Modernisation Plan Diesels

[Peter Kazmierczak]

Were the Standards just a Riddles "vanity" project?

[The Stationmaster]

I'm not getting at Peter - just that this post will probably follow his and that is happenstance - but I'm ceasing to be amazed at some of the nonsense posted in this thread.  It is very easy to look back art the immediate Post-War and Post-Nationalisation periods and say what we think ought to have happened but it would have been one heck of a lot more difficult to have been there and branched out on something radical, especially something expensively radical such as buying fleets of mainline diesels and building the infrastructure to operate and maintain them.  

 

the newly nationalised railway industry faced a pile of problems so high it would have taken a very brave man, or total idiot, to have added more - much of the infrastructure was crumbling, most of the rolling stock fleet needed repair or renewal, the same went for the loco fleet and all of these things needed to be done yesterday simply in order to standstill.  Those are the all too obvious things - accompanied by a major shortage of investment monies - but there were some which were far less obvious;  we might all quickly cotton on to the fact that the new BR had over 20,00 steam engines on its books  but it is perhaps less easy to envisage that the newly nationalised industry employed more than 600,000 people in an enormous variety of roles and all of them expecting to see change in their employment conditions come out of state ownership.  Simply managing something that size and unifying the way things were done was a massive task and I know for a fact that even by the time of privatisation in 1994 that task had not been completed especially as even by then there were people around who stuck out for 'the old ways' (which inevitably they had never actually been involved with in pre 1948 days).

 

So there was a huge management task - and management of a railway is far, far more than building engines but perhaps if that could be got onto some sort of common footing it might help to weld organisations together and now directly coming to Peter's proposition about the Standards being a vanity project I think it is probably far more true to say that they definitely involved an element of being a political project, one to bring people into working together.  But they were undeniably in many respects a practical answer to existing problems with some of the most useful smaller designs simply being updated re-works of existing types but using 'standard' components.  And anyone who has ever spent any time in a depot stores would know the value of 'standard components' for the consumable stuff used at that level.

 

The important thing about the Standards is that all of them actually found work although because of other changes - including the later headlong dash to reduce operating costs and 'rationalise the network - they all had relatively short operational lives.  Hindsight is a wonderful thing - especially when it's all too easy not to have been in the shoes who had to make very difficult decisions on how to use limited resources to deal with massive problems.  BTW in retrospect I have no doubt that some bad decisions were made on BR all the way through the 1950s but there were an awful lot of good ones and many pragmatic ones which contributed to keeping something running.

[Peter Kazmierczak]

I like to toss in the occasional grenade.......

 

As Mike rightly says, looking back is easy. Looking forward is the hard bit, but it's nice to sometimes ponder on the "what ifs".

 

Hurcomb seems to have had more of a handle on things than is credited for. Was it inertia (or whatever you want to call it) at the RE that held back diesel (and electrification) developments that the BTC seemed to be asking for?

 

Did any other developed country set out a wholesale post-war programme of motive power renewal based on steam?

[jonny777]

I'm not getting at Peter - just that this post will probably follow his and that is happenstance - but I'm ceasing to be amazed at some of the nonsense posted in this thread. 

 

And I certainly hope you are not getting at me, because if you look back through my posts on this thread you will see that I have pasted contempory evidence to back up my suggestions.

 

The dieselisation of the ECML as far as Grantham was certainly not what "we think ought to have happened", but what the LNER had invited, and received, tenders from six companies to do; and was subsequently shelved by the BTC who then (after the report they commissioned came back mentioning nothing about perpetuating steam) ordered hundreds of brand new steam locomotives with not a hint of a main line diesel.

 

I do not see this as nonsense. It is all fact.

 

My view is that, not only is it fact, but it is bordering on gross incompetence - given that the average life of a steam locomotive is 30-35 years.  The order for the standards must have expected for them to keep going until the mid 1980s. This is definitely not hindsight. This is what any sensible locomotive designer would be planning for into the future.

 

The lack of oil argument doesn't wash either, because there seems to have been plenty for motor buses, so much so that most cities began a rapid programme to eliminate their tram systems and replace them with diesel or petrol buses in the early 1950s.

[Allegheny1600]

Did any other developed country set out a wholesale post-war programme of motive power renewal based on steam?

Yes!!!

Germany (west and east) had entire ranges of "Neubauloks" (new build locos) that they both built even as they were building and developing new forms of traction! One reason for this is that (in the west, particularly) they DID choose a rolling programme of dieselisation or electrification, area by area.

IMHO, these were sensible ways of going about this modernisation process.

Further, although some small steam designs were tried, the majority of these new classes were of the medium to large power classifications and lasted in the west until 1977 and in the east, until 1988 - yes! 1988!! (although that was due to restricted access to oil by their Soviet masters).

France built some new steam locos, inherited many others and purchased some too. AFAIK, France also did a rolling programme of modernisation but spent an awful lot more money than we ever have, on electrification.

