GWML Electification

[RJS1977]

 

 

On the electrification scheme itself some of the bridgeworks have had to be considerably reorganised and tackled in a different way once there has been a chance for local authority etc representations, and that must have inevitably increased costs - a good example being the bridge at Wantage Road which the NR planners (or contractors) seemed to have thought was minor country road insted a of the only decently available northward link out of major industrialdevelopment etc site.

 

 

As far as I know, the only 'major industrial development' at Wantage Road is the Williams F1 factory - which is closed for several weeks during the summer under F1 rules.

 

However the road is also the only road north out of Wantage and Grove for the residents of both towns.

[Arun Sharma]

As far as I know, the only 'major industrial development' at Wantage Road is the Williams F1 factory - which is closed for several weeks during the summer under F1 rules.

 

However the road is also the only road north out of Wantage and Grove for the residents of both towns.

The problem was not the bridge by the Volunteer PH - It was that long-term simultaneous work was taking place on the main A34 bridge at Didcot and hence the two main [and only extant] routes routes south from Oxford [A34 and A338] would have been dramatically obstructed simultaneously. Not surprisingly the local councils said, "Not on yer nelly" or words to that effect. If I was being unkind, I would suggest that whoever thought up such a scheme had not spent more than two seconds seeking local knowledge or was unable to read an AA 3miles to the inch road map.

[Northroader]

Even if you apply Christian charity to a difficult situation, that bridge at Wantage Road (The Grove) is progressing at a terribly slow pace, it seems to me. hOw long have they been at it? How much longer to completion?

[The Stationmaster]

As far as I know, the only 'major industrial development' at Wantage Road is the Williams F1 factory - which is closed for several weeks during the summer under F1 rules.

 

However the road is also the only road north out of Wantage and Grove for the residents of both towns.

There are number of companies around/adjacent to the old airfield/AWRE site as well.

[The Stationmaster]

Even if you apply Christian charity to a difficult situation, that bridge at Wantage Road (The Grove) is progressing at a terribly slow pace, it seems to me. hOw long have they been at it? How much longer to completion?

They are currently showing a completion date of July 2016 - which I'm fairly sure is much later than the original plan

The problem was not the bridge by the Volunteer PH - It was that long-term simultaneous work was taking place on the main A34 bridge at Didcot and hence the two main [and only extant] routes routes south from Oxford [A34 and A338] would have been dramatically obstructed simultaneously. Not surprisingly the local councils said, "Not on yer nelly" or words to that effect. If I was being unkind, I would suggest that whoever thought up such a scheme had not spent more than two seconds seeking local knowledge or was unable to read an AA 3miles to the inch road map.

 

As I understand it the A34 bridge was built to electrification clearances and it is certainly not listed currently as requiring any work.  

 

The Steventon High St bridge (B4017) is currently shown as under review and 'looking again at the implications of an alternative to reconstruction particularly those relating to operation of the railway'  - which presumably translates as 'we are considering track lowering' (and thereby creating a pile of maintenance problems for the future as teh track was lifted to avoid sub-formation damage from high speed running).  Whatever that decision process involves it would seem to be getting rather tight for electric operation to at least Swindon by the time the first Class 8XX trains are supposed to arrive.

 

It does look as if NR have managed to tie itself into a number of knots in respect of bridgeworks.

Edited December 7, 2015 by The Stationmaster

[jamie92208]

They are currently showing a completion date of July 2016 - which I'm fairly sure is much later than the original plan

 

As I understand it the A34 bridge was built to electrification clearances and it is certainly not listed currently as requiring any work.  

 

The Steventon High St bridge (B4017) is currently shown as under review and 'looking again at the implications of an alternative to reconstruction particularly those relating to operation of the railway'  - which presumably translates as 'we are considering track lowering' (and thereby creating a pile of maintenance problems for the future as teh track was lifted to avoid sub-formation damage from high speed running).  Whatever that decision process involves it would seem to be getting rather tight for electric operation to at least Swindon by the time the first Class 8XX trains are supposed to arrive.

 

It does look as if NR have managed to tie itself into a number of knots in respect of bridgeworks.

