GWML Electification

[The Stationmaster]

The discussions on DOO are an interesting and important part of the 21st Century railway. Personally, I feel that for shorter services like the 3-6 car services around glasgow, DOO works well and is suitable for them. The driver can, and has for many years, safely operate the doors and the second member of on train staff can focus on revenue protection and customer service. Importantly though, as is the case in Scotland, it is important in my eyes that there is a second member of rail staff on board.

 

Personally, I feel like there are too many unanswered questions about DOO works for intercity services, such as are they really prepared to run a 9 coach express with one member of staff? How are the passengers monitored during the journey? What measures are there to prevent a potential mass "self-evacuation" onto live lines? I doubt the answers to these questions will be answered to my satisfaction but I will be interested to hear the response. I expect as a result of barriers in major stations and cost cutting we will see train crews compromoising of the driver and the trolley person (if they are booked for every service) which will work fine until it doesn't and it fails spectacularly.

 

Is there any precendent for this move elsewhere in the world?

The main measure which prevents any sort of evacuation is centralised control of power operated doors.  Let's not overlook the simple fact of the nasty series of deaths which occurred on HSTs in their fairly early days (every single one of them had a Guard of course) and many other deaths over the years associated on people coming out of doors or opening doors at the wrong moment - central door locking has done more to reduce those deaths than the presence of Guards ever did.  There is of course the continuing potential for egress using emergency door releases but statistically the presence of a Guard on a train hasn't prevented such deaths - in fact on one occasion someone opened a door and fell out after being told by a member of the traincrew not to do so.

 

I seriously doubt that trains would run around unmanned except for the Driver in most normal circumstances - if nothing else there will be a revenue protection type on board and on many trains there will also be customer service folk

 

As far as 'trolley persons' are concerned what is wrong with them - on one train operator, which directly employs its trolley people - several of them have progressed from the trolley via other duties to becoming Drivers.  that suggest to me that if you employ the right people in the first place and train and encourage them they are going to be perfectly competent with safety duties.  Nowadays gender is largely irrelevant as all the heavy lifting involving in the old style of Guard's job has long gone.

[david.hill64]

The issue about manning is important, but if we broaden the scope to include metros, UTO (unattended train operation) is becoming quite common. Evacuation is a key issue for UTO services, but operators - and their regulatory and safety approvers - accept that directing passengers using communications from the control centre is perfectly acceptable. I am presently writing the signalling safety case for UTO operations in Delhi. Society has accepted unmanned people movers at airports for a long time. I can even remember lift operators in a department store, and my mum being worried about how safe the new fangled lifts without operators would be!

 

Times move on, technology changes, and we now have a railway that is significantly safer than before even with many services being DOO.

 

Personally I think that the traditional role of the guard is dead, but I welcome having customer service (hate that term) / revenue protection staff on board who have been trained in safety procedures. Train managers are a good concept with a title that is apt. 

[Great Western]

I refer to Guard as in the rule book term, the person charged with train protection etc when the driver isn't able to do so.

 

But yes, the tradional Guard as in no customer service duties as per SWT metro services and former Overgroudn servcies is dead.

 

The concept of Train Manager, as in a full trained Guard with commercial duties is the way to go. Charge them with the ability to make decisions etc.

 

An TE ticket examiner is all well and good, but as per SPTE in Scotland no TE doesn't mean no train, so you have solo DOO trains running contrary to the aggreement of twin manning.

 

I simply don't trust modern money grabbing TOCs to recruit and ensure TEs are on all trains, the concept SET have in their HS1 services is the way twin Manning is going I think and I don't have an objection either.

 

As soon as you remove the requirement for a 2nd competent person you have DOO solo Manning,

 

Do you really fancy being on a derailed or stranded train on the S&C in deepest winter with no driver (he's been injured or God forbid killed) ? I for sure don't !

