GWML Electification

[black and decker boy]

Unfortunately many of the mistakes cannot be unmade, and some of the full effects have yet to be felt.

Very sad but very true

[jjb1970]

The importance of getting certain things right is crucial and a lot of that is just basic engineering and project risk management. In a major project and especially with an old asset there will always be a significant residual risk but many things which are sometimes excused as being outside of human scientific knowledge and invention are anything but if the initial stages of a project are well managed.

[Peter Kazmierczak]

I think something called "politics" might've been behind the (perhaps rather hasty) "unpausing".

[96701]

I think something called "politics" might've been behind the (perhaps rather hasty) "unpausing".

 

I don't think it was politics. My opinion is that some projects have been paused is down to having insufficient technical specialists to deliver all the projects during this 'control period'

[The Stationmaster]

I suspect this will not be a popular opinion but following the last couple of issues of Modern Railways I do not believe that GWML electrification should have been unpaused until a proper project recovery plan was in place. I admit we have to be careful about being too believing of what we read, but people like Roger Ford and Ian Walmsley are not technically illiterate half wits who just regurgitate any old guff. Even if we apply an adjustment to offset possible exaggeration it still feels like it has been a monumentally badly managed program that has dropped a few major klangers on basic stuff. The costs are becoming ridiculous and it is just not tenable to continue with over spends and delays of this magnitude unless there is confidence that a recovery plan will bring things back down. I do not hold the current Railtrack CEO responsible for the initial foul ups, what I am unimpressed with is the seeming acceptance that things are what they are. This is yet another example of the lesson we need to learn over and over again that money spent up front long before a shovel goes anywhere near the ground is not money wasted but an investment. NR should have been aware of some of the project risks from the outset and it does appear that some of the failings were just down to not being able to do the basics.

Have you read the Hendy Report JJB?  That does in fact amend a number of timescales and skids some work back into CP6.  Now obviously Sir Peter H cannot have looked into every nook & cranny of the scheme on his own and has presumably had to base his conclusions on what he has been told by the folk responsible for delivering the work - the worrying element in that is perhaps that the people giving him this information now might be the same ones as those responsible for where it has/hasn't got so far.

 

To me - speaking as an operator with more than bit of past experience arranging and planning possessions and working very closely in deciding possession timescales with those responsible for delivering much of what is in the scheme I think they are offering much more realistic estimates than originally.  However I do still have concerns about some aspects of the job - hopefully bringing back someone out of retirement for advice on ground conditions and recruiting piling engineers should have a positive impact on the sinking of the foundation tubes but timely delivery will still depend on having the plant and properly arranged possessions (and I understand that software has still not been fixed) so in order to best progress things what they really need is a couple of top notch possession planners; maybe they are hiring or digging out retired folk?

 

Other work aspects do seem to have slipped and while the timescales look achievable measured against what has been done so far it is only going to work if someone gets in there at a high enough level to push backsides in the right direction instead of kicking people and convening some sort of equivalent of a focus group 'to talk things through'.  I seriously don't know if NR has got the right people in the right positions to do some of that and cast a lot of its bureaucratic, back covering,  baggage aside.  If they actually get on with it instead of talking about it I think they can do it within the new timescales.  But wasting time with senior managers issuing instructions about how to cross the road to get to the office in Swindon leaves me wondering if the emphasis is necessarily in the right places.

[Edwin_m]

I don't think it was politics. My opinion is that some projects have been paused is down to having insufficient technical specialists to deliver all the projects during this 'control period'

The pausing was probably a way of flagging up that the original budgets and timescales were now unattainable, so driven by reality but with a political element.  The unpausing is essentially political, saying that these projects will go ahead anyway but will take longer and almost certainly cost more but despite this they are still considered as priorities. 

