springs branch Posted July 21, 2011 Share Posted July 21, 2011 97304+97303 off to Macynlleth again today. More testing?? 97302 and 97304 went up on Monday. It was more testing, but nothing to do with ERTMS, it was standard rail testing with the Track inspection Coach. Went to Mach on monday and then a return to Pwllheli and back to Shrewsbury on the Tuesday. 97303 was due to take a tamper to Towyn on the Monday night but didnt happen. I think another Tamper move next week. Link to post Share on other sites More sharing options...
Shed Posted July 8, 2012 Share Posted July 8, 2012 So when does the Hertford loop get ERTMS installed? 1 Link to post Share on other sites More sharing options...
18B Posted July 8, 2012 Share Posted July 8, 2012 A recent document was posted by a senior figure in ATW ; http://www.signallin...ter_Leppard.pdf I like his quote, For ATW on the Cambrian line •Our very simple railway has been converted to something much more complex (and expensive!) •So far, the results suggest we should have kept what we previously had… 1 Link to post Share on other sites More sharing options...
RMweb Gold The Stationmaster Posted July 8, 2012 RMweb Gold Share Posted July 8, 2012 I like his quote, For ATW on the Cambrian line •Our very simple railway has been converted to something much more complex (and expensive!) •So far, the results suggest we should have kept what we previously had… Yes, but don't overlook the fact - very clearly made - that he was writing very much from the train operator's viewpoint and he completely ignored the fact that the Cambrian is also just one part of the Europe wide trials of various versions/levels of ERTMS (which has suffered considerable teething problems in other countries as well). And one point which he does not make - but might be relevant to some of the reliability issues is the fact that the Cambrian conversion work was under-financed and that some things were 'missed out'. The question of brake and speed curves is interesting because as I understood the original (operating) spec there should have been no such problems as the software was intended to be very flexible in that respect - so it looks like something has been de-sec'd in order to save money? 1 Link to post Share on other sites More sharing options...
18B Posted July 8, 2012 Share Posted July 8, 2012 Indeed, an he does go on to say that he appreciates that in the wider context this is good for the UK. Link to post Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest Phil Posted July 9, 2012 Share Posted July 9, 2012 I remain far from convinced that the Cambrian ERTMS system should be run from computer servers in Didcot (England) and managed by a bunch of Italian engineers based in Stoke (England). Perhaps that is what the trials are actually for - to see if a Welsh trainset can be managed from a foreign country Link to post Share on other sites More sharing options...
Supaned Posted July 9, 2012 Share Posted July 9, 2012 Phil , the location of the equipment would be largely irrelevant - if you think of the master plan to run the entire network from these "super" boxes like WMSCC and co. I suspect the Italians are involved as Ansaldo is an Italian company - their signal heads are frankly rubbish (which is probably why the Dorman-type LED signal seems to be the new standard) , and it's also of note that the GSM-R cab radios are Siemens products. 1 Link to post Share on other sites More sharing options...
RMweb Gold The Stationmaster Posted July 9, 2012 RMweb Gold Share Posted July 9, 2012 I remain far from convinced that the Cambrian ERTMS system should be run from computer servers in Didcot (England) and managed by a bunch of Italian engineers based in Stoke (England). Perhaps that is what the trials are actually for - to see if a Welsh trainset can be managed from a foreign country You're quite right in the first case - as that distance from Didcot has caused at least one major failure on the Cambrian and it seems to relate to the links from Didcot perhaps not being 'signalling standard' (at least HMRI have taken a n interest in that so I understand). The Italian involvement is down to Ansaldo and their part in the overall ERTMS project but I know that there was initially enormous troubles in 'translating' (in more ways than one) the stuff Ansaldo were coming up with to British practice and - so I was told - even to ERTMS specs. But then as Supaned has already noted they were exactly clever at delivering signals to British spec either (and I could say a lot more about that but am not eally in a position to do so). 1 Link to post Share on other sites More sharing options...
Jon Fitness Posted July 9, 2012 Share Posted July 9, 2012 (edited) Strangely enough, it's not just on the Cambrian that ERTMS is having an effect. At Chester a "quick shunt" from platform to platform with a fitted 158 can turn in to a "long drawn out shunt" if the driver has to reset the ERTMS during reversing. I now check beforehand which type of unit the driver is moving before calculating whether or not to chance a "quick shunt". I have heard rumours of ERTMS activations in odd places down the north Wales coast line... JF Edited July 9, 2012 by Jon Fitness 1 Link to post Share on other sites More sharing options...
Edwin_m Posted July 9, 2012 Share Posted July 9, 2012 It has protected manual (manual driving supervised by the system) and restricted manual (manual driving with no protection but limited to a certain speed). Link to post Share on other sites More sharing options...
dmustu Posted July 10, 2012 Share Posted July 10, 2012 (edited) I suspect the Italians are involved as Ansaldo is an Italian company - their signal heads are frankly rubbish Their trams aint much cop either! Edited July 10, 2012 by dmustu Link to post Share on other sites More sharing options...
Derekl Posted July 10, 2012 Share Posted July 10, 2012 There is a fairly detailed discussion of ERTMS in relation to a train passing Llandebarn crossing with the barriers up in this RAIB report. The Appendices may also contain useful information (confess I did not get as far as reading them): http://www.raib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/120627_R112012_Llanbadarn.pdf Link to post Share on other sites More sharing options...
Talltim Posted July 10, 2012 Share Posted July 10, 2012 (edited) I read that report last week and thought that was interesting that ERTMS was implicated in several ways in contributing to the incident. A: the driver was overly concentrating on the ERTMS terminal to the detriment of looking out the front (although that was partly because of the brake test requirements) B: the reboot of the ERTMS took the time over the ten minutes allowed from pressing the crossing interlock request button to it resetting so that the crossing did not start its closing procedure. C: the cost of ERTMS made it too expensive to properly integrate the crossing into ERTMS Edited July 10, 2012 by Talltim Link to post Share on other sites More sharing options...
