What could have ended the Midland's 'small engine' policy

[Barry O]

The Midland did build bigger engines but not for its own use (S&DJR 2-8-0) - and the Lickey Banker ( a one off) so the idea that they had a problem with delivering bigger locos seems to be ...... bean counter management ..... so that must be the people running our railways today - the latest generation of Midland Railway Management...

[Sheffield]

During the Victoria era Locomotive Superintendents were a powerful force in the railway, answerable directly to the board, but during the early years of the 20th century there was a move to reduce their power and status, making them CMEs answerable to the General Manager.This was the reason Deeley did not stay, and it happened to Churchward after the death of Alfred Baldwin. Locomotive developement largely ceased, although fortunately Churchward's plans were mostly complete, and a number of Churchward's team left.

Although the bean counters are reviled, railways are a business and have to run on sound financial and commercial lines. The Midland was a profitable well run railway, but as circumstances changed after the first war running a profitable railway became very diifcult.

The MR's big locos, the S&D 2-8-0s and the Banker were tried on the London coal trains, without much success.

The problem with the coal trains was not so much pulling them as stopping them, and here two 0-6-0s had an advantage. Quite how the LNWR managed with its 0-8-0s is one of life's little mysteries. Under test with a Crewe 0-8-0 running a loaded train  down a 1in 100 at 20mph, after 3055 yards the train had accelerated to 25mph under full brake application. That the trains were worked day in day out is a monument to the skill of the drivers, and to just how crude engineering can be and still work.

And surely the fault of the present day railways has to be the polictians. Train operating companies are just that-companies. And companies are corporate bodies designed to make a profit. We can not blame them for doing just that, by means of running trains. If some thing else was wanted, such as a public service, the politicians should have arranged accordingly.

[MarkC]

I don't know about the 2-8-0s (axle box problems?), but I believe that The Banker's problem was basically strangulation of the steam flow. It was absolutely fine for the 2 mile slog up the Lickey, but no good for any job requiring much more speed than those regularly attained on the big hill.

 

Mark

[coachmann]

Locomotives are funny tings and theory doesn't always translate into practice. Take the S&DJR 7F 2-8-0....It was designed by someone who's name escapes me (I dont thing Fowler or Anderson were involved) and was an okay engine. It could work loads over the Mendips and one might have assumed the LMS would have given it a modern 'engine' part with long travel valves and decent axeboxes to produce an all-line 7F. It didn't happen and instead they designed the 7F 0-8-0 as late as 1929 and gave it 4F axleboxes. The world depression was on after the collapse of Wall Street so maybe this had a bearing on the bearings! Whatever, the LMS soon realised their mistake and started upgrading the old LNWR Super D instead to form what amounted to a second division standard class.  But as bad as the Fowler 7F 0-8-0 was, the class hauled prodigeous trains of coal 365 days a years over the harduous L&Y and LNWR routed over the Pennines for 20 years until the Austerity 2-8-0 came along to assist. The Stanier 2-8-0 hardly made an impact on these routes until the very end.

Edited February 12, 2013 by coachmann

[The Stationmaster]

 

 

The MR's big locos, the S&D 2-8-0s and the Banker were tried on the London coal trains, without much success.

The problem with the coal trains was not so much pulling them as stopping them, and here two 0-6-0s had an advantage. Quite how the LNWR managed with its 0-8-0s is one of life's little mysteries. Under test with a Crewe 0-8-0 running a loaded train  down a 1in 100 at 20mph, after 3055 yards the train had accelerated to 25mph under full brake application. That the trains were worked day in day out is a monument to the skill of the drivers, and to just how crude engineering can be and still work.

