First Group win South West franchise

[phil-b259]

As I have no source of inside knowledge at all, just the published photos, I am free to speculate. My guess would be that someone mistakenly clipped up the points the wrong way. We will find out when the inquiry reports if not before.

Regards

Clipping points only becomes relevant if the train requires to be cautioned over a set of points that are not detected and locked in the required position by the interlocking, or if the locking function of the point machine has been compromised such that there is a risk that the point blades may move under the train.

[4630]

But then in my world so was shutting down half of Waterloo for three weeks in the first place. 

 

 

I'm not sure what you're suggesting here.

 

Are you suggesting that the work at Waterloo should have been done on a protracted basis a la London Bridge, where the travel inconvenience endured by passengers has extended over several years?

 

Or perhaps you meant that the work at Waterloo didn't need doing at all?

 

From what I've seen and experienced first hand on my frequent visits to and journeys through Waterloo over many years, it's a piece of work that is long overdue and 3 weeks of inconvenience is a pretty small price to pay.  The timing of the work has been well known and publicised widely for the best part of the past year.

 

The planning by both SWT and Network Rail, from what I've seen and experienced, has been pretty well done on the whole.

 

The only questionable aspect of all this has nothing to do with SWT or Network Rail, but rather the micro-managers clowns at DaFT who insisted that the franchise change takes place smack bang in the middle of the work.  That piece of planning is priceless.

Edited August 15, 2017 by 4630

[Gwiwer]

 

I'm not sure what you're suggesting here.

 

Are you suggesting that the work at Waterloo should have been done on a protracted basis a la London Bridge

I am suggesting that based upon what I see and what is in the public domain that it could have been done over a large number of weekend occupations which in total offer less disruption than a three-week complete shut-down.  And as it turns out this has become a three-week nightmare for reasons partly but not entirely within SWT's control.  Platforms 1-9 closed became platforms 1-10 and is now until further notice platforms 1-13.  The extent of even the "normal" disruption to travel is going down like a lead balloon in some areas.  For example the fact that there are no trains to Norbiton, the nearest station to Kingston Hospital, at all and the minibuses which are used on the K2 and K4 routes that rail passengers are expected to use instead are refusing to take some wheelchairs and larger buggies for those with hospital appointments because they do not fit in the buses.

[4630]

I am suggesting that based upon what I see and what is in the public domain that it could have been done over a large number of weekend occupations which in total offer less disruption than a three-week complete shut-down. 

 

 

But it isn't a complete three week shut down is it.

[Gwiwer]

Ten platforms are closed for three weeks which has required decimation of the timetable.  Close ten platforms from, say, 20.00 Friday until 04.00 Monday and you can cope with the weekend service in what's left with relatively few changes.  OK five platforms have been made available in the Eurostar station but those are coming back into use full time anyway though not immediately.

[stewartingram]

SWT just going out with a Bang methinks....

 

OK don't need a coat or hat, and I'd be gone if there was a train running.....  

 

Stewart

[jjb1970]

There is no way to do the work without causing disruption and upsetting people. My impression is that a lot of employers are being very reasonable in letting affected staff work from home for the period. We are where we are with an extremely intensively worked railway, the work has to be done somehow.

[jim.snowdon]

There's a little bit of blue fencing there ick but not enough to protect the site so the train appears to be the safety protection.  Possibly cam e in with some ballast, therefore the fence was removed, and left as the protection once any ballast was unloaded because the site would have been unfenced when it moved (for a while).  Interesting tho' that the site wasn't fenced off when you saw it last week - maybe someone considered a dead running line was the fencing?

 

None of which explains why the unit had an interface with it and no doubt that incident is provoking some interesting (and possibly embarassing?) questions for someone.

Indeed. Assuming that the driver didn't SPAD, the obvoius question has to be how the platform signal could be cleared for a route into an occupied track. If it was, it would point towards a failure of the interlocking, in which case there will be embarrassing questions being asked. Even if, as someone else has suggested, the points were incorrectly clipped in the wrong position, the same conclusion has to emerge, as the interlocking should have confirmed that the points were detected correctly for the through route as a condition for clearing the signal.

 

Jim

[Gwiwer]

SWT and other sources have throughout the day indicated - without investigation having taken place - that there was a "points problem" at Waterloo.  Read into that what you will.  I read into it that something may have moved beneath the train rather than an interlocking failure and definitely not a SPAD as TPWS would have intervened in that instance.

It would seem the train has not been moved yet.  There appears to be space enough to create a work zone between it and the remaining live  tracks.  So given the urgency and chaos being caused one might ask why nothing has yet been done - if indeed that is the case - to start a recovery.