[Talltim]

In highly complex situations, the most obvious solution is often overlooked

 

As for the shortages you mentioned, here's some local (to me) solutions:

https://movares.nl/en/

http://www.strukton.com/

http://www.volkerrail.co.uk/

http://www.bam.eu/

 

All of these are active on the Dutch rail transport market and as you noticed, all* are represented in the UK. I'm sure the French and Germans would also like a slice of the sausage pie.   And of course the latest craze in Westminster: the Chinese

 

*except Movares, but Britain isn't too far from their HQ

VolkerRail are active in the UK, they have been doing the track replacement for Sheffield Supertram and I regularly see one of their vans down my road

[PenrithBeacon]

I don't think it was politics. My opinion is that some projects have been paused is down to having insufficient technical specialists to deliver all the projects during this 'control period'

I think the use of the word 'pause' is a political spin. Any project manager would stop a project that is out of control to allow his line managers (and in this case the government also) to decide whether or nor the project should go ahead but with a different project plan and budget. If you like the project would be 'paused' during this period but might be chopped altogether.

 

Bearing in mind the political situation with the election just out of the way and the government open to accusations that it had lied during the election campaign about railway electrification the use of 'paused' makes sense.

 

I can take the point made earlier that successive governments ought to have continued electrification but I think it also has to be borne on mind that the denationalised railway companies looked askance at electrification, they didn't like it at all, much preferring diesels. In fact they didn't like anything that BR did much and retired as many BR employees as possible as quickly as possible. It was only after Hatfield that they started to understand that running a railway requires a different mindset to running a bus company or an airline and in retiring so many men with the experience they had made a serious error.

Edited December 4, 2015 by PenrithBeacon

[Titan]

Unfortunately it is the ones at the top who are inexperienced and it is them who make the decisions. The way that OLE design process has previously been carried out was very traditional, but also very logical, there was a critical path in that x had to be done before y. But because x takes longer, it was decided to do y first so something could get built quickly. Then it is discovered that x does not fit with y and you have to redesign it all, which may mean removing already installed structures and installing new ones...

 

There are still many experienced ex BR Engineers out there, (and some good other ones too), it is just that no-one is listening to them or asking their advice!

[Jonboy]

I notice a larger number of the poles are going up through Didcot, particularly alongside Aldi.

[The Stationmaster]

It is worrying to me to reflect on my own recent comment about 'getting on with it'.  Regular followers of this thread may well recall the picture below which I posted recently including a comment about a foundation pile not driven fully into the ground while Titan explained that it was probably a second pile added on top of one that had already been sunk out of site.  The picture was taken on 25 November - 9 days ago; when I passed the site at 12.00 today the tube was still in exactly the same state - whether it needs to be driven further or is going to be trimmed off I do not know but whichever it is has not happened - the job has been left half done.

 

If one of my senior bosses from the past had seen that there would be some serious 'phone calls going on and some stinging ears on the receiving end of them while explanations for lack of progress were demanded.  It's in a spot right next to good quality access for road-rail vehicles - that's on the left margin of the photo - and it's in a position where it is simple to take a possession of not just the line next to it but the one beyond that so no worries about trains infringing on site safety.  

 

Immediately to the east registration arms and other fittings are being installed on gantry structures, the same is happening west of the station platforms but between the two is a gap of non-existent or incomplete gantry structures and the wiring between the two cannot start until they are in place -15 months after this section was supposed to be energised.

 

Overall it suggests to me a lack of organisation in the way this work is carried out, and possibly, due to schedules which are so tight that if something isn't right first time there is no time in the workplan to put it right.

 

 

[APOLLO]

Electrification - It ain't really rocket science, BUT as Stationmaster states, it DOES require careful planning.

 

The Liverpool - Manchester line and Liverpool to Wigan via St Helens electrification went well. Yes, both a bit late (6 months or so) but OK. My son used the line almost daily with hardly any service disruptions during the electrification works. He is at Liverpool University travelling daily from Wigan.

 

The Chat Moss route opened a little earlier than the Wigan route. They met George Stephenson's problems across Chat Moss, though very deep piling for the masts was used. The Liverpool - Manchester line across the moss still "floats"  and even the new electrics bounce at line speed on this stretch, which isn't very fast.