I can't see any relevance at all of the comment about the acceleration of a train accelerating from 20mph to 25mph on a falling gradient - it sounds to me to be data from some sort of braking experiment and is certainly a long way removed from normal loose coupled incline working.  The whole point about descending a 1 in 100 gradient is that the train would be going no faster than walking pace at the top - any faster than that and it would be very difficult to apply wagon brakes, and equally the situation would be that the loco has to move the train against the brakes.  So having two engines would make no real difference - yes they would have a bit more brake force but equally they might have more pulling power and what matters in braking a train on a steep descending gradient is not braking power but pulling power because it is what decides how much braking force to apply under normal incline working.

 

As Coach has already pointed out the 7F 2-8-0s seem to have coped quite successfuly with the gradients on the SDJtRy and indeed over some sections (e.g. Binegar up to Masbury) a single 7F was allowed the same load as a pair of 3Fs.

[bluebottle]

... Take the S&DJR 7F 2-8-0....It was designed by someone who's name escapes me (I dont thing Fowler or Anderson were involved) ...

 

D'you mean James Clayton, assistant chief locomotive draughtsman at Derby at the time, Coach?

 

Gordon

[PhilJ W]

The MR's big locos, the S&D 2-8-0s and the Banker were tried on the London coal trains, without much success.

The problem with the coal trains was not so much pulling them as stopping them, and here two 0-6-0s had an advantage. Quite how the LNWR managed with its 0-8-0s is one of life's little mysteries. Under test with a Crewe 0-8-0 running a loaded train  down a 1in 100 at 20mph, after 3055 yards the train had accelerated to 25mph under full brake application. That the trains were worked day in day out is a monument to the skill of the drivers, and to just how crude engineering can be and still work.

I wonder how the GE J20's got on? They were designed to do the work of an 0-8-0 but with the 0-6-0 wheel arrangement.

Edited February 12, 2013 by PhilJ W

[MarkC]

D'you mean James Clayton, assistant chief locomotive draughtsman at Derby at the time, Coach?

 

Gordon

I think you're right there, Gordon

 

Mark

[kevinlms]

 Quite how the LNWR managed with its 0-8-0s is one of life's little mysteries. Under test with a Crewe 0-8-0 running a loaded train  down a 1in 100 at 20mph, after 3055 yards the train had accelerated to 25mph under full brake application. That the trains were worked day in day out is a monument to the skill of the drivers, and to just how crude engineering can be and still work.

 

But it wasn't just the LNWR who had 0-8-0s on freight traffic. Many others had them on similar trains and worked them OK, some even had eight coupled tank locos, where the braking ability got less as the tank water levels went down. So were the GWR, North Eastern. L&YR, GCR etc, all wrong?

The Midland, just continued the practice from Kirtley days.

[Sheffield]

I am not saying the others were wrong, but that the Midland could not accommadate these larger locos without significant capital expenditure, which the Board and Senior Management were not prepared to make. They were running a successful and profitable railway, and could see no need for change.  Before we critise this attitude too much we need look no further than our own High Streets. However the Midland Board did make significant changes when they thought it justified for example putting a comfortable third class on all trains, and the introduction of centralised control. To answer to the original question, the only thing really likely to change the MR policy was the future becoming the present, ie circumstances changing, but that was an LMS problem, rather than a Midland one, so out side the remit of the question. But I still say that if there had been a change of policy, the CME's office had, after Deeleys departure, no one of sufficiant seniorority and competance to produce satisfactory larger locos. And that did not change in the first two years of the LMS. Imagine the LMS Board declaring in January 1923 that it wanted, quickly, 50 larger locos capable of doing what the Scots were required to do. The LMS had nothing near suitable, and I suggest, no one able to produce any thing. Perhaps the problems of the early LMS were a blessing as they delayed production of a express passenger engine suitable for the West Coast until enough people with enough design skill were availalbe to allow the Royal Scots to be created.

[Barry O]

The L&Y started by making loads of money then hit the brick wall and had to work hard by building new locos and stock to continue to make money. The small engine policy was a bean counter type approach - the S&DJR locos could have worked well but the Midland had a problem with engine axle boxes- which is also why the LMS Garretts didn't work out as good as those designed and built for overseas use - cheapskate Midland axleboxes.....

