jjb1970

A great way of promoting a model by DJM, this offers a nice discount to customers whilst being accessible to anybody with an interest in the 71 and 74. Very nice touch! Based on the 71 sample shots I have no doubt that the 74 will be a cracking model, I hope it gets lots of sales.

I've just received a red and cream one and am very pleased with it. Some have commented that there is not the same feeling of a huge leap forward compared with the Airfix/Hornby version compared to other new releases but I think that is much more because the Airfix model was extremely good for its day and is still not a bad model. A bit like the ancient Mainline Mk.1 restaurant/buffet still holding up well. The Bachmann one is a bit pricey but c'est la vie, I think we get used to it. As well as price inflation we will soon be faced with a produce to meet pre-order route, I don't like that model for locomotives but like it even less for coaches. I can see the points raised about the interior, but it is easily addressed by a lick of paint I think although I also take the point that you shouldn't really be faced with a need to get the paint brush out for a premium priced coach. Really, I think the criticisms I'd make rather minor and on the whole I think Bachmann have done a really good job.

I can see the logic in this but it is based on two assumptions, one is that the truck is not speeding and the second is that the truck speed control is more accurate than that of a car. Neither is a safe assumption to make IMO. Whilst the speedo and cruise control in my car is not completely accurate it seems to be reasonable (like I say, my estimate is that at an indicated 50 I am doing 48) and I'm pretty sure some of the trucks passing me are north of 50.

On the Dapol not being responsible for livery foul ups argument, Dapol are responsible for managing their supply chain and for ensuring that the product they supply to the customer is of an acceptable standard. Model railways are no different to any other industry in that outsourcing is fine as long as you have the capability to write good contracts and manage your supply chain, and the ability to enforce QA. If any of those things are lacking then outsourcing can be a disaster. Whatever the politics and internal blame game Dapol are the responsible party if they supply a model which is the wrong colour. If the factory drop a klanger then it is Dapol's job to manage that or alternatively take it on the chin that they've decided the costs and difficulties associated with the issue mean they'll just supply what they've received from the factory. We seldom see companies pass on the laurels for good products to the manufacturers, if they're happy to take the praise for their factories successes then they can also take the opprobrium when it goes wrong.

I'd agree that my preference for a 5AT is probably not shared by the majority of heritage train enthusiasts and that more classic steam would be the more popular choice. That said, I do think there'd be some potential to capture peoples affections by an effort to bring the steam locomotive back to life not just as a museum piece but as something trying to be relevant in the 21st Century. I'm not saying that the 5AT would threaten modern diesels or electrics. The thermal efficiency is still dire despite all the efforts of Mr. Wardale and combusting coal is rapidly becoming about as socially acceptable as smoking or drink driving (although the 5AT could be fuelled on oil) but the performance potential of the 5AT was very promising for a steamer. I'd just love to see it done.

If there are more efforts to manufacture new steam locomotives, rather than producing copies of what has gone before I think it would be much more interesting (and perhaps much more useful) for that effort to be invested in building something like the Wardale 5AT. Whilst it is probably of academic interest only it would be fascinating to see what could be achieved by trying to apply modern technology to the steam locomotive with the aim of delivering optimum performance. There are always great claims made for concepts like the 5AT and it would be wonderful to see just what the design was capable of in the real world. And in terms of running steam excursions etc it would probably be much more attractive in terms of operation than building a copy of a 1920's or 1930's design I think.

Collectors are a funny old part of the model train market. I think it is easy to joke about them and see collecting as an odd past time yet without the collector segment we'd probably see a lot less investment in new locomotive development and tooling in particular as it does seem that a significant part of production goes to collectors. So modellers and layout operators get a lot of benefit on the back of demand created by collectors. Equally, collectors gain from demand created by modellers, so there is a symbiotic relationship between modellers and collectors I think. That said, at times it does seem to get a bit silly to me, I remember the instant collectability craze bubble that Lima/RIKO inflated for a while by making everything "limited edition" and flooding the market with those limited editions. I knew a fellow who was determined to buy one of every Lima locomotive release, it got to the point he'd have needed a bigger house to fit all the things in.

Most plastic RTR suffers from a less than ideal paint finish IMO. That is not to say it stops me buying models and some are better than others but very few plastic models get close to the paint finish of a good brass or white metal model. One of the reasons I still buy US and Japanese outline brass is that despite the big leaps in plastic RTR there is still a big difference in finish.

