Derailment of traditional grease lubricated wagons due to resignalling?

[cary hill]

In the August RM GWR supplement:

 

"The WR was also in a rush to eliminate steam, and in it's haste many mistakes were made: resignalling left long stretches of track vulnerable to derailment by traditional wagons with grease lubrication"

 

Has this been covered before? I have not been able to devise a suitable search on this site.

 

Can someone explain the significance of the above,as it is a personal area of general ignorance for me.

 

Thanks for any simple explanations which may be offered.

 

David

[buffalo]

Given that the GWR had been replacing grease axleboxes with oil ones since the 1890s, that does sound a little strange.

 

Nick

[ChrisH]

Given that the GWR had been replacing grease axleboxes with oil ones since the 1890s, that does sound a little strange.

 

Nick

 

That was my thinking as well. There were not many grease boxes around when WR dumped steam.

 

I'm guessing that the problem highlighted is the distance trains have to run without being observed by a signalman. One of the problems with grease boxes, and a lesser extend their oil replacements, was the habit of running hot. If this was not spotted and action taken, you could loose the entire journal end of the axle leading to a derailment.

 

Chris

[The Stationmaster]

In the August RM GWR supplement:

"The WR was also in a rush to eliminate steam, and in it's haste many mistakes were made: resignalling left long stretches of track vulnerable to derailment by traditional wagons with grease lubrication"

 

Sounds like someone has got hold of the wrong end of several different sticks! One effect of dieselisation was that actual freight train running speeds tended not only to increase but also to more frequently exceed laid down limits. This took place at a time of an ever increasing number of plain line derailments so much so that a special team was established at Derby Research Centre to investigate the phenomenon (not my word - it was much bandied about at the time ) and they seemed to ignore the speed increase issue and began to look at all sorts of things like worn tyre profiles and whatever - and that led to all sorts of new research and new, long wheelbase, 4 wheel chassis designs.

 

The Western had spate of such derailments between Didcot & Swindon (mainly) where resignalling/rationalisation was also gradually removing loops - hence freights were on the run where they might have been looped (well that's the main way I can connect the two!). Plus of course once you were off the road if the layout had been rationalised at the time of/prior to resignalling you might potentially have lost an easy way round the heap of derailed wagons (although I doubt it).

[Edwin_m]

I'd also take issue with the implication in the original quote that resignalling was necessary to get rid of steam.

[Poor Old Bruce]

Sounds like someone has got hold of the wrong end of several different sticks! One effect of dieselisation was that actual freight train running speeds tended not only to increase but also to more frequently exceed laid down limits. This took place at a time of an ever increasing number of plain line derailments so much so that a special team was established at Derby Research Centre to investigate the phenomenon (not my word - it was much bandied about at the time ) and they seemed to ignore the speed increase issue and began to look at all sorts of things like worn tyre profiles and whatever - and that led to all sorts of new research and new, long wheelbase, 4 wheel chassis designs.

 

The Western had spate of such derailments between Didcot & Swindon (mainly) where resignalling/rationalisation was also gradually removing loops - hence freights were on the run where they might have been looped (well that's the main way I can connect the two!). Plus of course once you were off the road if the layout had been rationalised at the time of/prior to resignalling you might potentially have lost an easy way round the heap of derailed wagons (although I doubt it).

 

Quite true SM, The Derailment Investigation Team (except it wasn't really a designated team in those days so perhaps 'Service' would be a better word) was established in the mid 1960s. Also true is that a lot of time was spent looking into wheel tread wear patterns. One feature Derby Research may or may not have appreciated was the mechanisation of track maintenance. One track engineer I spoke to reckoned that, although the 'average' condition of track had improved, the condition of the 'best' (i.e. previously hand packed) main line track had deteriorated. Add to this the fact that the track gauge was changed from 1435mm to 1432mm with CWR so that the 'effective conicity' at the wheel-to-rail interface was increased. You thus have the overall effect that more and more wagons were travelling faster on (albeit slightly) poorer track where their wheel profiles were incompatible with the track gauge, thus travelling above their 'critical' speed where they could cope with even minor track irregularities. I do appreciate that many derailments also occurred on good old-fashioned jointed track and a lot of work was carried out into vehicle-and-track interaction by installing defined irregularities into existing track and running at different speeds to assess vehicle behaviour.

