Edward Thompson: for and against

[Tony Wright]

Having followed this topic over the last few days and been intrigued by the 'arguments' for and against Edward Thompson and his work, might I make the following comments, please? My apologies if some of what I present has been stated before, albeit in a slightly different form.

 

With extreme hostilities causing a savage decline in maintenance and the unexpected death of one of the greatest of steam's CMEs, whoever subsequently took over was going to be faced with a most difficult job. The motives in seeking to find a solution to the problems of the conjugated gear, make maintenance easier by building/modifying to simpler locos and embark on a standardisation policy all appear laudable given the appalling conditions of the time and the considerable constraints imposed by them. So, as a primary statement, praise must go to ET for at least having the conviction to attempt to see his 'radical' policies through. 

 

Since a fair bit has been 'quoted' from various sources, I've attempted to sift through some of the material mentioned and try and come to some conclusions of my own. Some of these are bound to be subjective, even argumentative. Where Thompson is 'defended', I've examined those (both on this thread and in established works) and also the opposite. I admit to not having read Cox, though I have read anecdotal and reported evidence of the said report which seems to have come to the conclusion that though it neither endorsed nor derided the conjugated gear, it was 'not something the LMS would use'. Anyway, it seems to have been enough for Thompson to convince his board.

 

The RCTS Green Series has been mentioned and, in fairness, if one reads a paragraph on page 144 of 2A with regard to the A2/2s, the conclusion is that Thompson was making the best of a bad job by rebuilding the P2s. However, if one takes that further, why is the question not asked, what was the result of this? An even worse job might be the answer. I know the constraints imposed meant that the new chief could not build new, but to 'emasculate' the six most powerful express passenger locomotives this country ever had was surely, in hindsight, an act of folly - even more so given the priceless asset there prodigious haulage feats were in being able to shift the heaviest loads. A glance at Terry Miller's piece in Peter Townend's recent book on the LNER Pacifics by Irwell leaves one in no doubt as to how a professional railwayman (as shed-master at Haymarket at the time) felt about the rebuilding. He regarded it as 'a criminal act'. This is not stigma, nor prejudice (though it subsequently could have been because Miller almost lost his job!). Though the RCTS cites one example of a troop train between Edinburgh and Newcastle being hauled by a P2, it seems many more were - overnight. These were huge and, if a P2 were not available a pilot was required or the train split. The P2s just walked up Cockburnspath bank. Geoff Lund's notes (which I've seen, but have not been published) tell the same tale.

 

As is well-known, because Thompson was committed to retaining much of the original, the short connecting rods were used, resulting in the shoving-forward of the bogie to clear the cylinders. The design was immediately compromised because of this and the Thompson Pacific front end was diabolical in terms of a riding vehicle, keeping steam joints tight and making sure the cylinders didn't work loose. Why then (and Thompson must have known of the problems) was the same poor arrangement applied to the other three subsequent Pacific types, which were effectively new build? Equal-length connecting rods? I'm no engineer but (as far as I know) apart from giving a degree of standardisation, equal length connecting rods are not necessary for a good design. Gresley's A4, Stanier's 'Princess Coronation'? One comment seems to have been made that there is a visual similarity with regard to the look of the chassis between Chapelon's, Churchward's, Collett's and Stanier's multi-cylinder designs and Thompson's - meaning they'll work the same? I don't entirely agree, because the former are four-cylinder locos, meaning the rear bogie wheel is tucked behind the outside cylinders, not shoved out (with the rest of the bogie) way too far in front of them. The locos just mentioned previously ran very smoothly, so there any similarity ends. Anyway, Stanier quickly changed his Pacifics' outside cylinder position to the 'norm'.

 

As for the original short cab on GREAT NORTHERN, even when it was erected the fitters said it couldn't be stayed properly. Whether the same affliction affected the final two Ivatt Pacifics on the LMS/LMR I don't know. As rebuilt, it was obviously better than the original in terms of power but it was not as good as a Kylchap A3 (which it would have become) and the subsequent Peppercorn A1s bear precious little resemblance to it, nor owe little to it. 

 

Returning to the Townend book, Jack Somers' chapter makes interesting reading. He was Assistant DMPS at Peterborough and has a fair bit to say on the Thompson Pacifics (little of it complimentary). He also provides a useful insight into how the divided drive and independent gear could be more problematic than the Gresley equivalent. With proper maintenance, perhaps the latter was better. Other correspondents in the same book paint the same bleak picture of Thompson's big stuff, though, in fairness, one could not stand 2001 as originally built. Remember, these are all professional railwaymen.

 

Much has been made of Peter Grafton's book on Edward Thompson. I bought this book in 1978 and found it well written, well researched and fair. That said, it reads (to me) like a defence counsel's work. It's thus (again to me) a defence of Edward Thompson and his work. Do you know of any author who has written a 'defence' of Gresley, Churchward, Stanier, etc, etc? In praise of, there have been dozens. Bulleid perhaps, but there are differences. Whereas, almost without exception, professional railwaymen have precious little to say that's positive about ET's Pacifics (or some of his other designs), the SR drivers thought the 'Spam Cans' were tremendous. What the fitters said is a different matter, but that is beside the point.

 

Unless I'm being particularly obtuse, wasn't one of the reasons given by one correspondent for the appearance of the Q1s that it gave spare tenders? So, and I admit to being argumentative here, you rebuild a locomotive to obtain its tender? Why not just scrap the loco? Or if the loco is still some good, just retain it and build new tenders - much cheaper. Since the rebuild wasn't much cop, anyway, it seems a very expensive way of obtaining a tender to me. 

 

As it is (was), other than the B1, K1 and O1, Thompson's legacy to the LNER and its successor is (was) precious little. He introduced far more classes/sub-divisions by rebuilds and new construction than any 'standardisation' policy might have thought desirable. None of the rebuilds was (with the exception of the ex-Robinson 2-8-0s) an improvement on the original and, it can be argued, that precious little (if anything) was ever recovered in terms of cost. To have 'shown Peppercorn the way' (other than in the K1s) is a gross misrepresentation of the facts. 

