Derailment and fire in Quebec

[Oldddudders]

In these cases a smaller operator, with a more flexible work force, and a willingness to provide a high level of service (usually in something as simple as having a person answer a phone) to smaller shippers is enough to make a line profitable.  .

My emboldening shows the bit I think has a great deal to do with it. ISTR that when Timothy Mellon's Guilford Corporation set up and obtained control of a number of smaller lines in NE USA (did he start with Springfield Terminal?), there was considerable emphasis on non-unionised work rules and thus significantly reduced labour costs. I'm sure those who know could cite other similar changes of ownership. A Class 1 doesn't really have a chance of cutting costs on this or that branch because they are covered by standard agreements across the whole network of that company's lines.

[The Stationmaster]

My emboldening shows the bit I think has a great deal to do with it. ISTR that when Timothy Mellon's Guilford Corporation set up and obtained control of a number of smaller lines in NE USA (did he start with Springfield Terminal?), there was considerable emphasis on non-unionised work rules and thus significantly reduced labour costs. I'm sure those who know could cite other similar changes of ownership. A Class 1 doesn't really have a chance of cutting costs on this or that branch because they are covered by standard agreements across the whole network of that company's lines.

There's also an interesting commercial way of working (which EWS tried over here and which failed dismally in the British situation) and that makes a difference in speed of response to small customers in the occasional/limited numbers of cars per week situation and is in many respects a product of a very 'relaxed' way of working crews and assets.

[Adrian Wintle]

My emboldening shows the bit I think has a great deal to do with it. ISTR that when Timothy Mellon's Guilford Corporation set up and obtained control of a number of smaller lines in NE USA (did he start with Springfield Terminal?), there was considerable emphasis on non-unionised work rules and thus significantly reduced labour costs. I'm sure those who know could cite other similar changes of ownership. A Class 1 doesn't really have a chance of cutting costs on this or that branch because they are covered by standard agreements across the whole network of that company's lines.

I was just reading an article in an early '90s RailPace magazine that was discussing why a US company (I forget which one) had backed off from acquiring any more Ontario lines because the provincial government of the day (NDP*) had brought in rules that any acquisition had to keep the existing workforce. This made it uneconomical to run the line as a shortline (as proven by the fact that the Class 1s had considered it uneconomical). This led to some lines closing completely, although fortunately some of the lines did actually remain and are still in operation.

 

*NDP = New Democratic Party - the most socialist of the mainstream parties, elected with a lot of union support.

 

Adrian

[Oldddudders]

It might be the way it has been reported, but it just seems so unseemly to be publicly pointing fingers of blame so soon after the event; they haven't even established how many victims there have been...

I have pondered on this, and, while we are talking a different country, I think the principle is the same.

 

The Kings Cross fire on the late '80s killed a number of people. Initially, London Underground denied responsibility, and almost certainly it wasn't an LU match which set the fire going. But as the evidence emerged, it became clear that had LU been more careful about substances and rubbish below ground, the fire might not have taken off as fast or as far as it so tragically did. I believe new people were soon in charge at LU. Once blame had been established, insurance etc claims could be processed - and while that won't bring your loved-one back, at least you know why they died and can be compensated in some trivial way with money. Let's not forget that if the breadwinner suddenly doesn't come home, there may be immediate and real issues of financial hardship for his/her family.

 

Contrast that with Clapham, where BR admitted liability within a couple of days - the evidence of poor workmanship in the rewiring at Clapham having been found. There was an immediate sense of relief, and the bereaved were able to proceed.

 

It seems unlikely that Mr Burkhardt would have made his public statements without firm evidence from company advisers. He would also have discussed the issue of liability with his insurers. I believe holding up the corporate hand is the right thing to do.

[brossard]

I thought this was interesting:  http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2013/07/09/f-runaway-trains.html

 

Most are class 2 railroads and the consensus appears to be that brake systems are inadequate.  So why do we continue to put up with this?  Maybe Lac Megantic will be the catalyst for a clamp down.