 

and yes it happens today - near sightedness its called and I (with my Engineering hat on) have suffered from this for all of my working life.

[kevinlms]

 However the Midland Board did make significant changes when they thought it justified for example putting a comfortable third class on all trains, and the introduction of centralised control.

But the change to upgrade 3rd class happened in 1875! and the centralised traffic control around 1905 or 1907. That's the fundamental flaw, they appeared to have gone to sleep from 1911 onwards (the introduction of the 4F's), with very little innovation.

Did they not recognise the fact that the standard parts (example of axle box lubrication) might need upgrading on a loco that was approx. 25% more powerful than its predecessor? Having built 192 for their own use before grouping ought to have shown up their limitations, (I recall reading somewhere that on some railways, a hot box on a loco was virtually unknown - wagons another story), before building hundreds more almost identical.

History was repeated with the Garratts, with 30 more ordered, after 3 years of running the first 3, with almost nothing changed (rotating bunker excepted).

[bluebottle]

I <think> that it was in Hamilton Ellis' book "LMS- a Railway in Retrospect" that Fowler is quoted as 'having never designed a locomotive in his life'

 

Mark

 

I haven't managed a look at that book yet, Mark, but according to "Steam Index", "Ellis in his book on The Midland Railway wrote: "He (Fowler) is reported as having once said, after dining, that he never did such a thing in his life." So the position at the moment is that I've said that "Steam Index" says that Hamilton Ellis says that Fowler is reported as having once said ...

Actually the page on Fowler is quite interesting, including a surprising comparison of Fowler with Collett ...

http://www.steamindex.com/people/fowler.htm

 

Gordon

[MarkC]

I haven't managed a look at that book yet, Mark, but according to "Steam Index", "Ellis in his book on The Midland Railway wrote: "He (Fowler) is reported as having once said, after dining, that he never did such a thing in his life." So the position at the moment is that I've said that "Steam Index" says that Hamilton Ellis says that Fowler is reported as having once said ...

Actually the page on Fowler is quite interesting, including a surprising comparison of Fowler with Collett ...

http://www.steamindex.com/people/fowler.htm

 

Gordon

It could well be in that book that I've seen it, Gordon. I was certain that it was in an Ellis book that I'd read it - maybe it's in both? Not that it matters, of course; the content is what is counts.

 

Yes, Fowler vs Collett - interesting.

 

Mark

[coachmann]

The quotation attibuted to Fowler as never having designed a loco is in Brian Haresnape's 'Fowler Locomotives - A Pictorial History' (IA). 

[The Stationmaster]

I haven't managed a look at that book yet, Mark, but according to "Steam Index", "Ellis in his book on The Midland Railway wrote: "He (Fowler) is reported as having once said, after dining, that he never did such a thing in his life." So the position at the moment is that I've said that "Steam Index" says that Hamilton Ellis says that Fowler is reported as having once said ...

Actually the page on Fowler is quite interesting, including a surprising comparison of Fowler with Collett ...

http://www.steamindex.com/people/fowler.htm

 

Gordon

Do take care with 'Steam Index' Gordon - it is an amazingly useful and very comprehensive resource and I think it is probably fairly reliable on direct quotes from technical papers etc but where the compiler draws his own conclusions it is prone to error (he attributed a lot of my published stuff to someone else by suggesting that my name was somebody else's pen-name - but he was quick to correct things when I came across it and pointed out that he was incorrect).

[Sheffield]

The question asked was "what could have ended the Midland's policy". The short answer is grouping, but that did not really apply to the Midland as such. The Midland Railway was successful, and by the standards of the industry had a good share value, a good reputation with its customers, and made a good profit. To have changed the policy of using "small" engines would have meant significant capital expenditure, and under the circumstances of the time not necessary. The costs of using two locos where necessary has to be balanced against the cost of the capital to do otherwise. Until the Great War buggered every thing up the Midland was a sound railway.