 

Had Gresley survived, who knows? For the conditions at the time, the V4 was not the mixed-traffic answer, but the B1 was. But, to lose the P2s and be given a series of rather poor Pacifics plus some rather non-cost-effective rebuilds, just for the B1 seems a very high price to pay. 

 

My apologies for the length of this post........

[The Stationmaster]

An excellent summary if I may humbly say so Tony - with one of the most important factors of all, contemporaneous views/evidence from those who were there and had to work with these various engines.

 

The matter of 'convincing his board (of directors)' is incidentally something which can be very difficult to judge in hindsight, especially over many years. How a board judges, or wishes via its minutes to subsequently be seen to have judged, a report or proposal from an officer of the company depends on all sorts of things including its internal relationships and indeed its relationship with a recently appointed officer.  As a longtime railwayman and officer Thompson would have probably been fairly well aware of the politics and views of individual board members and so accordingly wrote his report to suit his audience and also, in so far as he could, to achieve his own aims.  All these things in my experience in the railway industry over a good many years often say more between the lines than in the words on the page, and so too do the minutes.  And what better way to win an argument than by saying, for example, 'this isn't the way a highly successful company would do the job' - a few words like that can lead to major decisions.

 

It would be interesting to see both the report itself and the relevant board minutes, especially as Col HCB Rogers expressed the view that it wasn't Thompson's report which convinced the board but the one he subsequently commissioned in support of it from Stanier and which was in fact written by ES Cox.  An area which perhaps deserves further research?

[micklner]

I have the new Townsend book excellent ,with if you like them some excellent photos of Thompsons pacifics including in particular GN in LNER days. Very useful for modellers as well.

 

Re the P2's yet again how did Thompson ever get approval for their rebuild? The only real problem I have ever read was the front bogie in Scottish curves. Simple cure trasfer them to ECML and redesign the bogie as they have done on the new Prince of Wales , cannot see any justification for their destruction an for what was actually used in the build to A2/2 spec is what happended. A very sad loss just imagine if one had survived to be next the A4's at the NRM.

[Tony Wright]

An excellent summary if I may humbly say so Tony - with one of the most important factors of all, contemporaneous views/evidence from those who were there and had to work with these various engines.

 

The matter of 'convincing his board (of directors)' is incidentally something which can be very difficult to judge in hindsight, especially over many years. How a board judges, or wishes via its minutes to subsequently be seen to have judged, a report or proposal from an officer of the company depends on all sorts of things including its internal relationships and indeed its relationship with a recently appointed officer.  As a longtime railwayman and officer Thompson would have probably been fairly well aware of the politics and views of individual board members and so accordingly wrote his report to suit his audience and also, in so far as he could, to achieve his own aims.  All these things in my experience in the railway industry over a good many years often say more between the lines than in the words on the page, and so too do the minutes.  And what better way to win an argument than by saying, for example, 'this isn't the way a highly successful company would do the job' - a few words like that can lead to major decisions.

 

It would be interesting to see both the report itself and the relevant board minutes, especially as Col HCB Rogers expressed the view that it wasn't Thompson's report which convinced the board but the one he subsequently commissioned in support of it from Stanier and which was in fact written by ES Cox.  An area which perhaps deserves further research?

Many thanks, Mike, for your assessment of my summary. It isn't comprehensive, by the way, and much more could be said but, perhaps, that's for further discussion.

 

That said, in fairness to Thompson's being accused of being an autocrat, high-handed and heartily disliked by his staff, many of whom were in complete disagreement with his policies (read Barnie Symes's chapter in the latest Irwell book by Peter Townend), he does not have a monopoly on being 'feared'. R. Taylor (in the same book) cites an example where he reported problems in the 2-to-1 gear to E. D. Trask. Trask declined to forward the criticism to Gresley because he wanted to keep his job! There are also published works where Thompson is credited for being extremely helpful to the author - Dick Hardy, for instance, and, Peter Townend himself. On the other hand, other professional railwaymen such as the late Malcolm Crawley (who was at Doncaster at the end of Thompson's regime) had not a good word to say for Thompson, or his work. There are many others holding the latter view. And, perhaps that is the big difference. Whereas Gresley (by most, if not all, published accounts) was held in the highest regard by his superiors and subordinates alike (and to a lesser extent was Peppercorn), particularly amongst the majority beneath him and those who had to work with what they were given by him, Edward Thompson was held in rather less esteem. If one turns to the enthusiasts' accounts, the picture is even worse! 

[Tony Wright]

I have the new Townsend book excellent ,with if you like them some excellent photos of Thompsons pacifics including in particular GN in LNER days. Very useful for modellers as well.

 

Re the P2's yet again how did Thompson ever get approval for their rebuild? The only real problem I have ever read was the front bogie in Scottish curves. Simple cure trasfer them to ECML and redesign the bogie as they have done on the new Prince of Wales , cannot see any justification for their destruction an for what was actually used in the build to A2/2 spec is what happended. A very sad loss just imagine if one had survived to be next the A4's at the NRM.

Mick,

         I also think the new book is superb, and an absolute 'must' for any enthusiast's library, whatever their allegiance. But, then I would say that because I proof read it, suggested the odd addition to the text and dated most of the photographs. If any of the last-mentioned are wrong, then it's me to blame! 

[PenrithBeacon]

It's a given in railway histography that the L1 weren't so good. OK so what was wrong with them?

 

Regards

[billbedford]

Re the P2's yet again how did Thompson ever get approval for their rebuild? The only real problem I have ever read was the front bogie in Scottish curves. 

 

The lack of guidance from the swing link pony truck, and a less than perfect middle big end, lead to scoring on the middle crank pin and some broken crank axles. IIRC there were a couple of such incidents in the early 40s. These failures almost certainly lead to the decision to rebuild. Whether this was Thompson doing his patriotic duty or he was told by someone higher up that he should do something about 'those locos that caused so much chaos in Scotland' has not bee recorded.

[jjb1970]

One thing this thread does show is that whatever Thompson's faults there is more fun and interest in discussing controversial types like Thompson than threads where we all agree how splendid Gresley (or Churchward or Stanier) were

[Tony Wright]

The lack of guidance from the swing link pony truck, and a less than perfect middle big end, lead to scoring on the middle crank pin and some broken crank axles. IIRC there were a couple of such incidents in the early 40s. These failures almost certainly lead to the decision to rebuild. Whether this was Thompson doing his patriotic duty or he was told by someone higher up that he should do something about 'those locos that caused so much chaos in Scotland' has not bee recorded.

