Railways and Politics

[1165Valour]

Hey all, just how much was the government and the Board of Trade involved in the building and operation of the railways? If anyone knows of books on this, including the 1926 General Strike, feel free to mention them.

[slilley]

Hey all, just how much was the government and the Board of Trade involved in the building and operation of the railways? If anyone knows of books on this, including the 1926 General Strike, feel free to mention them.

 

I have just looked at the National Archives catalogue for files on the 1926 General Strike and the Railways and there are some 50 or so files on the subject it would seem. Not strictly Board of Trade, plenty of LNER and GWR material in there, but a good look through might give an indication of the level of Government involvement in the railways at the time of the strike.

[AberdeenBill]

This excellent book https://www.amazon.co.uk/Castlemans-Corkscrew-Nineteenth-Bournemouth-Associated/dp/0853616663/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1545076121&sr=8-2&keywords=castleman%27s+corkscrew has a strong focus on the social and political aspects of railway building in the 19th Century.

 

Bill

[The Johnster]

I believe that the Government underwrote the cost of some 19th century schemes, including the Crewe-Holyhead route (it was thought desirable to be able to get troops quickly and in large numbers to Holyhead to quell Irish rebellions) and the Severn Tunnel (which improved the ability of warships to be made ready for sea quickly at Portsmouth and Plymouth by reducing the journey times from South Wales of the coal trains; the Admiralty had it's own colliery at Tonypandy).

 

That apart, the laissez faire attitude of Victorian governments mean that much of that period was spent in a constant and consistent struggle between the Board of Trade on one hand and the railway companies, some more so than others, on the other hand in which the former attempted to persuade the latter to introduce the most basic and (to our eyes) obvious of safety measures, such as brakes that could be applied by drivers, simple block regulations to keep trains apart from each other, and locked facing points.  By and large the B of T can be regarded as the goodies and the companies as the baddies in this.

[Steamport Southport]

Hey all, just how much was the government and the Board of Trade involved in the building and operation of the railways? If anyone knows of books on this, including the 1926 General Strike, feel free to mention them.

 

Very little in the building of them. They were more trying to stop them being built as it destroyed their land. Most politicians at the time were Lords and other landed classes who opposed the railways.

 

 

Good books on the general strike and politics of the time is the "History Of The Big Four" series by Michael Bonavia and OS Nock. There is also a Bonavia book on the General Strike.

 

https://www.amazon.co.uk/s/ref=sr_pg_1?rh=n%3A266239%2Cp_27%3AMichael+R.+Bonavia&ie=UTF8&qid=1545155573

 

https://www.amazon.co.uk/s/ref=nb_sb_noss_1?url=search-alias%3Dstripbooks&field-keywords=a+history+of+the+lms&rh=n%3A266239%2Ck%3Aa+history+of+the+lms

 

GWR and the General Strike

 

https://www.amazon.co.uk/GWR-General-Strike-Locomotion-Papers/dp/0853614881/ref=sr_1_5?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1545155790&sr=1-5&keywords=the+general+strike

 

 

I think the Bonavia book which has details on the General Strike is Railway Policy between the Wars. It's a long time since I read it so I might be mistaken.

 

 

http://www.steamindex.com/library/bonavia.htm

 

 

 

Jason

Edited December 18, 2018 by Steamport Southport

[The Johnster]

There was government input from the earliest days in the sense of an imposition on the railways of a 'parliamentary' penny a mile daily service stopping at all stations and a determined 'mileage' rate for general merchandise goods carriage.  But there was little else; the Liverpool and Manchester, which can be regarded as the template for main line railways in general, probably succeeded because much of it's route was across Chat Moss, which was not agricultural or hunting land of any great value to it's owners.  Such safety features as it did employ, up and down lines, time interval working, minimum distances between running tracks, 6 foot wide platforms with sloping ends, even the hunting horns which drivers were issued with until steam whistles were invented, and, on the vehicles, buffers and safety chains, were Stephenson's ideas and not imposed by government.

 

One 'safety' feature was the result of the very tight and vigorously enforced land ownership laws prevailing; railway land was fenced off from it's neighbours!

 

Health and safety was learned the hard way; I recall Mr. Lloyd, the Western Region guard's inspector who passed me out on rules and regulation in 1970, commenting that I should always remember that 'every one of these rules was discovered lying at the bottom of a bucket of blood'.  This impressive statement, which I have never forgotten, is essentially true, and some of that blood belonged to fare paying passengers and was thus very bad for business...

