GWR- a research project

[rodent279]

A man who was Swindon born, bred, educated, trained etc will have taken with him a great deal, between his ears. That having been said, he might not have been able to implement all that he thought was good, and he may not have thought that everything his old masters did was good.

 

Stephenson valve gear is a case in point where the GWR was almost certainly clinging to the familiar, where better existed. Waelschaerts gear was proven, and didn't the Hughes moguls have it? In fact, weren't the Horwich engines already generally more advanced than Derby practice, despite attempts to 'water down' the design by use of old fashioned components?

 

K

Hughes is often overshadowed by GJC, but they were contemporaries, and I believe personal friends. Both were admirers of each other's work, in much the same way as WAS & HNG were a couple of decades later.

With it's early experimentation with, and trhen adoption of, electrification, and a diesel-electric loco built on the chassis of a steam loco, if anything the L&Y was more "innovative" than the GW- depending on your definition of that word.

Edited August 5, 2017 by rodent279

[The Johnster]

Wires are much less visually offensive than NR's current production of signal gantries, which look like something designed to go with Hornby 0 gauge clockwork trains and then redesigned by someone who thought that the first attempt was too finescale.  In contrast the foldaway plug'n'play single post signals are rather neat and tidy.

 

Mind, I have an odd aesthetic appreciation of signals, rather liking the round backed GW searchlight pattern used at Cardiff General and Bristol TM in my childhood.

[The Johnster]

A man who was Swindon born, bred, educated, trained etc will have taken with him a great deal, between his ears. That having been said, he might not have been able to implement all that he thought was good, and he may not have thought that everything his old masters did was good.

 

Stephenson valve gear is a case in point where the GWR was almost certainly clinging to the familiar, where better existed. Waelschaerts gear was proven, and didn't the Hughes moguls have it? In fact, weren't the Horwich engines already generally more advanced than Derby practice, despite attempts to 'water down' the design by use of old fashioned components?

 

K

 

As a purely personal viewpoint and without much in the way of hard engineering to back it up, I'd say that almost every large English railway was a good bit ahead of Derby practice by the time of the grouping and had been for over a decade.  Ashford/Woolwich, Eastleigh, Doncaster, Darlington, Brighton, Crewe, Horwich, Swindon (of course) and Stratford were all producing what I would describe as modern style locos in the years immediately following the Great War and some had been doing it for a while.  Derby's boilers were as good as anyone's, and it is below the footplate that they seem to have lost the plot, or abandoned it after Kirtley, to the detriment of their early 20th century output and that of the early LMS, and to be fair to their loco men, they were constrained by board level interference and a policy of using small (too small in many cases) engines that were simple to maintain and easy to produce in large numbers.

 

On the Celtic fringes, we lagged a bit, with the Scots seeming unwilling to adopt modern methods with the possible exception of the controversial Highland 'Castles', and the Welsh going for big boilers on some of the Valleys 0-6-2 tanks but not much else.  The Cambrian was producing newly designed 4-4-0s and 0-6-0s in 1921 which could easily have been drawn up 30 years earlier, and Scottish traditional practice led to some hopeless 4-6-0s on the LSWR from Drummond, who made some of the best Victorian 4-4-0s in the game.

 

Compounding was all the rage in those days and you would have to say was evidence of progressive thinking, but in the event it needed French levels of driver education and skill to implement successfully, and was not suited to the rough and tumble small c conservative world of British operating practice.  Derby managed to squeeze this idea at least past their recalcitrant bosses!  And it was the Derby philosophy and culture of short, light, frequent trains that eventually triumphed, producing the HST, beyond doubt the most successful passenger train ever built in the UK, at it's introduction the fastest train in the world for which you did not have to pay a supplementary fare, while being able to run on conventional tracks and throwing air conditioning, double glazing, and air suspension in for free, a phenomenal achievement that arguably saved the Railway from the likes of Serpell and is still in front line service 40 years later with only the method of providing the current to the traction motors being any significant difference on later trains.  

 

An interesting but academic now point is whether Swindon would have bothered with the hydraulics had the railway not been nationalised.  With no 1955 Modernisation plan and given the attitude they had in the early 50s, I reckon we'd have seen another decade at least of Castles and 28xx, and the railway would have been in serious trouble by the 70s, with the good steam coal running out, unable to afford electrification, and reliant on outside contractors for diesel electrics.  