 

John

[Legend]

It often takes a disaster to prompt a rethink.  Titanic and lifeboats. The Glen Cinema and doors that open outwards etc  Hopefully something positive can come out of this, not that that will in anyway help those that have lost loved ones.

[highpeak]

I don't see Ed Burkhardt holding up his hand in a mea culpa, I see him pointing fingers. He just threw his engineer under the train to deflect attention from the shortcomings of his company, after trying to tell us it was the Nantes VFD that was to blame for shutting down an engine that was on fire. I'd be asking Mr. Burkhardt to explain quite why parking a heavy oil train unattended for several hours on a main running line at the top of a 1% grade a few miles outside of a town the line runs right through is a sensible or necessary operating practice in the first place.

 

Burkhardt is a drowning man, and I suspect the fallout from this accident is going to result in a lot more than changing his recrewing procedures.

 

Gerald is correct in saying you can't lump all class 2s together, but you can take a hard look at the history of operations up in Maine to see how we got where we are. Under Spencer Miller and Bucky Dumaine, Maine Central and Bangor and Aroostook made a decent if not spectacular living primarily off wood products for a long time. The B&A also had spuds and made money off them thanks to some creative thinking in sharing power and rolling stock to make sense of a seasonal operation. Maine Central was efficient enough to make money off fairly short hauls of low-value freight (such as clothespin blanks from Mattawamkeag to Wilton in converted hoppers, pulpwood from all over to the mills in all sorts of modified cars). So it's not like the erstwhile operators were not capable of providing service even within the constraints of tightly regulated industry.

 

But those halcyon days (as they now seem) didn't last forever. The most spectacular change was the fairly abrupt loss of the spud traffic which went over to trucks once the federal government extended I-95 up into Aroostook County. The fact that Penn Central couldn't railroad their way out of a paper bag and lost entire trains of spuds for weeks didn't help.

 

You could write a hefty thesis on the deindustrialisation of Maine, changes in the paper industry, the arrival of actors such as Timmy Mellon on the scene,the impact of the Staggers Act and so on and how it all got us where we are today with a much shrunken rail system that creeps around at little more than walking pace and leaves trains idling in the middle of nowhere. None of that mattered much, although the locals complain bitterly when a train is parked in their backyards for 15 hours (google "Pan Am idling trains") and the EPA gets upset when they occasionally dump hazardous material on the ground.

 

But the game changes when you ask that system and culture to suddenly (and the growth of this oil traffic has been very rapid) handle heavy unit oil trains. Ed Burkhardt is now blaming a hapless, tired engineer for not applying enough handbrakes to hold a heavy train at the top of a 1% grade a few miles away from a town andtrying to share the blame with some volunteer firemen who had to come and put out a fire on his clapped out diesel engine. I hope the TSB goes a bit further than that and looks at the operating environment of roads like MMA.

[Gerald Henriksen]

I thought this was interesting:  http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2013/07/09/f-runaway-trains.html

 

Most are class 2 railroads and the consensus appears to be that brake systems are inadequate.  So why do we continue to put up with this?  Maybe Lac Megantic will be the catalyst for a clamp down.

 

Actually it is a pretty even mix of classes.  Of the 6 incidents 2 were CN (class I), 2 where class II (White Pass / Quebec North Shore), and 2 where class III (Kettle Falls and Southern Ontario).

 

Similarly, the causes also differ.  The 2 shortlines were operator error, the 2 class II's were maintenance issues (in both cases isolated railroads responsible for their own maintenance) with the White Pass also being operator error by whoever loaded the ballast car.   Of the 2 CN, one was a case of standard practice being insufficient for the weight/grade, and the other was an attempted cost cutting move (eliminating locomotives with dynamic brakes).

[Oldddudders]

I don't see Ed Burkhardt holding up his hand in a mea culpa, I see him pointing fingers. He just threw his engineer under the train to deflect attention from the shortcomings of his company, after trying to tell us it was the Nantes VFD that was to blame for shutting down an engine that was on fire. I'd be asking Mr. Burkhardt to explain quite why parking a heavy oil train unattended for several hours on a main running line at the top of a 1% grade a few miles outside of a town the line runs right through is a sensible or necessary operating practice in the first place.