Edited December 19, 2018 by The Johnster

[kevinlms]

Very little in the building of them. They were more trying to stop them being built as it destroyed their land. Most politicians at the time were Lords and other landed classes who opposed the railways.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Jason

Not entirely true as many MP's owned businesses such as coal mines and so wanted railways to serve their properties. But of course in some instances, allowed railways to be built, but had them slightly diverted, so they didn't have to see them from the manor!

[96701]

The railways have always been interlinked with politics since it was seen as a life changing system.

[The Johnster]

All railways were associated with politics in the sense that they were authorised by Acts of Parliament which established the route of each one, and the provision of a 'parliamentary' service in each direction once daily (all stations at a penny a mile) and the mileage freight rates.  And of course your railway had to pass a Board of Trade inspection before it could operate.  But, in the early days, there was little more than that!  Both Tory and Whig governments believed strongly but to differing extents in laissez faire, 'leave it be', a policy of non-interference, when it came to regulating any commercial undertaking; they did not see it as the job of government to oversee or influence economic life and regarded their main obligation to the populace as being the preservation of law and order, and defence of the realm.

 

Businesses, the railways included, were happy enough with this state of affairs and resented such involvement as the government had.  The railways believed that they were best fit to pronounce on matters that affected their own business, as they were the ones who were running it on a daily basis, and thought they knew best.  This was fine until a major accident flagged up shortcomings, and with the Board of Trade constantly pushing for improvements and the railways resisting them to varying degrees, it was inevitable that  legislation would eventually have to be provided to enforce compliance.  

 

Thus the LB&SC, having suffered a major rear end collision in Clayton Tunnel as a result of refusing to adopt the recommended block regulations, objected to having to do so as a matter of compliance with the new law on the grounds that it would remove the onus of the driver to keep a good look out ahead, and the LNWR complained, when automatic brakes were required, that the extra braking power would encourage their drivers to speed.  It is easy from a modern cynical viewpoint to regard such attitudes as excuses to avoid spending money on the necessary changes, but many professional railwaymen genuinely felt this way!

Edited December 21, 2018 by The Johnster

[The Stationmaster]

 

 

Thus the LB&SC, having suffered a major rear end collision in Clayton Tunnel as a result of refusing to adopt the recommended block regulations, objected to having to do so as a matter of compliance with the new law on the grounds that it would remove the onus of the driver to keep a good look out ahead, and the LNWR complained, when automatic brakes were required, that the extra braking power would encourage their drivers to speed.  It is easy from a modern cynical viewpoint to regard such attitudes as excuses to avoid spending money on the necessary changes, but many professional railwaymen genuinely felt this way!

 

Firstly there was no law, new or otherwise, in 1861 which would compel the LB&SCR, or any other Railway, to install telegraph on any section of its railway.  In fact it was not until the 1873 Regulation of Railways Act that the companies were required to submit returns and of course it was not a legal requirement to provide block telegraph on lines used by passenger trains until the 1889 Regulation of Railways Act.

 

Secondlty the line through Clayton Tunnel did have a telegraph system in operation between the signalboxes at each end of the tunnel however Captain Tyler in his Report criticised the fact that only one sihgle needle instrument was in use to deal with both lines and on any event one of the signalmen involved was not applying the system correctly.  More broadly Captain Tyler was critical not only of the lack of any records at either of these signalbboxes but of a similar lack of records elsewhere on the Company's lines where Time Interval Working was, wholly legitimately, in operation - it was the replacement of that, on part of its mainline route which the Brighton company initially objected to but 2 months later agreed to install it 'to give it a fair trial'.

[Poggy1165]

It is interesting that Parliament, at different times, either blessed or refused major amalgamations.

 

For example  SER/LC&DR OK. A few years later GC/GN/GE not OK. There was no consistent policy. 

 

On the European mainland, governments seem to have been aware of the military significance of railways from the get-go. Indeed, in several countries the railways were state controlled from day one, and I think it fair to say that in all of them the necessity for them to be put on a war footing at short notice was clearly recognised.

 

Due to our "big moat" a much more relaxed view was taken in the UK, and it was only really with the growing belief that Germany was a threat that the state began to take measures to develop the railways as a military asset. This led to them being put under state control in 1914-18, but it was very much as an afterthought. 

[62613]

It is interesting that Parliament, at different times, either blessed or refused major amalgamations.

 

For example  SER/LC&DR OK. A few years later GC/GN/GE not OK. There was no consistent policy. 

 

On the European mainland, governments seem to have been aware of the military significance of railways from the get-go. Indeed, in several countries the railways were state controlled from day one, and I think it fair to say that in all of them the necessity for them to be put on a war footing at short notice was clearly recognised.

 

Due to our "big moat" a much more relaxed view was taken in the UK, and it was only really with the growing belief that Germany was a threat that the state began to take measures to develop the railways as a military asset. This led to them being put under state control in 1914-18, but it was very much as an afterthought. 