 

None of this is relevant to the OP though as grease axleboxes were a thing of the past by the 1960s even though hot boxes and journal failures still occurred with oil axleboxes as indeed they still do today even with roller bearings.

[Eggesford box]

Hi,

perhaps they where just getting a little confused in the article and lumping grease and oil boxes together as opposed to roller bearings. As per previous posts I suspect it was a case of a number of circumstances coming together; wagons being hauled longer distances at higher speeds, changes in track and an increase in power signalling schemes. As far as the latter is concerned, I have sent stop and examine for a hotbox when working a manual box and had the train stopped before a derailment occured. In a power signalling scheme no one would have seen the hotbox at that location and the situation may have got worse to the state that the wagon derailed. At the next box to me at that time one of the signalman had a train stopped for a hotbox even though it was on the opposite side to the signal box as he saw the glow reflected in the window of a building opposite the signal box! It would be interesting to know how often trains where stopped before a derailment occured in the sixties in manually signalled areas, particularly on main lines. Nowadays, hot box detectors are located trackside and give a warning in the controlling signalbox. For obvious reasons though you ignore them for steam hauled trains!

[The Stationmaster]

I'm guessing that the problem highlighted is the distance trains have to run without being observed by a signalman. One of the problems with grease boxes, and a lesser extend their oil replacements, was the habit of running hot. If this was not spotted and action taken, you could loose the entire journal end of the axle leading to a derailment.

Chris

Usually the journal end was the last thing to go - the pad went first (burnt away), then without lubrication the white metal bearings melted and from there disintegration spread to the rest of the axlebox and the springs also collapsed. The worst one I ever saw was a Grampus (or similar) on the 19.05 Meldon ballast one night where it ended up with the journal running on the bottom edge of the side frame and just about everything else gone never to be seen again.

[cary hill]

Thanks for the replies so far. Once again I have been "educated" by RMWeb members.

[DY444]

The other issue on the WR was that the resignalling schemes at Swindon and Reading saw long stretches of automatic signalling, one of which was between Didcot and Swindon. After one of the derailments on this stretch (at Steventon I think off the top of my head) where the train ran derailed for some distance, Reading panel knew that something bad had happened from the fact that track circuits were not clearing behind the train. However they could not stop the train or block the other road because they had no restore switches on any of the auto signals. All they could do was sit and watch until the inevitable happened. I believe as a result of this incident the signalling was changed such that as a minimum every 4th or 5th signal in an otherwise unbroken chain of automatics had to be capable of being restored to danger from the panel. I also have an idea it was one of the incidents which lead to the introduction of TC clips.

[96701]

For obvious reasons though you ignore them for steam hauled trains!

 

And Voyagers with inside frame bogies?

[Eggesford box]

And Voyagers with inside frame bogies?

No, but there have been issues with the detector at Cropredy with , something to do with reflected sunlight at a certain angle, not much of a problem this summer! There also used to be an instruction to ignore the detector with 'Heritage' units (they did list the type numbers which I have forgotten). The instruction was withdrawn with the withdrawal of the units.

[62613]

The other issue on the WR was that the resignalling schemes at Swindon and Reading saw long stretches of automatic signalling, one of which was between Didcot and Swindon. After one of the derailments on this stretch (at Steventon I think off the top of my head) where the train ran derailed for some distance, Reading panel knew that something bad had happened from the fact that track circuits were not clearing behind the train. However they could not stop the train or block the other road because they had no restore switches on any of the auto signals. All they could do was sit and watch until the inevitable happened. I believe as a result of this incident the signalling was changed such that as a minimum every 4th or 5th signal in an otherwise unbroken chain of automatics had to be capable of being restored to danger from the panel. I also have an idea it was one of the incidents which lead to the introduction of TC clips.