I don't know whether the decision to rebuild was entirely due to the factors mentioned, though those faults are serious. A re-design of the pony truck (as happened on the V2s, and Thompson should be given some credit for this) might have alleviated some of the problems, and most certainly would have been much cheaper than a costly (and ultimately futile) rebuilding. Part of the problems must also lie with a poor standard of workmanship at Cowlairs. All the other big engines in Scotland were shopped at Doncaster or Darlington but many P2 repairs/overhauls were conducted at Cowlairs, and that works wasn't really up to the job. Geoff Lund's notes refer to this and many of the problems on the road were down to this.

 

As for 'those locos that caused so much chaos in Scotland' who said that? Certainly not Miller, certainly not Lund and certainly not Trask. Since the first two were directly responsible for running the P2s out of and in to Edinburgh and the only tool they had to pull the heaviest trains was the Gresley passenger 2-8-2, doesn't their opinion count?  

[Nimbus]

There are also published works where Thompson is credited for being extremely helpful to the author - Dick Hardy, for instance

 

I was interviewed by Dick Hardy at The Kremlin, in 1974, to discuss the options for basing a railway career on disappointing

academic results, and he had Edward Thompson's photograph hanging on his office wall. The brief chat we had about him

left the clear impression that Dick thought ET had not been given a fair hearing by railway historians at that date.

 

The Nim.

[S.A.C Martin]

That photograph you saw on his wall Nimbus, was a gift from Thompson's secretary to Mr Hardy, according to Steam in the Blood, which also heaps praise on a number of Thompson's locomotives (also quantifying that he did not have the experience of the Pacifics to make an informed judgement) and quite a lot of praise on the man as well. It's one of those detailed accounts that I find describes an entirely different man to the Richard III like figure known in railway history at this point.

 

If anyone has a copy of The Gresley Observer, no.110, I'd be very glad of purchasing a copy, on a related note.

[jjb1970]

When it comes to personalities I hope everybody here has enough experience of life to know that you take people as you find them. Obviously with a historical figure it is not that easy and we rely on second hand accounts which by definition are subjective (whether or not we like somebody is not really a logical choice) and we need to keep a degree of caution. Few people are either completely good or completely bad and a lot depends on circumstance and personal values. Clearly some had a loathing for Thompson, a minority didn't, the fact that a minority was positive on him shouldn't be cause to write him off, the Richard III comparison is very apt. The old adage that the victors write history is very apt and it is true that in the LNER CME feud the victors have been Thompson's detractors. Now maybe they were correct and maybe it is true that Thompson was not the best CME of his era but there is a huge step from recognising he had faults and that his re-builds had issues to villifying anything and everything about the man which is a position which has been held by many I think. Equally, it is clear that for all Gresley's greatness he was not beyond criticism, as with many arguments of this type there has been a polarisation of opinion in which as Thompson sinks ever deeper into a pit of villainy Gresley's halo shines ever brighter. Which is neither helpful nor accurate I think. That Gresley was a great engineer is beyond question but he was a human being like others. Personally I find that considering people as rounded human beings, warts and all as one of our leaders once said, enhances their stature. On bosses, the best boss I ever worked for was a young lady who had a reputation as black as coal and who was despised by most of the UK company (and it was a big multi-national electricity and gas company you'll all have heard of) but I thought she was great, yes she was as tough as a rhino hide, took no prisoners and could be pretty ruthless but to those who made their best effort she was terrific. She gave me all the support I could have asked for and more and was never anything but fair and honest (and I say that as having been at the receiving end of her wrath) so I tend to take the stories about what an ogre Thompson was with a pinch of salt.

[PenrithBeacon]

The lack of guidance from the swing link pony truck ...

Gresley used the Adams swing link pony truck, so there was guidance. Whether he (or Bulleid as is more likely) modified the design to a less satisfactory one or the Adams' design wasn't up to the work it was put to I don't know. Whatever, Thomson used the LMS design possibly after the experience of seeing them on LMS locos.

 

The Stanier design wasn't actually his. It came from the Baldwin moguls the Midland bought before WW1. First re-used on the Fowler 2-6-4T and last used on the 9F! Again the design might have been modified on the way, but without access to the drawings it's not possible to say.

 

Regards

[billbedford]

Gresley made enough changes to the Adams pony truck to have a a patent accepted in 1913. Patent No 8000 of 1912, if you want to look it up.

[coachmann]

The LNWR, MR, GWR and the Pennsylvania Railroad (self-styled Standard Railroad of the world), all recognised the benefits of standardisation in the 19th Century. But not when it came to carriages. Neither the mighty GWR nor the SR and LNER made any headway right up to 1947. LMS underframe designs for articulated stock and experience with welded bodies after the war culminated in the BR Mk.I coach design, indeed, LMS loco design provided the backbone for the BR Standard classes. Bullied coaches were still being built with wood and canvass roofs and GWR coach design was the opposite of standardisation, indeed the post-war Hawsworth designs were merely a continuation of 1930s Sunshine stock with a new roof and side profile.

 

So I submit the LNER and standardisation should not be in the same sentence when Gresley designed locos for specific needs or routes and Thompson's designs were merely tampering with past technology. So arguing the merits or otherwise of Gresley and Thompson is like arguing who designed the best incandescent gas light when everybody else had adopted electricity. 

[S.A.C Martin]

Tony Wright, on 31 May 2014 - 10:29, said:

Having followed this topic over the last few days and been intrigued by the 'arguments' for and against Edward Thompson and his work, might I make the following comments, please? My apologies if some of what I present has been stated before, albeit in a slightly different form.

 

 

Tony, feel free. That's what the thread was intended for, after all. Free and honest debate.

 

With extreme hostilities causing a savage decline in maintenance and the unexpected death of one of the greatest of steam's CMEs, whoever subsequently took over was going to be faced with a most difficult job. The motives in seeking to find a solution to the problems of the conjugated gear, make maintenance easier by building/modifying to simpler locos and embark on a standardisation policy all appear laudable given the appalling conditions of the time and the considerable constraints imposed by them. So, as a primary statement, praise must go to ET for at least having the conviction to attempt to see his 'radical' policies through. 

