Signalling for modellers who don't know much about signalling

[PatB]

When I was at school we used to have little pots of mercury, we made TNT in chemistry and grew copper sulphate crystals - all highly dangerous in their own ways.

 

Even with safeguards in place it's possible to defeat them and cause an accident

 

True, although it appears that the signalman in the Connington case was actively playing silly b***ers, which is much harder to guard against than an honest mistake.

 

As for higher risks once being tolerated, although I didn't get to make TNT at school, we did play with mercury in open containers, and I remember having a Junior Science Encyclopedia which advocated, to an intended readership of, I'd guess, 10 year olds and up, the growing of a crystal garden. Thinking back, I find it remarkable that it was not only suggested, but that the kids reading it might reasonably be expected to legitimately obtain the raw materials from supposedly responsible suppliers. Different times indeed .

[PatB]

Well, little did I know that my 'let's look at some modelling' post would have spawned such a discussion.

 

Pat B - as a railway industry safety assurance professional I could write a PhD dissertation in response to your posting. I don't have the time today(!) so I will limit myself to the following:

 

The Hull Paragon accident was in 1927, 90 years ago.

 

Most railway historians regard the Armagh accident in 1889 as the 'seminal' moment in the history of railway safety, when railway companies were forced to adopt fundamental safety controls to prevent accidents. The working methods in place on that day would be comical were their consequences not so tragic.

 

Using a crude bit of maths, Hull Paragon is somewhat closer to Armagh 1889 than the present day (2017). So on that - admittedly rather unscientific - basis, comparisons with contemporary safety thinking such as hierarchy of control and Swiss cheeses is perhaps a little disingenuous. (as indeed you do acknowledge)

 

Sadly, but perhaps inevitably, advances in safety on the railway have often been spurred on by accidents which expose weaknesses in the incumbent systems. I have more than a suspicion that the railway industry might not be unique in this regard? Two classic examples illustrate the point.

 

Harrow 1952 brought about the widespread adoption of AWS (the cab warning system that advises the driver of signal aspects and applies the brakes if he doesn't react to an adverse signal). The rail industry had been toying with that idea for at least the previous 30 years and an equivalent system was already in use on the former GWR. Contemporary safety thinking would have it that the industry should have assessed the risk, determined it to be intolerable (or at the very least not ALARP) and fitted the system before such an accident occurred. But it didn't (two world wars didn't exactly help, to be fair!)

 

Bringing the story more up to date, a spate of bad accidents in the 1990's, notably Southall (1997) and Ladbroke Grove (1999) highlighted that, good as it was, AWS was not infallible and so nowadays we have TPWS, an overlay which prevents* the driver overriding the warning should the TPWS trap be 'tripped' and thus bringing train safely to a stand. It is now beyond reasonable doubt that this initiative is a major factor (in my view THE major factor) as to why we have not had a single passenger train crash fatality in the UK for over 10 years now, an unprecedented record. (*feel free to cite the circumstances behind the Wootton Bassett SPAD by all means, if you must...)

 

Rail industry a leader in its approach to safety? Hmm... People I work with certainly don't think of it like that and we are constantly looking over our shoulder and comparing ourselves with other industries wondering whether we could do more. And I haven't even 'gone there' in terms of human factors and organisational culture.

 

Next post back to modelling - promise!

 

All fair comment. As I've noted, one of the things I find most surprising about Hull was the lack of comment by the Inspector about that brief but crucial moment between the replacement of the signal to danger and the first axle of the lrain reaching the locking bar. I had been under the impression that, by 1927, this would have been recognized as a hole in the system and covered by BoT/legislative requirements. Clearly not so and also sufficiently normal that rectification was recommended rather than mandated.

 

My comments on the rail industry as a leader in the approach to safety, I was thinking more broad brush historically than about what might be happening now. Note that I did include those overseeing the industry (BoT primarily I suppose) as they probably had more to do with this than the companies themselves. As an outsider, I have difficulty thinking of any industry in which such a concerted effort was made so early and applied so widely to develop safe practices and safe equipment. Maybe commercial shipping involving paying passengers?