 

Burkhardt is a drowning man, and I suspect the fallout from this accident is going to result in a lot more than changing his recrewing procedures.

 

 

Do I infer from that that MMA will not be held responsible, if it is proved that their employee didn't do as required? I would have thought that blaming the engineer makes no difference. MMA ran the train, no other party is now seen to have been involved - MMA and insurer have the mess to pay for. Is that not the way it will work?

[Mike Boucher]

Gerald is correct in saying you can't lump all class 2s together, but you can take a hard look at the history of operations up in Maine to see how we got where we are. Under Spencer Miller and Bucky Dumaine, Maine Central and Bangor and Aroostook made a decent if not spectacular living primarily off wood products for a long time. The B&A also had spuds and made money off them thanks to some creative thinking in sharing power and rolling stock to make sense of a seasonal operation. Maine Central was efficient enough to make money off fairly short hauls of low-value freight (such as clothespin blanks from Mattawamkeag to Wilton in converted hoppers, pulpwood from all over to the mills in all sorts of modified cars). So it's not like the erstwhile operators were not capable of providing service even within the constraints of tightly regulated industry.

 

8>< snip ><8

 

But the game changes when you ask that system and culture to suddenly (and the growth of this oil traffic has been very rapid) handle heavy unit oil trains. Ed Burkhardt is now blaming a hapless, tired engineer for not applying enough handbrakes to hold a heavy train at the top of a 1% grade a few miles away from a town andtrying to share the blame with some volunteer firemen who had to come and put out a fire on his clapped out diesel engine. I hope the TSB goes a bit further than that and looks at the operating environment of roads like MMA.

 

As for your second point here.  I'm curious, knowing nothing about the topography of the MMR, why the train proceeded to Nantes (as mentioned, at the top of a grade) to park, then they taxied the engineer back to Lac-Megantic to sleep.  Why didn't he just park the train in Lac-Megantic?  Is that in the middle of a steeper grade?  are there too many grade crossings that couldn't be blocked?  Seems to me that it would have been prudent to park the train relatively close to the hotel the engineer would sleep in.

 

The only reason I can think of is, at 10 miles an hour, they wanted the engineer to get as far along the route before he timed-out, as 12 miles is another hour on the road.  It still seems penny-wise-pound-foolish to me.

 

As for the first paragraph, minor nitpick:  The B&A is (was) the Boston and Albany.  Bangor and Aroostoock is the BAR.  (and yes, I know locals up there call it the B&A, but the FRA reporting marks are what I'm concerned with...)

[highpeak]

MMA is of course responsible for the actions of their employees, so blaming the engineer for not following the rules doesn't get the railroad off the hook.

 

The point I was trying to make is that Burkhardt is trying to paint this as Tom Harding's fault (the engineer) for doing a lousy job of laying up his train. Burkhardt isn't willing to say that maybe the company is also at fault for a few things. Such as the way they deal with crew changes, the fact that a crew change is necessary at all at Nantes, not a great place to be parking a train, why they operate with one engineer (having a second man around to lay the train up would make the job a lot easier apart from any additional safety a second pair of eyes in the cab would provide)and so on. He might have pondered the impact that reductions in the workforce and pay cuts imposed on the remaining employees might have had on morale. (One of the first actions Rail World took when they bought the railroad was a 40% pay cut.) He has no way of knowing how effective the brakes were on the cars in the train. (MMA had an accident a couple of years ago when a car ran away after the conductor set the handbrake, an investigation revealed a defect in the brake rigging that meant the handbrake was not operable.) And so on. That would be an admission of liability, not just trying to say it was the engineer's fault and we've suspended him without pay.

 

None of the above are direct causes of the accident, but I would expect an investigation to consider contributing causes, most of which will be nothing to do with Tom Harding but quite a lot to do with Ed Burkhardt and his management.