Whether it was wise to continue that policy when later the LMS was created is a question to which most of us would probably answer no, but that is not what we were asked.

To critise the Midland locomotive designs does not undermine the "small loco policy", but just highlights the inability of the CME's design side to do any better. The locos could have been much better without breeching the railway's structural constraints. In fact I suggest it adds weight to my view that if the new LMS board had said in early 1923 it wanted locos capable ot hauling heavier trains without loco change between London and Carlisle/beyond, ie what the Scots were purchased to do, the CME's office would have been hard put to comply. I suspect  Anderson recognised this but his loco experience was sufficently outdated to .prevent his interferance making any improvement

I suggest the commonly held view that the Midland Railway management were somehow short sighted and narrow minded is, under the Midland's circumstances, wrong. The quality of loco design may have been wanting, but that was the CME's fault, not the Board's or the rest of Senior Management.. When viewing history, although hindsight can be useful, we need to try to see things through the eyes of the people making the decisions, using only to information availalbe to them. Who in the Midland Senior Management at the turn of the century would have thought they could be called upon to manage the rival LNWR?

[bluebottle]

Do take care with 'Steam Index' Gordon - it is an amazingly useful and very comprehensive resource and I think it is probably fairly reliable on direct quotes from technical papers etc but where the compiler draws his own conclusions it is prone to error (he attributed a lot of my published stuff to someone else by suggesting that my name was somebody else's pen-name - but he was quick to correct things when I came across it and pointed out that he was incorrect).

 

Thanks for the caution on “Steam Index”, Mike. Having occasionally paddled in the shark-infested waters of Wikipedia editing, I do try to be circumspect in assessing the validity of sources of information; that's why I pointed out the indirect nature of Ellis's quote. I was surprised by the compiler's comparison of Fowler with Collett, but pointed it out because I couldn't resist the chance of a bit of friendly GWR bloc ankle-biting!

 

Gordon

[The Stationmaster]

The question asked was "what could have ended the Midland's policy". The short answer is grouping, but that did not really apply to the Midland as such. The Midland Railway was successful, and by the standards of the industry had a good share value, a good reputation with its customers, and made a good profit. To have changed the policy of using "small" engines would have meant significant capital expenditure, and under the circumstances of the time not necessary. The costs of using two locos where necessary has to be balanced against the cost of the capital to do otherwise. Until the Great War buggered every thing up the Midland was a sound railway.

Whether it was wise to continue that policy when later the LMS was created is a question to which most of us would probably answer no, but that is not what we were asked.

To critise the Midland locomotive designs does not undermine the "small loco policy", but just highlights the inability of the CME's design side to do any better. The locos could have been much better without breeching the railway's structural constraints. In fact I suggest it adds weight to my view that if the new LMS board had said in early 1923 it wanted locos capable ot hauling heavier trains without loco change between London and Carlisle/beyond, ie what the Scots were purchased to do, the CME's office would have been hard put to comply. I suspect  Anderson recognised this but his loco experience was sufficently outdated to .prevent his interferance making any improvement

I suggest the commonly held view that the Midland Railway management were somehow short sighted and narrow minded is, under the Midland's circumstances, wrong. The quality of loco design may have been wanting, but that was the CME's fault, not the Board's or the rest of Senior Management.. When viewing history, although hindsight can be useful, we need to try to see things through the eyes of the people making the decisions, using only to information availalbe to them. Who in the Midland Senior Management at the turn of the century would have thought they could be called upon to manage the rival LNWR?

Simple answer to all this (although after a lot of delving I can't find anything on it) is to compare Operating Ratios between the various companies.  While numerous factors can influence costs it is still a reasonably handy method of drawing  some general conclusions.  All I have been able to find are some generalised figures which clearly show the steady rise in operating ratio for the British railway industry as a whole going from 48% in 1870 and up to 52% by 1886, 54% in 1890, 56% in 1894, 58% in 1898,  and 62% in 1902.  Clearly against that background anything which would be likely to reduce operating costs - such as bigger trainloads - would be a course the better managed railways would pursue.

