RMweb Premium PhilJ W Posted February 9, 2016 RMweb Premium Share Posted February 9, 2016 According to one of the passengers the train he normally was on usually waited at the passing loop/station about five minutes for the other train to pass but this morning it only waited about two or three minutes before proceeding and before the other train had passed. I am not going to speculate as to the reason for this or how the train went through the points that should have been set against it. Link to post Share on other sites More sharing options...
LMS2968 Posted February 9, 2016 Share Posted February 9, 2016 Yes Bob. I didn't listen to JV (in fact, I always turn him off) as I knew what would happen: a bunch of idiots who know nothing about the subject - whatever it might be - are given the opportunity to display their ignorance and stupidity to the nation. Link to post Share on other sites More sharing options...
RMweb Gold martin_wynne Posted February 9, 2016 RMweb Gold Share Posted February 9, 2016 Found myself getting seriously annoyed with the coverage and the ensuing debate on the Jeremy Vine show on Radio 2 today. Don't expect to take seriously anything on a programme which calls itself a "show". Link to post Share on other sites More sharing options...
RMweb Premium phil-b259 Posted February 9, 2016 Author RMweb Premium Share Posted February 9, 2016 Could not. I saw this question coming. All Stellwerke on single track lines do work to the principle of Erlaubniswechsel. Only one of the two stations of a single line can have the Erlaubnis which translate as allowance/permitment to send trains to the other. Giving of the Erlaubnis first locks all Exit Signals on the transmitting station, then unlocks the Exit Signals of the other station. This was done from the earliest days of Signalling. It all sounds pretty much identical to the key token system (but minus the physical token) used on many single lines over here, which also requires a positive action to release it and is interlocked with the signals protecting the single line. Link to post Share on other sites More sharing options...
RMweb Gold NHY 581 Posted February 9, 2016 RMweb Gold Share Posted February 9, 2016 Don't expect to take seriously anything on a programme which calls itself a "show".Quite.....for example 'The Muppet Show'......the case for the prosecution rests M'lud... A tragic event is one thing. Poor reporting of the facts when said facts are not fully known or understood, then subsequently attempting to turn it into ratings is deplorable. Rob Link to post Share on other sites More sharing options...
Glorious NSE Posted February 9, 2016 Share Posted February 9, 2016 Could not. I saw this question coming. Felix, with respect, what you describe is what is supposed to happen when the signal system works normally, it does not prove that a wrong-side failure (IE a fault within the signalling system causing a false aspect) could never have taken place. Such things are very rare, but many accidents through history have the feature. If you were to say that one or other of the trains passing a red was more likely than it being a wrong side failure, i'd agree, but it's all speculation till more is said officially. Link to post Share on other sites More sharing options...
RMweb Premium jjb1970 Posted February 9, 2016 RMweb Premium Share Posted February 9, 2016 A very tragic incident, my heart goes out to the victims and those who have lost loved ones. We do not know what happened and will have to await the outcome of the investigation and then hope that steps are taken to prevent a recurrence. Whilst I have no idea what caused this incident I think Glorious NSE makes a valid point in that safety systems are designed to prevent dangerous occurrences but that "should not" is more appropriate than "could not" for the simple reason that all systems are susceptible to failures and maloperation. If all safety systems worked as designed and intended and all staff behaved in accordance with safe systems of work and all procedures were fit for purpose and all management cultures were good etc etc then we wouldn't have incidents but unfortunately we do not live in a perfect world and bad things still happen despite the best efforts of many clever and dedicated people. Link to post Share on other sites More sharing options...
Mike Storey Posted February 9, 2016 Share Posted February 9, 2016 Felix, with respect, what you describe is what is supposed to happen when the signal system works normally, it does not prove that a wrong-side failure (IE a fault within the signalling system causing a false aspect) could never have taken place. Such things are very rare, but many accidents through history have the feature. If you were to say that one or other of the trains passing a red was more likely than it being a wrong side failure, i'd agree, but it's all speculation till more is said officially. Absolutely. A key part of the investigation will centre on whether a set of points has been run through. If it has, then wrong side failure is unlikely (but still possible). One interesting comment from the press conference was that they are focussing on why the automatic brake operation did not apparently function. This suggests the signalling worked correctly but the on-board system did not. But maybe they are speculating too? It is very odd that a passenger stated that one train normally sits at a passing loop for up to 5 mins and does not normally move off until the opposite train has entered the loop. But this time, the train moved off after c.3 mins without waiting for the other train. Why? Who knows, yet. Link to post Share on other sites More sharing options...