[The Stationmaster]

After its experience with the gas turbines there is probably reason to expect that Swindon would have tried diesel hydraulics because of the alleged electrical problems suffered by the two gas turbines.

 

And of course it is very easy to forget the success f hydraulic transmission in Germany which Swindon drew on and the successes of two of the WR's own hydraulic classes in traffic with the D10XX actually being for some time more reliable and cheaper to maintain than the BR 'standard' Brush Type 4.  but of course once the plus was pulled and the maintenance infrastructure was dismantled it was hardly unexpected that things began to fall apart.  However, lack of ETH apart, they were still plenty good enough to replace the abysmal 50'50s when they first arrived on the Western.

[Nearholmer]

Yes, my guess is that a not-nationalised GWR would have concluded, quite quickly, that GT on rails was a fuel-guzzling nightmare, and had to turn to the more practical proposition of diesel.

 

Now, the LMS was streets ahead in the diesel stakes, so we can surmise that, by the time the GWR realised the folly of GT, they would have had a convincing demonstration of: main-line passenger DE at c2000hp/unit; freight/branch DE at c1000hp per unit; and lightweight DMMU in service.

 

And, the SR would have had roughly the same locos (much nicer livery!) plus DEMU in service.

 

And, the Germans would be well into their stride with lightweight DH locos.

 

Coal prices are climbing, labour costs are soaring, the company is bleeding cash, so, what to do?

 

I think there is a realistic possibility that Swindon could have gone DH, rather than DE, for locos, and expanded its railcar programme to become DMMUs, or even DHMUs. There just wasn't an "electrical culture" on the GWR, whereas there was a culture of ever-finer mechanical engineering. Added to which, looked at from some perspectives, DH is more efficient, and I think the Swindon mind would have fastened on that.

 

I suppose it is even possible that they would have electrified their most densely used main-lines, perhaps following the example of the not-nationalised LNER, which has, in my fantasy-land, scraped together enough ha'pennies to electrify London to Tyneside and the core of Yorkshire, instead of wasting money on a fleet of dead-fancy super-power DE's that EE were trying to enveigle them into buying. But, I'm not sure that even the busiest parts of the GWR were busy enough to support the infrastructure costs.

 

The real issue for all of them, except perhaps the SR, would, of course, have been capital with which to buy any of this desperately needed new-tech. Was there enough free capital in the country to tempt it into investments at the rates of return that they could have achieved?

 

Kevin

Edited August 5, 2017 by Nearholmer

[LMS2968]

Staying away from the topic, as we do, and referring back to Stanier's move to the LMS, he had, as already said, spent his working life on that railway and was imbued with its working and techniques. These he brought to and imposed on the LMS. Some were an outstanding success, others less so. The biggest contribution to LMS practice was the GWR axlebox, modified to accept mechanical lubrication, and which virtually eliminated hot boxes which had previously plagued that railway. The taper boiler was also a success, and while the LMS was already using Belpaire fireboxes, Stanier moved it from the straight side and top configuration to the GWR curved type. Less successful, although it is often overstated, were the smokebox regulator and low degree superheat, but in this Stanier learned the lessons and went back to previous LMS practice.

 

He did have an effect on workshop practice. He was appalled at the finish of many components of 6200, the first Stanier engine to traffic, and ordered an improvement. This was legacy of F.W. Webb, whose search for economies saw no reason to finish components beyond the point where they were functional. Stanier did. He also banned the use of Crewe's three-roller tube expander for its tendency to produce triangular tube ends; he introduced Swindon's six-roller type.

 

The GWR had a great influence on the other three railways in the Grouping years, but it tends to be forgotten that they the other three had influences on each other as staff, Drawing Office staff in particular, moved from one railway to another, although this receives far less publicity than the various trials of Castles on the LNER and LMS. The influence they had on the GWR is minimal, however; while Churchwood was always willing to learn from others (the French compounds, for example) Collett was satisfied with what they had. And while this was good, as my grandmother used to say, there is always something to learn.