 

Absolutely agree.

 

Since a fair bit has been 'quoted' from various sources, I've attempted to sift through some of the material mentioned and try and come to some conclusions of my own. Some of these are bound to be subjective, even argumentative. Where Thompson is 'defended', I've examined those (both on this thread and in established works) and also the opposite. I admit to not having read Cox, though I have read anecdotal and reported evidence of the said report which seems to have come to the conclusion that though it neither endorsed nor derided the conjugated gear, it was 'not something the LMS would use'. Anyway, it seems to have been enough for Thompson to convince his board.

I would love to read the full report (if it still exists) as I cannot imagine that Thompson - however convincing and critical he may have been of Gresley work - would have convinced the LNER board to abandon the conjugated valve gear altogether for new build locomotives.

 

It seems incredibly unlikely that Thompson alone – given what railway enthusiasts seem to believe of him as a thoroughly unloved individual at the LNER – could have swayed opinion that markedy. We are talking about a radical departure from the norm at Doncaster and a norm which prevailed for around 35 years or more.

 

The RCTS Green Series has been mentioned and, in fairness, if one reads a paragraph on page 144 of 2A with regard to the A2/2s, the conclusion is that Thompson was making the best of a bad job by rebuilding the P2s. However, if one takes that further, why is the question not asked, what was the result of this? An even worse job might be the answer. I know the constraints imposed meant that the new chief could not build new, but to 'emasculate' the six most powerful express passenger locomotives this country ever had was surely, in hindsight, an act of folly - even more so given the priceless asset there prodigious haulage feats were in being able to shift the heaviest loads. A glance at Terry Miller's piece in Peter Townend's recent book on the LNER Pacifics by Irwell leaves one in no doubt as to how a professional railwayman (as shed-master at Haymarket at the time) felt about the rebuilding. He regarded it as 'a criminal act'. This is not stigma, nor prejudice (though it subsequently could have been because Miller almost lost his job!). Though the RCTS cites one example of a troop train between Edinburgh and Newcastle being hauled by a P2, it seems many more were - overnight. These were huge and, if a P2 were not available a pilot was required or the train split. The P2s just walked up Cockburnspath bank. Geoff Lund's notes (which I've seen, but have not been published) tell the same tale.

 

The work done by the P2 Trust and Delta Rail on the P2 design has shown beyond reasonable doubt how potentially dangerous the fitting of the original Gresley pony truck was/is. There was a point on the curves the model was put through that the front driving wheels were lifted clear of the rails. It is clear this was a major fault and possibly directly to blame for the damaged crank axles, bearings and other problems associated with the P2s. 

 

The problem with describing anything as a "criminal act" is the emotive language used. I agree it was the wrong decision: in hindsight, not enough was known about the failures of the P2s in this manner to make a fully informed judgment. You mention elsewhere that the level of maintenance at Cowlairs was inadequate: perhaps this facilitated more failures than expected and this added to the case for rebuilding the Mikados as Pacifics? Not all of the blame can be laid at Edward Thompson's door I feel.

 

Though I agree entirely he missed the point of the mikado design and was wrong perhaps to not investigate further, but then he was in the middle of a very bloody conflict and looked to make the best use of the locomotives through rebuilding. He can hardly be blamed for Gresley's failure to note the running characteristics and problems of his V2 and P2 classes - can he?

 

And this is a rare failure on Gresley's part, particularly when you consider that engineers within his circle (Bulleid I think made this suggestion, I may be wrong) that the P2s should have had a bissel truck included as part of the design. That in itself would have solved the problems, albeit differently, to that the P2 Trust is working on now.

 

As is well-known, because Thompson was committed to retaining much of the original, the short connecting rods were used, resulting in the shoving-forward of the bogie to clear the cylinders. The design was immediately compromised because of this and the Thompson Pacific front end was diabolical in terms of a riding vehicle, keeping steam joints tight and making sure the cylinders didn't work loose. Why then (and Thompson must have known of the problems) was the same poor arrangement applied to the other three subsequent Pacific types, which were effectively new build? Equal-length connecting rods? I'm no engineer but (as far as I know) apart from giving a degree of standardisation, equal length connecting rods are not necessary for a good design. Gresley's A4, Stanier's 'Princess Coronation'? One comment seems to have been made that there is a visual similarity with regard to the look of the chassis between Chapelon's, Churchward's, Collett's and Stanier's multi-cylinder designs and Thompson's - meaning they'll work the same? I don't entirely agree, because the former are four-cylinder locos, meaning the rear bogie wheel is tucked behind the outside cylinders, not shoved out (with the rest of the bogie) way too far in front of them. The locos just mentioned previously ran very smoothly, so there any similarity ends. Anyway, Stanier quickly changed his Pacifics' outside cylinder position to the 'norm'.

I'm aware it was my comment earlier regarding the similar layout of the other Pacifics mentioned. In my defense it was not to excuse any mechanical inadequacies of Thompson's but to point out that engineers will follow trends of the time and look to other engineer's work to improve their own. 

 

There is no doubt in my mind with the research that I have undertaken, that Thompson's Pacifics follow several trends for new Pacifics at the time, and the trend of short connecting rods with the cylinders set aft of the front bogie is one which Stanier and Chapelon both used on their Pacifics in the late 1930s.

 

In particular, the Princess class locomotive went through several proposals (including a 3-cylindered variant proposed) and the final result produced a locomotive thought of today positively, despite suffering similar problems to Thompson's Pacifics in practice (cylinders working loose, for example, some early problems with the steam circuit at the front end, but otherwise an excellent design which in its final form was arguably one of Britain's finest Pacific classes).

 

Equal length connecting rods were used on other railways successfully in a large number of designs and there is no reason (other than it was not Doncaster practice) for Thompson to not want to try this. Clearly he altered his views as the A1/1, the single 6ft 8in and intended express passenger locomotive he designed, had three sets of walschaerts valve gear and the centre one was of a different length to the outside two, unlike all of his A2 variants.