In the USA, several of the (privately owned) railroads insisted on continuing with steam traction and spent heavily on developing advanced* types of steam locomotives, it being seen as foolish to alienate their major customer (coal). However, such spending was generally suspended by about 1950 and they literally switched overnight to diesel traction, scrapping even newer steam locos than we did! Of course, they DID buy a fully working, pretty reliable# product.

Cheers,

John.

 

*Far, far more advanced than anything built in Britain.

# Some of the early US diesel builders couldn't negotiate the switch-over from building steam to building diesel very well and did build failures, unreliable machines and so forth. However, I think even an Alco with a 244 engine was still considerably better than say, a North British diesel! They also built considerable quantities for export and some are still going today!

[Allegheny1600]

I'm not getting at Peter - just that this post will probably follow his and that is happenstance - but I'm ceasing to be amazed at some of the nonsense posted in this thread.* 

 

 

It is very easy to look back art the immediate Post-War and Post-Nationalisation periods and say what we think ought to have happened but it would have been one heck of a lot more difficult to have been there and branched out on something radical, especially something expensively radical such as buying fleets of mainline diesels and building the infrastructure to operate and maintain them.  

* Hopefully I qualified (and apologised for) my ignorance in these matters!

 

As you can see by my previous post, I have studied how other countries did manage to dieselise in the post war period.

To pick up on Germany again (partly due to our joint interest in WR hydraulics!), they started their dieselisation process in 1952/3/4 and built a small fleet of medium power locos (10 x class V80), similar with higher power locos (5 x V200) and they then tested them for five years prior to ordering them in quantity.

What is really interesting is that even though the bodies, engines, transmissions and so forth could be built by different manufacturers, they all had to be interchangeable with each other AND they could be fitted to ANY of V80, V100, V200 locos and the VT08, VT11 & VT12 diesel multiple units.

I think the principle difference is that German dieselisation was not interfered with by the politicos - the management knew how to run their railway and were left to get on with it.

British railways managers may have had a hard time integrating their railway from four different systems into one but don't forget the German counterpart had to contend with much worse war damage as well as the forced partition of their railway and the loss of huge numbers of personnel and materiels.

Therefore different problems but surely of roughly equal difficulty?

[railsquid]

I must find the time to write up Japan's modernisation efforts - some interesting parallels and differences, especially regarding diesel hydraulics.

 

Meanwhile here's a video showing quite a few British diesel and electric exports of the 50s, from about 11:00 onwards.

 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hyFqUEDbkdc

[Clive Mortimore]

I'm not getting at Peter - just that this post will probably follow his and that is happenstance - but I'm ceasing to be amazed at some of the nonsense posted in this thread.  It is very easy to look back art the immediate Post-War and Post-Nationalisation periods and say what we think ought to have happened but it would have been one heck of a lot more difficult to have been there and branched out on something radical, especially something expensively radical such as buying fleets of mainline diesels and building the infrastructure to operate and maintain them.  

 

the newly nationalised railway industry faced a pile of problems so high it would have taken a very brave man, or total idiot, to have added more - much of the infrastructure was crumbling, most of the rolling stock fleet needed repair or renewal, the same went for the loco fleet and all of these things needed to be done yesterday simply in order to standstill.  Those are the all too obvious things - accompanied by a major shortage of investment monies - but there were some which were far less obvious;  we might all quickly cotton on to the fact that the new BR had over 20,00 steam engines on its books  but it is perhaps less easy to envisage that the newly nationalised industry employed more than 600,000 people in an enormous variety of roles and all of them expecting to see change in their employment conditions come out of state ownership.  Simply managing something that size and unifying the way things were done was a massive task and I know for a fact that even by the time of privatisation in 1994 that task had not been completed especially as even by then there were people around who stuck out for 'the old ways' (which inevitably they had never actually been involved with in pre 1948 days).

 

So there was a huge management task - and management of a railway is far, far more than building engines but perhaps if that could be got onto some sort of common footing it might help to weld organisations together and now directly coming to Peter's proposition about the Standards being a vanity project I think it is probably far more true to say that they definitely involved an element of being a political project, one to bring people into working together.  But they were undeniably in many respects a practical answer to existing problems with some of the most useful smaller designs simply being updated re-works of existing types but using 'standard' components.  And anyone who has ever spent any time in a depot stores would know the value of 'standard components' for the consumable stuff used at that level.

 

The important thing about the Standards is that all of them actually found work although because of other changes - including the later headlong dash to reduce operating costs and 'rationalise the network - they all had relatively short operational lives.  Hindsight is a wonderful thing - especially when it's all too easy not to have been in the shoes who had to make very difficult decisions on how to use limited resources to deal with massive problems.  BTW in retrospect I have no doubt that some bad decisions were made on BR all the way through the 1950s but there were an awful lot of good ones and many pragmatic ones which contributed to keeping something running.

Hi Mike

 

I think you have summed up everything nicely.

