German Train Crash

[russ p]

But in this case there is no mention of a fault? Simply that one train was running late.

 

The BBC link suggests that the signaller may be prosecuted and could face jail. I would think whoever designed a "safety" system which allows one man acting alone to over-ride it simply because a train is a few minutes late, should be in the dock with him.

 

Martin.

It's the same here, a signalman can authorise a train to pass a signal at danger

[meil]

It's the same here, a signalman can authorise a train to pass a signal at danger

Yes but no driver in his right mind would enter a section without a token and a bloody good explanation of why.

[Southernman46]

Whatever the why's & wherefore's - poor sod, fancy having that on his conscience now

[russ p]

Yes but no driver in his right mind would enter a section without a token and a bloody good explanation of why.

You can only enter a token section without the token if going to assist a failure. If its track circuit block there is no token and a train occupying a track circuit can look the same as a track circuit failure

[PaulRhB]

Simply passing a signal at danger and doing it onto a single line is quite different.

You must tell the driver the reason too which means they should then challenge if the procedure they expect isn't followed. As with all accidents though it's rarely one thing and in this case it remains to be seen what authority they gave the driver, again we would need to know the specifics for that type of signalling and it won't surprise me to find there's another factor in there somewhere. Technically in a UK scenario the driver should have been aware some info was missing and the German signalling stuff I've been studying suggests their system is pretty much as safe as ours with very similar interlock indications etc. As with the vast majority of accidents you bring together physical failures and people not on top form for whatever reason and it goes tragically wrong. I'm glad to see he tried to stop it and immediately admitted the error, as with the train wreck in the U.S. there is someone who probably can't understand why they made that error and earns the respect of the investigators.

[Dunsignalling]

It's the same here, a signalman can authorise a train to pass a signal at danger

The only circumstance under which I was ever permitted to do so into a single line section without instituting Modified Block Working or Working by Pilotman was when sending in an assisting engine to remove a failed train. Even then there were a number of conditions I had to verify before acting.

 

I had to know exactly where the train was, obtain the driver's assurance that he would not move it, obtain assurance that detonators were in place and that the driver would meet the assisting engine at the protection to conduct it onto the disabled train.

 

I only ever had to do it once, and instructing a driver to pass that signal without any of the alternative modes of working in place, was not a comfortable experience. 

 

On recounting this to an old hand a few days later, he said it should always feel like that and, if it ever stopped doing so, it was time to pack the job in.

 

John

[russ p]

One train can pass through the section before pilotman working is introduced. But single lead junctions and bi directional lines don't require this.

There are plenty of things a signalman has to verify before authorising a driver to pass a signal but if he has these wrong but it sounds OK to the driver is where things go badly wrong

[PaulRhB]

One train can pass through the section before pilotman working is introduced.

Just to clarify that's only true of certain TCB single lines under specific circumstances not token lines, you have to have MBW or Pilotman.

[russ p]

Thats correct

[PaulRhB]

I only ever had to do it once, and instructing a driver to pass that signal without any of the alternative modes of working in place, was not a comfortable experience.

 

On recounting this to an old hand a few days later, he said it should always feel like that and, if it ever stopped doing so, it was time to pack the job in.

 

John

I agree completely with the feeling bit though, check and triple check, I'm still checking as it goes in.

[russ p]

I agree completely with the feeling bit though, check and triple check, I'm still checking as it goes in.

Thats the nature if railway work when done correctly by a professional

[Gilloverland]

Speaking as a current UK signaller, I'll bet my next rest day worked that what has happened is something like this:

 

1. Signaller is busy / tired / just come back from break / something on his mind *delete as appropriate.

 

2. Signaller sees the late runner stood for 'no immediatly obvious reason' and tries to set route.

 

3. Route fails to prove (of course it would, theres a train already in there).

 

4. Signaller makes rushed assumption that the reason the signal wont clear is a technical failure (perhaps last week it was?).

 

5. Signaller uses the 3 lights calling on type failure signal (whatever its called) to get the train moving without 'pestering his supervisor'.

 

6. Train departs under authority of above signal, driver doesn't question it because hes either not required to or has 'done this a million times'.

 

The rest is history...

[Oldddudders]

Timetables are only a guide when things go haywire Jeff   If the infrastructure allows it, moving the crossing of trains to the next station (or somewhere else) is a common occurrence. Happens everywhere

Not so. In the USA, where Jeff resides, the traditional signalling system on single lines, of which there are and were many, many thousands of miles, is Timetable & Train Orders. The WTT is then a key component of the safety system. If you are booked to pass a train at station A, then you sit there until the darned train passes you, unless you receive a written 'order' to proceed. What makes sense in busy Europe is not necessarily the case elsewhere on the planet.

[martin_wynne]

4. Signaller makes rushed assumption that the reason the signal wont clear is a technical failure (perhaps last week it was?).

 

5. Signaller uses the 3 lights calling on type failure signal (whatever its called) to get the train moving without 'pestering his supervisor'.