 

London Overground, Metro style services......OK maybe single Manning works as help is at the next station from 1st to last train, out in the sticks you lucky to have station assistants anytime of the day, due to money grabbing TOCS closing booking offices Etc.

 

GSMR isn't a goldern egg that will save all. If you think it is then I'm afraid you don't the experience of its flaws I and many of my colleagues do.

 

GSMR has its place of course, it's an excellent system, crystal clear reception even at speed pretty much whole network coverage in the end. But it's doesn't always connect to the required box, critical in an emergency situation etc.

 

Great Western

[Titan]

, if you think DOO is a good idea then I'm afraid your a  fool with no idea of the real railway, the risks and the results of pasengers who think they know best.

 

Great Western.

 

Try telling that to the victims and families of the dead in Bellgrove rail crash, which would never have happened if the train had been fitted with DOO..

[jamie92208]

Just to get back on topic of electrification.   I wonder if my slow progress to getting overhead wires up on Green Ayre will actually be achieved before the GWML.  I started the layout in 2010 and put the first trial bit of contact wire up this week.  Have I beaten the real railway.

 

Jamie

[phil-b259]

Try telling that to the victims and families of the dead in Bellgrove rail crash, which would never have happened if the train had been fitted with DOO..

That's a little harsh - while yes the guard was at fault for giving the right away to the driver, if the driver had done his job properly he would have checked the signal aspect, seen it was red and not moved off.

 

As with most things on the railway, the fault for the accident lies in three places, the guard, the driver and the adoption of single lead junctions without some sort of trapping facility. At Belgrove all three fell apart at the same time.

 

On today's railway, thanks to TPWS (which is not easy to circumnavigate / override, and a sackable offence unless permission to isolate / overide it without authorisation) the "ding and away" style collision cannot happen, guard or no guard.

 

Going back to the role of the guard - yes GMSR is by no means perfect but that in itself is no argument for the blanket retention of the traditional role of guard. In reality things like frequency of staffed stations, the ability to reach a stranded train quickly, mobile / radio reception, is the line a busy one (I.e. Assistance can quickly be provided from another service), track configuration and the risks it might present, CCTV coverage, etc all come into play when deciding on what level of staff provision and training might be most suitable.

 

Yes we have seen outstanding examples of guards doing an excellent job but in this day and age there is simply no need for a traditional guard who sits in their office having as little to do with passengers as possible. Replacing the guard with a train manager with suitably enhanced skills (PTS and the ability to help the driver do a rolling wheel test) would be a sensible compromise, but prividing the station is suitably equipped and staffed, I see no need for door control to be part of said train managers duties on a day to day basis.

 

Also to mitigate scenarios where the rostered train manager cannot be there (I.e. they have gone sick) you could ensure each train has a deputy train manager who would be trained to forfill that role in an emergency but may lack the training to help the driver undertake a rolling wheel test say.

 

So ultimately there are lots of possibilities there - the only thing I fear is that the RMT will fail to be sensible and accept the way things are heading because as sure as eggs are eggs, renationalisation and most of the policies the RMT leadership enthusiastically embrace have as much chance of coming to pass as hell freezing over. That's not to say they should capitulate and give the DfT an easy ride, but if they really want to help their members, they should be working on devising suitable jobs for their members in a post 'traditional guard' era, not simply stonewalling any attempts to change things.

[The Stationmaster]

Just to get back on topic of electrification.   I wonder if my slow progress to getting overhead wires up on Green Ayre will actually be achieved before the GWML.  I started the layout in 2010 and put the first trial bit of contact wire up this week.  Have I beaten the real railway.

 

Jamie

I think you cheated by starting first Jamie  Actually I think GWML is ahead of you in getting ohle structures erected but you are winning when it comes to actually having some contact wire in place.

[Great Western]

Try telling that to the victims and families of the dead in Bellgrove rail crash, which would never have happened if the train had been fitted with DOO..

Bellgrove......the TE gave 2-2 against a red and the driver had a fatal SPAD.......?