RMweb Gold martin_wynne Posted February 9, 2016 RMweb Gold Share Posted February 9, 2016 unfortunately we do not live in a perfect world and bad things still happen despite the best efforts of many clever and dedicated people. We also live in a world where some people intend bad things to happen. Nothing can yet be ruled out. Link to post Share on other sites More sharing options...
Horsetan Posted February 9, 2016 Share Posted February 9, 2016 ....In particular Jeremy Vine himself. Utter buffoon. . Could be worse. Could have been Jeremy Kyle. Link to post Share on other sites More sharing options...
meil Posted February 9, 2016 Share Posted February 9, 2016 I suppose one puzzling aspect is, assuming experienced drivers, even if a wrong side failure did occur wouldn't the driver who usually waits for the passing train not query signal before moving? Link to post Share on other sites More sharing options...
dullsteamer Posted February 9, 2016 Share Posted February 9, 2016 P I reckon that exact question will be key to the investigation Sadly, neither driver can now tell us what they've seen/heard/acted upon any more Agreed. It's an awful business for all concerned. According to one news report I read; "A spokesman for the train operator, TransDev, a French company, confirmed that a driving instructor together with an apprentice train driver had been travelling in the traction unit of one of the trains." I don't know whether this means one of the trains was being driven by a trainee under instruction, or they were doing road knowledge/traction qualification. I don't know anything about how driver training is conducted on German railways, but either way I think it's a significant bit of information. Cheers, Mark. Link to post Share on other sites More sharing options...
Talltim Posted February 9, 2016 Share Posted February 9, 2016 A cab view video of the line (not the crash). The accident spot is at about 28:00 minutes in. At about 25:00 mins the train passes Bad Aibling and the signal that one of the trains will have passed can be seen. (note, I have no idea whether it should have passed the signal)https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y04O09B8vy0This is the journey from the other direction. Kolbermoor station is at about 3:30, the signal onto the single line is a fair distance from where the train stops at the platform. The crash site is about 6:30https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5vazpLHPB-wThe trains were due to pass each other at Kolbermoor, the one going in the direction of the first video was running about 4 mins late and normally the other has to wait for it. Link to post Share on other sites More sharing options...
roythebus Posted February 9, 2016 Share Posted February 9, 2016 Back in the 1980s the DB didn't have a system of route knowledge we have in the UK. DB drivers have a route book in the cab for the route they are driving. a typical loco would have a veritable library of route books in the cupboard in the cab. the driver would have the appropriate route book open on the desk in front of him as he drove along. Hence the km markings on OHLE and other markers which we don't usually have in the UK. Maybe this accident as a case of WCR-itis? something isolated that should not have been? Best not speculate though. Link to post Share on other sites More sharing options...
FelixM Posted February 9, 2016 Share Posted February 9, 2016 Felix, with respect, what you describe is what is supposed to happen when the signal system works normally, it does not prove that a wrong-side failure (IE a fault within the signalling system causing a false aspect) could never have taken place. Such things are very rare, but many accidents through history have the feature. If you were to say that one or other of the trains passing a red was more likely than it being a wrong side failure, i'd agree, but it's all speculation till more is said officially. I am not sure how "safety" is defined in the UK but it certainly is not done with percentages and the like in Germany. You either have full safety, then the system is fit for work, or you do not have full safety, then it must not be used. New safety systems that seek permission must apply to the rule "same safety level as current systems", this is enforced by the Eisenbahn-Bundesamt (EBA, federal railway office). Each generation of safety systems, may it be block systems or interlocking/signalbox types, are fail-safe, otherwise they would not be considered "safe" itself. I previously described how in regular working train collisions are prevented. Fail-safe means, that when there is a failure of the technical systems, then a fallback level of guaranteed safety is reached. This is valid for each component, parting signal and point wires in mechanical interlocking, charred contacts in relay interlocking and so on. In doubt, nothing will work anymore. Fail-safe extends on working instructions. In case of a blackout noone is required to hurry with a red flag on the line and the like. If a signal does not become green though the signaller requests it, then probably the technics are right and the signaller wrong. A signal displaying nothing at all shall always be considered as displaying the most restrictive aspect that is possible for the signal (you can distinct stop and distant signals by their mast board). My statement of "could not" does include working technical systems, technical failures as well as the rules which have to be obeyed. This way it is possible to warrant the German signalling system an Absolute Safety. I guess it might sound strange to British ears to have absolute safety in railway signalling but this is what Eisenbahn-Bau- und -Betriebsordnung (EBO), Deutsche Bahn Richtlinien, the universities and all the signalling authors say. I have talked to a few colleagues earlier today and noone of them could highlight any aspect of the interlockings in use on the particular line in Germany that would leave room for such as disaster. Disobeying rules is explicitly not part of my statement. There are ways to override the systems, and these are protected from misuse as far as practical. It however is not possible to address every issue in regular working, there are too many of them. As I have written earlier in such a case the signaller acts on his own responsibility. The technics won't stop him in such a case, but there are well defined rules what has to be checked first before doing such a thing. Therefore I am staying with that the German Interlocking is a safe system which always prevents trains from colliding. This statement comprises regular working, technical failures and rules for behaviour of railway staff. It does not extent onto misbehaviour which is a common German perspective of view. When taking human errors into account then your view of that there is a certain probability of things going wrong is true and I agree with you. I hope you will agree with me too. Link to post Share on other sites More sharing options...