[The Johnster]

Yes, my guess is that a not-nationalised GWR would have concluded, quite quickly, that GT on rails was a fuel-guzzling nightmare, and had to turn to the more practical proposition of diesel.

 

Now, the LMS was streets ahead in the diesel stakes, so we can surmise that, by the time the GWR realised the folly of GT, they would have had a convincing demonstration of: main-line passenger DE at c2000hp/unit; freight/branch DE at c1000hp per unit; and lightweight DMMU in service.

 

And, the SR would have had roughly the same locos (much nicer livery!) plus DEMU in service.

 

And, the Germans would be well into their stride with lightweight DH locos.

 

Coal prices are climbing, labour costs are soaring, the company is bleeding cash, so, what to do?

 

I think there is a realistic possibility that Swindon could have gone DH, rather than DE, for locos, and expanded its railcar programme to become DMMUs, or even DHMUs. There just wasn't an "electrical culture" on the GWR, whereas there was a culture of ever-finer mechanical engineering. Added to which, looked at from some perspectives, DH is more efficient, and I think the Swindon mind would have fastened on that.

 

I suppose it is even possible that they would have electrified their most densely used main-lines, perhaps following the example of the not-nationalised LNER, which has, in my fantasy-land, scraped together enough ha'pennies to electrify London to Tyneside and the core of Yorkshire, instead of wasting money on a fleet of dead-fancy super-power DE's that EE were trying to enveigle them into buying. But, I'm not sure that even the busiest parts of the GWR were busy enough to support the infrastructure costs.

 

The real issue for all of them, except perhaps the SR, would, of course, have been capital with which to buy any of this desperately needed new-tech. Was there enough free capital in the country to tempt it into investments at the rates of return that they could have achieved?

 

Kevin

 

I think you are probably right about the dmus, Kevin, and I reckon the early ones would have been effectively A38 auto trailers with motors underneath for branch and semi-fast work.  The internal layout of the 119/120 cross country sets was not dissimilar to these.

Edited August 6, 2017 by The Johnster

[The Stationmaster]

Staying away from the topic, as we do, and referring back to Stanier's move to the LMS, he had, as already said, spent his working life on that railway and was imbued with its working and techniques. These he brought to and imposed on the LMS. Some were an outstanding success, others less so. The biggest contribution to LMS practice was the GWR axlebox, modified to accept mechanical lubrication, and which virtually eliminated hot boxes which had previously plagued that railway. The taper boiler was also a success, and while the LMS was already using Belpaire fireboxes, Stanier moved it from the straight side and top configuration to the GWR curved type. Less successful, although it is often overstated, were the smokebox regulator and low degree superheat, but in this Stanier learned the lessons and went back to previous LMS practice.

 

He did have an effect on workshop practice. He was appalled at the finish of many components of 6200, the first Stanier engine to traffic, and ordered an improvement. This was legacy of F.W. Webb, whose search for economies saw no reason to finish components beyond the point where they were functional. Stanier did. He also banned the use of Crewe's three-roller tube expander for its tendency to produce triangular tube ends; he introduced Swindon's six-roller type.

 

The GWR had a great influence on the other three railways in the Grouping years, but it tends to be forgotten that they the other three had influences on each other as staff, Drawing Office staff in particular, moved from one railway to another, although this receives far less publicity than the various trials of Castles on the LNER and LMS. The influence they had on the GWR is minimal, however; while Churchwood was always willing to learn from others (the French compounds, for example) Collett was satisfied with what they had. And while this was good, as my grandmother used to say, there is always something to learn.

 

Don't forget that in the Collett era there were not only considerable advances in GWR workshop practice but also advances in managing the heavy maintenance of the  loco stock which reduced repair costs - so overall just as important as shiny new designs when it came to the ever important bottom line.

[The Stationmaster]

I think you are probably right about the dmus, Kevin, and I reckon the early ones would have been effectively A38 auto trailers with motors underneath for branch and semi-fast work.  The internal layout of the 119/120 cross country sets was not dissimilar to these.

Between the wars Swindon tried what were then seen as the most likely/viable alternatives for reducing short distance & branch line type passenger train operating cost.  it had direct experience of steam railmotors and auto trains, carried out trials with Sentinel locos on branch line working and then went into diesel railcars, and finally and latterly, a multiple unit version of them.   The die was seemingly cast and all it needed was development (then they went and ordered the 16XX!!!)