 

I think it's highly unfair and unless you can present report evidence extremely offensive to suggest the TE giving TRTS caused the accident. The bucks stops at the bloke at the front to check the signal not just take the Train READY to start signal. Note the Ready to, not GO signal. Either way the driver had total responsibly to check the aspect of the signal before opening the power handle.

 

On the flip side try telling the families of the dead from Upton Nevett that DOO Is a good idea (I know the guard on it personally) he blocked the lines and then helped injured passengers despite being injured himself.

 

Great Western

[Great Western]

That's a little harsh - while yes the guard was at fault for giving the right away to the driver, if the driver had done his job properly he would have checked the signal aspect, seen it was red and not moved off.

As with most things on the railway, the fault for the accident lies in three places, the guard, the driver and the adoption of single lead junctions without some sort of trapping facility. At Belgrove all three fell apart at the same time.

On today's railway, thanks to TPWS (which is not easy to circumnavigate / override, and a sackable offence unless permission to isolate / overide it without authorisation) the "ding ###### and away" style collision cannot happen, guard or no guard.

Going back to the role of the guard - yes GMSR is by no means perfect but that in itself is no argument for the blanket retention of the traditional role of guard. In reality things like frequency of staffed stations, the ability to reach a stranded train quickly, mobile / radio reception, is the line a busy one (I.e. Assistance can quickly be provided from another service), track configuration and the risks it might present, CCTV coverage, etc all come into play when deciding on what level of staff provision and training might be most suitable.

Yes we have seen outstanding examples of guards doing an excellent job but in this day and age there is simply no need for a traditional guard who sits in their office having as little to do with passengers as possible. Replacing the guard with a train manager with suitably enhanced skills (PTS and the ability to help the driver do a rolling wheel test) would be a sensible compromise, but prividing the station is suitably equipped and staffed, I see no need for door control to be part of said train managers duties on a day to day basis.

Also to mitigate scenarios where the rostered train manager cannot be there (I.e. they have gone sick) you could ensure each train has a deputy train manager who would be trained to forfill that role in an emergency but may lack the training to help the driver undertake a rolling wheel test say.

So ultimately there are lots of possibilities there - the only thing I fear is that the RMT will fail to be sensible and accept the way things are heading because as sure as eggs are eggs, renationalisation and most of the policies the RMT leadership enthusiastically embrace have as much chance of coming to pass as hell freezing over. That's not to say they should capitulate and give the DfT an easy ride, but if they really want to help their members, they should be working on devising suitable jobs for their members in a post 'traditional guard' era, not simply stonewalling any attempts to change things.

Yes, I agree with 99% of what you've said....however when you remove aspects of a role you deskill and demotive the person doing the role. The guard sitting in the van is dead, long dead....the train manager doing the operational aspects of the guard role plus enchanced customer service role with full door control is the way I want to go. I don't want to be a ticket inspector on 16k a year who can be removed at a moments notice.

 

Great Western

[caradoc]

This is getting a bit off-topic, but at Bellgrove the Guard (not Ticket Examiner as these trains were still double-manned at the time) had a duty to check that the signal was at proceed before giving the Driver 2 bells, this being a Rule Book change after the very similar accident at Paisley Gilmour St in 1979.

[cheesysmith]

I wonder how much of this DOO and gate barriers at stations nationwide is formed from the DaFT having their understanding of railways coloured by their commuting on the ex NSE lines into London. Also, if you gate the stations, people cannot get onto the trains without tickets anyway, so it doesn't matter if you cannot get through to check em, so giving the DaFT more reason to ram em full to sardine levels. Of course, this policy of gates is the opposite of what intercity was doing, as they saw the ability of relatives to see people off as a good way of ensuring you didn't need overworked customer staff at stations and generated much goodwill amongst the joe public.