[Grovenor]

Even with safeguards in place it's possible to defeat them and cause an accident

The referenced accident being another case of inadequate safeguards from which the industry has developed as mentioned by LNER4479 above.

Regards

[The Stationmaster]

I'm posting on my phone and so can't easily quote all the stuff I'd like to address, but hopefully I can make myself adequately clear (perhaps not a given). Firstly, thanks to Beast, Stationmaster, Mick et al for clarification of correct terminology and providing me with informational resources I didn't previously know about. Very useful.

 

I confess to approaching the Hull crash from the perspective of a C21st engineer with some experience in safety systems rather than as an expert in railway signalling and operation either historic or contemporary, so yes, I'm probably guilty of a degree of projection of current standards to a different era. However, even allowing that the Swiss Cheese Model and the Hierarchy of Controls were many decades into the future at the time, I find myself surprised that the system in place met the legislation in force both at the time and subsequently. That it did is clear both from the lack of censure from the Inspector and the fact that it remained in place afterwards. Even without the frameworks developed later I remain surprised that an administrative control (a rule) was considered adequate when an engineering control (a track circuit or an extended/repositioned locking bar) would have provided a more robust safeguard. This particularly in the context of a busy station, a large and complex signalling system and multiple signalmen working under considerable pressure of time; all factors increasing the likelihood of errors.Even allowing for strict adherence to the Rule Book, wouldn't, for example, a light engine (obviously much shorter than the train involved) have shaved any margin of safety in the system very thin indeed?

 

Anyhow, consider me educated, which is, after all, the point of this thread.

 

I suspect that what might have come across as dogged insistence that I knew better than the experts was more an internet filtered manifestation of my astonishment that such a fragile system remained in place so late. Especially given that the railways and those overseeing them were probably the leading pioneers in the development of effective, fail-safe safety systems from a very early date.

 

I certainly wouldn't regard a Rule as an 'administrative control' - in fact in modern parlance you would call it a work procedure or method statement and would have arrived at it through risk assessment (although clearly a further risk which should be controlled existed because of the lack of a track circuit or locking bar extending the whole of the way from the signal to the point toe.  But in the context of British railway operation  The Rules and Regulations produced a disciplined method of working, and particularly in the case of the latter, were part of the apparatus and procedure for enforcing the law of the land within that disciplined system.

 

And this takes us back to the subject of this thread because what happened at Paragon is one illustration of the fact that ideally sited signals protecting the toe end of a facing point should be sited as closely as possible to that toe end (although the use of track circuits allowed signals to be sited further in rear if other factors so required).  But in many cases 'other factors' were an important influence hence the need before widespread adoption of reliable track circuiting to apply a disciplined approach (not an 'administrative' one) to the working of signals at facing points.  The alternative would simply to have been to add more signals at a succession of facing points but, again using modern terminology, that would simply inject more risk due to potential sighting difficulties and the potential for Drivers to 'read through' and miss a signal standing at danger.

 

It is very easy in todays railway context to also forget that until comparatively recent times track layouts were far more complex than they are today for example at my local branch junction station layout rationalisation plus a bit of bi-directional signalling and 4 point ends (which effectively make two crossovers) do what once required a double junction and a total of 4 single point ends, a diamond crossing, and two single slip compound points.  The change from steam to diesel power and unit trains has brought about that change on the running lines (plus the removal of a four more point ends needed mainly for engine run-round purposes from the branch bay).  That is but one relatively straightforward junction station which in many respects was typical of its kind and considerably less complex in track layout terms than quite a few others.

[LNER4479]

And this takes us back to the subject of this thread because what happened at Paragon is one illustration of the fact that ideally sited signals protecting the toe end of a facing point should be sited as closely as possible to that toe end

 

It is very easy in todays railway context to also forget that until comparatively recent times track layouts were far more complex than they are today.