 

Now for my nonsense, I am happy as I have made the following over the years, a couple of class 14s (kits), 12 or so class 15s, 6 class 16s, 3 class 17s, a class 20, several class 21s (conversions), some class 22s (kits and conversions), far more class 23s than BR had (conversions and scratch), not sure how many class 24s (conversions) and class 25s (conversions), a few class 26 and 27 (conversions), a pair of class 28s,  a handful of class 29s, some class 30/31 conversions (including two coupled with the front doors open and gangway in place, and one from plastic card), a Slim Jim 33 (conversion), a 37, a fleet of 40s (conversions and one scratch), a flotilla of class 41s, various 44, 45 and 46 conversions, a flock of class 47 conversions, a class 48, Falcon, Lion, Kestrel, DP2, Deltic (a real Kitmaster kit), Hawk, 10001, 10203 and made a squad of Deltics the right length. All now a waste of time as the RTR boys have made them for everyone. :locomotive:

[jjb1970]

On the short life of many of the standard steamers I think there are two quite separate questions, were the standard steamers the best available option at the point of ordering, and should they have been retained once conditions changed?

The answer to the first I think is dependent upon what point in the process you consider. I'm with those that think a new steam program wasn't so much the best option BR had with the cards they'd been dealt but pretty much the only one. However by the mid 1950's the economy was improving and the arguments that had acted in favour of the BR standards were less persuasive and the arguments had turned to favouring getting rid of steam. I think some of the later batches of standards should not have been built when BR had made the decision to modernise.

The second question tends to generate strong opinions and emotive responses, but the fact that an asset is still young is not in itself a good reason for keeping it in service as depending on how costs are calculated it can actually make sense to get rid of an asset on receipt from the builder. That is an extreme position but is not really that unusual as it happens in industry quite a lot that conditions change hugely between placing an order and taking delivery. At the moment mobile offshore drilling unit owners are paying shipyards in Korea a lot of money to delay delivery as they do not want the units they've ordered but equally either cannot afford to cancel or do not want their new tonnage entering the market with one of their competitors. In the case of steam locomotives I believe the fact many of the locomotives withdrawn were young was irrelevant, the economic case to get rid of them was compelling regardless of age. This was not a uniquely British phenomenon, as Allegheny 1600 has pointed out North American operators also abandoned relatively new locomotives to dieselise.

[The Stationmaster]

I like to toss in the occasional grenade.......

 

As Mike rightly says, looking back is easy. Looking forward is the hard bit, but it's nice to sometimes ponder on the "what ifs".

 

Hurcomb seems to have had more of a handle on things than is credited for. Was it inertia (or whatever you want to call it) at the RE that held back diesel (and electrification) developments that the BTC seemed to be asking for?

 

Did any other developed country set out a wholesale post-war programme of motive power renewal based on steam?

There were major programmes in a  number of Western European countries.  I agree regarding Hurcomb - he was no doubt looking forward logically and coming up with a  well reasoned proposition of the way things ought too but I've no doubt that it was stifled by lack of money rather than anything else.  Some electrification of course did happen - albeit mainly if not entirely resumption of Pre-War plans and don't forget that at roughly the time he was coming up with that other even more sensible bright ideas were emerging about new Cross London routes and some of those still haven't happened!

 

Incidentally as far as dieselisation was concerned let's not overlook the fact that on the Western Region - if nowhere else diesel loco fuelling facilities (if not much else) were available because of the abortive plan to go in for a fairly large programme of oil-firing of steam engines.  The oil-firing plan foundered not a technical grounds but on the fact that the country could not spare the dollars needed to buy the oil - and we were hardly much more flush for dollars a few years later with massive debts to the USA and the drive to get in as many dollars as possible through export earnings (as well as simply not having the money available for investment).

 

 

It is interesting to reflect on the words of ES Cox who was very much at the centre of things during the development of the BR Standard designs.  Firstly there was not at that time an agreed standard for new electrification - it didn't emerge until 1951 when it was settled that 1,500vdc overhead should be the standard (except on the Southern Region) - interestingly that 'standard' had a shorter life than the Standard steam engines!   Cox also points out that time there was insufficient experience in the operation of mainline diesel types which of course very much the case - there was simply insufficient knowledge and experience to start on large scale dieselisation.  However is most interesting comment is about the political message which was given to the Railway Executive and that was very clearly to embark on a wholesale programme of standardisation to suit the ideas of the politicians who had taken the railway into state ownership.  Only a  few years later along came a different complexion of politicians who not only immediately asked for something different but equally quickly set about abolishing the management structure which had been working to the ground rules of the previous lot.

 

As ever you can't discount the presence of the sticky fingers of the politicos in the workings and management of the railway industry.  Oddly much the same sort of thing happened, later, in Russia where the engineer continuing the Post-War development of steam traction met an even more inglorious end than the team Riddles had built as didn't suffer the fate of either Kagonovich (exile to Siberia for being an advocate of steam) or Lebedyansky (design leader on the Post-War designs) whose major decline in health followed immediatelty after condemnation of his latest design proposal);  Riddles simply retired.