[Talltim]

Mike, you're getting your geography mixed up, the train was eastbound and had not yet reached Lac Megantic

[Adrian Wintle]

As for your second point here.  I'm curious, knowing nothing about the topography of the MMR, why the train proceeded to Nantes (as mentioned, at the top of a grade) to park, then they taxied the engineer back to Lac-Megantic to sleep.  Why didn't he just park the train in Lac-Megantic?  Is that in the middle of a steeper grade?  are there too many grade crossings that couldn't be blocked?  Seems to me that it would have been prudent to park the train relatively close to the hotel the engineer would sleep in.

 

The only reason I can think of is, at 10 miles an hour, they wanted the engineer to get as far along the route before he timed-out, as 12 miles is another hour on the road.  It still seems penny-wise-pound-foolish to me.

 

As for the first paragraph, minor nitpick:  The B&A is (was) the Boston and Albany.  Bangor and Aroostoock is the BAR.  (and yes, I know locals up there call it the B&A, but the FRA reporting marks are what I'm concerned with...)

 

I don't think you could stable a train at Lac-Megantic without leaving it out in the woods on the main line. Anywhere in town would block a grade crossing. If you stopped it short there would be an idling loco at the edge of town while if you stopped it beyond the town the locos would be out in the woods. The Nantes loop is alonside the main road and not in a built up area.

 

Here is a map of the area.

The blue line is the intended route to Maine, with red indicating the location of the Nantes loop. The green line is the route taken by the locos (based on the photos and reports) the other arm of the wye, which is where the majority of the tank cars seemed to want to go. The red circle is the derailment point. For scale, the orange line to the SW of the town is about 2km.

 

 

Adrian

 

Edit to reflect updated information.

Edited July 12, 2013 by Adrian Wintle

[Gerald Henriksen]

As for your second point here.  I'm curious, knowing nothing about the topography of the MMR, why the train proceeded to Nantes (as mentioned, at the top of a grade) to park, then they taxied the engineer back to Lac-Megantic to sleep.  Why didn't he just park the train in Lac-Megantic?  Is that in the middle of a steeper grade?  are there too many grade crossings that couldn't be blocked?  Seems to me that it would have been prudent to park the train relatively close to the hotel the engineer would sleep in.

 

Nantes has a passing track which presumably the train would fit in.

 

Lac-Megantic isn't big enough in rail terms.  If you look at the satellite views you can count 7 cars in the yard (with Google), and quickly see a 72 car train wouldn't fit without blocking roads.

[highpeak]

 

As for your second point here.  I'm curious, knowing nothing about the topography of the MMR, why the train proceeded to Nantes (as mentioned, at the top of a grade) to park, then they taxied the engineer back to Lac-Megantic to sleep.  Why didn't he just park the train in Lac-Megantic?  Is that in the middle of a steeper grade?  are there too many grade crossings that couldn't be blocked?  Seems to me that it would have been prudent to park the train relatively close to the hotel the engineer would sleep in.

 

The only reason I can think of is, at 10 miles an hour, they wanted the engineer to get as far along the route before he timed-out, as 12 miles is another hour on the road.  It still seems penny-wise-pound-foolish to me.

 

As for the first paragraph, minor nitpick:  The B&A is (was) the Boston and Albany.  Bangor and Aroostoock is the BAR.  (and yes, I know locals up there call it the B&A, but the FRA reporting marks are what I'm concerned with...)

I imagine we'll have to wait for the TSB report to shed light on matters such as the engineer's hours of duty, previous rest periods and so on. I'd also hope the report looks at why the railroad couldn't have a relief crew ready to take over at the changeover point.

Penny-wise pound-foolish is a good comment, somebody on railroad.net calculated the value of the oil as in excess of $3.4 million.

 

The reporting mark business always amused me. Everybody I ever met up in Maine took care to acknowledge the existence of "the other B&A" and then, due homage having been paid to the Boston and Albany, appropriated the mark for the Bangor and Aroostook! "The BAR" just didn't sound right for some reason.

[Gerald Henriksen]

Do I infer from that that MMA will not be held responsible, if it is proved that their employee didn't do as required? I would have thought that blaming the engineer makes no difference. MMA ran the train, no other party is now seen to have been involved - MMA and insurer have the mess to pay for. Is that not the way it will work?