[Nearholmer]

Does any GWR expert here present know how the engines on the multi-engine and two-car railcars were controlled from the cabs (pneumatic? Hydraulic? Electrical? Mechanical?), and whether the system was capable of expansion to permit cars to be coupled together and driven from one cab?

 

I ask, because getting the MU control arrangement sorted-out for diesel railcars was actually quite a conundrum for engineers in the period c1935-55 not only in GB, but elsewhere, and quite a few of what people think of as early-DMUs didn't actually have true MU capability in the way that electric trains had had since the 1890s (1880s, if you count a very early, and very short-lived, Siemens system of mechanical control of electric traction).

 

The answer to this may win the GWR 'innovation points'!

 

Kevin

[Edwardian]

Well Broad Gauge was an innovation, but one that failed to influence enough other companies; being largely restricted to concerns intended to form part of the trunk route to the west.

 

There is an argument that the Broad Gauge lines thereafter became increasingly fixed in aspic.  I was interested to read an old Railway Magazine article on Broad Gauge Singles.  All those running in May 1892 had been rebuilt, or, in the main, built, in the 1880s, so were fairly modern locomotives, but I doubt they were exhibiting much by way of innovation.

 

ATC was a brilliant concept, but probably more influential in the longer term than it was with rival concerns at the time. Generally the Great Western did not rely upon periodic disasters to keep developing best practice in railway safety, and I think it deserves credit for that.

 

It is a vice of all historians and biographers that their chosen subject assumes an undue prominence, and the railway historian can invariably point to "firsts" or innovations or impressive statistics that, out of the context of the general railway scene, can give the impression that the company being described led its field.

 

I find that railway companies are like most institutions, they go through periods of innovation, consolidation and stagnation.  I should hesitate to claim that the Great Western was a greater or more influential innovator than its peers.

 

Yet its sheer size means that it will have a great share of the innovations, and its longevity enhanced that.  The Premier Line might have been so in its day, but it was gone in 1923 and its achievements had disproportionately little influence after that.  

 

In the Grouping Era, I think the GW had a head start over the others; Castles, Kings, Cheltenham Flyer, Diesel Railcars etc, and could take advantage of the modern fast lines developed c.1905-1910 and the standardisation programme of Churchward. 

 

In the 1920s and early '30s, the other three had to cope with much more heterogeneous locomotives and rolling stock, and divers standards and practices, and do not seem to have had that much cash to throw about, especially the LNER. The Southern seems to have concentrated its energies on electrification and the LMS and LNER seemed to take a long time to realise their potential under Stannier and Gresley, but when they did they started to look very 'go ahead' compared with the contemporary Great Western, with their streamlined Pacifics and coaching stock. It is a pity this was so soon interrupted by Herr Hitler.  

 

But, then, although it might seem that the best in innovation was over by the early '30s, the Great Western seems to have been limbering up for another fit of innovation, with plans to electrify the GW Mainline and the ordering of the Gas Turbines, when Hitler and Nationalisation intervened. 

Edited August 7, 2017 by Edwardian

[34theletterbetweenB&D]

...To what extent was the Great Western Railway innovative and how did those innovations influence other railways in Rolling Stock Technology and Infrastructure?...

If I were assessor, I'd have failed him on the question. There's a presumption that influential innovation occurred. Evidence of bias, unsound if research is the purpose of the exercise.

[LMS2968]

ATC was a brilliant concept, but probably more influential in the longer term than it was with rival concerns at the time. Generally the Great Western did not rely upon periodic disasters to keep developing best practice in railway safety, and I think it deserves credit for that.

No argument there, but it was only one of three safety devices available, all costing huge sums of money and long time periods to install. Besides ATC there were colour light signalling to assist the driver and track circuits to assist the bobby. Ideally, all three were needed and were all eventually installed, but long after Nationalisation, let alone the Grouping!

 

Much depends on how you look at it. Colour lights are not only easier to see but also allow great simplification of signalling installations, simplifying the driver's task. The GWR stayed (mostly) with semaphores. These were more difficult to see and interpret, so leading to driver error and signal overruns, but had ATC as an additional safeguard in this eventuality.