Well, Mike - I can't think of a more perfect introduction to another model signal posting following my previous offering.

 

These are the Grantham north end signals. All three of these signals are junction signals and are thus sited close to the point where the lines junction off from each other. Each of the two arms signals the same route, but using different trackwork, as we shall see. The big signal prominent in the centre is the same signal we saw in the distance in the previous posting. It has two additional features compared to the other two signals. Firstly, a distant arm that relates to the next signal along the ECML (I'll illustrate that in a subsequent post); secondly, co-acting home arms. As can be seen, these work together so if the bottom one falls the top one does as well. This is for sighting purposes on the faster route. Approaching the station from the south, a driver would not be able to see the lower arms until he was almost upon the signal, due to presence of the station buildings and the footbridge.

 

This is the view looking the other way and shows the junction being referred to. Simply put, the lines to Nottingham diverge away from the East Coast Mainline and the heart of it is a double junction, to the immediate right hand side of the signalbox. However, the line to the left hand side of the signal box is the departing line to Nottingham from the west side of the station so that adds to the complexity - and interest. The (incorrectly-liveried!) O2 freight loco is coming across the junction from the Nottingham direction and thus blocking the East Coast Mainline in both directions. The signal in this view is therefore locked from being cleared for the (green) pacific loco to proceed northwards along the ECML. The signal is sited at the end of the platform and there is thus a little distance, and one trailing point, to be negotiated before a train gets to the point that forms the actual junction. This is because trains that access the ECML from the other platforms use that trailing connection hence a train in the main platform needs to be stopped far enough back to avoid a conflict. Purists on here will highlight (and indeed have already pointed out to me) that the point alongside the signal box should be set in correspondence to the point that the freight train is passing over to provide flank protection. A mixture of indolence and compromise means that the layout signalling system does not require that.

 

This wider view shows the full junction and how the signals for the other two platforms function. I have marked up the picture in terms of how the lower right signal works. This is where a northbound train arriving along the down relief (see previous posting) ends up and was numbered as Platform 5 back in the day (nowadays it is Platform 4). Not quite sure what happened to the train in the picture as it appears to have moved a bit too far forward (a SPAD?!); putting that to one side(!), if the right hand (higher) signal arm is cleared then that indicates the route out onto the ECML using the trailing connection referred to above. The left hand (lower) signal arm indicates the route to Nottingham which passes round the left hand side of the signalbox. The 'rule' here is that the higher arm indicates the more important route - ECML more important than Nottingham so far as Grantham is concerned! The arms on the middle signal give equivalent indications from Platform 4, trains to Nottingham using the dedicated connection across the diamond crossing to access the Nottingham route, as opposed to briefly joining the ECML only to immediately diverge away from it again. This is a good example of a more complex track layout, as Mike refers to, that would probably be rationalised today. In fact, that is exactly what has happened at Grantham. So much so in fact that the North junctions do not exist at all; the junction for Nottingham is now half a mile further south where 'South Box' once stood.

 

In passing, and picking up on this latter point in particular, can I emphasise how the positioning of the signals and the trackplan go hand in hand. What I mean by that is that I sometimes see some posts on here along the lines of 'how should this be signalled?'. Looking at the accompanying track plan, the answer is often 'with some difficulty' (although in theory it can always be done). Sometimes, an alteration to the trackplan can make the signalling fall into place more logically and look more (proto)typical. In other words, the design of the signalling and the design of the trackplan should really go hand-in-hand and there are not so much 'rules' as typical practice in terms of how the railway companies went about things. If these are replicated in model railway trackplans then - in my view - things look more convincing and the siting and use of signals follows suit.

Edited November 3, 2017 by LNER4479

[RailWest]

I agree wholeheartedly with the final paragraph! By the time that you start laying track it is already too late to start thinking about your signalling (or lack thereof). :-)

[micknich2003]

I agree wholeheartedly with the final paragraph! By the time that you start laying track it is already too late to start thinking about your signalling (or lack thereof). :-)

Or you can use the exact opposite, and design the P Way to fit the signals you have in stock.