[PaulRhB]

You can't do some of the work in a 52 hour 'golden block' because of the impact it has to other works. Lengthening platforms and adding a new long gantry means moving track and a hell of a lot of complicated switches and crossings around in a very tight space and you just can't rebuild that complexity in a weekend and restore normal service every Monday.

They had to shut Salisbury down for a weekend to relay two tracks through platforms, that weren't touched, and two switches.

They considered loads of options to choose the least overall disruption and gave loads of warning.

The M3 was blighted for what, 2 years?, with a 50mph congested average speed mess with idiots diving between lanes into gaps barely big enough causing others to brake and stop.

They are offering the option via Reading to remove some of the outer traffic but loads are changing at Basingstoke because 20mins off their day is too much to take

 

We are currently enduring 6, (which should have been 4,) weeks of chaos where the four lane road into the City has been restricted to 2 lanes for essential bridge work. There's only one main bridge so should they have built another temporary one at say 3 million more just so we didn't have to allow 15 minutes more on our journey for 4 weeks?

[Dunsignalling]

If you compare the front of the 66 with the lampost, you can see the train has been moved back slightly by the impact.

Well within the realm of the photographer not standing in precisely the same spot for both shots, I'd have thought.

Edited August 15, 2017 by Dunsignalling

[roythebus]

Looking at some closed "staff groups" on Facebook things are looking towards some sort of signalling failure.

[bigP]

--

Edited January 31, 2021 by bigP
Deleted

[Peter Kazmierczak]

Well within the realm of the photographer not standing in precisely the same spot for both shots, I'd have thought.

I thought the pictures were from a fixed position camera.

[Talltim]

Well within the realm of the photographer not standing in precisely the same spot for both shots, I'd have thought.

It's a fixed time lapse camera that was covering the work for the general public. I believe there are a few around the worksite, although I think that one is off now.

Of course it is possible that whatever it's fixed to wobbles slightly

Edited August 15, 2017 by Talltim

[phil-b259]

SWT and other sources have throughout the day indicated - without investigation having taken place - that there was a "points problem" at Waterloo.  Read into that what you will.  I read into it that something may have moved beneath the train rather than an interlocking failure and definitely not a SPAD as TPWS would have intervened in that instance.

 

It would seem the train has not been moved yet.  There appears to be space enough to create a work zone between it and the remaining live  tracks.  So given the urgency and chaos being caused one might ask why nothing has yet been done - if indeed that is the case - to start a recovery.

 

Ask yourself this though - WHY would a set of points move under a train when things like track circuits and route locking are there precisely to prevent such an occurrence. The answer to that, remembering just how complex the locking circuitry will be at locations such as Waterloo perhaps gives some indication why recovery of the derailed train is not the uppermost of priorities at the moment.

 

As I noted earlier signalling design, testing, maintenance, etc is designed precisely to avoid this sort of situation occurring*, yet seemingly the impossible has occurred at Waterloo.

 

* I speak from experience here - I have strapped out point detection on a crossover so one end can be worked on in a possession while trains operate normal over the other end and have changed over multicore cables containing point detection circuits and track circuits so am only to well aware of what could go wrong and the potential implications.

[phil-b259]

 BTP have declared it a crime scene and until they and RAIB are finished no one can begin to rerail the unit. 

There are/were 4 breakdown recovery crews called to site earlier, including the LUL emergency response unit.  Still, nothing can be done until the Police allow.  Things are never as straight forward as they seem on the railway.

 

 

Cheers,

Paul

 

Not exactly surprising - I reiterate the signalling system is designed to stop this sort of thing happening - and as such we are dealing with something very different from a standard derailment (as caused by a rail / wagon defect)

[Gwiwer]

While I understand things from a "railway" point of view I wonder just how much empathy the travelling public might have when (if) they see the same train in the same position 24 hours later having endured a third consecutive massively disrupted peak.  I though we had got past the era of days-long blockages because BTP thought everything which went wrong was suddenly a crime scene.  

[phil-b259]

While I understand things from a "railway" point of view I wonder just how much empathy the travelling public might have when (if) they see the same train in the same position 24 hours later having endured a third consecutive massively disrupted peak.  I though we had got past the era of days-long blockages because BTP thought everything which went wrong was suddenly a crime scene.  

 

Its not a 'railway' point of view - to put in bluntly its called the possibility of other signalling deficiencies being present that worries us railway staff.