Edwin_m Posted July 10, 2012 Share Posted July 10, 2012 (edited) A and C are probably correct but B is debateable. The reason the driver couldn't start away when ready was that the signaller had failed to cancel the route into the platform so the system couldn't set a route out again. The reboot was an inappropriate attempt to solve this problem. Edited July 10, 2012 by Edwin_m 2 Link to post Share on other sites More sharing options...
Derekl Posted July 10, 2012 Share Posted July 10, 2012 A and C are probably correct but B is debateable. The reason the driver couldn't start away when ready was that the signaller had failed to cancel the route into the platform so the system couldn't set a route out again. The reboot was an inappropriate attempt to solve this problem. I read the problem as being that the signaller had not reset the route, which would have automatically reset had the train travelled all the way to the end of the platform, rather than stopping (correctly) at the stop-board for a 2 coach train, but then identified the problem as an ERTMS problem and instructed the driver to re-set (not necessary, once the incoming route had been cancelled). The driver seems to have been unaware of the 10 minutes allowed for departure following pressing the crossing interlock request button, but probably did not need to remember that in normal operation. On the "A" issue, I noticed that the report referred to a practice of "heads-down" driving (reasonable, as presumably the driver has to monitor the DMI fairly continuously). That may well relate to the difficulty of locating the equipment in the 158 cab, which has been referred to (either above, or in one of the links). There are obviously (and unsurprisingly) some "learning issues" with this equipment. Link to post Share on other sites More sharing options...
RMweb Gold The Stationmaster Posted July 10, 2012 RMweb Gold Share Posted July 10, 2012 Odd to relate but it's not the first time I've heard of a Driver using a running brake test as a reason for not observing lineside signals. The only new feature in this incident is the distraction potential of the screen and messages/commands it is showing and that, and its impact on Driver workload together with the siting of the balise, should have been considered in reassessing the SPAD risk on the level crossing at the time the signalling system was altered. We were looking at factors like this in SPAD risk reviews for CTRL (HS1) some years back so it is hardly a new subject. 1 Link to post Share on other sites More sharing options...
Edwin_m Posted July 10, 2012 Share Posted July 10, 2012 (edited) Effectively you just apply the brakes and make sure the train slows down. It also has the function in cold weather of generating a bit of heat to keep the brake gear from freezing solid. The normal brake test on coupling up proves that the air is getting all the way down the pipe but doesn't say anything about whether the brakes themselves are working. Edited July 10, 2012 by Edwin_m Link to post Share on other sites More sharing options...
RMweb Gold The Stationmaster Posted July 10, 2012 RMweb Gold Share Posted July 10, 2012 Effectively you just apply the brakes and make sure the train slows down. It also has the function in cold weather of generating a bit of heat to keep the brake gear from freezing solid. The normal brake test on coupling up proves that the air is getting all the way down the pipe but doesn't say anything about whether the brakes themselves are working. Not strictly accurate Edwin. A Brake Continuity Test is made to ensure that the brake system works and that the brake physically on the rear vehicle(s) except on multiple units where it is simply a continuity test (unless there are any brake cylinder pressure gauges). But you're quite right in saying that it does not mean checking the observation of the brake applying on every vehicle in the train. A Complete Brake Test is more rigorous but not normally carried out in traffic (unless things have changed). Link to post Share on other sites More sharing options...
Talltim Posted July 10, 2012 Share Posted July 10, 2012 A and C are probably correct but B is debateable. The reason the driver couldn't start away when ready was that the signaller had failed to cancel the route into the platform so the system couldn't set a route out again. The reboot was an inappropriate attempt to solve this problem. Now you remind me, yes, correct. Although ERTMS could be quicker to boot... Link to post Share on other sites More sharing options...
dmustu Posted July 12, 2012 Share Posted July 12, 2012 Well, that's why walking inspections are made along the train: apply the brakes: see if all brake shoes are indeed pressing against the wheel, release the brake: check all are loose from the wheel threads. I've done plenty of those over the years Most trains here use disc brakes, either wheel mounted or axle mounted. You generally cant see the brake pads because they are either hidden by the bogie or are mounted on the 'inside', ie between the wheels for axle mounted brakes. To view them would involve crawling underneath the train with a torch! 1 Link to post Share on other sites More sharing options...
Supaned Posted July 12, 2012 Share Posted July 12, 2012 Those brake indicators do feature on Pendolino units , but not on every form of traction. Another reason for a running brake test is to let the driver get a "feel" for the train brakes to see how they handle - even trains of the same type have differing brake characteristics. Link to post Share on other sites More sharing options...
dmustu Posted July 12, 2012 Share Posted July 12, 2012 So is Supaned and myself. Link to post Share on other sites More sharing options...
RMweb Gold 96701 Posted July 12, 2012 RMweb Gold Share Posted July 12, 2012 Extract from a RAIB report:- 110 As with snow and ice ingress at the friction face, the principal defence against snow and ice reducing brake rigging mobility is the undertaking of periodic running brake tests (see paragraph 134). Page 30 of http://www.raib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/110224_R032011_Carrbridge.pdf Link to post Share on other sites More sharing options...
Supaned Posted July 13, 2012 Share Posted July 13, 2012 Fair enough Dutch Master , we aim to inform members on here. 1 Link to post Share on other sites More sharing options...
ess1uk Posted September 22, 2012 Share Posted September 22, 2012 Work on Hertford loop getting on well. Kit popping up all over the place. Link to post Share on other sites More sharing options...
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