 

But how can the system allow those lights to clear if there is a train in the section and it's not faulty? Surely a system failure causes a big red lamp to flash somewhere? Assuming a system failure just because a signal won't clear is crazy, in the absence of any other failure indication, and when the obvious assumption would be that the interlocking is doing its job.

 

And does it fail so often that a specific signal is provided for the purpose?

 

I'm sure there must be some factor here that we don't know about.

[roythebus]

Speaking as a current UK signaller, I'll bet my next rest day worked that what has happened is something like this:

 

1. Signaller is busy / tired / just come back from break / something on his mind *delete as appropriate.

 

2. Signaller sees the late runner stood for 'no immediatly obvious reason' and tries to set route.

 

3. Route fails to prove (of course it would, theres a train already in there).

 

4. Signaller makes rushed assumption that the reason the signal wont clear is a technical failure (perhaps last week it was?).

 

5. Signaller uses the 3 lights calling on type failure signal (whatever its called) to get the train moving without 'pestering his supervisor'.

 

6. Train departs under authority of above signal, driver doesn't question it because hes either not required to or has 'done this a million times'.

 

The rest is history...

Had you read the posts by Felix he did actually explain that the signalman had to consult with his boss, and only then could the movement be authorised.

[Gilloverland]

Had you read the posts by Felix he did actually explain that the signalman had to consult with his boss, and only then could the movement be authorised.

 

I'm only guessing of course, and I'm sure the German signaller should have consulted with his boss, but should is the key word here.

[The Stationmaster]

I agree completely with the feeling bit though, check and triple check, I'm still checking as it goes in.

That always used to be my thing with Modified Pilot Working on the Salisbury - Exeter line - whenever I had a call asking for authority to issue a Ticket i would check very carefully with both Signlaman (as as I was required to do of course) exactly what the previous train through the section had been and when it had passed clear of the section.  Back in the 1970s there were only three of us who had authority to institute Modified Pilot Working and the original Order from HMRI authorising it was an interesting read - hence on one occasion, when I was at my parents home in Oxfordshire and not On Call (and this a long way from Yeovil, the 'box in question,, so obviously not able to make my way there) I refused point blank to authorise a Ticket telling the Yeovil Jcn Signalman that the only person authorised was the man On Call and even if i did authorise one there was non way I could get to Yeovil Jcn ready to institute working By Pilotman if the fault didn't self-rectify or the S&T couldn't fix it  (incidentally our Area Manager - who they tried next - wouldn't authorise a Ticket either as he had no authority to do so).

 

We are talking about the safe working of single lines when the proper signalling system is defective and the last thing you can do is not take great care and you must apply the emergency procedures correctly - that is why they are written the way they are.

[martin_wynne]

We are talking about the safe working of single lines when the proper signalling system is defective

 

But in this case there has been no suggestion that the signalling system was defective?

 

Martin.

[PaulRhB]

It appears in reality it was not failed but it also appears the Signalman thought it was hence using part of the failure procedure but according to the media not all of it.

[Pacific231G]

It alway worries me when "human error" is given as the cause of any accident. The one certainty is that humans make errors, often when they're dealing with unusual situations when other ducks are likely to be lining up and sometimes seemingly inexplicable (as at Quintishill). Much if not most of the progress in transport safety has come from not simply accepting someone's mistake as the cause but looking deeper and developing systems and procedures that make it very much harder for such an error to cause an accident.

[phil-b259]

But in this case there has been no suggestion that the signalling system was defective?

 

Martin.

Precisely - and from that it follows that a human being must have by-passed the signalling system in some manor to get both trains on a collision course.

 

Hence all the discussion about what procedures the German signaller did or didn't follow when the signaller believed the system to have failed, because had those procedures been correctly followed (and were fit for purpose) the signaller would have realised that the signalling system was most definitely working to protect a head on collision in the first place!

[Titan]

Precisely - and from that it follows that a human being must have by-passed the signalling system in some manor to get both trains on a collision course.

 

And where are you going to get a 78XX to pass it with - I thought both trains were electric?

[John_Hughes]

This horribly reminds me of Poupart's Junction in 1933, when Signalman Childs, unfamiliar with the box and wrongly believing that he had an error in the Sykes electro-mechanical locking, and after a series of other errors, cut the seal which enabled him to get into the equipment case - and broke no regulations while doing so.

 

Exactly what else happened after that was, I think, never completely settled though the Official Enquiry offered a very likely explanation, but the result was a crash which killed ten people.

[TonyA]

It is sad to note that there was an earlier crash only 800m from the present one. This was on 28th May 1945 when a train carrying German soldiers to Bad Aibling collided with an empty stock train going towards Kolbermoor. In this case, the telephone and telegraph link had been out of action for more than eight days.

 

Details (in German) are here.

 

https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eisenbahnunfall_von_Bad_Aibling_(1945)

 

I assume the German soldiers were heading for the large PoW camp at Bad Aibling airfield.

 

Tony

[dullsteamer]

Whatever the why's & wherefore's - poor sod, fancy having that on his conscience now

My thoughts exactly. I bet there isn't a railwayman posting on this thread who hasn't made a mistake or done something stupid at some stage of their career that could have had serious consequences. I know I have.

 

Mark.