 20 only

01 Exxon Mobil

07 Royal Dutch Shell

08 Chevron

14 China National Petroleum

19 Petronas

Edited July 15, 2013 by Ozexpatriate

[dave1905]

I know I have been pushing back a lot, but that's because there are a whole bunch of wild ideas being thrown around with very little asking why or consideration of the what's really involved.

 

Why was the train on the main track?  To go into the siding with a one man crew the train would have had to stop short of the siding and the engineer get off and walk up to line the switch (and/or derail), leaving the train unmanned sitting on the main track with no handbrakes set.  By driving up the main track the engineer would be with his train until he had the handbrakes set.

 

In all likelihood, fencing in the siding would require physically moving the siding or main track (or both).  That is, shifting the track, rails, ties and ballast, over a few feet.  Why?  Putting a fence (esepcially one with barbed wire to repel intruders) between the main track and the siding would create a dangerous close clearance situation.  The tracks would have to be physically separated from the typical 13-15 feet to something closer to 18-20 feet on center.  Can it be done?  Sure, but I bet nobody even considered that as a barrier.

 

Other solution:  Assuming there was a way to get power to the west switch, install a power switch (and or  derail) that is radio controlled, so the engineer can line the switch as he approaches the siding and pull into the siding without getting off the train.

Barrier : (other than power) that solution could cost a couple hundred thousand dollars.  With all the concern about the quality of track and engines, how many ties or rails would the MMA not be able to buy to install that switch apparatus?   There are some other cheaper things they could have done (setting more handbrakes being one).   In hind sight its an easy decision.  I doubt that a shortline has a very sophisticated risk management staff (if they have one at all).  It is entirely possible they didn't have any.

 

Other questions that haven't been asked on this list : What was the MMA's testing program?  US railroads are required to evaluate the performance of the crews by observation of the crews performing their duites.  Woe be the class 1 operating manager who doesn't have his crew observation and testing program up to snuff.  What was the Canadian equivalent of the US FRA's audit/testing record?  Had the government audited the railroad hauling oil?  I'm sure the TSB will wade through all of this.

[Glorious NSE]

 I would have expected that some of the money from what is (or certainly should be) a lucrative contract, is ploughed back into the infrastructure. 

 

My own guess would be they will have been trying desperately to offset losses instead, but how exactly do you know they haven't used money from this contract to invest in their infrastructure? They have had the contract for only around 8 months!

 

 

 

 I don't doubt that it complies with the required standards, the CP or CN main lines, it ain't, so the standards must differ and I guess that's why it's a class 2 railway.

 

Sorry you do have that wrong. CN and CP are 'class 1' due to their income, MMA is a 'class 2' due to the level of it's income, it's got zero to do with the speed of their main line. 

 

Ref the track, yes clearly it doesn't have a high speed main line, but I believe you're wrong in stating that standards differ. North America gives a 'class' to it's track (with 'unclassified' as the lowest, followed by 1, and higher numbers then allowing higher speeds but with more maintenance needed) - but I would expect ALL class 1 railroads to have some track to the same classification as the MMA, and so the same speeds and maintenance required.

Edited July 15, 2013 by Glorious NSE

[Edwin_m]

"Haven't they effectively done so, by suggesting it's their own employee who was at fault."

 

My worry is that this is not so much admitting liability on behalf of the company, as an attempt to do the opposite by placing the blame entirely on the employee. If he can be shown to be negligent, despite (presumably) following what had become a normal procedure, could the company wriggle out of a liability suit?  Ever since EB's statement I've been worried that the engineer is going to be the fall guy, with not even a union to stand up for him.

Anyone who is intending to take legal action will want to be doing all they can to pin on the company rather than the employee, for the simple reason that the company (or more correctly its insurers) has more money. 

[highpeak]

While we discuss what we believe to be causes and contributing factors, the FRA is going to take a look at MM&A's "track, operations and equipment": http://bangordailynews.com/2013/07/15/news/penobscot/feds-to-inspect-montreal-maine-and-atlantic-rail-operations-in-wake-of-quebec-disaster/

 

To the points about what we know about whether under that weary paint lies a loco that runs like a Swiss watch, we don't know much beyond they had four fires at Nantes on locomotives that had fuel leaks over the past nine years, including the one the night of the accident (source: Nantes FD chief Patrick Lambert). We don't know which locomotives were involved beyond the crash locomotive, nor do we know if locomotives only caught fire in Nantes. I don't know if there are industry statistics for how many locomotives can be expected to catch fire in a nine year period, MM&A's record might be superior to the industry as a whole.

 

We know that  after the fire involving the locomotive the attending MM&A employee was a track worker. We do not know how far beyond track work that employee's knowledge extended or whether he was qualified to determine whether the shut down locomotive was safe and its train secured.

 

We also know that Derby shops did work for outside customers including Rail World's European ventures (source: Atlantic Northeast Rails and Ports, December 2008) and that management viewed this as a profit center. We do not know if there were ever times when the need to complete outside work for revenue interfered with MM&A's operational requirements and maintenance.

 

We know that MM&A has 75 employees (if a source on the trainorders site is accurate), 20 of whom are involved in operations. We do not know what procedures MM&A followed for in-service training or testing.

 

We know that MM&A's safety record did not compare well to the industry as a whole. MM&A had an average of 38.81 accidents or incidents per million track miles between 2003 and 2012, compared to a national average of 17.15. On the main line the rate was 5.83 compared to 1.21. The trend was improving between 2006 and 2012 but saw a recent negative trend this year. (Source: just about any news outlet you care to google for in Maine/Eastern Canada).

 

But there's a lot we don't know about the road so we should perhaps wait and see if the FRA (or the State of Maine's own review) tells us anything; the TSB report will take a while longer I would imagine.