phil-b259

Axle counters are a relatively new phenomenon when it comes to their squadron use - as such only lines that have been resignaled since 2000 use them in large numbers - everywhere else conventional track circuits are the order of the day, which technically require wheels free testing every time their integrity has been compromised by a bit of rail being renewed. While it would be nice to think that NR had taken into account all departments in their planning, unfortunately that is not what I see on the ground, where far to many permenant way jobs overlook the need for S&T or ETE cover until the very last minute. As for 3rd rail issues - you would like to think that had been accounted for when the South East route went and bought a couple (Horsham and Paddock Wood are mentioned as getting them). My observation is that there has been plenty of talk about how wonderful these machines are, but precious little information on how they will deployed in 3rd rail areas, which is hardly insignificant in terms of route mileage. Don't get me wrong I am all for improving safety, but if working on the railway has taught me anything it's that the upper management is dominated by p-way types who are prone to overlook things in their enthusiasm for shiny new toys. Hopefully all will come clear in due course but with the machines not that far off arriving it would be nice to have the confidence that the practicalities of how they will be used have been properly thought through.

What nobody behind this initiative in NR has adequately explained to me is how this 'take a possession round the train business' will work with conductor rails. In 99% of cases these have to be isolated for any track based activity to be carried out and unlike OHLE isolating conrail is a time consuming and very manual process with hook switches and suchlike needing to be manually operated on site. It also ignores that if the p-way renew a length of rail say, the track cannot be returned to service until the S&T have tested the track circuit - which cannot happen if the maintenance train is sat on it! I fear that once again its a case of NR forgetting it does have other disciplines than P-Way in its empire to consider....

Its more the fact that we have done this subject to death many, many, many times over what feels like hundreds of threads. Having decided to not buy the first release of the Midland Pullman and subsequently been seduced into getting this one I am not disappointed with what I got for my money - (even if strictly speaking I don't need the 'extras' and would have been quite happy with a plain vanilla release like the first one with a slightly lower price).

what I am saying is that from a 'buildability' point of view professionals have been pointed out how it is much, much cheaper, easier and down right cost effective to build a brand new line than quadruple the entire Chiltern main line or 6 track the WCML - which is what is required to provide a similar uplift in capacity. They also recognise that you don't build it to outdated standards and that removing high speed traffic from the current routes represents best - hence the need for gentle curves and tunnelling to get under obstacles which roads would simply swerve round (given their 70mph maximum limit) As for the 'out of town stations' a large part of that is the desire not to demolish vast swathes of property unless absolutely unavoidable. I refer you to the French experience - they were quite happy to build 'parkway' stations at the likes of Lyon (conveniently located at the regions main airport) rather than in the city centre with the latter served by links from the LGV to the classic lines. Finally its not bad mouthing people when they refuse to acknowledge the truth (1) High speed is a complete red herring - and much hyped by the politicians, not the engineers (2) If HS2 is cancelled the money does NOT go back into the rail network - it gets used by the chancellor to pay off our national debt. (3) With demand for our rail transport (passenger and freight) set to outstrip demand on the WCML in the next two decades something has to be done, Namely:- (a.) Make people travel less through sky high fares to suppress demand (and similar moves to constrain freight) (b.) Subject those living alongside the WCML or the Chiltern line to decades of misery while you totally rebuild them. (c.) Build HS2 (or a variant of it) If you disagree with HS2 as proposed the onus is on you to address the problems HS2 is designed to solve. Simply saying you don't like it is not good enough, or disputing that a problem exists is the equivalent of sticking your head in the sand. Come up with some reasoned, sensible and buildable proposals that can fully meet the objectives HS2 is designed to solve (of which journey time reduction is one) and I will be more than happy to listen to them.