 

I remember the WCML electrification through Wigan back around 1971. There was an electrification depot using the old 27D L&Y loco depot at Prescott St shed, the electrification trains passing through Wallgate station every morning as I waited for the Southport to Manchester express. No problems I remember back then, even on the WCML.

 

Of course engineers, not accountants ran the show back then !!.

 

Brit15

[Titan]

It's the same Engineers doing the Great Western as did the Liverpool - Manchester. Different project, different equipment, different rules and ideas and different management.

[Mike Storey]

In highly complex situations, the most obvious solution is often overlooked

 

As for the shortages you mentioned, here's some local (to me) solutions:

https://movares.nl/en/

http://www.strukton.com/

http://www.volkerrail.co.uk/

http://www.bam.eu/

 

All of these are active on the Dutch rail transport market and as you noticed, all* are represented in the UK. I'm sure the French and Germans would also like a slice of the sausage pie.   And of course the latest craze in Westminster: the Chinese

 

*except Movares, but Britain isn't too far from their HQ

 

Bam Nuttall were primarily civils engineers and have come late into other areas. I would be surprised if they had suddenly gained resources others have not. I worked with them extensively on Scottish platform extensions, UK wide station accessibility upgrades and 2012 projects. Volkerrail were very welcome when they came into the UK market, but they were already overstretched by 2011, when I last dealt with them. I have no knowledge of the other two, but I also I have no idea how you form your opinions or suggestions.

[4630]

.

Edited November 14, 2016 by 4630

[Mike Storey]

I think the use of the word 'pause' is a political spin. Any project manager would stop a project that is out of control to allow his line managers (and in this case the government also) to decide whether or nor the project should go ahead but with a different project plan and budget. If you like the project would be 'paused' during this period but might be chopped altogether.

 

Bearing in mind the political situation with the election just out of the way and the government open to accusations that it had lied during the election campaign about railway electrification the use of 'paused' makes sense.

 

I can take the point made earlier that successive governments ought to have continued electrification but I think it also has to be borne on mind that the denationalised railway companies looked askance at electrification, they didn't like it at all, much preferring diesels. In fact they didn't like anything that BR did much and retired as many BR employees as possible as quickly as possible. It was only after Hatfield that they started to understand that running a railway requires a different mindset to running a bus company or an airline and in retiring so many men with the experience they had made a serious error.

 

I share your sentiments but some of your statements don't match the facts at all - the vast majority of managers and engineers in Railtrack and the TOCs/FOCs were ex-BR. I know, I was one of them. Engineers were not "retired off" by Railtrack, but out-sourced as the fashion was at the time (not just by the railways) to the various IMC's and consultancies. The major contractors already had their own pool of engineers, under BR and then RT, who were frequently in and out of one or the other (much more so after privatisation as their pensions and priv travel were suddenly protected). The TOCs did similar with outsourcing much of their rolling stock maintenance.

 

Hatfield was a phenomenon which clearly showed up the loss of wheel/rail interface management under one responsibility, in that the long term effect of the relatively new monocoque wheels of much of the new rolling stock was not understood on CWR laid in pre-stressed conditions. Tachevals would not have been observed by patrolmen - it needed a new angle on the rail crack detectors to spot them. If you are trying to solely blame privatisation for Hatfield (it was definitely partly to blame) then how would you explain the reverse coin accident (ie the wheel split rather than the rail) to the ICE on fully nationalised and integrated DB in Germany around the same period, involving much greater loss of life, but which also largely involved a lack of understanding about the the behaviour of monocoque wheelsets? Life is more complicated than you make out.

 

That said, you are absolutely right that the industry did not see a future for widespread electrification for about 20 years, hence the stop,, stop, stop, now go much faster than you are able. I remember being told by experts that battery technology would make all that string redundant, so we should wait for that. Peversely, recent stuff I have read could well mean that they were right, and we just have not waited long enough. But who knows, not me......(Bowie D.)

