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Derailment and fire in Quebec


pH

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Just because its explodes doesn't make it "explosive". Gasoline expolodes, ethanol will explode, LPG, butane, propane, ethylene oxide will explode, etc., etc.

 

Regardless of the volatility, its still a flammable liquid. If it was a unit train of gasoline it would have been more volatile and still have been placarded flammable.

 

Even if it was placarded an "explosive" it wouldn't have changed the rules or requirements governing the way the train was handled (it would change the paperwork, documentation and interchange requirements, at least in the US).

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Can't they mix something with it that reduces the likelihood of an explosion, and separate that stuff out of it when it reaches its destination?

Jet fuel now has an additive that suppresses any tendency to explode. Airliners burn such modified fuel with no adverse effects.

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Jet fuel now has an additive that suppresses any tendency to explode. Airliners burn such modified fuel with no adverse effects.

Yes, but we're talking about crude here, and I guess the additive might affect any refining process it has to go through.
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  • 1 month later...

Some updates on recent developments:

 

An interesting article on MM&A's safety record as regards securing trains at [/url]http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/mm-a-railway-had-repeated-brake-violations-on-the-books-1.2534131[/url]

 

Meanwhile the Portland Press Herald reported that lawsuits are starting to be filed by various parties involved: http://www.pressherald.com/news/Maine_rail_bankruptcy_likely_to_spawn_more_lawsuits.html

 

Cases against the various oil companies involved might be bolstered by some fines levied against oil companies for incorrectly representing the nature of their product http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/05/business/energy-environment/3-companies-fined-for-mislabeling-crude-oil-in-rail-transit.html?_r=0. This might be useful material for a lawyer but I think MM&A might have a hard time convincing anyone they would have done anything differently had they known more.

Some motive power has moved off the MM&A to other RailWorld properties and locomotives that were pretty much junk are being cut up at Derby (source: various posters on railroad.net).

 

Fortress Investment reportedly paid somewhere around $15 million for the road. In 2003 the transactions that led to the formation of the MM&A totalled $55 million, and in the 10 years following around $110 million was invested, including a $34 million FRA loan for track rehab. Taking into account money raised when some of the road was sold to Maine DOT or Irving, the loss in value over 10 years comes to around $71 million. (source: post on railroad.net by a pretty savvy individual)

 

Helluva way to run a railroad.

 

(railroad.net posts are in the MM&A sub-forum which is part of class II regionals)

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  • 2 months later...

Charges have been laid in this derailment & fire.

 

47 counts of criminal negligence causing death have been laid against 3 employees (the engineer, railway traffic controller, and manager of train operations) as well as against the railway itself.

 

http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/mm-a-railway-faces-charges-in-lac-m%C3%A9gantic-disaster-1.2640654

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The first newspaper I read this morning said that the railway had been arrested (headline).  In the article they twice mentioned the hydraulic brakes leaking off. (drip, drip, drip...)

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  • 1 month later...

Documents submitted by the Surete du Quebec (provincial police force) in support of an application for a search warrant for the MM&A's Farnham offices have been unsealed. They give more details of what happened before the train ran away: http://www.montrealgazette.com/news/a9gantic+employee+statements+police+unsealed/9936116/story.html

 

(Edit - spelling)

Edited by pH
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  • 4 weeks later...

The MMA's locos are up for auction

http://www.adamsauctions.com//live/docu ... 0Flyer.pdf

Init # Type
MMAL 21 GP7
MMAL 23 GP7
MMAL 79 GP9
MMAL 100 GP7
SLC 270 F40PH
SLC 293 F40PH
SLC 302 F40PH
CDAC 450 F40PHM-2
MMA 2000 B23-7
MMA 3000 C30-7M
MMA 3603 C30-7
MMA 3609 C30-7
MMA 3613 C30-7
MMA 3614 C30-7
MMA 5016 C30-7
MMA 5017 C30-7
MMA 5018 C30-7
MMA 5021 C30-7
MMA 5023 C30-7
MMA 5026 C30-7
MMA 5078 C30-7
MMA 8202 C39-8
MMA 8207 C39-8
MMA 8208 C39-8
MMA 8525 B39-8
MMA 8541 B39-8
MMA 8546 B39-8
MMA 8553 B39-8
MMA 8569 B39-8
MMA 8578 B39-8
MMA 8583 B39-8
MMA 8592 B39-8

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Seems something vaguely distasteful about the thought of anyone buying 5017. Presumably this is the liquidation of the whole MMA operation?

