LMS2968

19 minutes ago, Rich_F said:

Inspiration for your modern era depots 

Or Springs Branch, 20 July 2020, brand new!

A stall, quite simply, is when a loco comes to an involuntary stand and is unable to  restart its train and move forward. It can be caused by a lack of adhesion between steel tyres on steel rails when conditions are poor, but other reasons can include shortage of steam, forcing the train to stop for a 'blow up'.

If you can keep the train moving, even slowly, in poor adhesion conditions, this is easier than restarting once the stall has happened.

Cycles and cyclists aren't!

I see we're off on yet another non-railway related tangent.

10 hours ago, Compound2632 said:

 

This, I gather, is generally supposed to be because the LNWR smokebox doors were too flimsy to stand being drilled for the bolts to fix the numberplates.

One of those urban myths. Even a flimsy door would withstand the weight of a cast plate; it had to be sufficiently strong not to distort and had to remain air tight under thermal expansion. Many LNWR engines were fitted with smokebox plates in the mid-twenties, and look surprisingly strange with them!

17 minutes ago, Wickham Green too said:

But it would have been a simple matter to put a number on the rear as well ................. was it only the Southern that did so ?

Not so easy if you regularly move tenders around between engines, as did the LNWR among others.

11 minutes ago, The Stationmaster said:

Usual practice at western sheds - even with tank engines - seems to have been to have somokebox end towards the turntable and the smoke hoods were of course arranged that way round as well as the photos above show.

And thereby allowing the buffer beam numbers to be read by the next crew, smokebox plates in the case of the Midland. The engine would then be turned to face the right direction as it was leaving its stall.

Which signals? If they were Starter (now Section) signals they would not be cleared as this would give permission to go as far as the next box, from which permission would need to be obtained anyway. For restricted movement within station limits there would need to be a dummy to control it , and these were not always provided.

Could I suggest 'The Engineering and History of Rocket' by Michael R Bailey and John B Clithero (2000), National Railway Museum, ISBN 1 900747 18 9. All the answers are in there, including a photo of a bronze axlebox with oil boxes cast in and oil holes into the box and lubrication grooves in the bearing surface.

By the way, that drawing is totally wrong about the firebox shape so don't trust it for anything else either.

Rocket's boiler pressure was 50 p.s.i., the limit allowed by the Liverpool & Manchester Railway under its rules for the Rainhill Trials. The gauge was a mercurial gauge mounted vertically alongside the the chimney and with its lower end connected to the boiler; the higher the pressure, the higher the mercury stood in the glass tube which was visible to the enginemen. See II and V! below.

5 minutes ago, Jeremy Cumberland said:

There are indeed several possibilities, but my comment was no less well valid than many others on here, including some by very knowledgeable people.

From the video, it seems a reasonable supposition that the driver did not expect the coaches to be there. What was he expecting instead? What information had he been given? Was it his duty to look out for obstructions, or was he, for example, proceeding under a cleared main signal, leading him to believe that the line was unoccupied? What arrangement, if any, had been reached between the driver and fireman in terms of looking out? If the shunter is on the footplate - which appears to be a possibility - had the shunter given the driver misleading information about the position of the coaches? Had the driver mistaken something else for a handsignal? Was a malicious actor giving false handsignals to the driver? Was there a medical incident? Was there a mechanical failure?

Answering all those, and possibly other questions, is of course, the purpose of an inquiry, whose answers will be evidence based rather than speculative.

The assumption being made, and this is also being made by Mike the Stationmaster, for whom I have the greatest respect, is that the driver knew the stock was where it was and not a lot further back. I'd suggest that the approach speed could indicate that this was the case, and being on a left-hand curve with that big tender in the way, he would not discover his error until the last minute. Of course, this would raise other questions, such as why he didn't know and why the fireman, who was looking back, did not intervene, at least in sufficient time. If this was so, stopping short of the stock has no relevance; you have to know where it is to do that.

I'm sure Mike will agree with me that, however many knowledgeable railwaymen there are, you do not condemn a men or jump to a conclusion until you have heard his side of the story. It might turn out that all the above was wrong and the earlier theories are correct, but we don't know. Let the inquiry establish ALL the facts.