[New Haven Neil]

Cox also points out why GM diesels weren't looked at - after the furore over the first three Warships having 'foreign' engines (the rest were built under licence - which was OK - apparently) buying US made engines was out - and GM would not under any circumstances licence engine building.  (Locomotive Panorama, Vol 2)  Worth a read in the context of the discussions on this topic - he was there at the time after all!

[Peter Kazmierczak]

I must find the time to write up Japan's modernisation efforts - some interesting parallels and differences, especially regarding diesel hydraulics.

 

Meanwhile here's a video showing quite a few British diesel and electric exports of the 50s, from about 11:00 onwards.

 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hyFqUEDbkdc

 

Like the bit near the beginning with everyone standing outside the pub by their cars, having a drink. Interesting bit of social history.

[jonny777]

There were major programmes in a  number of Western European countries.  I agree regarding Hurcomb - he was no doubt looking forward logically and coming up with a  well reasoned proposition of the way things ought too but I've no doubt that it was stifled by lack of money rather than anything else.  Some electrification of course did happen - albeit mainly if not entirely resumption of Pre-War plans and don't forget that at roughly the time he was coming up with that other even more sensible bright ideas were emerging about new Cross London routes and some of those still haven't happened!

 

Incidentally as far as dieselisation was concerned let's not overlook the fact that on the Western Region - if nowhere else diesel loco fuelling facilities (if not much else) were available because of the abortive plan to go in for a fairly large programme of oil-firing of steam engines.  The oil-firing plan foundered not a technical grounds but on the fact that the country could not spare the dollars needed to buy the oil - and we were hardly much more flush for dollars a few years later with massive debts to the USA and the drive to get in as many dollars as possible through export earnings (as well as simply not having the money available for investment).

 

 

It is interesting to reflect on the words of ES Cox who was very much at the centre of things during the development of the BR Standard designs.  Firstly there was not at that time an agreed standard for new electrification - it didn't emerge until 1951 when it was settled that 1,500vdc overhead should be the standard (except on the Southern Region) - interestingly that 'standard' had a shorter life than the Standard steam engines!   Cox also points out that time there was insufficient experience in the operation of mainline diesel types which of course very much the case - there was simply insufficient knowledge and experience to start on large scale dieselisation. 

 

 

But...

 

We are not talking about "large scale dieselisation".

 

I was simply pointing out that the LNER had a scheme for a very small scale dieselisation, Hurcomb later pointed this out to the BTC and asked why it had been shelved, the 1951 report recommended a small scale diesel trial (up to 100 units is mentioned in the body of the report), and yet all of this seems to have been kicked into the long grass by Riddles without any satisfactory excuse for doing so.

[The Stationmaster]

But...

 

We are not talking about "large scale dieselisation".

 

I was simply pointing out that the LNER had a scheme for a very small scale dieselisation, Hurcomb later pointed this out to the BTC and asked why it had been shelved, the 1951 report recommended a small scale diesel trial (up to 100 units is mentioned in the body of the report), and yet all of this seems to have been kicked into the long grass by Riddles without any satisfactory excuse for doing so.

Don't forget the first six Standard Classes were entering traffic in 1951, with several more following in 1952 although the others were a couple of years after that - thus the decision to design and build had been made before the 1951 report appeared (although quite likely some of Riddles people may well have been aware of what it might contain or recommend).  Thus the decision to go for Standard steam designs pre-dated that report and of course some building programmes were subsequently cutback - which was probably a result of tother factors and not that report.

 

The point is the need identified early on was seen as an urgent one and as Cox said it was considered that insufficient experience with diesels then existed - after all only the LMS twins were in service by then and

the Bulleid diesels, which had been a long time developing and building didn't first appear until 1951.  Three of the Big Four had progressed before nationalisation in ordering experimental relatively high (for the time) horsepower locos but even those plans had not come to fruition by 1948 - there really wasn't the sort of experience which those in charge thought was needed for ordering on a larger scale.  It would have been very easy for Riddles to respond to the report  by pointing out that two designs of diesel electric locomotive and two gas turbine locomotives were already in the process of being developed, tested and assessed and it was too early to draw any positive conclusions (I wonder if he did?)

 

The LNER proposal is however interesting for other reasons - there was in the years between the end of the war and nationalisation a less than veiled threat of nationalisation hanging over the railway industry.  And no doubt the companies did a number of things to not only progress matters but also to place stakes in the ground for posterity.  Just how serious was the LNER's intent knowing all along that it wouldn't have to pay for the locos it was ordering but that the cost would fall elsewhere?  Similarly was the strong LMS element in early BR motive power design  etc keen not to see other people's schemes achieve greater recognition than their own?  We really don't know - apart from what Cox has written exactly what took place and we definitely don't know what sort of railway industry politics were at play (if they were?).

 

I suspect that even if we went though all the relevant minutes we still wouldn't get anything more definitive than Cox's words on the subject

[kevinlms]

And I certainly hope you are not getting at me, because if you look back through my posts on this thread you will see that I have pasted contempory evidence to back up my suggestions.