CHRIS LEIGH

I don't know that it's very different from the Tay Bridge disaster locomotive being fished up from the bed of the estuary and returned to service. I think it's always gone on.

 

Jim

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  • 3 weeks later...
  • 2 weeks later...

There's a considerable difference between TSB reports and those of HMRI so I guess I shouldn't judge but TSB reports always seem to be angled towards cure rather than prevention - I guess its now down to Transport Canada to regulate so that nothing similar can happen again. I see there was an earlier recommendation for compulsory risk assessments and I wonder if TC will require them and in what circumstances. Some comparatively inexpensive infrastructure, and changes in operating practices would have prevented this, but if all that happens is another round of ' if people had done their jobs correctly.....' is all that happens, then nothing will change because people can't be relied upon to always do their job correctly.

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The trend over quite a lot of years now has been to try and engineer out human error, the ultimate development of such a philosophy in a railway context would be an unmanned fully automated system as per some metro systems (perhaps retaining a driver/operator as a passenger assurance and final stop precaution). The issue with this is that it doesn't eliminate human error, it just moves it to the software development and system assurance phases, and if you encounter a scenario outside any considered by the software development program then software doesn't have a seat of the pants mode. Another issue with automation is it de-skills operators so that if it fails then you tend to find that operations can be degraded to a much greater extent than you might expect as the skills and experience (and almost certainly the manning levels!!) to take everything back in hand just aren't there anymore. This has been identified as an issue by airlines with pilot flying skills and it is something that was very obvious in power plants. In some operations there has been a move to reduce automation to try and balance the advantages of automation with maintaining a reversionary human operator capability if needed. Equally there has also been a lot of movement towards fully automated plants and systems. 

In terms of accident investigation and risk management, that is one area where the UK still leads the world IMO. We may have lost a lot of our manufacturing and we may now rely on imported trains, power plants etc but in terms of accident investigation and controlling risks we are still world class. I attend several international forums for maritime safety and whilst the safety performance of UK shipping could be improved when I look at the performance of other administrations (an I do not just mean emerging countries) it can be quite shocking. I was employed by a German electricity generating company and when I visited German plants I always felt a bit edgy at the way they were operated as they were way behind the British plants in safety culture, or at least that was the opinion I formed.

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The report contains a couple of items that I've not seen mentioned previously, that the siding (loop) at Nantes where the train was tied up on the main was equipped with a derail and that it had stored cars parked on it, so was not available for the train.

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I have only read the summary of the TSB Report and it says enough to give a fairly complete picture not only of the criminally (in my view) stupid and idiotic manner in which the train was inadequately secured but by highlighting the abysmal, cheapskate, mismanagement of the company's operations, its lack of any sort of safety culture and - no doubt - total inadequacies in staff training and supervision.  Alas it was an incident waiting to happy in such a badly run concern and it is regrettable that such laxity led to appalling, and totally unnecessary, loss of life and destruction of property.

 

It is a relatively simple matter - believe it or not - to manage a railway and its basic operating procedures safely and to establish a safety management system.  It does not lead to onerous on-costs because if the job is being done properly and safely in the first place all the SMS does is codify and allow proper monitoring of procedures and standards.  But it does rely on competent professional managerial standards and the establishment of a safety (aware) culture - and that is inevitably up to the company and its managers. If (relatively simple) external audit reveals they are failing in that respect then they should be barred from the industry, permanently.

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