Sheffield

The book by Adrian Tester is very interesting, if a little demanding technically. It is one of the reasons I have started to question the age old view that the Midland was short sighted and narrow minded, and the others were more progressive. It has also lead me to other information that tends to confirm that the that the Midland policy made sense in Midland days and circumstances. He has also produced a book that puts the short traval/long traval valve debate in a new light, and that is worth reading. Clearly every thing was not bright and rosy with the Midland, but not as bad as has been protrayed in the past. I believe a lot of current thinking has come from the writings of E S Cox. While I feel we owe him a great debt for opening a large window on railway practice, it does seem necessary to be careful with some of his opinions. I feel he gained his promotion partly at least from his ability to produce a report that said what it was required to say.

Quote "It's like trying to get a football supporter to recognise brilliance in other teams" Indeed. One of the problems is that despite the large volume of information published in recent years, many enthusiasts see history in a rigid shortsighted way. Quote "It would be proper for you to qualify your condemnation of the LNWR locos." Much has been published about the crudity of design, poor valve ring design, poor ashpan design, poor brake design, poor axle box design. EG In one year 246 Prince of Wales locos suffered 161 hot boxes. And who designed the arrangement for lubricating the trailing axle box of the Claughtons, which in the end was one of the features that did for them? Or read J M dunn's writings on LNW Coal Tanks. Also broken connecting rods on Joy valve gear fitted locos. But all pregrouping designs had their weakness. At the time of grouping G Hughes instigated comparisons of the inherited loco designs. Taking class 4 general purpose locos for example what was available to use in the wider LMS? From Scotland there was the HR Jones Goods, by then an elderly design, and a few 0-6-0s and 0-8-0s viewed favourable only by the coal industry. The L&Y had nothing suitable, and the LNW no 0-6-0s that were not of small elderly design. The 0-8-0 would have been even less acceptable than the MR 4F, and was suitable only for low speeds. There was the Whale 4-6-0 19in goods, but perhaps I may quote H C Burgess "4-40pm fish from Swansea to Crewe...rostered to be worked by a 19in Goods. Unfortunatley so voracious was the appetite of these engines, they rarely had enough coal to go beyond Shrewsbury... Or E Talbot "with the advent of Whales 'Mankillers' the drivers began to crib at having youngsters with them, as not many experienced firemena were capable of firing a 19 Goods....A run down 'Precursor ' could chew up coal faster than a normal man could shovel it in to the fire box. Or K Stokes recalls "firing a 19 in Goods from Grimesthorpe to Liverpool hauling 35 wagons of steam coal and having to tranfer a couple of tons from the leading wagon in to the tender to complete the journey" W A tuplin records some coal consumptions figures of various locos in lbs drawbar horsepower, listing 5.1 for the Price of Wales, and 4.1 for the MR Compound. Even E S Cox, no fan of the MR, admitted the MR designs were best of the bunch. The LNW Claughton can perhaps be viewed a a tragic near miss. In many ways a capable design it was let down by poor detail design, and by the Civil Engineers. The LMS spent much time trying to resolve the problems, but in the end gave up and they were replaced. The original design had envisaged a larger boiler, and in LMS days this larger boiler was developed and fitted to some. It was this boiler that went on the Scot chassis to produce the Patriots. The smaller boiler was fitted because of the Civil Engineer's restriction on axle weight. In a curious echo of the HR Rivers, no allowance seems to have been made for the lack of hammer blow in the Claughton design, resulting in a smaller boiler than may have been necessary. In pregrouping days Civil Engineers gave no real details of why they would reject a loco design, and I do wonder to what extent the MR's restriction on loco axle load and spacing was actually justified. It does seem that the question of the effect of a loco on the track was not fully understood at the time. Comment has been made that with larger locos the Midland could have run longer coal trains. Surely the restriction was with the wagons, as has been mentioned, and the MR ran as long a trains as it could with such wagons. It just chose to use two locos, and in Victorian times the extra labour cost was probably less than the cost of capitial to otherwise. The main MR passenger route was London into the East Midlands and Yorkshire. Its direct competitor on most of this route, the GCR, also used 4-4-0s hauling light trains.