I'm going to go down the route of presumption here but the theory that the GWML electrification was rushed and not properly assessed and costed prior to commencement is the most plausible reason for the predicament of the project. That would reflect badly upon DfT and ORR but in some ways it'd reflect more badly on the top tier of NR management. At more junior levels engineers and other people involved can send messages back up the chain that what they're being asked to deliver is not achievable or realistic however if the response amounts to "we've listened and taken note of your concern, now just get on with it" (and I suspect most people involved with large projects have experienced that at some point in their career) that'd excuse some of the failings made by those on the ground. What is a lot less easy to excuse is why the top tier of NR as those people are pretty much there exactly because they're supposed to have the cajones to make hard decisions and kick back against silly instructions. Unlike people lower down the food chain the likes of Mark Carne and his compatriots and predecessors don't have to worry unduly about employment as at that level there is basically a revolving door culture. However, as I say, this is just speculation.

The speedo accuracy point is not correct. The allowable deviation for HGV speedometers is different and there are re-calibration requirements but the allowable deviation is still quite significant and an allowable deviation is a completely different concept to instrument accuracy. The fact that a car speedo has a wider allowable deviation on the side of reading high (but not low) doesn't say anything about the standard of accuracy implemented by the manufacturer. And reading speed accurately is not as simple as it may appear unless you actually measure speed over ground as opposed to calculating from shaftline speed or averaging speed between GPS positions. Both of those techniques are subject to variables. That said, even if a car speedo does read a lot higher than a truck speedo (my estimate is that 50mph on both my wife's car and my car speedo is about 48 however both have relatively fresh tyres) it does not excuse the sort of aggressive behaviour which seems to be becoming more common. I'm quite happy to let people past in normal conditions but it is difficult to pull over in a contra-flow and the difference in time to go through a typical motorway short speed restriction is trivial. Ultimately speed limits are not advisories, they're mandatory and the speedometer is the instrument a driver has to indicate speed.

I try and ignore it and if they want past they can usually overtake unless the restriction is also a reduction to a single lane but it can be quite intimidating at night when they also start flashing headlights etc.

There seems to be a lot more bullying in temporary speed restriction areas on motorways these days. I find it is now quite common in a 50mph restriction to find a truck or bus go almost bumper to bumper to try and force you to go above the 50 limit. And I'm not talking normal tail gating, but going right up to your tail.

Usually in bespoke arrangements everything depends on the stage in the contract. If it is before signing then normally I'd expect the MoD to call the shots, once the contract is signed then the MoD should get whatever is in the contract. There is however an unfortunate habit of the MoD to want A, sign a contract to buy B and then blame the supplier for supplying what they've been contracted to supply rather than what the MoD wanted.

I'm interested to see the next Oxford loco. Is the Adams radial indicative of their long term market positioning (aimed at a lower price point with some compromises to reflect that) or were they feeling their way with this release and will take note of the criticisms to improve their next release? I think there is an opportunity for a company losing a little bit of the finery in return for a competitive price (a segment Hornby have served with their new Railroad tooling I think) but it is not really what most expected when this effort was announced. Perhaps their next release will move things up a notch.

That is often the approach in commercial shipping if building a ship. The cost of amending a yard standard design beyond the standard options offered by the builder is so high that you just take what is offered or go elsewhere most of the time. Also, despite the objections to poor quality, operators would generally prefer to get their new asset into service and making a return rather than delay things and end up in litigation with uncertainty over the outcome. I think as well many ship owners are a lot more realistic than many realise. There was a case a couple of years ago in China with a ship that had appalling build quality, the owners view was that they weren't expecting much for the price but it'd carry cargo for a few years until the market was right to sell it and make a good return. That attitude may not sit well with some but the owner concerned was as sharp as a tack.

Apologies for keeping diverting things but something I observed in defence programs was a reluctance to spend sufficient amounts up front before going anywhere near manufacture. Unfortunately the MoD lost a lot of the capability to do early stage assessment and definition work so were relying on outside companies (such as the one I worked for) and there were regular media stories and smart you know what political points scored about how X millions had been spent on consultants and nothing had actually been done. Kind of missing the point that the point of the spend at those stages was not to build anything but rather to ensure the defency agency knew what they wanted/needed, were ordering something that met those needs and that the designs were well found. If you have to make major changes at the design stage it is not that expensive, as soon as long lead items are ordered, steel is cut and the hull form and compartment layout are fixed then any changes subsequent to these points become hideously expensive. Therefore spending money upfront to get it right is not frivolous spending but trying to reduce costs down the line. A lot of the howlers I saw were primarily caused by defence agencies deciding to cut back on these early stage phases (in some cases not doing much at all) and ending up with power and propulsion plant needing to be redesigned after a good part of it was already in manufacture or delivered to the yard.