 

So what would be interesting is to compare the Midland's figures with those of other companies, especially for freight where a number of companies seriously strove to reduce costs in the early 20th century.

[coachmann]

I suggest the commonly held view that the Midland Railway management were somehow short sighted and narrow minded is, under the Midland's circumstances, wrong. The quality of loco design may have been wanting, but that was the CME's fault, not the Board's or the rest of Senior Management..

Senior management not at fault????  Management is there to manage! If they have employed a total muppet or room full of muppets, then management is at fault for not ditching the flaming lot. To specifiy 4F axleboxes on the 7F S&DJR 2-8-0 in 1914 should have been spotted by management by 1923 seeing as the axleboxes were giving trouble on the 4F's! This management team went on to high places within the LMS and continued with its crass stupidy in specifying 4F axleboxes on Beyer Garratts and 7F 0-8-0s. Then in 1930 when a smaller tank loco than the 2-6-4T was required, the 'Midland' element trotted out an old drawing for an 0-6-2T. When it was declined they then came up with the 2-6-2T with a Midland 2F boiler supplying an old fashioned chassis with short travel valves and laughingly placed in Class 3P category. Remember, the LMS considered the LNWR George V Class 3P, but not even the most wishful thinking person would imagine a Fowler 2-6-2T bowling along the West Coast mainline with passenger trains wieghing 400 tons. Management took things into its own hands with the North British Loco Company 'Royal Scot' loco, and Anderson of the Midland was involved in the process, and yet not one lesson was learned.

[Sheffield]

I am not sure it was that simple. It does seem that axle box performance in Midland days was reasonable by the standards of the time. I quote Eric Langridge " The bearings that were sufficient for MR days were not equal to the rough and tumble of LMS handling. Quality of materials went down with the economic pressure from commercially minded managers and oil became poor. All this can be false economy from an engineering point of view; cheapness does not really pay. However I sometimes wonder if critics of bearing sizes ever had a go at designing themselves" The LMS changed to a bearing white metal that contained lead, unlike the MR who used no lead, and changed to a cheaper oil for goods engines, with a detrimental effect on axle box life. In 1943 the LMS had to returned to a better oil, with a consequent drop in the number of failed axleboxes. Mr Cox tells us that in1930, the MR 0-8-0 suffered, on average per engine, a hotbox every  27.2 months. The corresponding figure for LNW G2 was one per engine every 32.7 months, not a lot worse. The bearing pressure in the 4F box was recorded as 796 lb/sq in, while the same figure for the G2 was 856, and for the LNE J20 ( a class some of which lasted until the end of steam) was 832. For the Canadian Selkirk the figure was 836. There was more to it than just size.

The prgrouping companies did not generally collect individual loco class costings, but the LMS did, and for the period 1927-29 the 4f had costs of 12.98 per mile, slightly less than the average for all goods engines (on the LMS). Or " the class 7 0-8-0 should have been much better, but in spite of its poor axleboxes its costs ran lower than those of its ex-LNW competitors" (E S Cox). Ten average total running costs for the ex-MR 7F was 13.92 old pence, for the ex-MR 4F 12.29, for the ex-LNW G2 15.46, and the L&Y 0-8-0 19.33. These are the sort of figures that would have appealed to Managerment. The question refered to MR policy, and nothing has been said to prove that was seriously at fault for the Midland Railway. All the problems mentioned stem from the LMS time, and that was outside the question, and not always totally the fault of the MR designs. I agree it was wrong to apply the Midland design to later loco designs, but that was not the fault of the Midland's policy. The comments about about the Folwer 2-6-2T and the Scots confirm my view expressed earlier that the LMS CME's office in the early days of the LMS was poorly managed and in a mess, but again that is an LMS problem, not a Midland one.  And I am not sure things would have been any better if Crewe or some where else had been in charge after 1923 instead of Derby. As I said it it was not until Lord Stamp was brought in to sort out the LMS that there was any real difference.