But the question was about the Midland, where as we seem to be discussing the effect on the LMS of Midland type policy. Before the Great War, when every thing changed, the Midland policy suited the Midland and its circumstances. Clearly the Midland policy did not suit the different circumstances of the LMS, nor would it have been suitable for a parallel universe where grouping did not happen. In terms of capital the Midland had about 160 million, compared with the LNWR at 120, and in 1913 the MR carried around 20% of the total goods carried by rail. Not a company sinking under the weight of poor policy making. It is rather like saying Jessops were wrong to successfully run for 70 years a network of film and camera shops because it went wrong in the last 5 years. There also seems to be an argument that because MR locos are thought to have design deficiencies the "small engine" policy was wrong in principle, which is nonsence. The fault of Midland policy was that it was appropriate and successful, but was continued after it ceased to be so. Whether or not the MR locos were as bad as they are now considered to be is another point that is debatable. The LNWR were pretty dire, and if the LMS suffered by following MR loco designs, what would have happened if they had followed LNW standards and methods?

I did take care to say a lot rather than all layouts that inspired us, but some of the inspirational layouts did so by their overall effect, rather than indiviual details. They showed us how we could produce layouts that seemed "real railways" with a plausible and realistic theme, with good operation. For me it was sometimes the overall effect that some of the past masters achieved that inspired.

I am not sure it was that simple. It does seem that axle box performance in Midland days was reasonable by the standards of the time. I quote Eric Langridge " The bearings that were sufficient for MR days were not equal to the rough and tumble of LMS handling. Quality of materials went down with the economic pressure from commercially minded managers and oil became poor. All this can be false economy from an engineering point of view; cheapness does not really pay. However I sometimes wonder if critics of bearing sizes ever had a go at designing themselves" The LMS changed to a bearing white metal that contained lead, unlike the MR who used no lead, and changed to a cheaper oil for goods engines, with a detrimental effect on axle box life. In 1943 the LMS had to returned to a better oil, with a consequent drop in the number of failed axleboxes. Mr Cox tells us that in1930, the MR 0-8-0 suffered, on average per engine, a hotbox every 27.2 months. The corresponding figure for LNW G2 was one per engine every 32.7 months, not a lot worse. The bearing pressure in the 4F box was recorded as 796 lb/sq in, while the same figure for the G2 was 856, and for the LNE J20 ( a class some of which lasted until the end of steam) was 832. For the Canadian Selkirk the figure was 836. There was more to it than just size. The prgrouping companies did not generally collect individual loco class costings, but the LMS did, and for the period 1927-29 the 4f had costs of 12.98 per mile, slightly less than the average for all goods engines (on the LMS). Or " the class 7 0-8-0 should have been much better, but in spite of its poor axleboxes its costs ran lower than those of its ex-LNW competitors" (E S Cox). Ten average total running costs for the ex-MR 7F was 13.92 old pence, for the ex-MR 4F 12.29, for the ex-LNW G2 15.46, and the L&Y 0-8-0 19.33. These are the sort of figures that would have appealed to Managerment. The question refered to MR policy, and nothing has been said to prove that was seriously at fault for the Midland Railway. All the problems mentioned stem from the LMS time, and that was outside the question, and not always totally the fault of the MR designs. I agree it was wrong to apply the Midland design to later loco designs, but that was not the fault of the Midland's policy. The comments about about the Folwer 2-6-2T and the Scots confirm my view expressed earlier that the LMS CME's office in the early days of the LMS was poorly managed and in a mess, but again that is an LMS problem, not a Midland one. And I am not sure things would have been any better if Crewe or some where else had been in charge after 1923 instead of Derby. As I said it it was not until Lord Stamp was brought in to sort out the LMS that there was any real difference.

Look how the introduction of the Bachmann 7mm narrow gauge 2-6-0 and their Shay produced a rash of American logging layouts. Provided Heljan do a good jobI think we can look forward to quite a few L&B based layouts

Is it not a measure of the improvement in standard and range of the RTR market that the standard of a lot of the layouts we look back upon as inspirational are now within the reach of an "average" modeller, providing his pocket is deep enough? That is not to denigrate those layouts, for their time they were truely inspirational, and sometimes a bit dispiriting when we realised we could not do as well. I wonder which "present day" layouts our successors will look back upon in 50 years time.