For conventional coal plants, the huge cost of adding a carbon capture plant is only really sensible for new builds or re-engineering to reset the expected life to something similar to new. The energy demand of available options is very high and the ground foot print high. The carbon capture plant proposed for Kingsnorth 5 & 5 was going to impose a parasitic load of something like a third of the plants output and be as big again in terms of foot print. Integrated gasification combined cycle technologies offer a much more carbon capture friendly way of combusting coal however when I was in generation despite a lot of claims by its advocates and promising pilots there were still some major metallurgy issues in terms of commercialising the technology on a large scale. Other options include things like oxy firing to control combustion and assist with knocking out carbon from the flue gas however most of the proposals I saw were very much in the purely post combustion amine sorbent camp. I think there are two real problems with the carbon capture fund. The first is that if we are going to move to a low carbon economy then there is a good chance carbon capture would be a medium term transitional technology and as with any transitional technology there is always that question of how much investment do you want to throw at a transitional technology. The second is that nobody wants to be first, or second. The archetypal "race to be third" was very much alive in this area. For those outside engineering that may sound odd, but usually the first generation of any technology is essentially technology proving and those buying it generally get a very expensive, inefficient solution which soon becomes obsolete. Second generation is a bit better but it is generally third generation when it becomes genuinely attractive/viable. There is always an argument that says we know the first generation is probably going to be expensive and not that great but it establishes us, puts us in pole position etc. Unfortunately the rest of the world can learn most of the lessons you'll learn by monitoring somebody else's pain and use that to develop a much more attractive solution. Hence the race to be third. In fairness to the government, if nobody has actually taken the money despite the fund being around for ages then at some point it seems pointless to continue with the idea.

There is a huge jump in going from a one or two person band with no premises beyond your existing home or retail unit or paid staff to employing designers, admin and logistics staff, a marketing person, marketing etc. On the other hand the bigger outfits will benefit from being able to negotiate better deals from the manufacturers, their costs are spread over a much bigger production program etc but nevertheless it is a huge leap to go from being what is in effect an enthusiastic amateur to having to cover the cost base of a large business making the same basic product.

Competition laws are clear and exist for good reasons. There is nothing to stop manufacturers meeting to discuss technical standards, promote joint research, agree joint positions with respect to regulatory matters etc however they cannot discuss pricing, discounts, contracts or anything commercial. Most industries have technical associations which exist to represent the interests of their members and normally the competition law policy is the first item after welcome and apologies for absence. I work for a trade association and there are refreshers on competition law policy three times a year to try and ensure nobody falls into any bad habits.

The thread seems to have digressed to a discussion about safety culture, and I actually see a parallel between safety and what has gone wrong with GWML in that too many incidents are not the result of unforeseeable events or technical failures that workers would not expect but are rather people getting the basics wrong, particularly doing things they are fully aware of as being contrary to procedures and good practice and/or things that they are technically competent to do but decide to do in a way which is unsafe. I've just written a paper on lifting incidents in the offshore heavy lifting sector for a conference next year. The association I work for represents companies that build offshore energy platforms, lay subsea pipes, construct offshore wind farms, diving etc. Given that heavy lifts in the sector really are heavy (regularly several thousand tonnes) and are done offshore the overwhelming majority of the incidents are not caused by losing control of a lift, environmental conditions, equipment failure in respect of equipment failure under load, poor procedures etc but are almost all really basic things. People positioning themselves under loads, things not properly secured before lifting, inadequate pre-lift inspection and poor management of change. In every case I reviewed whilst writing the paper you could not say those involved had not been trained, the procedures and lifting plans if they'd been followed were perfectly good and there was no indication of external pressures resulting in short cuts being taken or people being subject to putative pressure to do whatever was needed to just get the job done. Which brings us around to safety cultures. To consider why a well trained, highly competent person does something silly and ends up dead when they would have been able to explain why what they did that ended up costing them their lives was very dumb is a fascinating question and is linked to human behaviours, management leadership and many other factors. I think behavioural safety is almost like the final frontier of safety. Whenever something happens there are generally calls for better training, procedures, equipment etc yet this assumes that the training, procedures and equipment were lacking when in many cases they are not lacking if properly applied and used. I sort of came full circle. I was at sea at a time where if something happened and you'd worked in violation of a procedure or standing orders etc then you were in a very bad position with a high probability of being sent down the road. I thought the culture a bit brutal, then in electricity there was a no blame culture and an indulgent attitude to failure which promoted open communication and was much more humane for want of a better word. I found that really refreshing but then I felt it was being abused by some who when caught doing something stupid would just throw the various no blame policies in your face. So I actually ended up missing the flexibility of using the big stick when it was appropriate. Just as a positive safety culture does require a certain indulgence to failure, it also needs it to be understood that wilful violation of rules and procedures will not be tolerated. Getting that balance right is not easy. My own strongly held view is that in too many industries and organisations there has been far too much emphasis on what I call hard hat safety and not enough on technical risk management. Whilst not wearing a hard hat is a risk to an individual (who should know better in any case) an inadequate safety system forming part of the control arrangement of a hazardous process could be a major risk not just to plant staff but to 100's of members of the general public. I used to bang my head against walls in electricity when H&S people would go bonkers if they spotted somebody not wearing gloves or not holding the handrail walking down stairs yet were totally disinterested in technical risks such as unacceptable corrosion under insulation issues surrounding them. To return to the GWML electrical saga, I think it is true we are talking with the benefit of hindsight. However none of the problems reported in the articles I've read or been mentioned in this thread should have been unforeseeable to a competent project team. If things which are entirely foreseeable have gone horribly wrong then those responsible really should be accountable for those failures.