 

Thompson was clearly influenced in his work and we should consider this a positive trait not a negative one. Obviously his own layout for his Pacifics, though similar to Stanier's and Chapelon's, was not good enough (and Peppercorn's machines proved to some extent was unnecessary) but Thompson was CME and an individual: he is allowed to deviate from the norm. It was his job to.

 

On a separate note, I am unsure how the Thompson front end can be described as diabolical. This is at odds with several descriptions of the capacity for the A2 classes and their propensity for high speed. Cecil J Allen described the A2/2s in a particularly derogatory way in his British Pacific Locomotives book but praised the front end arrangement for its capacity for high speed - something positive, which is a rarity.

 

As for the original short cab on GREAT NORTHERN, even when it was erected the fitters said it couldn't be stayed properly. Whether the same affliction affected the final two Ivatt Pacifics on the LMS/LMR I don't know. As rebuilt, it was obviously better than the original in terms of power but it was not as good as a Kylchap A3 (which it would have become) and the subsequent Peppercorn A1s bear precious little resemblance to it, nor owe little to it. 

I'm not entirely sure it is fair to say that the Peppercorn A1s bear little resemblance to Thompson's A1/1. All of the Pacifics in the ECML family have a family resemblance. The long smokebox and double kylchap together with the high running plate give them some aesthetic similarities, and of course the tenders are more or less identical in a number of ways save for the beading and streamlining on the Peppercorn machine's tender. The front end is a different arrangement of course and that with the full length deflectors on 60113 give a different visual impression to Peppercorn's excellent A1.

 

Returning to the Townend book, Jack Somer's chapter makes interesting reading. He was Assistant DMPS at Peterborough and has a fair bit to say on the Thompson Pacifics (little of it complimentary). He also provides a useful insight into how the divided drive and independent gear could be more problematic than the Gresley equivalent. With proper maintenance, perhaps the latter was better. Other correspondents in the same book paint the same bleak picture of Thompson's big stuff, though, in fairness, one could not stand 2001 as originally built. Remember, these are all professional railwaymen.

I have read the book and - if we are being objective - there is quite a lot of criticism aimed at Gresley too, and in particular the conjugated valve gear on the Pacifics, D49s and P2s. R. Taylor makes a very detailed accounts of the problems there and others such as H Rowler make mention of the frame cracking problems that the Gresley Pacifics suffered - so the Thompson Pacifics, which may have been the worst, accepted, at least were not alone in their problems - this was shared by the original Pacifics too.

 

BC Symes' account of the development of the P2s is interesting and though he clearly intimates disagreeing with Thompson's layout for the Pacifics - echoing the drawing office drawing the rear end of the A2 before Thompson's retirement and the front portion after - he does not state outright that this arrangement was entirely inferior or superior, but different.

 

DR Carling states - and for me this is quite a significant piece:

 

One feature of interest concerns the riding of the A2 [/3]. In its virtually new condition and at the not very high speeds then required for the services in question it was considered by those of the testing staff who rode on the footplate to be the most comfortable locomotive in their experience. There was nothing whatsoever to indicate just how bad the riding of this class was to become when wear had developed and speed was higher. No was there any sign I can recall of the maintenance difficulties with exhaust pipes and smokebox saddle bolts.

 

So in the most run down condition the locomotive was a bad rider. Surely any locomotive in a run down condition is a bad rider to some extent compared to at their best? Does this not to some extent miss the point - the Gresley Pacifics (particularly the A1s and A3s) were bad riders when run down and there are enough accounts of this out there - yet seemingly this is not a criticism heaped and emphasised on them as much as the Thompson Pacifics.

 

KRM Cameron - notably from the Scottish Region and the one region I feel which militates against objective assessment of their pieces because of the known anti-Thompson bias - has nothing positive to say on the Thompson Pacifics in comparison. 

 

AJ Somers piece is very enlightening and I consider it to be the most objective of the pieces I've read on the Thompson Pacifics for a very long time. I accept fully his accounts regarding the locomotives bad riding though it must be offset by the faint praise for the Thompson types "never running a hot box" - something which the Gresley Pacifics are not known for. I note however the comparison to the V2s 2:1 gear and the difference in troubles this gave (in favour of the V2s). 

 

Looking at this overall, it seems to me that the Thompson Pacifics were powerful, free steamers all, but with a propensity for bad riding when run down and slipping if not handled extremely carefully (particularly in the case of the rebuilt P2s). Their quality for high speeds notwithstanding, and this comes across surprisingly well throughout the volume. I guess with any class there are going to be good and bad qualities and in Thompson's Pacifics he transferred problems from one part of the overall Gresley outline to other areas. 

 

May I say for the record that I consider this book to be one of the best reads I have had for a very long time, particularly in terms of railway books. It is an exquisite edition with a large number of never before seen photographs and it is one that every LNER aficionado should read.

 

Much has been made of Peter Grafton's book on Edward Thompson. I bought this book in 1978 and found it well written, well researched and fair. That said, it reads (to me) like a defence counsel's work. It's thus (again to me) a defence of Edward Thompson and his work. Do you know of any author who has written a 'defence' of Gresley, Churchward, Stanier, etc, etc? In praise of, there have been dozens. Bulleid perhaps, but there are differences. Whereas, almost without exception, professional railwaymen have precious little to say that's positive about ET's Pacifics (or some of his other designs), the SR drivers thought the 'Spam Cans' were tremendous.

The inherent problem with debating the merits or otherwise of Edward Thompson, I find, is in the langauge used. It is emotively charged to the extent where a locomotive which may be adequate for the work it is intended to do is denigrated to the point where it becomes irrelevant, for no other reason than it was developed under the auspices of Edward Thompson.

 

That's not helpful for people who "defend" Thompson who I would say can be reasonable in accepting fault - for it does exist and the evidence is there - but I would argue the anti-Thompson line can be sometimes unreasonable or unfair in their criticism. It becomes so emotive, so determined and so inflexible that to dare to challenge the approved thinking can sometimes feel like one is having to justify one's thought process at a very personal level.