I think that the A34 bridge that Mike is referring to is the one across the roundabout that give access to Didcot, not the railway bridge.  it was causing bad tailbacks in June when we went south that way.  They seemed to be strengthening the bridges over both sides of the roundabout.

 

Jamie

[D1059]

They are currently showing a completion date of July 2016 - which I'm fairly sure is much later than the original plan

 

As I understand it the A34 bridge was built to electrification clearances and it is certainly not listed currently as requiring any work.  

 

The Steventon High St bridge (B4017) is currently shown as under review and 'looking again at the implications of an alternative to reconstruction particularly those relating to operation of the railway'  - which presumably translates as 'we are considering track lowering' (and thereby creating a pile of maintenance problems for the future as teh track was lifted to avoid sub-formation damage from high speed running).  Whatever that decision process involves it would seem to be getting rather tight for electric operation to at least Swindon by the time the first Class 8XX trains are supposed to arrive.

 

It does look as if NR have managed to tie itself into a number of knots in respect of bridgeworks.

 

NR's first proposal was rebuilding the bridge at Steventon and wanted to close the road for (IIRC) 6 months. I know one of the local Parish Councillors and he told me that, privately, one NR guy told him 8 months minimum. Then after further objections (I presume from VOWHDC and Oxfordshire CC) they went back and looked at 'alternatives' (as Stationmaster says - in other words track lowering)

 

While the Milton Park interchange on the A34 is being rebuilt into a Hamburger style junction (and thats going to be another massive cock up as the A34 can't cope with whats on it now, let alone when there is a more efficient method of dumping cars onto it in place) I shudder to think of the consequences of an RTA closing the A34 (a not uncommon occurrence) if the route through Steventon is closed

[The Stationmaster]

NR's first proposal was rebuilding the bridge at Steventon and wanted to close the road for (IIRC) 6 months. I know one of the local Parish Councillors and he told me that, privately, one NR guy told him 8 months minimum. Then after further objections (I presume from VOWHDC and Oxfordshire CC) they went back and looked at 'alternatives' (as Stationmaster says - in other words track lowering)

 

While the Milton Park interchange on the A34 is being rebuilt into a Hamburger style junction (and thats going to be another massive cock up as the A34 can't cope with whats on it now, let alone when there is a more efficient method of dumping cars onto it in place) I shudder to think of the consequences of an RTA closing the A34 (a not uncommon occurrence) if the route through Steventon is closed

Agree absolutely re your latter comment (and thanks for the first one - even worse than I thought).  At present the B4017 no doubt is usable as a sort of alternative to the A34 (well it did used to be the A34 of course) but traffic volumes on the A34 have no doubt increased immensely since the Rowstock/Steventon/ Abingdon bypasses were built.   Overall the 'strategy' for bridge rebuilding east of Shrivenham seems to have been a shambles right from the beginning with major complaints regarding the situation at Challow and huge diversions in order to get round that one - unless you happened to know the back lanes.

 

It really does leave you wondering how NR came up with its original proposals and whether the engineers actually looked at any road usage.

[Arun Sharma]

The Steventon High Street bridge is a spectacularly ugly concrete thing but I understand that it is also a listed structure. That may well have had an influence on whether track lowering or bridge alteration was seen as the way ahead.

[Jonboy]

Why bother spending on studying the traffic when you can just announce what you intend to do, and then analyse the howls of complaint to see if there are any genuine concerns built on local knowledge?

[Mike Riley]

The Steventon High Street bridge is a spectacularly ugly concrete thing but I understand that it is also a listed structure. That may well have had an influence on whether track lowering or bridge alteration was seen as the way ahead.

It is a brick arch bridge, not concrete.

 

http://www.geograph.org.uk/photo/1537442

 

Though hard to see why it is listed grade II.

[jjb1970]

I'm going to go down the route of presumption here but the theory that the GWML electrification was rushed and not properly assessed and costed prior to commencement is the most plausible reason for the predicament of the project. That would reflect badly upon DfT and ORR but in some ways it'd reflect more badly on the top tier of NR management. At more junior levels engineers and other people involved can send messages back up the chain that what they're being asked to deliver is not achievable or realistic however if the response amounts to "we've listened and taken note of your concern, now just get on with it" (and I suspect most people involved with large projects have experienced that at some point in their career) that'd excuse some of the failings made by those on the ground. What is a lot less easy to excuse is why the top tier of NR as those people are pretty much there exactly because they're supposed to have the cajones to make hard decisions and kick back against silly instructions. Unlike people lower down the food chain the likes of Mark Carne and his compatriots and predecessors don't have to worry unduly about employment as at that level there is basically a revolving door culture. However, as I say, this is just speculation.