 

The dieselisation of the ECML as far as Grantham was certainly not what "we think ought to have happened", but what the LNER had invited, and received, tenders from six companies to do; and was subsequently shelved by the BTC who then (after the report they commissioned came back mentioning nothing about perpetuating steam) ordered hundreds of brand new steam locomotives with not a hint of a main line diesel.

 

I do not see this as nonsense. It is all fact.

 

.

So what was the real value of dieselising the ECML, as far as Grantham? Its not like all services would become diesel hauled. Changing to a steam loco there, would have been rather pointless & waste any time, saved thus! A better idea would have been another line, where the bulk of services could have benefited. The MML to Sheffield via Derby & Nottingham, would appear to have better prospects under nationalisation.

[ForestPines]

The LNER proposal is however interesting for other reasons - there was in the years between the end of the war and nationalisation a less than veiled threat of nationalisation hanging over the railway industry. And no doubt the companies did a number of things to not only progress matters but also to place stakes in the ground for posterity. Just how serious was the LNER's intent knowing all along that it wouldn't have to pay for the locos it was ordering but that the cost would fall elsewhere? Similarly was the strong LMS element in early BR motive power design etc keen not to see other people's schemes achieve greater recognition than their own? We really don't know - apart from what Cox has written exactly what took place and we definitely don't know what sort of railway industry politics were at play (if they were?).

 

I suspect that even if we went though all the relevant minutes we still wouldn't get anything more definitive than Cox's words on the subject

I suggest reading what Michael Bonavia has written on the LNER proposal, as he was directly involved in it.

 

The LNER trial scheme wasn't about dieselisation "to Grantham", it was about dieselisation of the main London-Edinburgh expresses - the proposed purchase was of 25 1600HP units to replace 32 Pacifics, which covered 8 London-Edinburgh runs in each direction plus three fill-in return trips per day.

 

The costings included roughly 20% to build two new diesel depots, in London and Edinburgh. The proposal said "separate and specialized maintenance accommodation is an essential, and the fact that this must be provided whatever the number of ... locomotives introduced supports the idea of a large-scale experiment against that of introducing, for example, one locomotive for trial".

[rockershovel]

There is definitely a minimum number in any test, and for the ECML it seems to be equal to the minimum to run a service. After all, the Woodhead electrification wouldn't have yielded the conclusive results it did if a mixed group of steam and electric locos has been employed.

 

One thing which has always struck me as politically motivated special pleading is the clip of Dr Beeching (it appears during the much-repeated "End of Steam" programme) claiming that it was essential and unavoidable that steam be replaced everywhere, simultaneously. Locomotives never ranged freely about the system at random, being rather designed and procured for defined tasks. Several European countries carried out ongoing, staged programmes of replacement regionally, or on specified routes, which appears to disprove the claim.

[Peter Kazmierczak]

With all this £££ for modernisation, were there any improvements in train services?

 

As example - WR services from Plymouth to Paddington for an arrival before mid afternoon.

 

Summer 1953:

Ply d  16.10 Padd a.21.00 (last day train of the previous day)

Ply d. 00.00 Padd a 07.25

Ply d. 01.00 Padd a.06.15 (incl Sleeping cars - vacate at Padd by 08.00)

Ply d. 07.15 Padd a.12.15

Ply d. 08.30 Padd a 13.30

 

Summer 1962

Ply d 16.30 Padd a. 21.13 (last day train of the previous day)

Ply d. 00.00 Padd a. 07.25 (incl Sleeping cars)

Ply d. 01.00 Padd a. 06.15 (incl. Sleeping cars accessible from 22.30, vacate at Padd by 07.30)

Ply d. 06.30 Padd a. 11.15

Ply d. 08.30 Padd a. 13.20

 

Apart from the first day train leaving an hour earlier, little other change (or acceleration) in nine years.

[jonny777]

I suggest reading what Michael Bonavia has written on the LNER proposal, as he was directly involved in it.

 

 

 

I have; and have also taken the trouble to read his thoughts on Riddles and the blind faith in standard steam locos.

 

" And the scheme that had been approved in outline by the Board of the LNER, for full conversion of the East Coast Main Line express passenger services to diesel traction, through the purchase of 25 large diesel-electric locomotives, was not merely shelved but consigned to the waste paper basket. This was a serious mistake. The experience gained from such a move into main line diesel traction would have been invaluable when funds for modernisation on a large scale became available."