 

So which was best, a system to reduce errors or a system to correct errors as they occurred? In practice, none gave 100% security. The human being is very adept at exploiting any holes in any system, especially if disaster results.

[96701]

Absolute nonsense.

Wires may be functional rather than aesthetic, but I'd rather be travelling on a swift silent electric than a slow dirty outmoded diesel.

I don't see how you can say wires intrude on the countryside anymore than the railway itself does. If you can put them up through the fells, through the Arlberg & Gotthard valleys, in the Bernese Oberland, then a bit of west country dairy land is no big loss.

Brianusa hasn't missed a trick yet on managing to criticise the electrification of the GWR beyond Airport Junction.

[DCB]

Good vid.

 

CofT's run down Wellington Bank however was done with its original parallel boiler and older slide valves. (Which kinda makes its speed even more impressive!)

Sorry, City of Truro never had a Parallel boiler, it had a Std no 4 boiler, a short cone taper boiler like a Black 5 or BR Std 5 as there ever was a long cone fullly tapered std 4,  It was unsuperheated, and had slide valves. Due perhaps to lubrication problems the pre WW1 non superheater locos were generally faster than the superheated versions and neither GW 4-4-0s nor LNWR Experiments ran as fast when superheated, more economical more powerful, not as fast. 

 

Swindon was the leader in Walschaerts valve gear, MSWJR no 4, the incredibly useless and unreliable Fairlie with Walschaerts gear would have been a source of merriment and amazement around Swindon pre 1890, and Swindon built more Walschaerts gear locos than any other company pre WW1, most of them Railmotors.   The Stephenson gear used on most swindon products produced more torque at low speeds than Walschaerts and the inside gear allowed regular piston and valve examinations without disturbing the valve setting. 

 

Interestingly when Stanier took GW methods to the LMS and introduced his Mogul it was less efficient then the Crab and the Jubilee worse than the Patriot.  Sadly he didn't take GW Piston Valves as they would have saved many struggles as fitters struggled with heavily carboned multi ring piston valves firmly stuck in their liners, where GW valves simply fell away from the liner when steam was shut off.

 

Stanier's innovations, Sloping Throat plates etc produced the GWs worst boilers, County and Manor, while Staniers best performing Jubilee "Rooke" had the GW Churchward derived straight throatplate boiler.

 

Holcroft's Swindon designed 2 to 1 conjugated valve gear did good service on a few hundred Gresley designs and some Union Pacific monstrosities.

 

Right to the end of steam no one else had a repair facility to equal Swindon, the A shop was for many years the worlds largest, They ran the worlds fastest train, and longest through run by a loco prior to the non stop Flying Scotsman and Silver Jubilee.

 

Best of all the GW didn't like outside valve gear and used cast number plates which makes modelling GW locos just that bit easier.

[Miss Prism]

Sorry, City of Truro never had a Parallel boiler, it had a Std no 4 boiler

 

Sorry, David, I must have been thinking of the original Atbaras.

[John_Miles]

Staying away from the topic, as we do, and referring back to Stanier's move to the LMS, he had, as already said, spent his working life on that railway and was imbued with its working and techniques. These he brought to and imposed on the LMS. Some were an outstanding success, others less so. The biggest contribution to LMS practice was the GWR axlebox, modified to accept mechanical lubrication, and which virtually eliminated hot boxes which had previously plagued that railway. The taper boiler was also a success, and while the LMS was already using Belpaire fireboxes, Stanier moved it from the straight side and top configuration to the GWR curved type. Less successful, although it is often overstated, were the smokebox regulator and low degree superheat, but in this Stanier learned the lessons and went back to previous LMS practice.

 

He did have an effect on workshop practice. He was appalled at the finish of many components of 6200, the first Stanier engine to traffic, and ordered an improvement. This was legacy of F.W. Webb, whose search for economies saw no reason to finish components beyond the point where they were functional. Stanier did. He also banned the use of Crewe's three-roller tube expander for its tendency to produce triangular tube ends; he introduced Swindon's six-roller type.