 

I would guess, particularly given there is a criminal investigation, that the difference is not whether MMA is held responsible, but whether specific executives can also be held responsible and face charges.

[Gerald Henriksen]

This article indicates this wasn't Ed Burkhardt's first derailment and fire/explosion:

 

http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2013/07/11/lac_megantic_railways_history_of_costcutting.html

Edited July 11, 2013 by Gerald Henriksen

[Ozexpatriate]

So, is this the sequence of events.

Eastbound train arrives at Nantes about 12 miles west of Lac Megantic and is tied down on the main at about 23:00 The engineer (driver) is taxied to a hotel in Lac Megantic.

A while later a fire is reported on one of the locos, a GE and the local fire crew arrive At about 23:50 and extinguish it, possibly shutting down the one loco left running. Staff from MMA are reported to be on site when they leave.

At about 00:56 the train starts runnng away eastbound down the 1.2% grade towards Lac Megantic (crossing the main road twice in the process). It makes it as far as the as the junction in the centre of town before the oil tanks derail at about 01:14, the tanks behind then piling up. The locos manage to avoid being derailed by the tanks behind them and carry on eastbound through Lac Megantic out into the countryside before stopping.

At some point after the fire has taken hold some of the tanks still on the track at the rear of the train are uncoupled and removed back westwards (to Nantes?) using a trackmover and a digger

Any corrections?

We're going to have to wait for a proper TSB report written by someone other than the press.

 

Extra detail (including conflicting reports) that needs to be sorted out include:

• Five locomotives
• The train was stabled on the mainline - not the passing loop
• Handbrakes were set on 11 vehicles (hearsay from Burkhardt)
• (Perhaps some) locomotives were stopped a quarter mile from Nantes? (doesn't make sense given the FRED / EOT device visible on the last tankers) *
• Nine? tankers at end of train pulled away using the Lac-Megantic trackmobile (and front-end loader)

How many tankers remained connected to the lead locomotives?

 

UPDATE:

 

* Squashed at last by reports of all five locomotives out of town.

Edited July 11, 2013 by Ozexpatriate

[Talltim]

This article indicates this wasn't Ed Burkhardt's first derailment and fire/explosion:

 

http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2013/07/11/lac_megantic_railways_history_of_costcutting.html

And completely missed out his involvement in EWS

[The Stationmaster]

MMA is of course responsible for the actions of their employees, so blaming the engineer for not following the rules doesn't get the railroad off the hook.

 

The point I was trying to make is that Burkhardt is trying to paint this as Tom Harding's fault (the engineer) for doing a lousy job of laying up his train. Burkhardt isn't willing to say that maybe the company is also at fault for a few things. Such as the way they deal with crew changes, the fact that a crew change is necessary at all at Nantes, not a great place to be parking a train, why they operate with one engineer (having a second man around to lay the train up would make the job a lot easier apart from any additional safety a second pair of eyes in the cab would provide)and so on. He might have pondered the impact that reductions in the workforce and pay cuts imposed on the remaining employees might have had on morale. (One of the first actions Rail World took when they bought the railroad was a 40% pay cut.) He has no way of knowing how effective the brakes were on the cars in the train. (MMA had an accident a couple of years ago when a car ran away after the conductor set the handbrake, an investigation revealed a defect in the brake rigging that meant the handbrake was not operable.) And so on. That would be an admission of liability, not just trying to say it was the engineer's fault and we've suspended him without pay.

 

None of the above are direct causes of the accident, but I would expect an investigation to consider contributing causes, most of which will be nothing to do with Tom Harding but quite a lot to do with Ed Burkhardt and his management.

I would have hoped that the point of the investigation would be to establish the facts - not point a finger of 'blame' at anybody (that's an incredibly outmoded idea in investigating incidents).  The facts once established might, or might not, lead to recommendations about the efficacy or advisability of certain procedures and the fact that they might need to be altered.  