 

 

"The steam locomotive policy was doubly unfortunate. It involved an immediate waste of resources which would have been better employed in obtaining the best results from the best company designs in existence, by rebuilding and improving them in ways that had already transformed the economy and performance of several famous locomotive classes. And in the longer term, when a change to diesel traction became inevitable, there was a lack of experience which was to cost the railways dearly. Furthermore, being late off the mark led to undue haste in traction conversion, with unsuitable types of diesel being ordered without sufficient trial running. If only a steady progress into diesel and electric traction had been planned and started in 1948, coupled with limited continued building and rebuilding of the most successful company steam locomotive designs, a great deal of money would have been saved and merchants' yards such as Woodhams at Barry would not have seen so many relatively new engines awaiting their turn to be scrapped. Moreover, there was a good example in France, where the changeover was less precipitate and where the steam locomotive did not suddenly become anomalous, as happened on BR. On this principle steam could have been retained longer over here, and properly maintained in 'pockets' of steam traction if an earlier start and a much steadier pace had been set between say 1950 and 1970"

 

Michael R Bonavia   'BR, The First 25 Years'  pp 42,54,55

[jonny777]

With all this £££ for modernisation, were there any improvements in train services?

 

As example - WR services from Plymouth to Paddington for an arrival before mid afternoon.

 

Summer 1953:

Ply d  16.10 Padd a.21.00 (last day train of the previous day)

Ply d. 00.00 Padd a 07.25

Ply d. 01.00 Padd a.06.15 (incl Sleeping cars - vacate at Padd by 08.00)

Ply d. 07.15 Padd a.12.15

Ply d. 08.30 Padd a 13.30

 

Summer 1962

Ply d 16.30 Padd a. 21.13 (last day train of the previous day)

Ply d. 00.00 Padd a. 07.25 (incl Sleeping cars)

Ply d. 01.00 Padd a. 06.15 (incl. Sleeping cars accessible from 22.30, vacate at Padd by 07.30)

Ply d. 06.30 Padd a. 11.15

Ply d. 08.30 Padd a. 13.20

 

Apart from the first day train leaving an hour earlier, little other change (or acceleration) in nine years.

 

 

There is an interesting piece in 'I Tried To Run A Railway' where Fiennes recounts the attempt to speed up the Liverpool St to Norwich services. He goes on to say that in the early 1930s they had B12s running the services and twenty years later they were given B1s as replacements, but which he reckons were barely any better at running the trains than their predecessors.

 

When they heard a lightweight (at least for the GE section axle loadings) pacific was being designed, Fiennes put in for 25 but this was cancelled by Barrington-Ward who told them they could cope with the B1s and referred insultingly to the GE as a "tram track".

 

It was only after Fiennes informed B-W that the accelerated timetables were already at the printers that he was allowed to have 23 Britannias.

 

The GE hierarchy worked out the accelerated schedules in advance by borrowing a couple of light pacifics from the SR.  As Fiennes says, a B1 would top Brentwood Bank flat out at barely over 40mph and would then need to stop for water at Ipswich. The first spam can trial was doing 56mph at that point and was blowing off at the same time, according to GF, plus it had no need for water en-route.

 

They decided to fill the SR pacific's tender with the worst quality coal they could find, something which would have 'killed' the B1, but the 4-6-2 found it to be no problem and still bowled along with steam to spare.

 

This seems to add weight to the feeling, that there was no attempt made by senior management to radically improve services in the early post-war, except perhaps for a few prestige expresses.

[The Stationmaster]

One thing which always should be borne in mind when reading anything written by senior - particularly very senior - railway folk is that they will very often have an axe to grind or their particular point of view or company position to maintain.  I would for example be very surprised - especially at the time he wrote it - for Bonavia to say anything different.  His cv perhaps helps tell the story as in 1948 he went not to the RE but to the BTC and it is obvious there was a difference of views and emphasis between the two organisations -simply from reading this thread. He ver briefly went to the RE in 1953 - presumably just before its abolition as his job title back with the BTC in the same year was the same as his designation in the RE - hence he became very closely involved with The Modernisation Plan moving to the ER, on similar work, in 1956.  Then - after 3 years as Director of Studies at the Staff College at Woking he went into a series of BRB jobs - his background was as an economist.

 

The question of 'waste' on steam engine construction is an interesting one - effectively a British loco had roughly a c.7 year life before needing major works attention although various components had a much shorter life while others lasted a lot longer.  But I think you can reasonably say that within 10 -15 uyears the boiler would have been completely retubed at least once, the firebox stays would probably have had most renewed, another 5-10 years on and major firebox partial renewals would be needed while the wheels would be re-tyred and all the various bearings given major overhauls or have been renewed.  Thus at the end of 20 -25 years - which was probably the average book life - the original build cost would have been written down and by then various renewal costs, even without inflation, would be starting to catch it up.

 

Steam engines with a life of less than 20 -25 years (and there were many around the world that fell into that category as dieselisation gained pace) would not have reached their financial book life but would still have incurred, or started to incur. various renewal costs although some were mileage and condition dependent.  Thus the money spent building them could indeed be classified as 'wasted' or partially wasted, especially by an accountant, but certainly by most people who - correctly - regard the average life of mainline steam as being considerably longer than its book life.