[Edwin_m]

Barriers can't check that people in First Class have tickets, nor protect against the so-called "doughnutting" where someone buys (say) a ticket from KX to Finsbury Park and one from Chester-le-Street to Newcastle. 

[DY444]

Try telling that to the victims and families of the dead in Bellgrove rail crash, which would never have happened if the train had been fitted with DOO..

 

The only slight flaw with that is the subsequent accident at Newton which was remarkably similar to Bellgrove.  In fact the only substantial difference was that the train which started away against the signal at danger was DOO.

[62613]

The only slight flaw with that is the subsequent accident at Newton which was remarkably similar to Bellgrove.  In fact the only substantial difference was that the train which started away against the signal at danger was DOO.

Are we talking about Hyde Junction here?

[DY444]

Are we talking about Hyde Junction here?

 

No that was yet another collision on a single lead junction.

[Great Western]

Common theme - single lead junctions, DOO in some cases are all outcomes of cost cutting!

 

Great Western

[The Stationmaster]

Bellgrove......the TE gave 2-2 against a red and the driver had a fatal SPAD.......?

 

I think it's highly unfair and unless you can present report evidence extremely offensive to suggest the TE giving TRTS caused the accident. The bucks stops at the bloke at the front to check the signal not just take the Train READY to start signal. Note the Ready to, not GO signal. Either way the driver had total responsibly to check the aspect of the signal before opening the power handle.

 

On the flip side try telling the families of the dead from Upton Nevett that DOO Is a good idea (I know the guard on it personally) he blocked the lines and then helped injured passengers despite being injured himself.

 

Great Western

If you are going to quote anything regarding incidents in the past it might help if you did so accurately.  As far as the Ufton (not Upton) Crossing collision and derailment concerned what one of the Train Managers did was a complete waste of time and, to be honest, difficult to understand although he was obviously in a state of shock and that might explain his actions (which did absolutely nothing to protect his train or the site).  The other Train Manager attempted to use an spt on the opposite line but it was dead but he was able to contact Swindon Control and advise them of the incident (and they no doubt were then able to advise Reading panel what had happened not that it would have made much difference in terms of protection of course).  In fact - although, again, they might not have realised it due to shock - the train had all too obviously, and very unfortunately, protected itself.

 

Now it is obvious that the two TMs were able to render assistance to passengers in various ways and one of them had a First Aid qualification which of course could have been the same with other on train staff had they been there.  Equally the incident does little to support the presence of a 'guard' one way or the other - the very fact that there were two TMs on the train could be taken to mean there would still be one even if the 'Guard' role was abolished.  The simple fact is that there was someone who had various competencies on the train and they were able, rightly or wrongly, to do various things - the key point is the word 'someone'; they didn't have to be in a particular grade to have those competencies as such skills can be trained into any suitable person.  The most important thing, as Ufton clearly demonstrates, is that whoever is carrying out any sort of protection should have the necessary training to do so effectively and the simple fact is that one of the two Train Managers tried to do it correctly while the other didn't.

 

Far more worrying - in some respects - about Ufton is what could happen nowadays on increasing amounts of GWML mileage (and elsewhere) when something is derailed foul of or onto an opposite or opposing line because of the loss of the first line of defence, the track circuit.  Not only does this remove the first line of protection but it also renders track circuit operating clips useless - meaning that the only immediately available protection is the Driver-to-Shore radio then GSM-R in the train then mobile 'phones and then detonators and a long walk.  I think there could be potential mitigations to this new situation - and one comes immediately to mind - but this is not the place to explore them.

 

As far as Bellgrove is concerned you seem to miss the critical point - the Driver was given a signal to start against a signal at danger.  It is - and always has been - very easy to say that the ultimate responsibility rests with the Driver (and, of course, it does) but the Rule Book has long made it clear that it is the duty/responsibility of others to observe relevant fixed signals, when possible, before indicating that the train is ready to start.  'Ding-ding and away' SPADs were never exactly rare events and a  lot of mitigation work has been done to reduce them but it is always going to be a situation where someone doing the wrong thing and making a simple error of mission can set the scene for a second person (the Driver) to be led into making a far more serious error of omission.  Fewer people in the chain means fewer chances for such errors to occur and for others to compound them.