 

Is this the one mentioned by Adrian Vaughan in one of his books?

[Edwin_m]

Voyagers and Meridians have an on-board detection system for hot boxes. It was triggered during the bearing failure that led to the East Langton derailment.

 

The original Low Track Force bogie wagons had a fusible plug which vents the train pipe if the bearings get too hot. I presume the later ones have something similar.

[Poor Old Bruce]

Usually the journal end was the last thing to go - the pad went first (burnt away), then without lubrication the white metal bearings melted and from there disintegration spread to the rest of the axlebox and the springs also collapsed. The worst one I ever saw was a Grampus (or similar) on the 19.05 Meldon ballast one night where it ended up with the journal running on the bottom edge of the side frame and just about everything else gone never to be seen again.

 

I can't say that I saw many plain bearing failures but what roller bearing failures I have seen had lost the journal end of the axle leaving the rest of the suspension intact. While I obviously wasn't there at your Grampus (or similar) incident, if the journal end was intact after the incident, dare I suggest that it could have been the result of a spring failure rather than the bearing?

[D1059]

Is this the one mentioned by Adrian Vaughan in one of his books?

 

I don't think so. That incident I think happened between Reading and Didcot. IIRC the driver of an up train saw that the rearmost vehicle of a parcels working on the down main or relief was derailed and swinging around. He stopped at the next signal and informed the signal box what had happened, but they could do nothing until the train reached Moreton Cutting as that was the first location they could control the signal aspects manually. Thankfully, the parcels didn't cross with another train on an adjacent track or gawd knows what the damage would have been. AV said in the book that the signalman on the route around that period pretty much rewrote the rulebook as required, such was the strain of the new systems on older working practises

 

STEVE

[cheesysmith]

When they say resignaling, are you sure they arn`t getting confused with the use of CWR. This was stated as one of the main reasons of allowing hunting to build up allowing derailments to happen. The RTC at derby developed suspensions that the critical hunting speed would happen well above any speed the suspension would ever encounter (the 2 axle long wheelbase setup, as used in pacers, was tested on the main line at 100mph, and on the rollers at derby at 125mph).

[Fat Controller]

When they say resignaling, are you sure they arn`t getting confused with the use of CWR. This was stated as one of the main reasons of allowing hunting to build up allowing derailments to happen. The RTC at derby developed suspensions that the critical hunting speed would happen well above any speed the suspension would ever encounter (the 2 axle long wheelbase setup, as used in pacers, was tested on the main line at 100mph, and on the rollers at derby at 125mph).

The issue isn't what caused the derailments; rather the fact that the automatic signals couldn't be replaced (closed) in front of the train with the derailed wagons in order to stop it and minimise the damage. A colleague told me of a similar incident on the Berks and Hants, where a derailed stone wagon ran for about 5 miles before the train was stopped- the majority of the sleepers it had run over had to be replaced.

[The Stationmaster]

I can't say that I saw many plain bearing failures but what roller bearing failures I have seen had lost the journal end of the axle leaving the rest of the suspension intact. While I obviously wasn't there at your Grampus (or similar) incident, if the journal end was intact after the incident, dare I suggest that it could have been the result of a spring failure rather than the bearing?

 

When it went past the 'box that sent 7 bells (Stop & Examine) the axlebox was burning nicely and the wagon was upright. It's possible the final collapse onto the sideframe was a result of the brake being applied but the local mechanical Foreman was of the view that the disintegration was a result of the hotbox. The way it was repaired was little short of Heath Robinson on speed - they took the C&W handcrane down from Westbury and stopped every few hundred yards to oil the axleboxes - it hadn't been moved for years - lifted the wagon from the opposite road put a new 'W' iron on the side where the bearing/collapse had happened as well as a new wheelset and axleboxes on both sides. All done in the block section and mostly in the dark apart from handlamps. I think the average breakdown gang would have fainted on seeing a job like that - tough blokes those S&D sorts (as our Foreman was) and well used to difficult jobs with simple equipment.