 

The GWR had a great influence on the other three railways in the Grouping years, but it tends to be forgotten that they the other three had influences on each other as staff, Drawing Office staff in particular, moved from one railway to another, although this receives far less publicity than the various trials of Castles on the LNER and LMS. The influence they had on the GWR is minimal, however; while Churchwood was always willing to learn from others (the French compounds, for example) Collett was satisfied with what they had. And while this was good, as my grandmother used to say, there is always something to learn.

 

There are quite a few myths in the above posts but I'll deal here with the one about GWR axleboxes. They were no more successful on the LMS than the previous practice. The LMS was a great collector of statistics and there is data to prove this. What did change was the oil. In the early 1930s the LMS started using a mineral oil as opposed to the previous tallow based substance. Locomotive axleboxes rely on what one could call smeared lubrication, unlike for example auto engine crankshaft bearings which have pressure forced lubrication with the oil being collected in a sump and recirculated. The mineral oil doesn't smear as well and so was less effective. The solution was to use an oil derived by the LNER. I forget what it consisted of but they had had the same problem.

 

The much derided 4Fs were tried with Stanier axleboxes and it made no difference and for the record their performance was no worse than most other inside cylinder engines owned by the LMS and for instance much better than the Super Ds.

 

The comments about workshop practice are true but only apply to Crewe which had failed to move with the times.

[LMS2968]

Could you actually quote these statistics? While there might have been a change in lubricant at the same time, every commentator has stated that the change in the type of axlebox was the key factor. It wasn't just this, though, also needed was an adequate bearing surface area and this wasn't available with a 4F, irrespective of the type of axlebox fitted. The Super Ds were an LNWR design and built on LNWR principles - cheap and light with an expectation of increased maintenance costs.

 

The commentators include E. Stuart Cox, Roland Bond, A.J Powell, J Maxwell Dunn, H.C.H. Burgess, all in a position to know, either as designers, inspectors, shed masters, or fitters. None mention a change of lubricant.

 

Crewe workshop practice was good, sometimes very good, in parts, and the boiler shop's capabilities drew praise from Stanier. It was capable of forming the firebox outer wrapper plate in a single piece. Swindon, and Stanier in his first designs, formed it in three pieces riveted together.

[John_Miles]

I'll give information in stages as I find it. First a quote from Langridge who worked in Derby drawing office "The bearings that were sufficient for MR days were not equal to te rough and tumble of LMS handling. Quality of materials went down [​this refers to the whitemetal as well as the oil]​ with economic pressure from commercially-minded managers and oil became poor. All this can be false economy from an Engineering point of view, cheapness does not really pay."

[John_Miles]

Here are some statistics which show the change that occurred after the LMS introduced a better type of oil based on LNER experience. The figures relate to Super Ds (G1 class). In 1942 each engine has on average a hot box once every 8.8 months, in 1943 it was 11.6, in 1944 16.4, in 1945 it leapt to 29.5. For the G2s it went from 8.5 to by 1946. There was also a change in the metal used in the axleboxes for the same period. In the 1930s the LMS started using a white metal with a high proportion of lead. They reverted to the no lead white metal in the 1940s. By contrast in the early 1940s, a 4F had a hot box once every 20 months. The reason is simple, they were less powerful than the Super D and therefore the forces on the axle boxes were lower. Inside cylinder engines always suffered from a lack of space for bearings because the big ends and valve gear all competed for space between the frames.

Edited August 11, 2017 by John_Miles

[John_Miles]

The oil developed by the LNER was known as W oil. Its secret ingredient was 15% of rape oil mixed in with the mineral oil. The properties of rape oil give enhanced "oiliness " (I have no idea what is meant by this) and viscosity. I think what it did was stick better in the bearing whereas the mineral oil tended to flow out.

 

E.S. Cox quoted the bearing life of a Midland axlebox between re-metalling as 35,000 to 40,000 miles. The Stanier box was quoted as 37,500 so about the same. I can't at the moment find the figures for hot boxes between the two but there is a quote by Adrian Tester, who has done a huge amount of research into this, that they were the same.