[Compound2632]

... and altogether the most splendid signal we've seen so far in this thread!

 

Question: why isn't the distant arm repeated too?

[LNER4479]

... and altogether the most splendid signal we've seen so far in this thread!

 

Question: why isn't the distant arm repeated too?

I'm sure others on here will point us to examples where distant arms were repeated (actually, I think we're talking about co-acting here - a repeater signal is something different ... I think) but the simple - probably over simple - answer is that it relates to the next signal not the one on the same post hence, providing the driver reads it OK then he has time to react if it is 'on', subject to signal spacing, etc. If the home signal to which it referred was too close for a safe stopping distance then there would also be a distant arm on the previous signal post - or a separate repeater signal would be provided. It could get quite complex in busy station areas where there were several boxes in a short distance.

 

Standing by for the true experts on here to clarify or expand on some of these points...

 

PS - thanks for compliment on the signal. It was indeed a most splendid signal (I am talking about the prototype here) and I enjoyed recreating it (I did attract some derision from Mrs4479 by referring to it as a 'signal to die for'!). Tony Wright - who took the photo (my apologies as I should have credited him on the above post) has vowed NEVER to photograph it again as it took him so long to draw round it in photoshop to create his equally splendid image!

Edited November 3, 2017 by LNER4479

[The Stationmaster]

I'm sure others on here will point us to examples where distant arms were repeated (actually, I think we're talking about co-acting here - a repeater signal is something different ... I think) but the simple - probably over simple - answer is that it relates to the next signal not the one on the same post hence, providing the driver reads it OK then he has time to react if it is 'on', subject to signal spacing, etc. If the home signal to which it referred was too close for a safe stopping distance then there would also be a distant arm on the previous signal post - or a separate repeater signal would be provided. It could get quite complex in busy station areas where there were several boxes in a short distance.

 

Standing by for the true experts on here to clarify or expand on some of these points...

 

PS - thanks for compliment on the signal. It was indeed a most splendid signal (I am talking about the prototype here) and I enjoyed recreating it (I did attract some derision from Mrs4479 by referring to it as a 'signal to die for'!). Tony Wright - who took the photo (my apologies as I should have credited him on the above post) has vowed NEVER to photograph it again as it took him so long to draw round it in photoshop to create his equally splendid image!

 

The main reason for providing the high co-acting arm on the North box's Home Signal was most likely to help keep trains moving so when a Driver saw it 'off' from a distance after being checked buy the North/Yard/South 'box distant(s) he would know that he now had a clear run at that end of Grantham and could release the brakes and get going down the gradient towards Barkston.  If the signal had not had the co-acting arm and was off it might well be harder to sight under or around the station canopy and a train approaching expecting to find it at danger would not be able to get away as quickly if the signal had been lowered after he had passed the distant(s).

 

No need to have a high mounted co-acting distant arm because at the time North 'box's (high mounted) Home Signal came into sight the Driver wouldn't be too interested in the distant for the next 'box in advance but as he approached Grantham North's Home Signal the view of the distant would become more important and he could then drive accordingly.

[Compound2632]

I'm sure others on here will point us to examples where distant arms were repeated (actually, I think we're talking about co-acting here - a repeater signal is something different ... I think) but the simple - probably over simple - answer is that it relates to the next signal not the one on the same post hence, providing the driver reads it OK then he has time to react if it is 'on', subject to signal spacing, etc. If the home signal to which it referred was too close for a safe stopping distance then there would also be a distant arm on the previous signal post - or a separate repeater signal would be provided. It could get quite complex in busy station areas where there were several boxes in a short distance.

 

Standing by for the true experts on here to clarify or expand on some of these points...

 

PS - thanks for compliment on the signal. It was indeed a most splendid signal (I am talking about the prototype here) and I enjoyed recreating it (I did attract some derision from Mrs4479 by referring to it as a 'signal to die for'!). Tony Wright - who took the photo (my apologies as I should have credited him on the above post) has vowed NEVER to photograph it again as it took him so long to draw round it in photoshop to create his equally splendid image!