[The Stationmaster]

Common theme - single lead junctions, DOO in some cases are all outcomes of cost cutting!

 

Great Western

Clearly you have a very limited understanding of single lead junctions - which have now been around for over 40 years.   The main purpose of them was not to 'save money' as you seem to believe but to eliminate diamond crossings which were being found increasingly difficult to maintain as train speeds increased.  Also in a number of places, particularly running junctions they increased flexibility and allowed junction turnout speeds to be raised by avoiding the need for the even more difficult to maintain switch diamonds.

 

Yes, in some respects they do save money as they reduce maintenance costs and allow considerable increases in turnout speeds while because of the added flexibility they can save money on duplicatiing facilities where duplication is not needed.  But the core of it all - right from the very first one on the WR - was to eliminate diamond crossings (and switch diamonds at higher speed turnouts).

[Great Western]

Reduce Maintence on diamond crossing, thus reduce the Main

If you are going to quote anything regarding incidents in the past it might help if you did so accurately.  As far as the Ufton (not Upton) Crossing collision and derailment concerned what one of the Train Managers did was a complete waste of time and, to be honest, difficult to understand although he was obviously in a state of shock and that might explain his actions (which did absolutely nothing to protect his train or the site).  The other Train Manager attempted to use an spt on the opposite line but it was dead but he was able to contact Swindon Control and advise them of the incident (and they no doubt were then able to advise Reading panel what had happened not that it would have made much difference in terms of protection of course).  In fact - although, again, they might not have realised it due to shock - the train had all too obviously, and very unfortunately, protected itself.

 

Now it is obvious that the two TMs were able to render assistance to passengers in various ways and one of them had a First Aid qualification which of course could have been the same with other on train staff had they been there.  Equally the incident does little to support the presence of a 'guard' one way or the other - the very fact that there were two TMs on the train could be taken to mean there would still be one even if the 'Guard' role was abolished.  The simple fact is that there was someone who had various competencies on the train and they were able, rightly or wrongly, to do various things - the key point is the word 'someone'; they didn't have to be in a particular grade to have those competencies as such skills can be trained into any suitable person.  The most important thing, as Ufton clearly demonstrates, is that whoever is carrying out any sort of protection should have the necessary training to do so effectively and the simple fact is that one of the two Train Managers tried to do it correctly while the other didn't.

 

Far more worrying - in some respects - about Ufton is what could happen nowadays on increasing amounts of GWML mileage (and elsewhere) when something is derailed foul of or onto an opposite or opposing line because of the loss of the first line of defence, the track circuit.  Not only does this remove the first line of protection but it also renders track circuit operating clips useless - meaning that the only immediately available protection is the Driver-to-Shore radio then GSM-R in the train then mobile 'phones and then detonators and a long walk.  I think there could be potential mitigations to this new situation - and one comes immediately to mind - but this is not the place to explore them.

 

As far as Bellgrove is concerned you seem to miss the critical point - the Driver was given a signal to start against a signal at danger.  It is - and always has been - very easy to say that the ultimate responsibility rests with the Driver (and, of course, it does) but the Rule Book has long made it clear that it is the duty/responsibility of others to observe relevant fixed signals, when possible, before indicating that the train is ready to start.  'Ding-ding and away' SPADs were never exactly rare events and a  lot of mitigation work has been done to reduce them but it is always going to be a situation where someone doing the wrong thing and making a simple error of mission can set the scene for a second person (the Driver) to be led into making a far more serious error of omission.  Fewer people in the chain means fewer chances for such errors to occur and for others to compound them.

I can only go in what the actual TM concerned has told me personally. He never worked an HST again after that night, and has retired last year. Very very experienced railwayman, starting as a fireman back in the steam days before being made redundant, but coming back in more modern BR days as a guard.