The question asked was "what could have ended the Midland's policy". The short answer is grouping, but that did not really apply to the Midland as such. The Midland Railway was successful, and by the standards of the industry had a good share value, a good reputation with its customers, and made a good profit. To have changed the policy of using "small" engines would have meant significant capital expenditure, and under the circumstances of the time not necessary. The costs of using two locos where necessary has to be balanced against the cost of the capital to do otherwise. Until the Great War buggered every thing up the Midland was a sound railway. Whether it was wise to continue that policy when later the LMS was created is a question to which most of us would probably answer no, but that is not what we were asked. To critise the Midland locomotive designs does not undermine the "small loco policy", but just highlights the inability of the CME's design side to do any better. The locos could have been much better without breeching the railway's structural constraints. In fact I suggest it adds weight to my view that if the new LMS board had said in early 1923 it wanted locos capable ot hauling heavier trains without loco change between London and Carlisle/beyond, ie what the Scots were purchased to do, the CME's office would have been hard put to comply. I suspect Anderson recognised this but his loco experience was sufficently outdated to .prevent his interferance making any improvement I suggest the commonly held view that the Midland Railway management were somehow short sighted and narrow minded is, under the Midland's circumstances, wrong. The quality of loco design may have been wanting, but that was the CME's fault, not the Board's or the rest of Senior Management.. When viewing history, although hindsight can be useful, we need to try to see things through the eyes of the people making the decisions, using only to information availalbe to them. Who in the Midland Senior Management at the turn of the century would have thought they could be called upon to manage the rival LNWR?

I am not saying the others were wrong, but that the Midland could not accommadate these larger locos without significant capital expenditure, which the Board and Senior Management were not prepared to make. They were running a successful and profitable railway, and could see no need for change. Before we critise this attitude too much we need look no further than our own High Streets. However the Midland Board did make significant changes when they thought it justified for example putting a comfortable third class on all trains, and the introduction of centralised control. To answer to the original question, the only thing really likely to change the MR policy was the future becoming the present, ie circumstances changing, but that was an LMS problem, rather than a Midland one, so out side the remit of the question. But I still say that if there had been a change of policy, the CME's office had, after Deeleys departure, no one of sufficiant seniorority and competance to produce satisfactory larger locos. And that did not change in the first two years of the LMS. Imagine the LMS Board declaring in January 1923 that it wanted, quickly, 50 larger locos capable of doing what the Scots were required to do. The LMS had nothing near suitable, and I suggest, no one able to produce any thing. Perhaps the problems of the early LMS were a blessing as they delayed production of a express passenger engine suitable for the West Coast until enough people with enough design skill were availalbe to allow the Royal Scots to be created.

During the Victoria era Locomotive Superintendents were a powerful force in the railway, answerable directly to the board, but during the early years of the 20th century there was a move to reduce their power and status, making them CMEs answerable to the General Manager.This was the reason Deeley did not stay, and it happened to Churchward after the death of Alfred Baldwin. Locomotive developement largely ceased, although fortunately Churchward's plans were mostly complete, and a number of Churchward's team left. Although the bean counters are reviled, railways are a business and have to run on sound financial and commercial lines. The Midland was a profitable well run railway, but as circumstances changed after the first war running a profitable railway became very diifcult. The MR's big locos, the S&D 2-8-0s and the Banker were tried on the London coal trains, without much success. The problem with the coal trains was not so much pulling them as stopping them, and here two 0-6-0s had an advantage. Quite how the LNWR managed with its 0-8-0s is one of life's little mysteries. Under test with a Crewe 0-8-0 running a loaded train down a 1in 100 at 20mph, after 3055 yards the train had accelerated to 25mph under full brake application. That the trains were worked day in day out is a monument to the skill of the drivers, and to just how crude engineering can be and still work. And surely the fault of the present day railways has to be the polictians. Train operating companies are just that-companies. And companies are corporate bodies designed to make a profit. We can not blame them for doing just that, by means of running trains. If some thing else was wanted, such as a public service, the politicians should have arranged accordingly.

That is the point I was trying to make. There was nothing suitable, and the designers had not shown themselves able to design any thing suitable. Hence Andersons trial of the Castle. Although it is true that the LNW locos were working the West Coast traffic they were not suitable for the heavier trains that were in prospect. And the CME's organisation was unable to provide what was wanted, partly because of a lack of clear direction from Fowler. As regards the Midlands continued use of 0-6-0s on the London coal trains, was there not a greater problem than turntables? The Civil Engineers ruling that the underline bridges on the London extension were unable to take any thing heavier. Hence the sacred MR 8ft-8ft6in wheel spacing. It was the Civil's interpretation of the bridge loading curve rather than just axle load. The fact that these interpretations were later discredited is irrelevent. There were difficulties getting 8 coupled locos within the restrictions, and even a Mallet was considered.