 

Sorry, yes, co-acting of course. I had in mind the Rugby bedstead where every signal was doubled. In that case, the lower arms were miniature.

[LNER4479]

Sorry, yes, co-acting of course. I had in mind the Rugby bedstead where every signal was doubled. In that case, the lower arms were miniature.

Ah yes - now that IS a signal to die for ... or have nightmares about, depending on your point of view.

 

Best I've managed like that is this:

 

 

Based on Aberdeen, all mechanically operated and interlocked

[micknich2003]

 I mentioned earlier how I made the PWay fit my signals, layout and a photograph attached. Hopefully of interest, and that constructive discussion will follow.

[ForestPines]

I'm sure others on here will point us to examples where distant arms were repeated (actually, I think we're talking about co-acting here - a repeater signal is something different ... I think) 

 

One example I remember well from my childhood was on the Down line at Friargate Crossing, Grimsby.  There's a picture at https://signalbox.org/gallery/e/friargatecrossing.php

[PatB]

I certainly wouldn't regard a Rule as an 'administrative control' - in fact in modern parlance you would call it a work procedure or method statement and would have arrived at it through risk assessment (although clearly a further risk which should be controlled existed because of the lack of a track circuit or locking bar extending the whole of the way from the signal to the point toe.  But in the context of British railway operation  The Rules and Regulations produced a disciplined method of working, and particularly in the case of the latter, were part of the apparatus and procedure for enforcing the law of the land within that disciplined system.

 

And this takes us back to the subject of this thread because what happened at Paragon is one illustration of the fact that ideally sited signals protecting the toe end of a facing point should be sited as closely as possible to that toe end (although the use of track circuits allowed signals to be sited further in rear if other factors so required).  But in many cases 'other factors' were an important influence hence the need before widespread adoption of reliable track circuiting to apply a disciplined approach (not an 'administrative' one) to the working of signals at facing points.  The alternative would simply to have been to add more signals at a succession of facing points but, again using modern terminology, that would simply inject more risk due to potential sighting difficulties and the potential for Drivers to 'read through' and miss a signal standing at danger.

 

It is very easy in todays railway context to also forget that until comparatively recent times track layouts were far more complex than they are today for example at my local branch junction station layout rationalisation plus a bit of bi-directional signalling and 4 point ends (which effectively make two crossovers) do what once required a double junction and a total of 4 single point ends, a diamond crossing, and two single slip compound points.  The change from steam to diesel power and unit trains has brought about that change on the running lines (plus the removal of a four more point ends needed mainly for engine run-round purposes from the branch bay).  That is but one relatively straightforward junction station which in many respects was typical of its kind and considerably less complex in track layout terms than quite a few others.

 

I understand what you're saying, but I've always understood the Hierarchy of Controls (which I've acknowledged is anachronistic in this context but which I'd regard as broadly applicable even so) to mean by "administrative control" something which, in short, relies on a human to do (or not do) something on the basis of an instruction alone. Rules, working procedures, codes of practice etc., however strict or detailed fall into this category. The next level up, the "engineering control" actually places a physical obstacle of some sort in the way of not doing (or doing) a particular action.

 

However, I do agree that the disciplined system of working adopted by the railways, in combination with strict enforcement of the Rules and procedures in place made such administrative controls much more robust than they might otherwise be by rendering compliance more likely. Social changes, changes in the nature of employment, company cultures etc. have, i suspect, rendered such a system of working much less likely to be effective now. 

[The Stationmaster]

I understand what you're saying, but I've always understood the Hierarchy of Controls (which I've acknowledged is anachronistic in this context but which I'd regard as broadly applicable even so) to mean by "administrative control" something which, in short, relies on a human to do (or not do) something on the basis of an instruction alone. Rules, working procedures, codes of practice etc., however strict or detailed fall into this category. The next level up, the "engineering control" actually places a physical obstacle of some sort in the way of not doing (or doing) a particular action.