Unfortunately the UK often falls down when it comes to joined up thinking. In the UK the cost of installing urban district heating schemes is often prohibitive unless either done during the development phase or if there are easy routes for piping which avoid the need for excavation (much of the City of London piping is routed via car parks or existing tunnels) yet everybody agrees that district heating/cooling is an excellent solution in offering both excellent thermal efficiency and robust energy supply. So much of our CHP development was for large industrial CHP schemes using CCGTs and steam export to a host industrial plant however then the risk is that plant shuts down and you're left with a small CCGT (tens of MW rather than 100's of MW) with nobody to take the steam. My former employer ended up with several CCGT plants that had been built as CHP but ended up as straight power plants because their steam clients closed not long after commissioning the CHP.

I think blaming accountants in this case is unjustified. The project was allocated a budget and looking at it from the outside that budget did not seem to be particularly mean. The project should have been costed and it is the job of the project management team to deliver it to the required specification within the allocated budget. If the budget was too low then it is probably more appropriate to question the original cost estimates and funding request than the accountants. Even if the budget was too tight this wouldn't explain the magnitude of the cost escalation we are seeing. The real threat to the railways here in my opinion is to the future of Network Rail. Despite some of my ranting in this thread, on the whole I do not support privatising NR and do not want to risk a repeat of Railtrack. However, if they drop klangers on this scale they're leaving themselves wide open to a campaign to claim they're not competent to run major projects and I fear the next step would be people in Westminster calling for privatisation. Clearly a large electrification scheme is a complex major project that needs a lot of skill and expertise to plan and deliver however electrification is not something new and there are a lot of people who are well paid precisely because they have been trained and developed to manage complex projects. If the things going wrong were failures to implement new, untried technologies then it'd be a lot less troubling, but when many of the failures appear to stem failings to get basic things right it is very troubling.

http://www.offshorewind.biz/2015/12/03/make-offshore-wind-capacity-to-reach-92gw-by-2024/?utm_source=emark&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=daily-update-offshore-wind-2015-12-04&uid=55671 Note that one of the key drivers for the growth of offshore wind is expected to be China. I think it is very unfair that people assume China is not doing anything to reduce its emissions when they're already investing huge amounts to develop clean energy. On coal, even the most modern super critical plants are not that efficient. The easiest way to increase efficiency of a thermal plant is to develop it as a CHP where you can get incredible efficiencies under optimum conditions but you need an awful lot of heat demand to really boost the efficiency of a coal plant. And the traditional problem with CHP is that the heat balances rarely get near their optimum design points with the result that efficiencies rarely match claimed figures and in some cases are not much above a power plant without CHP. When talking about CHP I mean external heating and cooling supply, not heat recovery within the plant for steam generation, feed heating, machinery thermal conditioning etc. which should all be done regardless of whether or not it is a CHP.

The importance of getting certain things right is crucial and a lot of that is just basic engineering and project risk management. In a major project and especially with an old asset there will always be a significant residual risk but many things which are sometimes excused as being outside of human scientific knowledge and invention are anything but if the initial stages of a project are well managed.

Whilst it is unlikely that any project recovery plan would get the project back onto its original budget and schedule it should be possible to develop a plan to establish a new budget and schedule which reduces the over runs and delivers value for money. As things are it just feels like things are out of control along with an attitude that these things happen and that it is a difficult and big project so you have to expect things to go wrong.