[jjb1970]

I think blaming accountants in this case is unjustified. The project was allocated a budget and looking at it from the outside that budget did not seem to be particularly mean. The project should have been costed and it is the job of the project management team to deliver it to the required specification within the allocated budget. If the budget was too low then it is probably more appropriate to question the original cost estimates and funding request than the accountants. Even if the budget was too tight this wouldn't explain the magnitude of the cost escalation we are seeing.

The real threat to the railways here in my opinion is to the future of Network Rail. Despite some of my ranting in this thread, on the whole I do not support privatising NR and do not want to risk a repeat of Railtrack. However, if they drop klangers on this scale they're leaving themselves wide open to a campaign to claim they're not competent to run major projects and I fear the next step would be people in Westminster calling for privatisation. Clearly a large electrification scheme is a complex major project that needs a lot of skill and expertise to plan and deliver however electrification is not something new and there are a lot of people who are well paid precisely because they have been trained and developed to manage complex projects. If the things going wrong were failures to implement new, untried technologies then it'd be a lot less troubling, but when many of the failures appear to stem failings to get basic things right it is very troubling.

[adanapress]

I still have a nasty taste in my mouth from the sequel to the Potters Bar accident, a  British Transport police Inspector was raging on  that some lawyers for a  ..  um .. well  ..  lets say an interested party  ..  had instructed staff not to speak to the Police, and my impression still is that they never in fact did so. .   All to protect that same interested party.  Ugly that.

 

And in passing quite a few proper railwaymen from the BR era  took early retirement during the Privatisation event, rightly thinking that their experience would not be wanted by the new regime. The railway was much the poorer and still remains so, despite feeble efforts at remedy.    You will never get loyalty and high morale with such short periods of certainty.   And without that  .....

[phil-b259]

I still have a nasty taste in my mouth from the sequel to the Potters Bar accident, a  British Transport police Inspector was raging on  that some lawyers for a  ..  um .. well  ..  lets say an interested party  ..  had instructed staff not to speak to the Police, and my impression still is that they never in fact did so. .   All to protect that same interested party.  Ugly that.

 

That is a big part of why the RAIB was set up. Under law any evidence they obtain from individuals pertaining to an incident CAN NEVER be used in legal proceeding (civil or criminal).

 

That is not to say that a prosecution cannot be undertaken, and use similar evidence as appears in RAIB reports - but said evidence must not be obtained from RAIB investigations.

[Titan]

 

Hatfield was a phenomenon which clearly showed up the loss of wheel/rail interface management under one responsibility, in that the long term effect of the relatively new monocoque wheels of much of the new rolling stock was not understood on CWR laid in pre-stressed conditions. Tachevals would not have been observed by patrolmen - it needed a new angle on the rail crack detectors to spot them. If you are trying to solely blame privatisation for Hatfield (it was definitely partly to blame) then how would you explain the reverse coin accident (ie the wheel split rather than the rail) to the ICE on fully nationalised and integrated DB in Germany around the same period, involving much greater loss of life, but which also largely involved a lack of understanding about the the behaviour of monocoque wheelsets? Life is more complicated than you make out.

 

This is rather far from the reality. The track that failed at Hatfield had been known to be defective prior to the accident. So much so that the replacement rail was already lying in the four foot awaiting fitment, where it had been for about six months prior to the derailment. Railtrack just did not give it the priority it deserved, because it was inconvenient and cost money that they would rather pay in dividends. 