 

There is always going to be a Pro DOO camp for whatever reason, that's your right to have that view and I respect that...however I tignk your wrong which again is my right.

 

Great Western

[The Stationmaster]

Reduce Maintence on diamond crossing, thus reduce the Main

I can only go in what the actual TM concerned has told me personally. He never worked an HST again after that night, and has retired last year. Very very experienced railwayman, starting as a fireman back in the steam days before being made redundant, but coming back in more modern BR days as a guard.

 

There is always going to be a Pro DOO camp for whatever reason, that's your right to have that view and I respect that...however I tignk your wrong which again is my right.

 

Great Western

Not so much 'reduce maintenance on the diamond crossing' as remove something which was becoming increasingly difficult to keep safely maintained at all  (the rate at which problems happened on them was surprisingly high).

 

Yes - opinions will no doubt always vary on DOO and as you say we are all likely to have our own views.

 

As far as the Ufton Crossing collision is concerned I am using the official report as my source and it doesn't name either of the two Train Managers but I would suspect that the more experienced man was the one who tried to use the spt.  Quite a number of former firemen finished up as Guards all over the Region.

[Great Western]

As for the Grest Western electrification project, vegetation clearance is ramping up on the Filton Four tracking project, and also around the English portal of Severn Tunnel and Ableton Lane Tunnel.

 

There doesn't appear to be much if any progress on the Bristol TM area, only foundations for new S&T equipment and cable runs being laid.

 

There seems to be a lot of work in not so much time to do..

 

Great Western

[Joseph_Pestell]

As for the Grest Western electrification project, vegetation clearance is ramping up on the Filton Four tracking project, and also around the English portal of Severn Tunnel and Ableton Lane Tunnel.

 

There doesn't appear to be much if any progress on the Bristol TM area, only foundations for new S&T equipment and cable runs being laid.

 

There seems to be a lot of work in not so much time to do..

 

Great Western

 

I think that it has been officially acknowledged that the programme is now quite seriously behind schedule.

[Peter Kazmierczak]

This is the stretch between Ableton Lane and Severn Tunnel (East) last week. Presumably the while patches on the tunnel mouth at Ableton Lane refer back to the days of semaphores, to ensure that the up signals could be clearly seen.

 

 

 

Still wondering if the Filton - Patchway side of the triangle is to be wired. Anyone know?

Edited February 22, 2015 by Peter Kazmierczak

[Great Western]

That's correct regards the White patches on the portal.

 

Regards the three sides of Patchway/Filton Triangle, they will be wired.

 

Although I can't see the logic with not providing a West end access/exit to the IEP depot, the only access is via a reversal (for Bristol) in Parkway.

 

Great Western

[The Stationmaster]

As for the Grest Western electrification project, vegetation clearance is ramping up on the Filton Four tracking project, and also around the English portal of Severn Tunnel and Ableton Lane Tunnel.

 

There doesn't appear to be much if any progress on the Bristol TM area, only foundations for new S&T equipment and cable runs being laid.

 

There seems to be a lot of work in not so much time to do..

 

Great Western

The rate at which the S&T work is going is remarkable considering that what is being replaced was installed over 7 - 8 years originally.  Judging by work east of Reading, and Reading - Didcot (which started later), you can reckon as little as 6 months between start of signalling work and commissioning - I think Reading (Scours Lane) - Didcot (Moreton Cutting) will in fact be a month or two inside that timescale.  The slow start seems to have been with electrification structures which are also  - it appears - very much a hit & miss affair although at least they now all appear to be in place between Westbury Lane overbridge and just east of Pangbourne and masts are no going up between Tilehurst station and Scours Lane I noticed on Friday.

 

One can but hope that the wiring trains will work a lot more rapidly that the process of installing structures otherwise considerable delays will be occurring in meeting the originally planned completion dates.