[kevinlms]

I am not sure it was that simple. It does seem that axle box performance in Midland days was reasonable by the standards of the time. I quote Eric Langridge " The bearings that were sufficient for MR days were not equal to the rough and tumble of LMS handling. Quality of materials went down with the economic pressure from commercially minded managers and oil became poor. All this can be false economy from an engineering point of view; cheapness does not really pay. However I sometimes wonder if critics of bearing sizes ever had a go at designing themselves" The LMS changed to a bearing white metal that contained lead, unlike the MR who used no lead, and changed to a cheaper oil for goods engines, with a detrimental effect on axle box life. In 1943 the LMS had to returned to a better oil, with a consequent drop in the number of failed axleboxes. Mr Cox tells us that in1930, the MR 0-8-0 suffered, on average per engine, a hotbox every  27.2 months. The corresponding figure for LNW G2 was one per engine every 32.7 months, not a lot worse. The bearing pressure in the 4F box was recorded as 796 lb/sq in, while the same figure for the G2 was 856, and for the LNE J20 ( a class some of which lasted until the end of steam) was 832. For the Canadian Selkirk the figure was 836. There was more to it than just size.

The prgrouping companies did not generally collect individual loco class costings, but the LMS did, and for the period 1927-29 the 4f had costs of 12.98 per mile, slightly less than the average for all goods engines (on the LMS). Or " the class 7 0-8-0 should have been much better, but in spite of its poor axleboxes its costs ran lower than those of its ex-LNW competitors" (E S Cox). Ten average total running costs for the ex-MR 7F was 13.92 old pence, for the ex-MR 4F 12.29, for the ex-LNW G2 15.46, and the L&Y 0-8-0 19.33. These are the sort of figures that would have appealed to Managerment. The question refered to MR policy, and nothing has been said to prove that was seriously at fault for the Midland Railway. All the problems mentioned stem from the LMS time, and that was outside the question, and not always totally the fault of the MR designs. I agree it was wrong to apply the Midland design to later loco designs, but that was not the fault of the Midland's policy. The comments about about the Folwer 2-6-2T and the Scots confirm my view expressed earlier that the LMS CME's office in the early days of the LMS was poorly managed and in a mess, but again that is an LMS problem, not a Midland one.  And I am not sure things would have been any better if Crewe or some where else had been in charge after 1923 instead of Derby. As I said it it was not until Lord Stamp was brought in to sort out the LMS that there was any real difference.

 

Not sure I understand your logic, Sheffield. If the LMS's locomotive department was poorly managed and yet largely under the influence of ex-Midland Railway personnel, along with the Operating Department, doesn't that imply that they were merely following on from what they'd always done? I.e. a "Greater" Midland Railway. If there were problems, then those 2 groups, ought to have been held responsible.

[MarkC]

The quotation attibuted to Fowler as never having designed a loco is in Brian Haresnape's 'Fowler Locomotives - A Pictorial History' (IA). 

 

Thanks, Coach. I hope you didn't spend too much time hunting that down

 

Cheers

Mark

[The Stationmaster]

I am not sure it was that simple. It does seem that axle box performance in Midland days was reasonable by the standards of the time. I quote Eric Langridge " The bearings that were sufficient for MR days were not equal to the rough and tumble of LMS handling. Quality of materials went down with the economic pressure from commercially minded managers and oil became poor. All this can be false economy from an engineering point of view; cheapness does not really pay. However I sometimes wonder if critics of bearing sizes ever had a go at designing themselves" The LMS changed to a bearing white metal that contained lead, unlike the MR who used no lead, and changed to a cheaper oil for goods engines, with a detrimental effect on axle box life. In 1943 the LMS had to returned to a better oil, with a consequent drop in the number of failed axleboxes. Mr Cox tells us that in1930, the MR 0-8-0 suffered, on average per engine, a hotbox every  27.2 months. The corresponding figure for LNW G2 was one per engine every 32.7 months, not a lot worse. The bearing pressure in the 4F box was recorded as 796 lb/sq in, while the same figure for the G2 was 856, and for the LNE J20 ( a class some of which lasted until the end of steam) was 832. For the Canadian Selkirk the figure was 836. There was more to it than just size.