 

Not aiming that at anyone in particular but to hear varied accounts of how poor Thomspon's Pacifics were - and to look at the facts, such as that they were never as extensively rebuilt en-masse as Bulleid's much praised Pacifics - must point the way to the thinking that they were not so bad as to be completely unusable, which is what is intimated strongly and sometimes said outright.

 

This cannot be true, and we know that it is not because they survived to the late fifties, and in the case of the A1/1, 1960 and the A2/3s a little longer than that.

 

They did not excel, they did not hold speed records or make exceptional runs, their annual mileage was inferior to the other Pacific types - but then they all occupied the smallest classes of Pacific on the LNER with more limited spares (and particularly for the A2/2s, boiler types for a good while), so what exactly was expected? They were still more reliable and freer running than mixed traffic locomotives on other railways and it is perhaps telling that the annual mileages of the Thompson Pacifics were all still greater than a number of the Great Western's 4-6-0 classes which did similar work. This point is one Peter Townend made in East Coast Pacifics at Work.

 

Perhaps aficionados of the LNER forget how truly exceptional the Pacific classes are in comparison to that elsewhere and that the worst of the bunch (as enthusiasts might say) or the least strong showing from them perhaps is made to look worse on a number of levels than they actually were.

 

What the fitters said is a different matter, but that is beside the point.

For me, it's the fitters who matter the most. The exceptional performances of locomotives do not interest me: it's how the locomotives worked on a daily basis and the merits or otherwise of that and it is why I am more likely to read Peter Townend's work, including those who worked with Thompson's machines and are critical of them, and agree or change my views on their words, than say Cecil J Allen or OS Nock who seemed to base their view of locomotives purely in terms of the exceptional performances when they were pushed to their limits. That's why Peter Townend's latest book is so excellent: we get the views from the railwaymen who worked alongside these locomotives and with other employees who worked with (or suffered!) the ECML Pacifics.

 

Peppercorn’s entire A1 class were not considered the best Pacifics in Britain because they had done any exceptional speed runs such as the A4s had previously. They are considered thus because of their daily work and enviable reliability and high mileages whilst in service.

 

However I feel there is one specific overlooked detail in Thompson’s Pacific work which time and again is ignored. From the outset, his A2 Pacifics were designed to be mixed traffic. Not express passenger – that was reserved for Gresley’s A3 and A4 classes which were to be retained and maintained for that role as part of his standardisation plans, and for the proposed A1/1 class which was limited as we know to the single prototype.

 

These were not locomotives being designed in the same line of thinking or for the prestige of the LNER: they were being designed for completely different traffic requirements and as such they should be judged on their ability to haul trains other than express passenger types.

 

On a previous page you stated that:

 

Can you imagine what Thompson's reaction might have been if he'd been told that when 500 emerged brand new from Doncaster works that it would be a great success on a cement train in the future?

 

I - personally - think Thompson would have been delighted, given that a locomotive specifically designed for such a role (a 9F) was found lacking on the same working.

 

The A2/3 being designed and advertised as a mixed traffic Pacific, neatly fulfils that role. The use of the 6ft 2in wheels in the design (thanks in part to Gresley’s use of these for the P2 and V2 designs) and the types of work the Thompson Pacifics found themselves on in later years perhaps best demonstrates this mixed traffic ability. Certainly the sort of work all of his A2 classes found themselves on included fast heavy freight and the A2/2s in particular were praised (a rarity!) by Cecil J Allen for their ability to pull trains at high speed.

 

Quote

Unless I'm being particularly obtuse, wasn't one of the reasons given by one correspondent for the appearance of the Q1s that it gave spare tenders? So, and I admit to being argumentative here, you rebuild a locomotive to obtain its tender? Why not just scrap the loco? Or if the loco is still some good, just retain it and build new tenders - much cheaper. Since the rebuild wasn't much cop, anyway, it seems a very expensive way of obtaining a tender to me. 

 

The Q1 is an interesting locomotive and has different reporting of the values or otherwise of Thompson's rebuilding program. They have been described as equally useless and useful dependent on who you read.

 

For me, it is clear that to provide a heavy shunter by rebuilding otherwise life expired units, using standard parts from another class (the J50) and using the tenders as spares for locomotives requiring them elsewhere is a good use of resources and materials in a wartime situation. This was certainly better than scrapping the whole locomotive and tenders, surely? Particularly when materials and resources were limited.

 

Thompson did not have the luxury of starting afresh every single time and that's why the majority of his locomotive designs are based on rebuilds.

 

If he had had a more free hand, such as Bulleid, I wonder if the LNER would have had the same level of problems the SR suffered with their heavy and light Pacifics?

 

Quote

As it is (was), other than the B1, K1 and O1, Thompson's legacy to the LNER and its successor is (was) precious little.

 

But you have mentioned the one locomotive class which became the LNER's - and the ER's - mosty numerous mixed traffic locomotive after the V2 and one which went everywhere - including on occasion filling in on other regions where their locomotives were out for repair (B1s and V2s on the Southern Region, for example).

 

The K1 became a very numerous class and was seen from the GE region to Scotland. The O1s were more localised but were very successful, even improving on their power rating, and it never fails to amaze me the accounts which turn up praising the O1 design. If these had been built new then I feel the LNER would probably have had a locomotive more than the equal of the WD 2-8-0s and certainly better than the Stanier 8F on a number of levels.

 

Those three locomotives are quite a legacy and befitting of the standardisation policies and ideals Thompson tried to install on the LNER.

 

Quote

He introduced far more classes/sub-divisions by rebuilds and new construction than any 'standardisation' policy might have thought desirable.

 

Three Pacific sub classes, One K1/1 prototype (hardly counts as a sub-type does it?), one D Class (unique) one K5 (unique) and the sensible idea of the O4/8s and O1s were built. Other locomotives such as the N7/5, A7/1, J20/1 and O2/4 were given longer service lives by virtue of replacing the life expired boilers with new round topped variants, which were shared amongst other classes. This surely is a decent use of resources. I don't really accept the idea that sub divisions of classes are necessarily a bad thing as they identify the different boiler types in use. 

 

I do accept this is somewhat at odds with a standardisation policy but he was working in very difficult conditions. The robustness of the designs mentioned - N7, A7, J20 and O2 for instance - tends them to be reboilered, as were other classes, and to be fair there is nothing wrong with that as it meant useful locomotives stayed in service longer and largely kept the LNER moving.