[Mike Storey]

I'm going to go down the route of presumption here but the theory that the GWML electrification was rushed and not properly assessed and costed prior to commencement is the most plausible reason for the predicament of the project. That would reflect badly upon DfT and ORR but in some ways it'd reflect more badly on the top tier of NR management. At more junior levels engineers and other people involved can send messages back up the chain that what they're being asked to deliver is not achievable or realistic however if the response amounts to "we've listened and taken note of your concern, now just get on with it" (and I suspect most people involved with large projects have experienced that at some point in their career) that'd excuse some of the failings made by those on the ground. What is a lot less easy to excuse is why the top tier of NR as those people are pretty much there exactly because they're supposed to have the cajones to make hard decisions and kick back against silly instructions. Unlike people lower down the food chain the likes of Mark Carne and his compatriots and predecessors don't have to worry unduly about employment as at that level there is basically a revolving door culture. However, as I say, this is just speculation.

 

I see where you are coming from but I doubt it was that simple. The "top tier" would have relied on the skill, knowledge and experience of the sponsors and project directors producing the individual elements of the scheme. No one person would have had the level of knowledge necessary to understand whether the technical scope, the current asset conditions, the methodologies proposed, the phasings, the possessions strategies, the local environmental and political considerations,  the availability of contractors' (including designers) skills and resources, the technical capabilities, ongoing changes in group and line standards (often driven by third parties) and a hundred other things and consequently the high level risk registers, timescales or the costings, were adequate and realistic. Somewhere in there lies the answer. My guess is that there was insufficient time to carry out the levels of peer review, technical review and deep risk analysis between different options (GRIP3) that would normally lead to a more rigorous outcome, especially if re-optioneering and outline design (GRIP 3 & 4) was still taking place whilst detailed design and implementation (GRIP 5 & 6!) was already in progress, which is implied by some of the anecdotal evidence supplied by Mike (SM) and others above. This often happens across different phases or geographical locations on a big project, but not in the same one!

 

Alarm bells should have been ringing loud from lessons learned on completion (?) of the WCML upgrade a decade earlier, but most of that was placed at the door of over-optimistic reliance on a new form of signalling leading to massive re-design, but that was not the whole story by any means, and the original deal by the RT commercial director (an experienced engineer) who had "read a book about it once". (Very nice and clever chap otherwise). Still, I am only speculating too, so we will have to wait until someone tells us, if they ever do.

[Titan]

It is a brick arch bridge, not concrete.

 

http://www.geograph.org.uk/photo/1537442

 

Though hard to see why it is listed grade II.

 

Anything that is substantially as Brunel designed it is listed. Many of the brick overbridges date from the original line and are therefore listed, including ones widened to four tracks later on by adding an arch or two, even if they don't really have any other significance. This is not very helpful if clearance is tight. I would have thought it would be an idea to perhaps list a few of the better examples, but almost all of them?

 

On an arch bridge it often looks like there will be clearance for OLE, the shape means that there is usually enough room to get the wires through as well as having enough space for supports if required. In these cases the critical bit is in fact how close the edge of the pantograph gets to the brickwork, which will almost certainly be the main problem for the example shown. This means that instead of track lowering, if there is space available a track slew may well get the required clearance, something more likely on the GWML than elsewhere!

Edited December 7, 2015 by Titan

[Arun Sharma]

Mike - Of course you're correct - it is brick. Senior moment. Given that Brunel had a house very close to Steventon, may be part of the reason why that bridge was one of those listed.

[47164]

I guess pigs might fly , but once cross rail is up and running and gwr electrification is in place there is no reason not to run a Norwich Bristol service .