 

However, I do agree that the disciplined system of working adopted by the railways, in combination with strict enforcement of the Rules and procedures in place made such administrative controls much more robust than they might otherwise be by rendering compliance more likely. Social changes, changes in the nature of employment, company cultures etc. have, i suspect, rendered such a system of working much less likely to be effective now. 

 

One can but hope that they are effective should one wish to travel on a train where it is known and has been physically checked that the brakes are working correctly  The only way a continuous brake can be fully checked for correct operation, even on the very latest trains such as a Class 800 IET, is to carry out the written Instruction to physically test it by actually applying it in a Running Brake Test.

 

And although things have since changed thanks to ATP (very limited in application in Britain) or TPWS - still not universally applied at every stop signal - as one of my Drivers famously said at a meeting back in the 1980s "Red signals do not stop trains; Drivers stop trains"

[Compound2632]

Ah yes - now that IS a signal to die for ... or have nightmares about, depending on your point of view.

 

I remember reading - in one of Tuplin's footplate accounts, so of dubious authority - of the fireman of a down express approaching Rugby being instructed by his driver to look for "four greens and forty reds". One hopes they were the right column of four!

[runs as required]

I hope this is the suitable place to draw attention to this item In the current Private Eye (No 1456 3 Nov 2017) where 'Dr B Ching' referred to a recent Safety Digest  14/2017: Magdalen Road level crossing near miss 9 August 2017 which is available here as a downloadable PDF

There was a sequence of failures that followed from a signaller giving permission for an up DOO train to London to pass a faulty signal protecting a level crossing at Watlington station, Norfolk. Meanwhile a down train to Kings Lynn passed triggering the level crossing barriers to rise - instead of staying down for the London train.
There was actually an instructor on board with the London DOO train driver, but as the train began to leave the station neither noticed the barriers had risen and a car right under their noses!

The near miss incident was reported by a following motorist. Six previous cars had crossed while the driver and instructor were occupied in checking the platform rather than the road ahead.

dh

Edited November 4, 2017 by runs as required

[runs as required]

I remember reading - in one of Tuplin's footplate accounts, so of dubious authority ...

 

Would that be Prof W A Tuplin listed here in Graces Guide:

1951 Appointed Professor of Applied Mechanics at the University of Sheffield and retired in 1968, becoming Emeritus Professor

1975 March 7th. Died

 

You imply that, as in Sir Michael Fallon's resignation letter, there were lower standards in those days.

 

dh

[keefer]

 a signaller giving permission for an up DOO train to London to pass a faulty signal protecting a level crossing at Watlington station

dh

 

i thought that whenever given permission to pass a signal (faulty/red/whatever restrictive aspect), it means only as far as the line can be seen to be clear and you must be prepared to stop short of any obstruction?

[Compound2632]

Would that be Prof W A Tuplin listed here in Graces Guide:

1951 Appointed Professor of Applied Mechanics at the University of Sheffield and retired in 1968, becoming Emeritus Professor

1975 March 7th. Died

 

You imply that, as in Sir Michael Fallon's resignation letter, there were lower standards in those days.

 

dh

 

The very same. Many years ago I read his Great Western Steam, North Western Steam, and Midland Steam - he published several more, in the 60s I think. I would not presume to pass judgement on his theoretical or practical knowledge of mechanical engineering but it has to be allowed that he was more of an enthusiast than a professional when it came to steam locomotives. He is very readable but his views on locomotive design are forthright and sometimes heterodox and the footplate tales he records in each book are I believe generally acknowledged to be to at least some extent works of the imagination, though they reveal considerable familiarity with the working of engines and routes described. This I wouldn't take the instruction to look for "four reds and forty greens" as the genuine words of a LNWR driver to his fireman.

 

Well worth a read if you can get hold of his books, but have a pinch or two of salt to hand.

