The "Pink Belt"

[F2Andy]

I have been reading "Oil on the Rails" by Alan Coppin, and in the section about WW2 it talks about the "Pink Belt",

 

"This was an area 30-60 miles deep, all along the coast from Newcastle to Plymouth in which no large stores of petrol were allowed to remain overnight, in an attempt to deny fuel to the enemy in the event of an invasion."

 

A consequence of this was a lot of traffic on the railways - especially with so much being used to support the war effort. Apparently nines times as much oil products were moved by rail in 1944 compared to 1940. However, I cannot find any other reference to a pink belt on the internet (plenty of other interesting stuff). Has any one else heard of it?

Edited March 1, 2022 by F2Andy
Typo (6- -> 60)

[Rivercider]

I do not remember seeing the name before. I have a copy of 'War on the Line', which covers the SR during WWII, and cannot recall any specific reference to the restriction on petrol in there either,

 

cheers

Edited March 2, 2022 by Rivercider
tidying up.

[F-UnitMad]

18 hours ago, F2Andy said:

Apparently nines times as much oil products were moved by rail in 1944 compared to 1940.

I would've thought part of that increase was the total change in circumstances. In 1940 Britain was on the defensive and until June 1941 effectively fighting the Nazi regime alone. By 1944 D-Day had to be prepared for and then supported afterwards, and both RAF Bomber Command and the USAAF 8th Air Force were approaching the peak of their offensives against the Reich as well. That all takes fuel & oil in massive quantities.

I'd never heard of a 'pink zone' either. An interesting assertion, at least.

[Nearholmer]

Weren’t the fuel stores at Micheldever in place before, or early during, WW2? [Yes, commissioned 1939] Maybe just 30 miles from the Solent, depending where the crow flies. They were very well hidden, and of strategic enough importance to be heavily defended though, and not in easily portable form.

 

I can well imagine that during the threat of invasion, easily accessible fuel dumps would have been kept well back from the coast, because the form of storage used, zillions of small cans, was ripe for use by the enemy if captured intact.

 

 

Edited March 2, 2022 by Nearholmer

[Fat Controller]

19 minutes ago, Nearholmer said:

Weren’t the fuel stores at Micheldever in place before, or early during, WW2? [Yes, commissioned 1939] Maybe just 30 miles from the Solent, depending where the crow flies. They were very well hidden, and of strategic enough importance to be heavily defended though, and not in easily portable form.

 

I can well imagine that during the threat of invasion, easily accessible fuel dumps would have been kept well back from the coast, because the form of storage used, zillions of small cans, was ripe for use by the enemy if captured intact.

 

 

There was a large fuel dump on the western edge of the New Forest, which was certainly closer than 20 miles to the coast.

[Nearholmer]

Date? I think things changed as threat of invasion and threat from luftwaffe receded, and preparations for D-Day began.

 

The more I read about this period, the more I am gobsmacked by the scale and speed of first defensive, then offensive preparations in this country. There was a military chap on the radio at lunchtime talking about this stuff wrt to the present horrors, and he said “amateurs think tactics, professionals think logistics” ……. Britain was clearly blessed with some serious professionals during the late 30s and into the 40s.

[C126]

Surely the fuel dump for R.A.F. Tangmere violated these distance requirements as well (or am I quite misinformed?).  This was then converted, I believe, to the oil depot served by the Speedlink service from Eastleigh, which also called at the Bartholomew's Agricultural supplies depot.

[Nearholmer]

It’s worth reading-up on the Government Pipeline & Storage System, which was created at treble-quick speed to supply the RAF and USAAF with fuel. It’s one of several bits of logistical support that were created “in no time”.

 

 

[C126]

Sorry, I fear I have mis-read the original post, citing "no large stores of petrol".  However, I did see this web-page:

 

https://derelictmisc.org.uk/psd.html

 

which elicited the desired melancholy in me for yet another bit of industrial archaeology I remember from my childhood going to ruin.

[pete_mcfarlane]

Denying fuel to a German landing force makes sense, as they struggled throughout the war with Oil supplies, and (given the state of their logistics planning for Operation Sealion) would have probably forgotten to bring any  petrol with them. There's also the logistical difficulties of transporting petrol in a war zone, especially by sea against a Navy that is much larger than your own. 

 

(ISTR that a lot of the British high command actually wanted the Germans to try to invade, as it wasn't expected to go very well for them)

 

 

Edited March 2, 2022 by pete_mcfarlane

[Aire Head]

2 hours ago, Nearholmer said:

Britain was clearly blessed with some serious professionals during the late 30s and into the 40s.

 

Throughout Modern British history the number of logistical feats pulled off far outweigh the disasters. Unfortunately only the latter tend to be remembered.

 

5 minutes ago, pete_mcfarlane said:

ISTR that a lot of the British high command actually wanted the Germans to try to invade, as it wasn't expected to go very well for them

 

It was "Wargamed" after the war to determine wether Sealion would be viable. Even the best case performances found the German army bogged down not far from their beach heads with the Royal Navy in possession of the channel and therefore completely cutting off the invading troops.

 

[slilley]

35 minutes ago, pete_mcfarlane said:

Denying fuel to a German landing force makes sense, as they struggled throughout the war with Oil supplies, and (given the state of their logistics planning for Operation Sealion) would have probably forgotten to bring any  petrol with them. There's also the logistical difficulties of transporting petrol in a war zone, especially by sea against a Navy that is much larger than your own. 

 

(ISTR that a lot of the British high command actually wanted the Germans to try to invade, as it wasn't expected to go very well for them)

 

 

Not forgetting that when the Allies invaded northern France they had the advantage of PLUTO, Pipeline Under The Ocean which enabled huge amounts of fuel to be transported across the Channel without needing large numbers of ships to do it.

 

Simon

[Phil Bullock]

54 minutes ago, pete_mcfarlane said:

Denying fuel to a German landing force makes sense, as they struggled throughout the war with Oil supplies, and (given the state of their logistics planning for Operation Sealion) would have probably forgotten to bring any  petrol with them. There's also the logistical difficulties of transporting petrol in a war zone, especially by sea against a Navy that is much larger than your own. 

 

(ISTR that a lot of the British high command actually wanted the Germans to try to invade, as it wasn't expected to go very well for them)

 

 

And it’s looking rather as if another invading force may have made the same mistakes….

[pete_mcfarlane]

1 hour ago, Aire Head said:

It was "Wargamed" after the war to determine wether Sealion would be viable. Even the best case performances found the German army bogged down not far from their beach heads with the Royal Navy in possession of the channel and therefore completely cutting off the invading troops.

 

At Sandhurst in the 70s, with a lot of mid-level World War two officers from both sides (Adolf Galland in charge of the Luftwaffe for example). I think they had to give the Germans a 24 hour head start (ie the RN not allowed to respond for a full day) to even get them across the Channel. 

 

At which point they'd be in command of a the narrow strip of Romney Marsh between the sea and the Royal Military canal, a lot of which is now flooded due to the sluice gates being left open during the 24 hours it took their barges to get across from France at 2mph.....

 

 

[Phil Bullock]

And German issues with fuel supplies continued …. Operation Bulbasket -SAS in France - was responsible for restricting panzer movement post Overlord by targeting and depriving access to fuel supplies…. 

[The Stationmaster]

Don't forget too that once the Germans had occupied France, especially opposited the Starits of diver the number of Channel convoys was reduced so coastal shipping movement of oil products became more difficult.  The only alternative was rail. 

[eastglosmog]

Fawley Refinery (0 miles from the coast) may have been closed for refining during WW2, but it was still in use as a storage facility - indeed several extra facilities were built.