 

As for applying handbrakes there is a very simple fact that should not be overlooked and thanks to the laws of physics and mechanics it applies as much in North America as anywhere else in the world.  And that is if you apply a handbrake (turning the wheel or pushing the lever as far it will go) with the auto brake fully applied that brake is going to be difficult to get off again - probably very difficult) provided there is a ratchet to hold the brakewheel/lever in that fully applied position.  It doesn't matter if the auto system then leaks air because as long as sufficient handbrakes have been applied and they are working correctly the brakes will not come off and the train will not move.  If a train which has allegedly been properly secured subsequently moves it immediately suggests to me that there was probably insufficient brake force applied to hold it.

 

I'm not going to speculate what took place here - that is for the investigators to establish - but I can perhaps understand why Burkhardt has reached the conclusion that led to his public statement, which was of course an admission of liability on the part of his company although dressed up in a different way.

[Ozexpatriate]

I'd also hope the report looks at why the railroad couldn't have a relief crew ready to take over at the changeover point.

This was reported as standard operating procedure.

 

There is a legal requirement that the trains in Canada are crewed by Canadians and the trains in Maine are crewed by US nationals. This crew change was to comply with the border crossing requirement. Presumably Nantes was the most convenient passing loop near the international border. 

 

Remember that the border is the local 'height of land' in the area. It is the ridgeline that separates the St. Lawerence watershed from the watershed that flows south through Maine. It's not exactly flat terrain. I believe this is the actual border crossing.

 

The Canadian crews regularly stayed at the same hotel in Lac-Megantic after parking their train in Nantes. It appears to be the nearest town to the border that is large enough to have a hotel. The MM&A was likely one of the best customers of this hotel.

 

Perhaps they considered daylight operation to be safer and given traffic volumes there was no particular hurry for this train.

Edited July 11, 2013 by Ozexpatriate

[Adrian Wintle]

This was reported as standard operating procedure.

 

There is a legal requirement that the trains in Canada are crewed by Canadians and the trains in Maine are crewed by US nationals. This crew change was to comply with the border crossing requirement. Presumably Nantes was the most convenient passing loop near the international border.

 

The Canadian crews regularly stayed at the same hotel in Lac-Megantic after parking their train in Nantes.

 

Perhaps they considered daylight operation to be safer and given traffic volumes there was no particular hurry for this train.

 

Stopping at Nantes also avoided running a train through the middle of Lac-Megantic at midnight (possibly whistling at each grade crossing). It is also possible that the border crossing only operates during normal working hours (this would not be out of character for the area).

 

Stopping on the main line would have saved having to stop short of the loop switch, having the train crew dismount and line the switch (or having a second person available to do that), pulling the train forward into the loop, and then going back (three quarters of a mile) to re-line the switch for the main. The new crew would have to do a similar action to get the train out of the loop (except it would be two walks the length of the train).

 

Adrian

Edited July 11, 2013 by Adrian Wintle

[Talltim]

Stopping on the main seems weird from British eyes, but I can't see that it made any difference in this case, stopping in the siding (loop) offered no more protection due to the lack of catch points

Edited July 11, 2013 by Talltim

[The Stationmaster]

 

There is a legal requirement that the trains in Canada are crewed by Canadians and the trains in Maine are crewed by US nationals. This crew change was to comply with the border crossing requirement. Presumably Nantes was the most convenient passing loop near the international border. 

 

 

How incredibly old-fashioned   Some folk accuse Europe of being behind the times and having restrictive practices but were getting out of this sort of nonsense over 20 years ago! (in fact the UIC provided for getting out of it many years before that although it has only really come in with modern operations and no need to stop at border crossings for non-operational reasons).

[Budgie]

There is a legal requirement that the trains in Canada are crewed by Canadians and the trains in Maine are crewed by US nationals. This crew change was to comply with the border crossing requirement. Presumably Nantes was the most convenient passing loop near the international border.

If this train originated in the USA, why was it travelling through Canada before crossing back into the USA? I know the final destination was in Canada, so why could its route not be arranged so that it only crossed the international boundary once?