While I agree the Hughes 2-6-0 did avoid the worst of the MR thinking, I suggest his refusal to go higher than 180lbs boiler pressure was almost as bad. A version of the Royal Scot with that boiler pressure and the large cylinders that would be necessary would not really be the answer. The Crabs were good engines, but in a lumbering sort of way. I still suggest in the first days of the LMS there was nothing suitable available and there was an incapability to produce the locos the West Coast line needed. More Compounds were all that was available, and it was not until the involvement of North British to produce the Royal Scot that the LMS got the locos it needed, with the Patriot evolving from the Royal Scot. There seems to be a feeling in the enthusiast world that the MR "small engine policy" was wrong, and the "dead hand of Derby" was wrong to impose that policy on the LMS. I suggest the policy was sound for the Midland, and although it was wrong for the "operators" to impose it on the new LMS, the "engineers" were incapable of providing anything that would allow a difference operating policy. All of course not helped by the civil engineers. The backward step in design in the Garratts, and the manner in which Anderson went directly behind the back of the CME to Beyers indicates the lack of trust they had. The fact that Anderson could not do any better, indeed did worse, does not change that, although it does seem that it was the efforts of Anderson that drove the Senior Management to agree to the Scots, rather than the CME. . The real fault was the failure of senior management to stifle the MR/LNWR rivalry and create a unified LMS. That had to wait until Lord Stamp and Stanier.

I was not really trying to say the MR Compound was suitable for the West Coast, but that it was suitable for the Midland Railway. The Midland "small engine policy" suited the Midland, but as has been pointed out, not the LMS or the ex LNWR main line. But I did want to suggest that the MR locos were not really smaller than the majority of pregrouping locos, and those that were bigger generally were not much better. Quite a number of designers produced good 4-4-0s, but could not produce significantly better 4-6-0s. It is interesting to speculate how the new LMS would have developed suitable locos had the MR thinking not prevailed in 1923. The LNWR Claughtons had significant failings, and the L&Y 4-6-0 soon showed they were unsuited long distance operation on the West Coast. Was there the ability in the CME's organisation to design any thing up to the job apart from more compounds? I have thought that the demonstration of a GWR Castle by the LMS operating section indicated their lack of trust in the CME's dept. to produce what was required, A sort of frustrated "this is what we want, stop messing and produce some"

When in the early days of the LMS various locos were compared they found the Compounds had some of the lowest costs, and were the appropriate choice for the future. Unfortunately of course this choice was based on the circumstances of the past, not the future. But were these findings because that is what the ex-MR management wanted them to be, or because the LNWR policy was to have low cost locos, work them hard, and accept the higher operating cost, unlike the MR? It does seem to me that, GWR excepted, when the pregrouping companies tried to produce bigger locos than the prevailing 4-4-0s to meet the increasing train loads the results were generally not much of a success. The real difference between the MR and the others was that the MR never actually produced any thing larger, despite a number of proposals. I would mention when the LMS wanted to try a nonstop London-Scotland run one of the locos chosen was a Compound, not a LNWR loco.

I'm not sure the difference in size between the LNWR and the Midland was as big as the differnce between SELNEC and Barlows. The Midland had a better business organisation, but their methods of operation did not suit the rest of the LMS. The Midland had what are now called infrastructure constraints such as round house type sheds and weak underline bridges that limited the physical size of their locos, but in pregrouping times I would suggest they were not far behind the rest in the effectiveness and efficiency of their locos, GWR excepted. For passenger use none of the other pregrouping railways, other than the GWR, had many locos that could do more than a MR compound, bearing in mind the GNR pacifics do not really belong in the pregrouping era. Certainly the other LMS constituants could not offer any thing much better.

The problem with the Tay Bridge was not the use of cast iron as such, but the poor design and construction. Had the detail design, manufacture and maintenance been better the bridge could still be standing. Bouch's other bridges, and the Crumlin viaduct, show the pipe bridge principle is fine. He just got sloppy and let success go to his head.

Given the labour rates at the time using two small locos was cheaper and more reliable than the considerable capital cost of providing larger locos and the infrastructure necessary to run them. In the days when this policy of the Midland was established the railways were able to attract the managerial talent that today would go into banking. They were not supid. However, as we are now seeing on the High Street, a business and operating model that works and is profitable will not stay that way when external circumstances change. In the Midland's time the small engine policy made sense, but when, for instance, the weight per passenger of carriages increased circumstances changed.. A recent book by Adrain Tester, A Defence of the 4F, has provided some evidence that in the haulage of slow heavy coal trains the short travel valves of the 4F may not have been a disadvantage, compared to long travel valves, that Mr Cox and others would have us believe. And their frame breakage seems no worse than more modern designs.

While £620 seems a lot, and I would never have spent that much in one go, being able to buy it at £20 a month was quite an advantage. The disadvantage was that I got the parts a few at a time, and that made it difficult to plan ahead.

I have wondered how many of these hatchet jobs were finished and are actually working on a layout. Sadly I don't have room to run mine, but all in all, I thought it was not a bad kit.