 

None of the rebuilds was (with the exception of the ex-Robinson 2-8-0s) an improvement on the original

 

Does every rebuild have to be an improvement on that which went before? Sincere question, the N7/5 for instance is one locomotive type preserved and I wonder if it would be described as a direct improvement on the belpaire boilered locomotive which went before. The B12/3 is certainly a better locomotive than its previous incarnation and we all know the level of work Thompson put into that under Gresley's auspices. 

 

My point in a round about way is that the level of exceptional performance may not be as important as continuing to do a job ably, simply and reliably.

 

and, it can be argued, that precious little (if anything) was ever recovered in terms of cost.

 

I'm struggling with the "costs" argument. I accept that building a one off prototype is more expensive per unit than building a batch of locomotives, but building prototypes is part of the creative process for any engineer and surely the limited number Thompson made - mostly through rebuilding and not new builds - did not ruin the budget he was set by the LNER for his work? If it had been then I feel sure he would not have been held in such high esteem as to have a locomotive named after him, as Gresley did. It is interesting that his superiors feel he did a good job yet those in and around his level do not.

 

To have 'shown Peppercorn the way' (other than in the K1s) is a gross misrepresentation of the facts. 

 

The fact remains that Thompson introduced the first all new three cylindered Pacific on the LNER with three spearate sets of Walschaerts valve gear. If these locomotives had been completely unsuccessful - and that to me means being incapable of doing the work asked of them on a daily basis - then surely it could be argued that Peppercorn would have returned to the conjugated valve gear instead for his designs?

 

As it was he had five, nearly six years of experience with the Thompson Pacifics and their strengths and weaknesses to draw on, and to intimate that all of the draughtsmen and engineers at Doncaster under Peppercorn completely ignored these experiences building and running the new 6ft 2in locomotives and lone A1/1 seems to me to be incredibly unlikely, even if it came down to knowing with no hesitation whatsoever that a compact machine could be built whilst retaining three separate sets of valve gear.

 

I absolutely accept that Peppercorn and his team disagreed with Thompson's engineering principles and changed the outline of the new locomotives A1 and A2 to something more compact (and therefore similar to Gresley's earlier Pacifics), but the long smokebox, standard double kylchap, higher running plate (thereby making  and three separate sets of walschaerts valve gear are Thompson's additions to the ECML Pacific story and it is this input which Peppercorn and his team carried forward to the overall story of the Pacific locomotive on the ECML. 

 

Had Gresley survived, who knows? For the conditions at the time, the V4 was not the mixed-traffic answer, but the B1 was.

 

This is the argument I feel that Gresley afficionados (and I am one, so I feel the same way) are very uncomfortable about admitting. Put simply, Gresley was not going to produce anything as good as the Peppercorn A1 if he had lived. He did not respond to the change in wartime conditions and to look to what might have been required afterwards and the V4 is clear proof of that.

 

High grade materials, conjugated valve gear in a locomotive which, while excellent (and I must emphasise it IS an excellent design) was not the locomotive the LNER needed. They had needed for a good decade a decent go anywhere mixed traffic 4-6-0 as per that on the GWR and LMS.

 

Thompson produced it. Whether we like it or not, Thompson did recognise that there would be a change in traffic needs and looked to address that.

 

I consider the use of existing tooling, including cylinders, valve gear, wheels, boiler and other associated components across several classes to be a better example of attempted standardisation on the LNER than was achieved previously. Accepted, as Larry has intimated above, still not in any way near the level the GWR and other railways achieved but nevertheless a decent effort given the circumstances of the second world war.

 

But, to lose the P2s and be given a series of rather poor Pacifics plus some rather non-cost-effective rebuilds, just for the B1 seems a very high price to pay. 

 

I'm not sure it is as simple as that Tony and I would agree to disagree on that one.

 

Losing a class of 6 Pacific locomotives lost which did few services daily in comparison to gaining a class of 400+ mixed traffic locomotives working across the length and breadth of Britain on a variety of services seems to me to be an unfair balance in favour of the B1s rather than the P2s if I am honest. In short, it seems a very small price to pay for the LNER's most needed locomotive - their own Black Five or Hall.

[S.A.C Martin]

I apologise for the number of spelling/grammatical errors in the above post. I have worked on it over a few days now (!) and don't have an edit facility when posting. Hindsight in reading back a number of times a wonderful thing!

[Welly]

Simon, I confess that at one time I had accepted "received wisdom" about Thompson's design compared with Gresley and Peppercorn's designs but your thread has now helped me change my mind about Thompson! I accept he had to work in quite adverse circumstances and needed to use what the LNER had.

 

Thanks for taking the trouble to put the case for Thompson, Simon! Mind you, I have a soft spot for his B1s!

[billbedford]

I don't know whether the decision to rebuild was entirely due to the factors mentioned, though those faults are serious. A re-design of the pony truck (as happened on the V2s, and Thompson should be given some credit for this) might have alleviated some of the problems, and most certainly would have been much cheaper than a costly (and ultimately futile) rebuilding. Part of the problems must also lie with a poor standard of workmanship at Cowlairs. All the other big engines in Scotland were shopped at Doncaster or Darlington but many P2 repairs/overhauls were conducted at Cowlairs, and that works wasn't really up to the job. Geoff Lund's notes refer to this and many of the problems on the road were down to this.

 

As for 'those locos that caused so much chaos in Scotland' who said that? Certainly not Miller, certainly not Lund and certainly not Trask. Since the first two were directly responsible for running the P2s out of and in to Edinburgh and the only tool they had to pull the heaviest trains was the Gresley passenger 2-8-2, doesn't their opinion count?  

 

Contrary to received wisdom based on post war history, the requirement in 1942 would be strongly in favour of reliable good-enough machines rather than exceptional ones with a known potential for catastrophic failure.

 

Just what Thompson understood about the role of the P2s pony truck in their axle failure is also clouded by hindsight. What we do know about problems with the pony truck, is that as early as 1934 experiments at Doncaster with a K3 showed that much of the centring force provided by the swing links was being absorbed by the bearing springs; Thompson utilised a bogie with sprung side control on the L1 based on the truck on the 8F, as he would have been unlikely to have seen the LMS drawings before the second half on 1942, after the design decisions on the P2 had already been taken; and the problems with the V2s didn't become apparent until a series of accidents in 1946.