Utter nonsense - and people who make such a claim are only showing their ignorance of the project as a whole. HS2 was originally promoted by railway engineers to solve foreseeable capacity issues in the decades ahead - and their preferred solution of a French style LGV is the ideal solution to the problem - for well founded engineering and construction issues. The "high speed" bit came out of Whitehall and was no doubt an attempt by the Government to try and impress everyone with a headline figure. What you describe as 'mission creep' was the politicians realisation that they had cocked up the PR aspect by focusing on the wrong thing. The other point to make is that even if you reduced the design speed back to 200mph (remember the LGV nord and HS1 have Eurostars running at 186mph so it doesn't make sense to make HS2 any lower) - it wouldn't save you that much in construction costs - you would still need miles of tunnelling to satisfy the NIMBYs / to get through the Chilterns, still need to expand Euston, still need to build a new station in Birmingham, etc

The two projects (new island at the exsisting Cambridge station) and the proposals for a new station to the north were completely separate and are seperated by a good decade or so in planning terms. Cambridge got its new island to relieve time tabling constraints while the new station is being promoted under a massive new development - which is basically paying most of the cost.

I didn't realise the CC 6500 had a top speed of 124mph or that the German 103 was designed to run at a maximum of 120mmph. So Alstoms bogie design could have potentially given the Brush design under the 89 some competition then? Mind you I am pretty sure you won't prove me wrong when I say we haven't seen a 140mph Co-Co design yet.

Yup - the ex post office bay and the non-electrified down siding are going.

Quite - but most of this is not about what might be happening now - its what might happen in a few years time. Like I said earlier with the GTR dispute, Southern are actually going to increase conductor numbers - not reduce them, plus there are no dramatic changes planned to the conductors T&Cs once the trains go over to DOO. In 5 or 10 years time however that might not be the case and DOO removes the most significant tool the RMT have to resist it (namely strike action) causing the mass disruption they need it to if it is to be effective. Thus the perceived training up of management to act as 'Scab' labour' in disputes (regardless of the truth of the mater) will always get the RMT going. As for informing the public - well survey after survey says what they actually want is to keep a visible staff presence on the train to help them out. In the GTR dispute management say this is not always possible if the conductor has to keep breaking off to oversee the door operation at every station particularly if they have to do so from the rear cab of the train, so DCO (as the DfT call it - where there is still a conductor on board - but they have no role in the trains movement / door operation) actually is giving the public what they want. This means the RMT have to focus on other things to try and skew public opinion their way and ensure that their members are not, strictly speaking* fundamental to train safe operation. * which does not mean guards / conductors do not have benefits of course. Have a look at the RMT 'news' page and note just how many of the articles are referring to Guards / DOO on various different operators. https://www.rmt.org.uk/news/archive/?p=1 Southerns explanation to passengers:- http://www.southernrailway.com/southern/news/rmt-strike-action/ RMTs explanation to passengers:- https://www.rmt.org.uk/news/a-letter-from-southern-conductors/

I think that this is an example of where the BR board was very good at playing Whitehall at its own game. For example if BR worked the numbers and said to the DfT that 140mph running would generate £Y extra revenue then it is quite possible that might induce the been counters to look more favourably on new stock. Similarly going for a BO-BO configuration, where there was lots of 'competition' as it were to obstensably lower the price would have no doubt gone down well with civil servants. Equally leaving the costs of modifying the signalling off the bill, but still giving the impression that they would be done 'soon' is quite a smart trick to pull if you can get away with it. You also need to rember that the Conservative Government of the day was, as with the present day, very much focused on the power of the 'market'. The 90s and Mk3s were built 'in house' by BR and this was seen as not good value for money by Whitehall* who no doubt applied political pressure for the future ECML electric stock to procured from private sector. Going for a new design fitted this mindset and may have helped. * Hence the privatisation of BREL halfway through the class 91 procurement.

