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Vivarail 230 catches fire


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I've not seen it mentioned anywhere, rightly or wrongly that any fault lies with Ford. The issues seem to be with the design of the engine raft (Revolve), the design of the installation (Vivarail) and with the quality of fitment of parts and maintenance (including record keeping), I don't know where the split of responsibility lies there.

The fact that there are also design issues with the CCTV point to Vivarail either failing to design things correctly, or failing to keep on top of what their suppliers are doing or both.

Agreed
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One problem with mass produced engines is the question of who is the manufacturer? What tends to happen is that the engine builder sells a bare engine to a packager who then packages the engine and manages application specific aspects (eg., providing a generator, fitting a SOLAS package, fitting a governor system etc). Is the "manufacturer" the engine builder or the packager (eg, is it Ford or Revolve)? That question may seem obvious but it is amazing how many disputes become mired in trying to answer that simple question. One approach is to say that whoever holds the engine certification is the manufacturer, but that causes problems also in that a lot of finished engines are completed by a packager and the engine builder will quite reasonably take the position that they are not liable for what the packager does. The packager will also quite reasonably say they complete the packaging in accordance with the engine builders project guidelines and instructions therefore the builder is still responsible for those instructions being correct. A tangled web.

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I thought that it said in the report that;

 

 

The procedure that was used to refit the fuel pipes did not follow the Ford workshop manual advice not to reuse the pipe

 

Then later on;
 

 

 
 
The Fire that occurred on unit 230001 on 30th December 2016 was caused by a fuel leak in the high pressure fuel system on Genset 4 that was subsequently ignited by a hot body – likely to have been the turbocharger.
 
The fuel leaks were likely caused by a repair intervention on Genset 4 by the genset supplier and not spotted due to the lack of suitable test procedures post repair work.

 

So it sounds like the fire was caused by an engineer from Revolve reusing parts that should be single use.  In fairness a lot of fixings on engines can be reused when they probably shouldn't be.  The trick is knowing when you can get away with it.  We have had two identical breakdowns at work on vans with similar Ford diesel engines caused by the single use fixing on the intercooler pipe being reused when it shouldn't have been.  One of these was reused by a main dealership and broke 2 miles up the road.

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I believe that is the plan, the engines are easily available, and will be replaced frequently.

 

In the bus world Optare vehicles have long been designed to have the engine and associated ancillaries on a separate frame so a fresh unit can be kept, ready to go, at the depot and be swapped in less than a shift. The bus is then back out earning money, and the engine can then be overhauled/have components replaced with less time pressure, and with easy access all round the unit. As I understand it, the 230 is designed on the same principle.

 

 

Goes back way before Optares. If a Routemaster had an engine failure during the morning rush hour, it could be towed back to the garage and have a new engine fitted in time for the evening peak.

 

I read somewhere that most of the RMs that made it to the last couple of years of regular London operation had had at least ten engines fitted.

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In another life I ran a small fleet of Optare Solo buses, nice little buses. Built in the UK, Mercedes OM904 engines, built in Germany, very good engines. What let them down was what they now call the interface between the engine and the rest of the bus! A single wire to carry battery volts and the control signal to the engine management caused one bus to sit at Guildford station for 3 days while we tried to find the fault! We followed the Mercedes advise on filter changes, only to have oil spew out of the filler pipes after about 12 weeks because on the bus application, they forgot buses would be working 20 out of 24 hours, and forgot to tell us to change the crankcase breather filter more often.

 

I needed 4 buses for service and ended up with 6 as one was permanently off the road with defects for a complete year (not the same bus, but collectively), and one was required as a running spare. Even in road use, the type of vehicle does matter when it comes to engine spec!

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The base engine is a simple component as far as liability is concerned on this, same as the hoses. The genset package appears to be produced by Revolve so it only comes down to, did the pipe fail, was the pipe fitted wrong or did the design of the package cause it to fail? They can still get tied up there in specification vs design but it's in both parties interests just solve it and get it out there if there's a market for more, the report suggests they are more interested in solving the problem than throwing blame around.

The fix to ensure the 15minute operation standard is fairly simple but fitting it may take some time, rerouting or protecting the relevant pipes and wiring. One thing is they will soon now know is how fire affects the chassis in various places so identifying the best place to route changes can be done with real confidence.

Long term this may well be very good for the project as production versions will have this critical detail right.

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I'm surprised that in this sort of application there isn't a requirement similar to marine engines that the HP fuel lines be enclosed or double skinned

I'm guessing on a boat you have more limited options for evacuation especially in poor weather, the 15 min standard is effectively that in the rail application even though it doesn't specify how you achieve it like the marine situation. The 15 mins is meant to allow a train to clear a tunnel or bridge to a safe place to evacuate.

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The SOLAS provisions are about fire prevention. High pressure oil lines have to be double skinned or otherwise enclosed to prevent loss of containment/spray and all hot surfaces above 220C have to be insulated and the insulation impervious to oil. The 220C is derived from the auto ignition temperatures of fuel oil and lubricating oil. In theory is you contain oil leakage, and screen hot surfaces so that even if you do have a loss of containment there are no temperatures above the auto ignition temperature than you will not have an oil fire. And oil fires are the main cause of engine fires. SOLAS also includes provisions for crankcase explosion prevention measures and crankcase relief valves in the event that you do have an explosion.

 

The problem with these measures is that they often are less effective in practice for a range of reasons, primarily:

 

• Some screening arrangements are so badly designed that post maintenance re-instatement is a nightmare

• Screening is allowed to deteriorate in service meaning gaps open up or oil leakage builds up, soaking it over time

• Crews are under so much pressure that they take short cuts re-instating the screening

• Some crews just don’t understand the importance of these measures and don’t look after them (I saw ships where I could get a fist through gaps in the exhaust manifold screens)

 

If well maintained then a hot turbo-charger should not be a fire risk (in terms of oil ignition). The arrangements are approved by the flag administration (which in reality means class acting as a recognised organisation) so at least when new everything should be ship shape. I must admit I never understood why so many non-marine engines don’t just install a SOLAS package as in terms of fire prevention it does represent pretty much best practice. When I worked in power generation we took a decision to specify SOLAS packages for our engines as part of our body of evidence that the engines were safe.

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Goes back way before Optares. If a Routemaster had an engine failure during the morning rush hour, it could be towed back to the garage and have a new engine fitted in time for the evening peak.

 

I read somewhere that most of the RMs that made it to the last couple of years of regular London operation had had at least ten engines fitted.

I'd guess ten might be a conservative estimate, many of the last ones saw 40+ years service and had engines from two or in a handful of cases, even three manufacturers fitted during their lifespan.

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Seems very off topic, whats that got to do with Vivarail? Unless somehow every bus, train or any other public transport which catches fire for any reason in any country is going to be added to this thread...

It wasn't meant to be off topic. Just to show that fires do happen. Not that it's a reason to not use buses.

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I'd guess ten might be a conservative estimate, many of the last ones saw 40+ years service and had engines from two or in a handful of cases, even three manufacturers fitted during their lifespan.

 

When I ran a small fleet of Routemasters, we had one put  leg out of bed at bout 1220 at Streatham Hill. We had a spare bus at the yard. We took the engine out of that, and by the time the dead bus had been toed back, had the engine out. the engines were swapped and the dead bus road tested by 1830. I've recently changed an RM engine in Germany in under a day by myself.

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