[The Stationmaster]

I see where you are coming from but I doubt it was that simple. The "top tier" would have relied on the skill, knowledge and experience of the sponsors and project directors producing the individual elements of the scheme. No one person would have had the level of knowledge necessary to understand whether the technical scope, the current asset conditions, the methodologies proposed, the phasings, the possessions strategies, the local environmental and political considerations,  the availability of contractors' (including designers) skills and resources, the technical capabilities, ongoing changes in group and line standards (often driven by third parties) and a hundred other things and consequently the high level risk registers, timescales or the costings, were adequate and realistic. Somewhere in there lies the answer. My guess is that there was insufficient time to carry out the levels of peer review, technical review and deep risk analysis between different options (GRIP3) that would normally lead to a more rigorous outcome, especially if re-optioneering and outline design (GRIP 3 & 4) was still taking place whilst detailed design and implementation (GRIP 5 & 6!) was already in progress, which is implied by some of the anecdotal evidence supplied by Mike (SM) and others above. This often happens across different phases or geographical locations on a big project, but not in the same one!

 

Alarm bells should have been ringing loud from lessons learned on completion (?) of the WCML upgrade a decade earlier, but most of that was placed at the door of over-optimistic reliance on a new form of signalling leading to massive re-design, but that was not the whole story by any means, and the original deal by the RT commercial director (an experienced engineer) who had "read a book about it once". (Very nice and clever chap otherwise). Still, I am only speculating too, so we will have to wait until someone tells us, if they ever do.

I think you're right Mike but then so, I strongly suspect, is JJB.

 

If we look at the BR system for authorities that require + 40% estimates for authority to develop and they were usually prepared using a range of 'standard prices' plus outline plans and an assessment of the work likely to be involved.  Each part of a large scheme would be prepared by the relevant dept and then probably be brought together in a summary paper plus subsidiary papers for the main elements.  each dept would be represented at the meeting which authorised development to commence and various people would sit there carefully questioning what was involved, even in a large scheme, and if they weren't satisfied the request for authority had to be re-submitted.  Now to pass judgement and give agreement at that stage - it was chaired by the Deputy GM on the WR - it meant the papers were being assessed by people who had the experience to understand them although (having put up papers for schemes) I know that some of them didn't always receive detailed attention at the meeting - but that would hardly have been the case with something like this.

 

If authority was given to develop the scheme the next stage was to go into greater detail to ensure that everything was taken into account and this included producing drawings to enable + 20% estimates to be produced and if that stage was authorised the final drawings and specs were produced and +10% estimates were developed which became the budgetted cost for the scheme.  The Project Manager then appointed was responsible for controlling the costs and if any variation began to emerge it was reported to senior management through the regular project review meetings etc.  Region could agree a small degree of variation but any significant variation went to the BRB for authorisation (or not) depending on the financial limits each level could authorise.

 

One reason for this system was because of the way costs had runaway, largely uncontrolled and poorly monitored, during the Modernisation Plan years.  And while it was obviously there to control the purse strings what it also meant was that senior management was aware of where a project was going in both budgetary and progress terms and could take action as necessary to try to get things back in line.  It seems - looking in from the outside - that this sort of control has been absent on the GWML scheme and that any emerging cost variations (inevitably upwards it appears) have just been added on as things went along.  That failing is 100% down to NR senior managers either for keeping it under wraps, or inaction, or failing to report things to the ORR or DfT where that became necessary.  Thsoe two organisations might also bear responsibility but that seems to me to depend entirely on any budgetary involvement/approval they had.

 

First of all it has been evident - simply by looking over the boundary fence - that this scheme has been slipping for a very long time and seemingly with not much visibly done until comparatively recently to address that slippage; somebody in senior management either just didn't understand or they couldn't be bothered to set things back towards the right course.  (and if either of those things they shouldn't have been in a senior job on a Zone/Route where this scheme is underway - ignorance is, in my view, no excuse).  Hence it does inescapably (in my opinion) come back to senior management in various ways.

[Mike Storey]

I think you're right Mike but then so, I strongly suspect, is JJB.