But to an extent their jobs ARE at risk. Lets have a look at the wider picture - the Government has made it clear ever since the McNulty review was published that it expects DOO operation (at least as far as door control is concerned) to be the norm and has been applying considerable pressure on franchise bidders to implement it in recent years. FGW for example got a new management contract style franchise to cover the introduction of the DOO IEPs with no dedicated catering car in the full knowledge that this would antagonise the RMT. Hence guards and catering staff held a series of strikes over the issue - but to no avail as the Government want the issue addressed now so the next franchise can be let with DOO and the no buffet cars issues all sorted by the time they let the next 'proper' franchise. Similarly GTR are expected to use the current short term management contract franchise to push through DOO on most routes, ready for re-franchising in 2018 (possibly being split up again in the process) as a DOO operation - which is what has led to the current industrial action / poor service on Southern. More recently guards on Scotrail are talking of industrial action as the new trains for the Edinburgh - Glasgow electrification project will be DOO operated. I fully expect to see a similar situation occur when the new Northern and TransPennine Express stock arrives, plus there have been rumblings of action on Merseyrail over its plan to procure new stock. The thing is once you remove the need for a 'guard' (or to be precise, someone trained to the current guards level), then the train can still run on time even if the ex guard goes on strike / is ill / is delayed getting to the service due to say late running, etc. As such its easy to see that terms and conditions for ex-guards (even they are still retained as conductors) are a perfect target for those looking to cut costs. This is why, even though Southern have said they will actually be looking to take on more conductors in future (not reducing them), the RMT is opposed to the plans - it totally undermines their bargaining position if a future management decide they do wish to cut numbers in future / not offer a suitable wage increase / alter staff T&Cs Thus the change in status of a guard being a 'must have' for services to run to a 'optional extra' does have serious implications the RMT unions ability to protect its members jobs / terms and conditions in the decades ahead. Unfortunately its a battle that through Westminster politics and increased technical progress they will eventually lose.

To be fair VTEC have made it Crystal clear that the DfT procured (and decidedly Spartan interiors) of the IEPs will be significantly enhanced to bring them up to the same or better than the interiors seen in the refurbished HST set shown to the press a few weeks ago. There is also the little mater that the use of the IEP was mandated by the DfT whoever won the franchise - any proposals not to use them would never have made it through the initial bidding process as given the amount of money the DfT / Treasury have spent procuring the things they need to save face by having operators being seen to embrace them.

But until Eurostars started running all OHLE - con rail changeovers were done at stations (Drayton Park & Farringdon) - so the issue of on the move changeovers never occurred until the WLL got OHLE from North Pole Juc to Willesden Junc*. There is also the fact that we have never had the French situation of two different OHLE systems meeting (1.5KV DC & 25KV AC) requiring pantograph swapping at speed. I would suggest the reason why the British took so long to allow on the move changeovers was much the same as the refusal to allow a 25KVAC connection running along the roof of passenger carrying vehicles until the introduction of the Pendalinos (despite the French having proved it being perfectly safe since 1980. Namely a far too cautious attitude to anything 'not invented here' and a desire to 'gold plate' regulations. *While today it might make sense to bring OHLE as far as Shepherds Bush station to facilitate turn rounds if the changeover doesn't work correctly, I believe there is insufficient clearance under the A40 (The Westway) bridge for OHLE. Plus of course Shepherds Bush station didn't exist at the time the line was electrified

One problem (that re-emerged when EWS were designing the class 67s) was that the CO-CO bogie design under the 89 was pretty much unique (every other 100mph+ design in the world used a BO-BO configuration) and consequently Brush were able to charge a high price for its use. As a result EWS rejected it - even though the use of a BO-BO design on the 67s resulted in a very high axle loading and restricted route avalbility. When BR was designing the class 91 and Mk4 carriage fleet, they were obliged (as a result of HM Treasuary) to spend as little as possible on the new trains and as such it was far more cost effective for BR to stick with the BO-BO configuration where there were a wide varity of maunfacturers to chose from rather than deplete the available funds in going for a unique solution.

Not good given the loco depot is south of the station.

The 20 has bad wheel flats as a result of its failure during the gala and it was thought it might require road transport. Hence it got left behind for a more in depth assessment. The 73 was left behind because (1) It was not certain the 20 would need to go away by road (if a slow speed path could be found by NR to get it back to a suitable depot then hailing it by rail was GBRFs preferred option) and (2) the Bluebell is VERY tight for locos at the moment* so the 73 could have been pressed into service if anything else went wrong. * The Q has been stopped with leaking firebox stays, the S15 is in the works having some work done on its valves / pistons, the H is likewise in for several jobs to be tackled (as usual it was stopped for one thing and a further 6 need doing) and the C is restricted to yard work. The only serviceable locos at present are Camelot (which desperately needs a boiler washout but is having to wait), the E4, Bluebell and Baxter.