 

So no doubt at all - some of the money spent on Post-War built steam was 'wasted' by several definitions of that term and in out & out practical terms.  But equally a lot of longer life costs for the same engines were avoided by withdrawing them from service before they began to incur those costs  (which of course helped to justify the far higher costs of building and operating diesels).  But all of that still leaves the practical situation face by Riddles and his team in 1948 - you have a crying need for new traction and you need it fairly soon.  You have a choice of continuing with existing company designs or producing new designs and you have outstanding orders which need to be delivered to replace life expired engines which are by now incurring very considerable repair costs and are in some cases inefficient to operate and maintain.  But above all you have to act quickly and deliver something which you know will work with minimum development and 'tuning' post build.

 

Solutions - well the immediate one is to allow previously placed orders to continue but rather (oddly considering other things which have been said) one late LNER order for 20 more pacifics was actually cancelled by the Railway Executive (perhaps to help justify the 'Britannias?).  Perhaps an interesting contrast with Bonavia's point about a diesel plan is that at the same time the LNER Board was authorising the building of new pacifics which were coming forward to increase the stock of such engines rather than as replacements and were presumably on the capital account.  Which in my mind raises a question about what might politely be termed as ' a difference of emphasis' within the LNER where Bonavia was in the General Manger's dept and not in the CME's and where any difference of proposals between the two would inevitably have to be resolved at Board level.  In some respects perhaps a similar situation to the one Gresley had faced when diesels had been suggested for the train acceleration ideas he solved with the A4s and the streamliners?

 

Elsewhere the steam, and diesel/gas turbine orders, were not cancelled and indeed building of various LMS designs was progressed at other works for delivery to other Regions pending completion of the design work on the new classes.

 

Overall I get a feeling that there was a lot more 'railway politics' involved than has ever been publicly to be the case and that a 'motive power engineers vs the others'  situation existed duly raising its head above the parapet from time to time.  What had begun on the LNER carried on between the RE and the BTC and I get the impression, rightly or wrongly, that unlike the other three companies the diesel etc trial proposals and designs were emanating from outside the CME organisations and as such were not advancing as quickly to Board approval.

[Clearwater]

With all this £££ for modernisation, were there any improvements in train services?

 

As example - WR services from Plymouth to Paddington for an arrival before mid afternoon.

 

Summer 1953:

Ply d 16.10 Padd a.21.00 (last day train of the previous day)

Ply d. 00.00 Padd a 07.25

Ply d. 01.00 Padd a.06.15 (incl Sleeping cars - vacate at Padd by 08.00)

Ply d. 07.15 Padd a.12.15

Ply d. 08.30 Padd a 13.30

 

Summer 1962

Ply d 16.30 Padd a. 21.13 (last day train of the previous day)

Ply d. 00.00 Padd a. 07.25 (incl Sleeping cars)

Ply d. 01.00 Padd a. 06.15 (incl. Sleeping cars accessible from 22.30, vacate at Padd by 07.30)

Ply d. 06.30 Padd a. 11.15

Ply d. 08.30 Padd a. 13.20

 

Apart from the first day train leaving an hour earlier, little other change (or acceleration) in nine years.

Do timetables give the full story? Eg if in summer 53, the timetable was rarely kept and there were frequent cancellations but in 63, reliability had improved, then the case may have been made

 

David

[jonny777]

One thing which always should be borne in mind when reading anything written by senior - particularly very senior - railway folk is that they will very often have an axe to grind or their particular point of view or company position to maintain.  I would for example be very surprised - especially at the time he wrote it - for Bonavia to say anything different.  His cv perhaps helps tell the story as in 1948 he went not to the RE but to the BTC and it is obvious there was a difference of views and emphasis between the two organisations -simply from reading this thread. He ver briefly went to the RE in 1953 - presumably just before its abolition as his job title back with the BTC in the same year was the same as his designation in the RE - hence he became very closely involved with The Modernisation Plan moving to the ER, on similar work, in 1956.  Then - after 3 years as Director of Studies at the Staff College at Woking he went into a series of BRB jobs - his background was as an economist.

 

The question of 'waste' on steam engine construction is an interesting one - effectively a British loco had roughly a c.7 year life before needing major works attention although various components had a much shorter life while others lasted a lot longer.  But I think you can reasonably say that within 10 -15 uyears the boiler would have been completely retubed at least once, the firebox stays would probably have had most renewed, another 5-10 years on and major firebox partial renewals would be needed while the wheels would be re-tyred and all the various bearings given major overhauls or have been renewed.  Thus at the end of 20 -25 years - which was probably the average book life - the original build cost would have been written down and by then various renewal costs, even without inflation, would be starting to catch it up.

 

Steam engines with a life of less than 20 -25 years (and there were many around the world that fell into that category as dieselisation gained pace) would not have reached their financial book life but would still have incurred, or started to incur. various renewal costs although some were mileage and condition dependent.  Thus the money spent building them could indeed be classified as 'wasted' or partially wasted, especially by an accountant, but certainly by most people who - correctly - regard the average life of mainline steam as being considerably longer than its book life.