 

If we look at the BR system for authorities that require + 40% estimates for authority to develop and they were usually prepared using a range of 'standard prices' plus outline plans and an assessment of the work likely to be involved.  Each part of a large scheme would be prepared by the relevant dept and then probably be brought together in a summary paper plus subsidiary papers for the main elements.  each dept would be represented at the meeting which authorised development to commence and various people would sit there carefully questioning what was involved, even in a large scheme, and if they weren't satisfied the request for authority had to be re-submitted.  Now to pass judgement and give agreement at that stage - it was chaired by the Deputy GM on the WR - it meant the papers were being assessed by people who had the experience to understand them although (having put up papers for schemes) I know that some of them didn't always receive detailed attention at the meeting - but that would hardly have been the case with something like this.

 

If authority was given to develop the scheme the next stage was to go into greater detail to ensure that everything was taken into account and this included producing drawings to enable + 20% estimates to be produced and if that stage was authorised the final drawings and specs were produced and +10% estimates were developed which became the budgetted cost for the scheme.  The Project Manager then appointed was responsible for controlling the costs and if any variation began to emerge it was reported to senior management through the regular project review meetings etc.  Region could agree a small degree of variation but any significant variation went to the BRB for authorisation (or not) depending on the financial limits each level could authorise.

 

One reason for this system was because of the way costs had runaway, largely uncontrolled and poorly monitored, during the Modernisation Plan years.  And while it was obviously there to control the purse strings what it also meant was that senior management was aware of where a project was going in both budgetary and progress terms and could take action as necessary to try to get things back in line.  It seems - looking in from the outside - that this sort of control has been absent on the GWML scheme and that any emerging cost variations (inevitably upwards it appears) have just been added on as things went along.  That failing is 100% down to NR senior managers either for keeping it under wraps, or inaction, or failing to report things to the ORR or DfT where that became necessary.  Thsoe two organisations might also bear responsibility but that seems to me to depend entirely on any budgetary involvement/approval they had.

 

First of all it has been evident - simply by looking over the boundary fence - that this scheme has been slipping for a very long time and seemingly with not much visibly done until comparatively recently to address that slippage; somebody in senior management either just didn't understand or they couldn't be bothered to set things back towards the right course.  (and if either of those things they shouldn't have been in a senior job on a Zone/Route where this scheme is underway - ignorance is, in my view, no excuse).  Hence it does inescapably (in my opinion) come back to senior management in various ways.

 

What you are broadly outlining is the StageGate process (in that each "gate" is opened or closed to the next stage, dependent on whether a number of criteria have been met. In theory, if the Gate stays shut, the project stops. The GRIP process is based primarily on this system but with a lot more sophistication than in BR days. GRIP describes the criteria which must be met at the end of each stage and it is the Sponsor's responsibility to sign that off before presentation to the authorising body. This is the robust process that BR latterly started to develop (there were previously five or more different methodologies being used prior) just before RT took over, who then made it manadatory, and NR have continued with a number of improvements, one of which includes upping the contingency levels used by BR, and splitting them into Project Manager's contingency (for reasonably low levels of additional or changed spend, for which the PM or the sponsor has a pre-determined authority), and Project Contingency, for which there is an amount set aside within the overall budget, but which the Sponsor cannot touch without seeking further authority from the authorising Board. Additional costs can arise from any number of things including extra time needed. Usage of these is therefore still "within budget".

 

When specifically funded by government, a further contingency pot is held, arising latterly from Optimism Bias calculation, for which DfT and sometimes Treasury authority is needed. Depending on what figure has been issued publicly, the project might still be said to be "within budget". Once all this is used up, the game is afoot, and that is where GWML is now..

 