I wouldn't hold your breath. Given Hornby have had the tooling to produce Southern liveried Athurs with Watercart / 6 wheel tenders and non smoke deflector fitted examples, but have consistently failed to do so, I don't see them embarking on a H15 Its something of a frustration that while the designers of Hornby's models generally allow for lots of variation, the marketing side seem to be very un-imaginative, simply turning out repeat versions of the same tooling configuration then wondering why they don't sell.

There is a big difference between the likes of DFS and Hornby. DFS effectively make their stuff with every intention of selling it at the 'Sale' price 11 months of the year (They jack the prices UP for one month, usually from mid November to Christmas when they cannot supply "in time for Christmas" and people generally are not that interested in buying furniture). Thus even when their furniture is 'on sale' DFS are still making a nice profit on everything sold - hence the 'never ending sale' which is simply a marketing trick too many people in the UK fall for. Hornby by contrast are having a sale simply get as much cash as possible so as to keep Barclays from pulling the plug - many of the items they are selling will actually be selling at a loss, but desperate times call for desperate measures with say £80 quid now being much better for the banks than a possible £140 in a months time.

Wind speeds are only one part of the equation. As good as it is, the original WCML OHLE kit will NOT cope with a train comprised of two multiple units travelling at 140MPH! A single pantograph at 140MPH (the design speed of a Pendalino) yes, but certainly not two shorter units coupled together as will be the case with the IEP. As such its not NR 'wasting taxpayers money" / "ignoring BR practice" - simply copying the WCML kit will not meet the technical needs of the GWML and thus a new design was required.

You need to remove the green glass from the semaphore signal arm and replace it with a metal plate. When a proceed indication is given the green (or single or double yellow indication is given by the colour light head mounted below the arm). You also need to ensure that the colour light head does not show a red aspect - the red indication is given by the red glass and lamp in the semaphore arm.

The official RAIB report goes into these aspects in quite some detail - and yes something (or rather many somethings) went adrift. From the report:- Identification of underlying factors Management of the trial POGO installation Network Rail did not ensure that the risks to crossing users at Oakwood Farm UWC were adequately mitigated. The factors related to this are: Network Rail did not adequately control the design and installation of the wiring of the gate operating buttons at Oakwood Farm UWC (paragraph 74); Network Rail did not implement previously recommended improvements to Oakwood Farm UWC (paragraph 80); and Network Rail did not risk assess the POGO as a full system before installing it at Oakwood Farm UWC (paragraph 88). Further in the report also states this:- Pratts Lower UWC is located between Billingshurst and Christs Hospital stations in West Sussex, and had been fitted with the first version of the POGO equipment in early 2010. Pratts Lower was the only other UWC with MSLs for which authority had been given under the first trial product acceptance certificate. The installation of the POGO equipment at Pratts Lower UWC, unlike Oakwood Farm UWC, did not have the additional buttons on the left-hand side of the crossing approaches. The equipment at both crossings included optical sensors whose purpose was to prevent the gates closing if the open/close button was pressed while a vehicle was travelling over the crossing. In May 2014 there was a near miss between a train and two road vehicles, when the gates closed and trapped both vehicles on the crossing. The vehicles managed to move clear around 20 seconds before the arrival of the train. On the basis of the initial incident notification, the RAIB wrote to Network Rail and requested that the subsequent Network Rail investigation consider: details of the POGO trial’s project plan, including duration of trial, how it was being monitored and assessed to be left in place and installed at other locations how the risk of potential malfunctions was identified and addressed for the trial. The subsequent Network Rail investigation found that: the control system associated with the optical sensors had been set up incorrectly following rectification of another fault; Network Rail had not trained its technicians in the testing and maintenance of the POGO equipment because no training instructions had been provided (despite this being a condition of the trial acceptance certificate); there was no clear evidence that any risk assessment had been undertaken which could have identified the possibility of wrongly setting up the control system; there was no evidence that any assessment had been done of the operational risks of the POGO equipment before the trial; there was no evidence that a formal trial had been conducted and reviewed by the certificate’s expiry date in March 2010 (which was also a condition of the trial acceptance certificate) for the period between March and December 2010, there was no valid certification in place for the POGO installation. All Items above (except the 1st one), were also applicable to the first POGO equipment during the time it was installed at Oakwood Farm UWC. The report made recommendations to Network Rail to review the following: the POGO control system at Pratts Lower UWC and any derivatives, to eliminate the risk of wrongly setting it up as far as is practicable; the robustness of accepting new equipment onto the operational railway with regard to how practical training is given to personnel responsible for its maintenance to ensure that they are fully conversant with new equipment before it becomes operational; the process of how the manufacturer’s product training documentation is made available to those responsible for its maintenance; the robustness of how the trial process is completed and full product acceptance granted, to ensure that all new equipment is suitably authorised to be in use. Following a review of Network Rail’s investigation, the RAIB wrote to Network Rail in February 2014 (copied to the Office of Rail and Road (ORR)) expressing the following concerns: that the investigation had been conducted at a local, and not at a national level, given that the consequences of the incident could have resulted in fatalities; that the sequence of events during the design, installation and commissioning of the POGO equipment could not be determined because there were insufficient records of what was done during these stages; and that the introduction of the POGO equipment was not suitably managed with respect to risks that it may have introduced. The RAIB also advised Network Rail that it should consider a review of the process of introducing new technology, including the level of safety assurance to be adopted. In particular it advised that it should review the provision of information and training to maintenance staff. It also advised Network Rail to consider reviewing the risk assessment process as applied to new equipment, including the proper use of risk assessment techniques to identify risk control measures. Following the accident at Oakwood Farm UWC, the RAIB asked Network Rail to provide an update on the progress of the recommendations made within its own report into the near miss at Pratts Lower UWC. Network Rail has provided no evidence that it had reviewed the control system at the crossing, or any derivatives. Neither has it provided the RAIB with any evidence that it has reviewed the robustness of how the trial process was completed and how full product acceptance was granted for new equipment. So yes NR monumentally screwed up what should have been a straight forward and rather good concept (i.e. how to deal with gates being left open by crossing users) and totally messed it up. It is only luck that has prevented fatalities so far and it should be a wake up to all at HQ that 'projects' need to be properly organised AND MODIFIED if found wanting. To many projects get left unfinished (though rarely in an unsafe condition) with maintenance left to pick up the pieces.