 

So no doubt at all - some of the money spent on Post-War built steam was 'wasted' by several definitions of that term and in out & out practical terms.  But equally a lot of longer life costs for the same engines were avoided by withdrawing them from service before they began to incur those costs  (which of course helped to justify the far higher costs of building and operating diesels).  But all of that still leaves the practical situation face by Riddles and his team in 1948 - you have a crying need for new traction and you need it fairly soon.  You have a choice of continuing with existing company designs or producing new designs and you have outstanding orders which need to be delivered to replace life expired engines which are by now incurring very considerable repair costs and are in some cases inefficient to operate and maintain.  But above all you have to act quickly and deliver something which you know will work with minimum development and 'tuning' post build.

 

Solutions - well the immediate one is to allow previously placed orders to continue but rather (oddly considering other things which have been said) one late LNER order for 20 more pacifics was actually cancelled by the Railway Executive (perhaps to help justify the 'Britannias?).  Perhaps an interesting contrast with Bonavia's point about a diesel plan is that at the same time the LNER Board was authorising the building of new pacifics which were coming forward to increase the stock of such engines rather than as replacements and were presumably on the capital account.  Which in my mind raises a question about what might politely be termed as ' a difference of emphasis' within the LNER where Bonavia was in the General Manger's dept and not in the CME's and where any difference of proposals between the two would inevitably have to be resolved at Board level.  In some respects perhaps a similar situation to the one Gresley had faced when diesels had been suggested for the train acceleration ideas he solved with the A4s and the streamliners?

 

Elsewhere the steam, and diesel/gas turbine orders, were not cancelled and indeed building of various LMS designs was progressed at other works for delivery to other Regions pending completion of the design work on the new classes.

 

Overall I get a feeling that there was a lot more 'railway politics' involved than has ever been publicly to be the case and that a 'motive power engineers vs the others'  situation existed duly raising its head above the parapet from time to time.  What had begun on the LNER carried on between the RE and the BTC and I get the impression, rightly or wrongly, that unlike the other three companies the diesel etc trial proposals and designs were emanating from outside the CME organisations and as such were not advancing as quickly to Board approval.

 

 

I think you are right concerning the political influences and bias. The more I read on this subject, the more strange certain activities become.

 

It seems that the push to dieselise branch lines with multiple units came from the appointment of F A Pope to the BTC in 1951. He had been chair of the UTA and had implemented diesel railcars in N Ireland very successfully so it was only natural that he should try to get BR to follow.

 

However, certain senior officers in the Railway Executive (RE) seemed not to want this to happen. H A Short is mentioned, because initially he agreed and then changed his mind and tried to call a halt for the project in his area (West Riding).

 

The BTC had also received a submission from the RE for the new construction of push-pull steam units on BR branch lines rather than DMUs. This almost beggars belief, that the RE were so anti-diesel that they did not even want multiple units on rural branch lines.

 

As can be imagined F A Pope was not amused.

 

It may not have been coincidence that the RE was aboilshed just over a year later.

[34theletterbetweenB&D]

Were the Standards just a Riddles "vanity" project?

 

...Overall I get a feeling that there was a lot more 'railway politics' involved than has ever been publicly to be the case and that a 'motive power engineers vs the others'  situation existed duly raising its head above the parapet from time to time...

 Leaving out all the other content (!) the internal railway 'political' aspect figures large. You became a recognised steam CME in fact, rather than by title, by getting successful locomotives designed and built under your signature. Robert Riddles was a human being, and career indoctrinated in the ways of a steam operated railway. He was never going to do anything but produce his own designs if the opportunity was afforded him. That was of the essence of a CME's position and standing, so that is what he did.

 

It's fairly obvious with hindsight that the right thing to do was perpetuate very few of the best of the existing grouping steam designs, to enable scrapping of as much of the pre-group legacy as fast as possible, as this resulted in a more standardised UK steam fleet. Brutally and unromantically, all the UK needed to operate its railway was four steam classes of capacity 8P, 8F, 5MT, and 4MT, the last a tank; for all of which selecting the four best existing designs was possible. Smaller power class steam locos not required, replace as fast as possible by what became class 08. (That's right, Panniers, small Prairies, Jinties, Mickey Mice, Radials and all the rest to the scrapper as fast as possible, all replaced either by 4MT tank or by something based on the platform that became class 08: that would have spurred on low power diesel development, where relatively quick progress was possible.)

[jonny777]

I think as far as railways were concerned the set-up was counter productive. The various transport executives were responsible to the BTC, but the Railway Executive behaved as if it was in overall control which angered the BTC members who should have had overall control, but were treated by the RE as just a 'rubber stamp' for their proposals.

 

When the BTC tried to exert pressure the RE just ignored them. I read that the Hurcomb letter, which I pasted some pages back, was delivered to the RE but went unanswered for 7 months.

 

I don't know if the other executive bodies reacted in the same way, but I did read that when the government set up the CEGB, they discovered that this newly appointed board realised just how much power (no pun intended) it could wield over the country and went off on its own course, ignoring government directives, but by then it was too late to reign them back in again.