The prgrouping companies did not generally collect individual loco class costings, but the LMS did, and for the period 1927-29 the 4f had costs of 12.98 per mile, slightly less than the average for all goods engines (on the LMS). Or " the class 7 0-8-0 should have been much better, but in spite of its poor axleboxes its costs ran lower than those of its ex-LNW competitors" (E S Cox). Ten average total running costs for the ex-MR 7F was 13.92 old pence, for the ex-MR 4F 12.29, for the ex-LNW G2 15.46, and the L&Y 0-8-0 19.33. These are the sort of figures that would have appealed to Managerment. The question refered to MR policy, and nothing has been said to prove that was seriously at fault for the Midland Railway. All the problems mentioned stem from the LMS time, and that was outside the question, and not always totally the fault of the MR designs. I agree it was wrong to apply the Midland design to later loco designs, but that was not the fault of the Midland's policy. The comments about about the Folwer 2-6-2T and the Scots confirm my view expressed earlier that the LMS CME's office in the early days of the LMS was poorly managed and in a mess, but again that is an LMS problem, not a Midland one.  And I am not sure things would have been any better if Crewe or some where else had been in charge after 1923 instead of Derby. As I said it it was not until Lord Stamp was brought in to sort out the LMS that there was any real difference.

And herein I think can be seen part of the problem of a blinkered management, bit like the SNCF approach in some respects!  A cost per loco mile is a very isolated figure bearing only a vague connection with train and traffic working.  Far more relevant to establish a cost per ton mile although that requires more inputs (and work) to assess.  For instance the GWR very carefully monitored freight train mileage and mileage against loadings (some other Railways did the same).    A cost per loco mile only becomes truly relevant when assessed against the work it achieved over those miles.  Fair enough if the 0-8-0s were moving the same size trains as the 4Fs, not so clever if they were moving larger loads.  For example using the quoted figures above on one stretch of the S&DJtR a 4F was allowed 35 wagons of mineral traffic and a 7F was allowed 45, so for an extra loco cost of 1.63d per mile the train load was c.28% greater but on pure loco costs alone the 4F was cheaper - a potentially very misleading comparison.

[Old Gringo]

"What could have ended the Midland's Small Engine Policy?"

 

One possible answer might be - bringing into line the speeding up of non-stop runs exceeding 100 miles to match the size of the company's standing and to keep up with its competitors.

 

On Gross receipts, the Midland ranked third in the pre-grouping companies, behind the Great Western and the 'Premier Line', the LNWR.

 

In 1910, the total number of these 'flagship' runs was 175; 57 on the LNWR, 41 on the GWR, 30 on the GNR, 12 on the NER and 13 on the Midland (followed by an assorted few from various companies). 

 

By 1914, the total number of these runs was 185;  62 on the LNWR, 37 on the GWR, 29 on the GNR, 13 on the NER and 23 on the Midland (followed by a few from each of the LSWR, GCR, GER and Caledonian).

 

Obviously the Midland was trying hard to catch up, with its lightly loaded trains hauled by highly polished little red engines and it was making a good profit.  But as the second largest coal-carrying company, its profits were underpinned by mineral traffic.  Post war, had it not been for the grouping, the Midland would have found it hard and were very lucky that their men found themselves in the top jobs.

 

Unfortunately, for the infant LMSR, faced as all the grouped railways were with much higher operating costs and changing economic conditions, Midland working practices were the last thing the new company needed - but without forward looking management, that's what it got until Stamp took control.

 

Had the railways stayed independent in 1923, I suspect the Midland might well have ended their own small engine policy, just to keep up.

 

 

Edit: Information from 'Railway Year Books' 1911 & 1919 editions