Various reasons, but amongst them is that copper is a better conductor of heat, is more easily worked and less prone to corrosion: steel fireboxes require a reliable and effective water treatment. On the other hand, they are cheaper and stronger for a given thickness.

I'm more inclined to the view that the injectors didn't pick up as there was insufficient water in the tanks to start with, so no means of pulling down the boiler pressure when the safety valves lifted.

From the 1950 BR Rule Book:

153. (a) A freight train must not be run on any running line beyond station limits without a brake van in rear, unless authorised by the Operating Superintendent.

(b) Where a freight train is authorised to run without a brake van in rear, a brake van, or other suitable vehicle, for the use of the man in charge of such train, must be attached—when it can be conveniently done—as near to the rear of the train as practicable. Where no such vehicle is available the man may ride on the engine. A tail signal must be carried on the last vehicle.

The practice of assisting FAILED (correct railway terminology, not broken down.  Break down implies derailment, hence breakdown crane to rerail it) trains from the rear is almost as old as railways themselves, and was noted on the Liverpool & Manchester Railway in the 1830s, long before radio, mobile phones or GSMR. Co-operation was by hand (lamps at night) and whistle signals. This happened before the introduction of the continuous automatic brake so the driver of the failed engine had no control over the assisting one. The rule covering assistance from rear is 179(c); the only instruction about working is, "The assisting train must run at reduced speed, and great caution must be observed by all concerned." Basically, use common sense.

I was privileged to know Jim Carter, who not only took thousands of railway photos from about 1954 to the end of his railway career on the footplate, but also published them in magazines, ABCs and even several books of his own. He never mentioned any managerial disapproval.

Yes, but it could be some distance away. The tank had to be higher than the column to give a pressure head but also to give a constant flow. The tank would hold more than a few tenders but had time to replenish between uses. At Bridgnorth the tank is to the west of the station set into the bank below the high level car park. I don't think you can see it from the station.

Glasses, I think.

1 hour ago, The Stationmaster said:

It's different now.  Definitely banned from the footplate in steam days and really should remain banned on steam for safety reasons although an exception sometimes seems to be allowed if they're made of the right type of material.

This one's always intrigued me.

2959 at Leyland station with the 11.40 Wigan NW - Carnforth passenger, 19 September 1964. The driver - wearing glasses - is looking back for the tip. Apparently, he took exception to being passed in the station by a Class 40-hauled parcels and wanted to catch and pass it. This story was told to the SMF by the photographer, Steve Leyland.

I spent quite a lot of time in Liverpool Exchange Station in the 1950s, fascinated by the steam engines standing at the blocks. I remember the pigeons were a bit of a nuisance, but that's part of life. I gradually stopped going after 1968 as steam had gone and there were diesels instead. Gone too were the pigeons. 

All true, of course, at least to an extent. Attracting labour to a hard and filthy work environment was becoming more and more difficult, but did it have to be that way? The LMS had introduced self-cleaning smokeboxes, rocking grates and hopper ashpans to the last Black Fives. This equipment, which was relatively cheap and easily fitted at works overhauls, could have been retrospectively fitted to the rest of the Black Fives, 8Fs, Crabs, 5XPs and Royal Scots, over 2,000 engines. Similar on other engines and other regions. It would have made the work less unpleasant ('pleasant' would be pushing it) and allowed engines back into traffic sooner after finishing a working. It wasn't done.

As for diesels' ability to start and go, it wasn't, and isn't, as instantaneous as that. Many Western Region engines were hot start only, a process taking about five hours, or the equivalent of raising steam from cold.

8 hours ago, Matt37268 said:

Is this the same railway that that thought it was a good idea to run it without taking the handbrake off on its tender? 

I don't know about that happening on a preserved railway but it did happen on the main line, between Crewe and Holyhead.

11 minutes ago, Blandford1969 said:

At least for those of us who are masters of it. 

Ooh! Nasty!

Yes it is; it certainly was on Thursday last week. I think the ticket expires in January and it will not enter works until then.