 

Every signalling engineer / tester should remember it was a signalling installation error that led to the deaths of 35 people and many more seriously injured in 1987 a few miles down the line at Clapham and while we don't know the cause of the Waterloo accident, the fact that the signalling allowed the impossible to happen and Waterloo is in the midst of significant layout alterations is something nobody can ignore.

 

We have seen something happen that should not have happened - so my questions would be what works took place over the preceding nights, what testing was done to verify the work and perhaps most importantly can the testing records be relied upon? On the face of it the answer is negative because we have now got one train embedded (albut not significantly) in the side of another.

 

Signalling testing plans are written up and independently verified before being given to the testers and are specifically designed to eliminate any possibility of the installation not working correctly so who is at fault, the writer of the plan or the tester, or both?

 

Were I the person in charge of Waterloo (and I freely admit I am not), and speaking in a general fashion (because I am not familiar with details of the signalling works taking place), after an incident like this I would be very reticent to allow any train movements until I was happy the integrity of the signalling system had been proved beyond doubt.

Edited August 15, 2017 by phil-b259

[jim.snowdon]

 BTP have declared it a crime scene and until they and RAIB are finished no one can begin to rerail the unit. 

There are/were 4 breakdown recovery crews called to site earlier, including the LUL emergency response unit.  Still, nothing can be done until the Police allow.  Things are never as straight forward as they seem on the railway.

 

 

Cheers,

Paul

BTP strike again

 

I wonder what sort of crime they think has been committed. RAIB will have a much better chance of finding out what has happened, but unlike the days of HM Railway Inspectorate, the results of their investigations will not appear for a long time and I have little confidence that they realise that the object of the exercise is to get Waterloo up and running again for the morning, or at least as much of it as can be given the amount that is under possession.

 

Jim

[phil-b259]

BTP strike again

 

I wonder what sort of crime they think has been committed. RAIB will have a much better chance of finding out what has happened, but unlike the days of HM Railway Inspectorate, the results of their investigations will not appear for a long time and I have little confidence that they realise that the object of the exercise is to get Waterloo up and running again for the morning, or at least as much of it as can be given the amount that is under possession.

 

Jim

 

Erm - how about the tester who signed off the overnight work as working correctly when they had infact skipped bits!

 

Note this doesn't mean anyone has done that in this case - but it has to be one of the potential answers as to why the collision occurred in the first place.

 

35 people would probably still be alive today if the current testing regime was in place back in 1987 so it is essential that the testing requirements are observed by all regardless of how inconvenient it might be. As such the law will want to ensure that the correct procedures were followed to the letter.

[Gwiwer]

A failure or oversight by anyone working on the railway is seldom a crime. If that is what has occurred it is for internal investigation not a person in a wig and gown to determine what action to take.

 

Yes I remember Clapham. A friend was teaching at the school next to the line and heard then saw events unfold until she asked to be relieved of duty. She never went back. Many months of counselling still left her a changed person who no longer wanted to maintain any friendships or contact with London.

[jjb1970]

Reading some of the above posts I can't help feeling that this incident may be a blessing in disguise if it identifies a serious safety issue. I know people were hurt but it sounds like their injuries weren't serious (I know an injury doesn't have to be "serious" to inflict serious pain and it is no consolation to those unfortunate people) and the disruption is a real pain for everybody concerned but it is better this than a potential fatal incident later on.

[jim.snowdon]

A failure or oversight by anyone working on the railway is seldom a crime. If that is what has occurred it is for internal investigation not a person in a wig and gown to determine what action to take.

Yes I remember Clapham. A friend was teaching at the school next to the line and heard then saw events unfold until she asked to be relieved of duty. She never went back. Many months of counselling still left her a changed person who no longer wanted to maintain any friendships or contact with London.

It is a role that was, and still is, undertaken by that part of the ORR that is HM Railway Inspectorate, as the safety authority for the railways. It is they, frequently assisted by the specialist engineers and operators from the railway, who have the knowledge to investigate what went wrong and, ultimately whether charges are brought, usually under the Health and Safety at Work Act. Finding out exactly what caused a route to be set into a track that was occupied by another train, if not also part of the engineering possession is unlikely to be simple and not a task that I would expect BTP to be able to undertake.

 

Jim

[Gwiwer]

Amid all the vented spleens around the chaos which is still the SWT network it is now just three days until the franchise ends.  It is a normal requirement that the outgoing franchisee removes their branding (but not their livery) at their expense before the new incumbent takes over.

 

To date I have not observed one de-branded unit, station or sign.

 

As this is a "soft" changeover in the middle of the Battle of Waterloo are the rules different or are we expecting that there will be a "big bang" de-branding with everything on depots being relieved of SWT logos on Saturday night?