 

You can see the replacement rail in this picture:

 

Edited December 4, 2015 by Titan

[phil-b259]

I suspect this will not be a popular opinion but following the last couple of issues of Modern Railways I do not believe that GWML electrification should have been unpaused until a proper project recovery plan was in place. I admit we have to be careful about being too believing of what we read, but people like Roger Ford and Ian Walmsley are not technically illiterate half wits who just regurgitate any old guff. Even if we apply an adjustment to offset possible exaggeration it still feels like it has been a monumentally badly managed program that has dropped a few major klangers on basic stuff. The costs are becoming ridiculous and it is just not tenable to continue with over spends and delays of this magnitude unless there is confidence that a recovery plan will bring things back down. I do not hold the current Railtrack CEO responsible for the initial foul ups, what I am unimpressed with is the seeming acceptance that things are what they are. This is yet another example of the lesson we need to learn over and over again that money spent up front long before a shovel goes anywhere near the ground is not money wasted but an investment. NR should have been aware of some of the project risks from the outset and it does appear that some of the failings were just down to not being able to do the basics.

 

Hindsight is a wonderful thing but unless you are the 13th Doctor and have a Tardis handy, you and everybody needs to stop focusing so much on what has been wasted / done badly / etc and focus on what has to happen from now on. However much you and others may not like it, whats been spent so far, has been spent - that money is not going to be magically reimbursed by continuing to bash NR for past mistakes (which I fully agree are not trivial ones) so continued focus on it is pointless, particularly as NR have been relatively honest about their mistakes and failures in the planning of the project.

 

What is needed now is to focus on the future - how do NR and their contractors / designers / planners / engineering partners go forward from here, (especially given certain things like a national shortage of suitably skilled people is not going to disappear overnight). Are the revised plans sustainable when looked at in the light of what has happened up to now, what further adjustments may be needed, what knock on consequences are there, has anything else been overlooked? These and other questions will have been receiving plenty of attention by NR over the past few months in a serious effort to sort out the answers and put in place revised arrangements, while at the same time not forgetting there is an existing 125mph pretty close to capacity main line to manage.

Edited December 4, 2015 by phil-b259

[Titan]

Hindsight is a wonderful thing but unless you are the 13th Doctor and have a Tardis handy.

 

Actually I am the 16th, and I am working on it..

 

[phil-b259]

 But wasting time with senior managers issuing instructions about how to cross the road to get to the office in Swindon leaves me wondering if the emphasis is necessarily in the right places.

 

It might sound trivial to us but you need to remember NR has been in the firing line for several years as regards workplace safety. In the past couple of years for example there have been a few cases where rail workers were involved in road traffic accidents and died because they were not wearing their seatbelts. As a result there was a big push from NR management (right from CEO down) on the issue which tried to get people to stop and think about the consequences of such a 'trivial matter'.

 

Other campaigns have for example focused on mundane things like not getting in the way of mechanical plant undertaking loading / unloading items within a depot - yes people 'should know better' but it doesn't help to be reminded.

 

One of the post recent campaigns concerned getting out of vans - yes it sounds silly until you realise that in my delivery unit there have been a few incidents in the past 5 - 10 years of people (including me) accidentally slamming a door shut while a colleagues hand was in the way...

 

Far from criticising such things I think the fact that NR are being proactive should be welcomed, it makes a refreshing change in an industry that still seems to injure far more of its workers than it should and whose traditional approch has historically been to discipline people rather than seek to learn from mistakes. Senior managers, as Mark Carne reminds us are not exempt from safety rules and should have their transgressions challenged (particularly from below where historically they were not) without fear of retribution.

 

So while, yes in the context of the GWML briefings about road safety might well be seem trival, but that does not mean they are pointless or in any way distract from other matters relating to the GWML programme.

[APOLLO]

The engineer  V accountant argument has been going on since both professions clashed (or should I politically correctly say "teamed up")

 

Same in the gas industry (where I worked all my life) as in the rail industry, I could write a book about it !!. 

 

I watched this earlier, from 1991, very interesting from the above perspective. It's also about a newly electrified (east coast) main line.

 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bRnMGQQFkME

 

All I can say is that I'm happy we got our lines electrified in the north west first. The Manchester Blackpool line is well advanced and also seems to be going well, though again a little late (and probably over budget, I don't know). I'm surprised the Trans-Pennine electrification is delayed. Perhaps they have bigger, better plans, or perhaps they have just run out of money.