[LMS2968]

Here are some statistics which show the change that occurred after the LMS introduced a better type of oil based on LNER experience. The figures relate to Super Ds (G1 class). In 1942 each engine has on average a hot box once every 8.8 months, in 1943 it was 11.6, in 1944 16.4, in 1945 it leapt to 29.5. For the G2s it went from 8.5 to by 1946. There was also a change in the metal used in the axleboxes for the same period. In the 1930s the LMS started using a white metal with a high proportion of lead. They reverted to the no lead white metal in the 1940s. By contrast in the early 1940s, a 4F had a hot box once every 20 months. The reason is simple, they were less powerful than the Super D and therefore the forces on the axle boxes were lower. Inside cylinder engines always suffered from a lack of space for bearings because the big ends and valve gear all competed for space between the frames.

Sounds reasonable. Although the 4Fs are renowned in literature for poor axleboxes, they were adequate, but only just, on that class; it was when they were fitted under the Garratts and Austin 7s that they really suffered.

 

By the way, much as I like reading Eric Langridge's works, he did have a certain pro-Midland leaning; this especially noticeable in his anti-GWR comments (although these stem from his apprenticeship on the LSWR) and rather condescending attitude to Stanier. He was largely responsible for the design of the Austin 7s, 4F boxes et al, but is strangely quiet on their deficiencies.

 

The 4Fs did of course have four eccentrics as well as two cranks between the frames, which severely limited the length of the axle journals. But it didn't restrict their diameters. Those of the Austin 7s and Garratts should have been enlarged but weren't. If Langridge suggested they should be and Symes vetoed it, he doesn't mention it, which is rather out of character for him.

 

The Super Ds of course had Joy gear and no eccentrics, so the journals were much longer. It was the ability to provide bigger bearings which attracted F.W. Webb to the gear. So why all the hot boxes? A POSSIBLE reason is that they also had a centre bearing on the driving axle, but the hierarchy at Derby decided that this was simply extra maintenance and had it removed. This almost immediately led to frames cracking; did it also lead to hot boxes?

 

I can accept that oils improved over the period (things often do), likewise the white metal (there were different grades for different purposes. When bearings were remetalled and the old metal removed, it was important that the 'scrap' went to the right bin for reuse). But I have not yet read anything indicating that the GWR boxes were not instrumental in reduced - drastically - the occurrence of hot boxes on the LMS.

Edited August 11, 2017 by LMS2968

[John_Miles]

One other statistic I found this afternoon while trawling through my very disorganised files was on availability for 4Fs. The figures were collected by region during BR days. In 1958 the availability for 4Fs on the Western region (presumably S&D) was 81% (measured by time) whereas for the Churchward 43s 2-6-0 it was 77%. On the other regions the 4F availability varied between 78% (LMR) and 85% (Eastern and NE). For comparison 8Fs varied between 72% (Scottish ) and 83% LMR. In part this shows you can prove anything with statistics but it also shows the 4Fs weren't as bad as all that. Adrian Tester has produced evidence that Cox was economical with the truth and that other writers have accepted what he wrote.

[LMS2968]

Yes, as you say, you can prove anything by statistics, and availability is one of them.

 

A loco that does a high mileage generally has low availability. This is because periodic and mileage exams and boiler washouts come up more frequently than with a low mileage engine. So one which sits at the back of the shed all the time but is available has a better availability record than one that racks up the miles. This also explains why big passenger locos have lower availability than goods engines, although this is sometimes compensated by higher mileages allowed between routine repairs.

[The Stationmaster]

One other statistic I found this afternoon while trawling through my very disorganised files was on availability for 4Fs. The figures were collected by region during BR days. In 1958 the availability for 4Fs on the Western region (presumably S&D) was 81% (measured by time) whereas for the Churchward 43s 2-6-0 it was 77%. On the other regions the 4F availability varied between 78% (LMR) and 85% (Eastern and NE). For comparison 8Fs varied between 72% (Scottish ) and 83% LMR. In part this shows you can prove anything with statistics but it also shows the 4Fs weren't as bad as all that. Adrian Tester has produced evidence that Cox was economical with the truth and that other writers have accepted what he wrote.

 

But did they all measure availability in the same way?  If it was anything like the way they measured mainline diesel loco availability then the answer is that they didn't. And were S&D 4Fs measured in the LMS way by Derby or were they measured the Swindon way? 

 

The Swindon/Western way of measuring availability would inevitably have produced worse figures than the way at least one other BR region measured availability (a good way to improve availability is to not take the total fleet but only count as the base fleet locos which are not in works).