[The Stationmaster]

I don't think so. That incident I think happened between Reading and Didcot. IIRC the driver of an up train saw that the rearmost vehicle of a parcels working on the down main or relief was derailed and swinging around. He stopped at the next signal and informed the signal box what had happened, but they could do nothing until the train reached Moreton Cutting as that was the first location they could control the signal aspects manually. Thankfully, the parcels didn't cross with another train on an adjacent track or gawd knows what the damage would have been. AV said in the book that the signalman on the route around that period pretty much rewrote the rulebook as required, such was the strain of the new systems on older working practises

STEVE

I would be wary of comments like 'rewrote the Rule Book because of ... etc' Not that the WR panels weren't new technology and not that they didn't bring changes but the Rules & Regs of the time, plus the Special Instructions for the 'boxes, took more than necessary account of the changes. So it was not so much a need to 'rewrite the Rule Book as required' as learn to apply the new procedures and a set of Regulations which had quite a number of differences from what had gone before.

 

Some of the men in Reading Panel took a very long time to adjust to the new world and one shift in particular was always known as the crazy gang because of some of the things they did or didn't do (not that any of that was dangerous but one of them had quite a record for causing delays because he never seemed able to work out where trains were - but according to someone who had worked with him there he hadn't been that much different when he was in Reading Mainline east before the resignalling!). The biggest difference was folk getting used to controlling a railway they couldn't see and folk on the ground finding they couldn't shout or give a handsignal all the way from Didcot to Reading .

[Poor Old Bruce]

When it went past the 'box that sent 7 bells (Stop & Examine) the axlebox was burning nicely and the wagon was upright. It's possible the final collapse onto the sideframe was a result of the brake being applied but the local mechanical Foreman was of the view that the disintegration was a result of the hotbox. The way it was repaired was little short of Heath Robinson on speed - they took the C&W handcrane down from Westbury and stopped every few hundred yards to oil the axleboxes - it hadn't been moved for years - lifted the wagon from the opposite road put a new 'W' iron on the side where the bearing/collapse had happened as well as a new wheelset and axleboxes on both sides. All done in the block section and mostly in the dark apart from handlamps. I think the average breakdown gang would have fainted on seeing a job like that - tough blokes those S&D sorts (as our Foreman was) and well used to difficult jobs with simple equipment.

 

Hey-Ho. Like I said, I wasn't there and it's a bit late to argue the point now.

 

I think the average breakdown gang would have either lifted the wagon to the the side of the track or onto another wagon to be taken away. I assume it was in the days before method statements and risk assessments - just good old common sense.

[Fay Singpoint]

The other issue on the WR was that the resignalling schemes at Swindon and Reading saw long stretches of automatic signalling, one of which was between Didcot and Swindon. After one of the derailments on this stretch (at Steventon I think off the top of my head) where the train ran derailed for some distance, Reading panel knew that something bad had happened from the fact that track circuits were not clearing behind the train. However they could not stop the train or block the other road because they had no restore switches on any of the auto signals. All they could do was sit and watch until the inevitable happened. I believe as a result of this incident the signalling was changed such that as a minimum every 4th or 5th signal in an otherwise unbroken chain of automatics had to be capable of being restored to danger from the panel. I also have an idea it was one of the incidents which lead to the introduction of TC clips.

 

Correct. You can read all about here http://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/documents/MoT_Steventon1966.pdf

[The Stationmaster]

Hey-Ho. Like I said, I wasn't there and it's a bit late to argue the point now.

 

I think the average breakdown gang would have either lifted the wagon to the the side of the track or onto another wagon to be taken away. I assume it was in the days before method statements and risk assessments - just good old common sense.

I sometimes think it was in the days before writing - but it was in fact mid 1970s but still long before writing down what you were going to do before you did it anyway and I suspect they probably exceeded the crane's plated capacity as well. Not to mention the fact that the Mech Foreman didn't know how to take a possession so I did that (which operating dept folk weren't allowed to do under the Rules as they by then were but how else was it to be done?), the wagon was duly repaired and everybody (eventually) went home tired but happy. To us it was just another part of keeping the job going - safely.