 

I've said this before, and I'll say it again. Electrify the whole damn lot.

 

Brit15

[The Stationmaster]

Hindsight is a wonderful thing but unless you are the 13th Doctor and have a Tardis handy, you and everybody needs to stop focusing so much on what has been wasted / done badly / etc and focus on what has to happen from now on. However much you and others may not like it whats been spent so far has been spent - that money is not going to be magically reimbursed by continue to bash NR for past mistakes (which I fully agree are not trivial ones) so continued focus on it is pointless, particularly as NR have been relatively honest about their mistakes and failures in the planning of the project.

 

What is needed now is to focus on the future - how do NR and their contractors / designers / planners / engineering partners go forward from here, (especially given certain things like a national shortage of suitably skilled people is not going to disappear overnight). Are the revised plans sustainable when looked at in the light of what has happened up to now, what further adjustments may be needed, what knock on consequences are there, has anything else been overlooked? These and other questions will have been receiving plenty of attention by NR over the past few months in a serious effort to sort out the answers and put in place revised arrangements, while at the same time not forgetting there is an resisting 125mph pretty close to capacity main line to manage.

To be blunt Phil I would start with the senior managers - the attitude and 'conviction' of any organisation owes, or can owe, an awful lot to its leadership and interest and conviction at that level and how it transmits down the teams.  It's no good at all kicking people for not doing something if they haven't been given the leadership and knowledge to do it in the first place or have to spend all their time in meetings explaining what they haven't been able to do rather than getting on with their job and being given the backing and information to do it.

 

Railtrack at the time of its formation was, largely because of the way privatisation was framed, stripped of a large part of its civil and signal engineering skills especially of those with experience - and with then went not only a massive pool of knowledge but a priceless collection of deeds and drawings from such places as the Cabinet Sections of the civils drawing offices including much of the rerailing and relaying records.  Within - in one case - 18 months of that stuff going into private ownership those who had stewardship of those records were told to dump them or sell them off because the new owners were not prepared for space to store it.  Not surprising now that those working on GWML electrification haven't got those records - including long dated information on slip sites etc to work from but give Great Western Zone/Route its due it has tackled many longstanding stability & slip problem sites beyond the former London Division.

 

After I left the big railway I went to work for a signal engineering company which had collected a useful portion of Western Region's Chief S&T Engineers design staff with not only a  mass of design experience but project management experience as well and fortunately had a new ownership (Lloyd's Register) shortly after I joined which encouraged skills and personal development and high professional standards.  Another company located nearby, and part of a national rail engineering company, also had an S&T design office staffed from the privatisation of the original privatised BR office - it eventually shut it down and those who still wished to work joined the company I worked for.  And from one job I did on SPAD mitigation I know we had a better resource in terms of locking sketches for power signalled areas on the WR than did Railtrack /NR as I obtained my base information from one or the other according to who had it in their records.  That design office is now back as party of NR - and took its records and skills with it and some of its design staff are doing outdoor work as well on the bigger schemes.

 

But whatever the situation now a wealth of experience was lost - mainly in order to save money and cut costs - and it was not there to lead in and train the next generation.  Even 15 years ago I was talking to a PWay man working for one of the contractors handling track maintenance (no renewal work) on the GWML and he said that they had nobody at supervisory level who had worked for BR, they'd all gone.

 

As for managing and maintaining the 125 mph GW mainline not much could be simpler - it can (and does) readily work as a two track railway east of Reading and weekends and can do the same overnight with a bit of careful planning.  Apart from a bit of shortsightedness in the new Reading layout it can do the same for most of the distance between Reading and Didcot and it has either full bi-directional signalling all SIMBDS all the way on from there to Swindon where it is relatively easy to close one line or the other for much of the night.  If someone can't get possessions sorted on that lot there is something seriously wrong  (although I know the software in use for recording possession details is abysmal and has still not been sorted some time into a major project).