The SER/LC&DR was more of a working arrangement rather than a full amalgamation, wasn't it? They'd just spent the the last 50 or so years engaged in 'Beggar thy neighbour' competition South of the Thames, with numerous duplicate routes and services. The GCR/GNR/GER failure in any case led to the first wagon pooling agreement, didn't it?

 

To return to the O.P.: there is a paper in the Railways Archive, which I read last week, concerning the 1844 Regulation of the Railways Act, in which there was a clause that would have allowed the government to take over the running of a railway company; something to do with abuse of monopoly power. It will be remembered that a large number of amalgamations of the original small companies began at about this time, and there was concern among some in parliament that the resulting larger companies could abuse their positions.

[The Johnster]

It is interesting that Parliament, at different times, either blessed or refused major amalgamations.

 

For example  SER/LC&DR OK. A few years later GC/GN/GE not OK. There was no consistent policy. 

 

On the European mainland, governments seem to have been aware of the military significance of railways from the get-go. Indeed, in several countries the railways were state controlled from day one, and I think it fair to say that in all of them the necessity for them to be put on a war footing at short notice was clearly recognised.

 

Due to our "big moat" a much more relaxed view was taken in the UK, and it was only really with the growing belief that Germany was a threat that the state began to take measures to develop the railways as a military asset. This led to them being put under state control in 1914-18, but it was very much as an afterthought. 

 

I would with all due respect suggest that the 'no consistent policy' was parliament for once doing it's proper job and acting in the best interests of the people as a democratic government should.  The 'amalgamation' that formed the SECR, and transformed it into a very effective and efficient modern railway was clearly more in the public interest than the collapse that was imminent for both partners, whereas a merger of the already profitable GC, GN, and GE (admittedly the GN was not all that profitable, but it was no lame duck) would have created a very powerful monopoly in those areas.

[62613]

I would with all due respect suggest that the 'no consistent policy' was parliament for once doing it's proper job and acting in the best interests of the people as a democratic government should.  The 'amalgamation' that formed the SECR, and transformed it into a very effective and efficient modern railway was clearly more in the public interest than the collapse that was imminent for both partners, whereas a merger of the already profitable GC, GN, and GE (admittedly the GN was not all that profitable, but it was no lame duck) would have created a very powerful monopoly in those areas.

But they never objected to the monopoly that the NER had in the North-East, except at the fringes. If you wanted to travel from, say, Newcastle to Hull, there was only one real way of going. Having said that, I believe the Hull and Barnsley was promoted by certain coal interests in South Yorkshire and certain merchants in Hull, to break the monopoly the NER had in running services to that city.

[The Johnster]

Similar to the founding principle of the Barry, which was to break the Bute/Bristol Merchant Venturer cabal's hold on export coal through Cardiff Docks and the TVR.  Lack of hydraulic power at Cardiff's Bute docks had led to traffic delays and both colliery and ship owners felt they were being overcharged for an inefficient service.

 

The NER's monopoly was really only north of York; it was in competition with the Midland, GN, LNW, L & Y, and H & B everywhere else, i.e the highly profitable South and West Yorkshire industrial areas.  It was pretty much unchallenged in Co. Durham and Northumberland, except by the NB on the Border fringes.  It does not seem to have attracted more than the normal amount of criticism for it's behaviour in this respect.

 

The SECR was of very considerable political and military importance as the route to Dover and the Continent.

[62613]

 

The NER's monopoly was really only north of York; it was in competition with the Midland, GN, LNW, L & Y, and H & B everywhere else, i.e the highly profitable South and West Yorkshire industrial areas.  It was pretty much unchallenged in Co. Durham and Northumberland, except by the NB on the Border fringes.  It does not seem to have attracted more than the normal amount of criticism for it's behaviour in this respect.

The NER monopoly was in Northumberland, Co. Durham, and most of the East and North Ridings of Yorkshire. "North of York", and including the areas mentioned is a large part of England.

[D9020 Nimbus]

The NER was fairly careful not to abuse its monopoly, and it was also politically well-connected—at one time its Deputy Chairman was Sir Edward Grey (WW1 Foreign Secretary).

[Edwin_m]

The NER was fairly careful not to abuse its monopoly, and it was also politically well-connected—at one time its Deputy Chairman was Sir Edward Grey (WW1 Foreign Secretary).

It's well known that the NER was one of the few places where coal was handled in hoppers instead of the less efficient open wagons.  Is the NER monopoly one of the reasons for this - the railway insisting on hoppers and the pit owners having to comply as they had no alternative carrier?