[iands]

I hope this is the suitable place to draw attention to this item In the current Private Eye (No 1456 3 Nov 2017) where 'Dr B Ching' referred to a recent Safety Digest  14/2017: Magdalen Road level crossing near miss 9 August 2017 which is available here as a downloadable PDF

There was a sequence of failures that followed from a signaller giving permission for an up DOO train to London to pass a faulty signal protecting a level crossing at Watlington station, Norfolk. Meanwhile a down train to Kings Lynn passed triggering the level crossing barriers to rise - instead of staying down for the London train.

There was actually an instructor on board with the London DOO train driver, but as the train began to leave the station neither noticed the barriers had risen and a car right under their noses!

The near miss incident was reported by a following motorist. Six previous cars had crossed while the driver and instructor were occupied in checking the platform rather than the road ahead.

dh

Whilst I agree that the driver should have observed the state of the crossing barriers, regardless of what else was perhaps distracting the driver's attention in the cab, this should not be viewed as a reason against DOO operation as perhaps the article may imply (I've not seen the Private Eye article, just my interpretation based on the comment above). Wasn't the problem of the barriers raising due to the signaller not placing the barriers into 'manual' rather than leaving them on 'auto' due to the other failures he was trying to manage?

 

Regards, Ian.

[Ray H]

Magdalen Road level crossing near miss 9 August 2017 which is available here as a downloadable PDF

Thanks for that link. Is that the limit of the "accident" reports these days or is there a more detailed version? I ask because I presume that the (old) HMRI inspectors would have delved deeper into the reason for the signal failure and included that reason in their report.

 

I'm surprised that there isn't an inbuilt test within the barrier operating equipment that checks that the relevant track circuit(s) aren't occupied before the system raises the barrier but then I assume the cost of providing several smaller track circuits - those for approaching and those for departing (or passed) trains - would be too expensive.

 

Apologies for drifting even further off topic.

[LNER4479]

Thanks for that link. Is that the limit of the "accident" reports these days or is there a more detailed version? I ask because I presume that the (old) HMRI inspectors would have delved deeper into the reason for the signal failure and included that reason in their report..

That's a Safety Digest, NOT a full accident report. The RAIB use a Safety Digest to get some important information out to the industry quickly. The full investigation and report can take over 12 months, are very detailed and are made publicly available.

Edited November 5, 2017 by LNER4479

[The Stationmaster]

I hope this is the suitable place to draw attention to this item In the current Private Eye (No 1456 3 Nov 2017) where 'Dr B Ching' referred to a recent Safety Digest  14/2017: Magdalen Road level crossing near miss 9 August 2017 which is available here as a downloadable PDF

 

There was a sequence of failures that followed from a signaller giving permission for an up DOO train to London to pass a faulty signal protecting a level crossing at Watlington station, Norfolk. Meanwhile a down train to Kings Lynn passed triggering the level crossing barriers to rise - instead of staying down for the London train.

There was actually an instructor on board with the London DOO train driver, but as the train began to leave the station neither noticed the barriers had risen and a car right under their noses!

 

The near miss incident was reported by a following motorist. Six previous cars had crossed while the driver and instructor were occupied in checking the platform rather than the road ahead.

dh

 

In another way that incident at the RAIB safety digest comes back very much to this thread because - as I have already remarked in another thread - the way in which the signalling is arranged with a difference between the way the level crossing are protected on the two opposite led the Signalman(ler) into a trap which the design had laid for him.  The crucial part of the incident was getting the train over the facing point in a  safe manner but the signal which protected the facing point also protected both level crossings.  Whereas in the opposite direction each level crossing was separately protected by a fixed signal although one of them also protected the trailing end of the point.

 

With considerable emphasis, rightly, on signalling trains through facing points in failure conditions following the Knaresborough incident it was all too easy to overlook what had happened at the level crossing yet the RAIB document misses that point entirely.  Yes the Signalman should have followed the various Rules and Instructions but in some respects the way the signalling is arranged failed to offer the safest possible option by separately protecting the two level crossings in both directions.