So, the methodology is there, and much improved on what we used in BR. That is clearly not the key issue. Apart from the question of whether original scope was adequate, or was inadequate when reaching detailed technical definition, the other key problem is the StageGate system itself. Once problems emerge, especially those arising from unknown unknowns, the project team will apply for the use of contingency to keep the project going whilst they sort it out. They will not necessarily know at this stage whether the problem (or set of problems) are finite or ongoing. In other words, will they grow or will they go away. For example, the new factory train had a bad start, some of which was expected, but which didn't get much better several weeks in. Initially this would have been dismissed as teething troubles and with staff familiarity taking longer than expected, There will have been some contingency built in for this so doubtless nobody worried too much, as it would speed up. But then it didn't, and no doubt more contingency would have been spent re-arranging other activities to work around this. Suddenly, this plus other problems will have used up all the PM;s and Sponsor's contingency and the Risk Report would be glowing red but the narrative would be describing how it would be made better later. So, Project Contingency would start to be authorised on the basis of this or that explanation and that the project had to be kept going. But then other reasons start to become clear for the failure of the new kit to perform, and it becomes unrealistic to assume they can catch up, as instead of assuming they can contain the risk, it is clear the risk is getting bigger and continuing. Multiply that by another dozen or so problems that appear to be affecting the Critical Path, which will all affect the original contract prices (be they fixed or shared target variety) by the issue of Project Variations, which is what the poor starving contractors actually make their profit from, and the balloon truly goes up by cumulative effect. We are now publicly "over budget" and "delayed". This is the basis, in project management terms, of Roger Ford's Boiling Frogs.

 

Note that delayed and over-budget are running in parallel on GWML, which is the most common combination when things go wrong. But this also suggests (and only "suggests") that the original costings were not that wrong, as they would have been based on a particular timescale relying on a particular set of methodologies. This is not to say the price of some individual items has not risen well beyond those estimates (it would be very unusual in any project for that not to be the case for some), and it is also still very possible that some scope was inadequately defined from the beginning, and changing that beyond a certain stage, as others have already said, is hugely expensive.

 

So my point, from the limited amount we have learned as opposed to assume so far, is that the issues leading to this state appear far more complicated than any one reason. Sure "senior management" must carry the can, but which one and at what point? The Boiling Frogs syndrome was already well known and the cure was inserted as Peer Review (an independent mini-audit) at each Stage Gate. This may have been cut or done after authority, due to time (or even qualified resources) limits, and that is possibly what happened here. The "Pause" on MML and Trans-Pennine will at least have allowed whatever those lessons are. to have some chance of being avoided for them.

[Zomboid]

I guess pigs might fly , but once cross rail is up and running and gwr electrification is in place there is no reason not to run a Norwich Bristol service .

Except the things which are preventing such a service being run today with diesel traction - pathing, rolling stock availability and demand...

[Titan]

Not only that, who is going to want to travel all the way from Norwich to Bristol on a slow suburban service with many stops?

 

And if it is an Intercity train then you would be talking new build specially to comply with crossrail requirements = £££££ for the benefit of just a few passengers?

[lmsforever]

Looking at the way the wires are going up in Scotland perhaps the team who are in charge should advise the GW team in Scotland the job is being done in a proper manner with problems overcome and of course its a rolling programme this is the difference to England.This shows how a broken up country works against itself as England seems to be always  on the receiving end of bad treatment with regard to projects funding etc not good at all.

[Fat Controller]

Not only that, who is going to want to travel all the way from Norwich to Bristol on a slow suburban service with many stops?

 

And if it is an Intercity train then you would be talking new build specially to comply with crossrail requirements = £££££ for the benefit of just a few passengers?

The Cross-Rail fleet will have been ordered to provide just enough vehicles for the planned services, and these will have been specified to a particular level of interior 'comfort' for the relatively short journeys involved. Not likely that these would be used for a long-distance journey. Other stock won't come up to the safety standards for operation through the tunnels involved, and won't have Automatic Train Operation fitted, so the idea of a Class 90 or 91 with Mk3 or 4 stock isn't on either.

The best option would be, if possible, a change at Stratford, then Crossrail, followed by a second change at Old Oak Common or Reading.

[Glorious NSE]

Even if somebody wanted to add new stock to do that, I suspect you couldn't design suitable "intercity spec" stock which could handle the short (sub 30sec?) dwell times that you'd need to keep Crossrail moving...

This does provide the option for a "tube free" transit of London which should make such a journey easier though as Brian suggests...

[Peter Kazmierczak]

Will this mean that Inter-City services will call more frequently at places like Stratford and the new Old Oak Common station? 

[Glorious NSE]

Some Norwich trains (every other one?) call at Stratford already.

I think the concept of Old Oak is to be a hub for all trains, it'll be a major interchange between the GWML, Crossrail, HS2, Heathrow Express, NLL and possibly more...