 

As for the source of the criticism of the P2s, I don't know, but with what we've heard of Thompson's character is was very unlikely to have been subordinates or even managers from other departments. It was more likely to have been someone who had read the Railway Inspectorate's report into one of the axle failure and understood the potential damage another such failure could cause. 

[The Stationmaster]

 

  Gresley was   ...    did not respond to the change in wartime conditions and to look to what might have been required afterwards and the V4 is clear proof of that.

 

High grade materials, conjugated valve gear in a locomotive which, while excellent (and I must emphasise it IS an excellent design) was not the locomotive the LNER needed. They had needed for a good decade a decent go anywhere mixed traffic 4-6-0 as per that on the GWR and LMS.

 

Slightly misleading there I think Simon.  The V4 was designed before the outbreak of war (sources variously quote '1939' and 'early 1939') however your point about materials is on the money because according to a couple of sources the reason it did not appear until 1941 was the difficulty in obtaining the materials to the necessary specification.

 

In terms of its versatility and abilities it probably was the locomotive the LNER needed (it could reputedly 'time' passenger train loads in excess of 400 tons and it could readily master J38 loads on freight trains), and with a lower axleload than the B1.  But it was without a shadow of doubt the locomotive which the LNER probably couldn't afford and certainly couldn't resource for material in wartime or readily maintain in wartime (and postwar) conditions.

[S.A.C Martin]

Slightly misleading there I think Simon.  The V4 was designed before the outbreak of war (sources variously quote '1939' and 'early 1939') however your point about materials is on the money because according to a couple of sources the reason it did not appear until 1941 was the difficulty in obtaining the materials to the necessary specification.

 

In terms of its versatility and abilities it probably was the locomotive the LNER needed (it could reputedly 'time' passenger train loads in excess of 400 tons and it could readily master J38 loads on freight trains), and with a lower axleload than the B1.  But it was without a shadow of doubt the locomotive which the LNER probably couldn't afford and certainly couldn't resource for material in wartime or readily maintain in wartime (and postwar) conditions.

 

That's fair enough Mike and certainly not my intention to mislead. I will make a note of that in my draft of the book I am writing and look to amend it wherever I have stated something similar.

 

Although I agree with you in terms of performance and axle load, by virtue of being a more complicated design and more difficult to obtain materials for, it was not the locomotive the LNER truly needed. Locomotive design (as I understand) is as much about compromise as performance, and the B1 was a more than capable design built at a much lower cost, simpler to build and maintain, and - let's be frank - in the long run proved why the LNER built 400+ B1s and only ever built two V4s, even post war and when things were getting better in terms of sourcing the necessary materials for new locomotives.

[micklner]

Sorry Simon the V4 was designed before Thompson was in charge and therefore irrelevant to the B1 and the same arguement covers all of Thompsons designs. If Gresley had survived and/or a different CME had replaced him the B1 etc would all have been a pipe dreams.

 

 

What will your proposed new book cover, that would be new relating to Thompson and not already covered by of other previous books ?.

[S.A.C Martin]

Sorry Simon the V4 was designed before Thompson was in charge and therefore irrelevant to the B1 and the same arguement covers all of Thompsons designs. If Gresley had survived and/or a different CME had replaced him the B1 etc would all have been a pipe dreams.

 

I don't follow your logic Mick, sorry. Of course the B1 wouldn't have been developed if Thompson had not been in charge - but it was and its work has proven beyond reasonable doubt that it was more of a match for what the LNER actually needed than the V4. Yes, the V4 was designed and built before Thompson but it was intended to do much the same work as the B1. The B1 cost less to manufacture, was easier to manufacture and was cheaper in pure materials cost. For a cash strapped LNER in wartime and thereafter the B1 was exactly what was needed. That's why they built 400+ of them.

 

 

What will your proposed new book cover, that would be new relating to Thompson and not already covered by of other previous books ?

 

 

It's not exactly "proposed" - in draft form, it's currently about 80,000 words long and includes some interviews I've done off my own bat, and some research I've done at the NRM's search engine facility. In addition, some photographs from private collections not published before.

 

It brings together in one place a number of arguments for and against and puts forward some different and alternate points of view.

[Tony Wright]

Simon,

           Some well thought out and considered arguments, and it's pointless my replying to each one. We'll agree to disagree, if that's OK? 

 

Where I would make a further point is with regard to the Thompson influence on the Peppercorn Pacifics. Though Thompson, most sensibly, standardised on the double Kylchap for all his Pacifics, other than that he can hardly be credited for the device itself. I suppose you could say he was one up on Peppercorn in one respect, because why the A2s reverted (originally) to a single blast pipe is a real puzzle. The only thing Thompson contributed to the A1/A2 was the divided drive and independent valve gear. The boiler (originally based on the shortened P2 - so, perhaps Thompson) reverted to the perforated steam collector and as for the high footplate above the wheels, the V2 had that, and the A1s reverted to (admittedly small) splashers.

 

What I find significant about this all is that an LNER-designed Pacific, one introduced over 20 years after the first, had such serious design flaws perpetuated in its front end that the arrangement was instantly abandoned on the appointment of the designer's successor. Yes, the independent gear might have stood up better to the rigours of wartime privations than the conjugated, and it was the right decision at the time. But, as Jack Somers intimates, when properly maintained it was easier for the fitters than the three separate sets. Apart from the gear/drive and a few visual details, the Peppercorn Pacifics are a development of Gresley principles, not Thompson's. So, it could be said that after five years of 'fiddling' with big locos, the Doncaster design team finally reverted to what was, and had been, best practice. 

[S.A.C Martin]

Simon,

           Some well thought out and considered arguments, and it's pointless my replying to each one. We'll agree to disagree, if that's OK? 

 

 

 

More than happy to Tony.

 

So, it could be said that after five years of 'fiddling' with big locos, the Doncaster design team finally reverted to what was, and had been, best practice. 

 

 

 

 

Absolutely agree.