If you look back at the history behind the Thameslink train order you will find that the Government wasted valuable design time by procrastinating about where to order them, plus exactly what specification they wanted. Siemens gave a good price - which was even better at one stage thanks to the euro - pond exchange rate, but Bombardier were going round saying there would be big job losses if they lost out. In the end Siemens has cost the Treasury more than having them built in Derby precisely because of the Whitehall delaying the whole process while they made their minds up. Similarly the IEP is WAY more costly than any other high speed train in the world because it's been a DfT led project that started life as a straightforward liked for like HST replacement but has morphed into something very different where the DfT kept changing their mind over what the end spec would be. So yes I accept that the Thameslink trains might still have arrived with flaws, and that those flaws (when it comes to engineering based issues) are the responsibility of Siemens, but that doesn't change the fact that the trains would have been here a good 12 months earlier if the DfT / Treasury had let the professionals in train procurement (the ROSCOs) do the job they were set up to do. (AND before you or others start claiming otherwise, EVERY enquiry into ROSCOs 'big profits' / unwillingness to invest / anti competitive behaviour has come out with the conclusion that such things are happening PRECISELY because the DfT / Treasury keep meddling in / have set up the industry in such a way that the ROSCOs have no choice but to behave as they do). People seem to forget, back in the days of the British a Railways Board you had a very good firewall keeping Politicians and Whitehall away from front line decisions (such as the design of train) that expertise has been lost and NO political party is going to set up a replacement that will be effective - precisely because it gives them less control over the industry.

Today we (the front line faulting and maintenance guys) finally got to see the approved plans for Redhill (just as work is starting). They do show, contrary to previous plans, that platform 1 will be turned into a south facing bay. I will try and post a pic later. Edit :- here they are, but please DO NOT reproduce them elsewhere

Its not a 'blunder' - any more than the lack of daylight under the boiler on the radial tank from Oxford or the motor block come firebox on Bachmanns C class extending too far forward. They are all design decisions taken for specific reasons - which people are naturally free to agree with by purchasing or not doing so if they feel it is something that the cannot live with. As such Horby have not apologised nor will they be doing anything about it.