roythebus Posted February 9, 2016 Share Posted February 9, 2016 Having just read the Wiki report on the Horsdorf accident, the driver faced criminal charges. He was give one year's probation but DB was held to bear greater responsibility. A different outcome to the UK where the driver in the Hitchin incident was jailed if I remember correctly. Link to post Share on other sites More sharing options...
roythebus Posted February 9, 2016 Share Posted February 9, 2016 I am not sure how "safety" is defined in the UK but it certainly is not done with percentages and the like in Germany. You either have full safety, then the system is fit for work, or you do not have full safety, then it must not be used. New safety systems that seek permission must apply to the rule "same safety level as current systems", this is enforced by the Eisenbahn-Bundesamt (EBA, federal railway office). Each generation of safety systems, may it be block systems or interlocking/signalbox types, are fail-safe, otherwise they would not be considered "safe" itself. I previously described how in regular working train collisions are prevented. Fail-safe means, that when there is a failure of the technical systems, then a fallback level of guaranteed safety is reached. This is valid for each component, parting signal and point wires in mechanical interlocking, charred contacts in relay interlocking and so on. In doubt, nothing will work anymore. Fail-safe extends on working instructions. In case of a blackout noone is required to hurry with a red flag on the line and the like. If a signal does not become green though the signaller requests it, then probably the technics are right and the signaller wrong. A signal displaying nothing at all shall always be considered as displaying the most restrictive aspect that is possible for the signal (you can distinct stop and distant signals by their mast board). My statement of "could not" does include working technical systems, technical failures as well as the rules which have to be obeyed. This way it is possible to warrant the German signalling system an Absolute Safety. I guess it might sound strange to British ears to have absolute safety in railway signalling but this is what Eisenbahn-Bau- und -Betriebsordnung (EBO), Deutsche Bahn Richtlinien, the universities and all the signalling authors say. I have talked to a few colleagues earlier today and noone of them could highlight any aspect of the interlockings in use on the particular line in Germany that would leave room for such as disaster. Disobeying rules is explicitly not part of my statement. There are ways to override the systems, and these are protected from misuse as far as practical. It however is not possible to address every issue in regular working, there are too many of them. As I have written earlier in such a case the signaller acts on his own responsibility. The technics won't stop him in such a case, but there are well defined rules what has to be checked first before doing such a thing. Therefore I am staying with that the German Interlocking is a safe system which always prevents trains from colliding. This statement comprises regular working, technical failures and rules for behaviour of railway staff. It does not extent onto misbehaviour which is a common German perspective of view. When taking human errors into account then your view of that there is a certain probability of things going wrong is true and I agree with you. I hope you will agree with me too. The UK system is also absolutely safe until as you rightly say the human factor becomes involved. The tragic crash at Clapham Junction in 1988 is witness to that where a whisker of wire in a relay rack touched an adjacent connection ad you had a wrong side failure, a green instead of a red. On BR there is a set procedure to follow when a signal fails, used to be Rule 55 in the "old" rule book. 8 ways to pass a signal at danger, now amended to 9 ways to pass a signal at danger. I'm not up to date with the latest BR rule book, maybe someone with current rules knowledge can comment on that. There was of course always the 9th and 10th way to pass a signal at danger! Link to post Share on other sites More sharing options...
RMweb Premium PhilJ W Posted February 10, 2016 RMweb Premium Share Posted February 10, 2016 A cab view video of the line (not the crash). The accident spot is at about 28:00 minutes in. At about 25:00 mins the train passes Bad Aibling and the signal that one of the trains will have passed can be seen. (note, I have no idea whether it should have passed the signal) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y04O09B8vy0 This is the journey from the other direction. Kolbermoor station is at about 3:30, the signal onto the single line is a fair distance from where the train stops at the platform. The crash site is about 6:30 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5vazpLHPB The trains were due to pass each other at Kolbermoor, the one going in the direction of the first video was running about 4 mins late and normally the other has to wait for it. The second film is 'not available'? Link to post Share on other sites More sharing options...
brigo Posted February 10, 2016 Share Posted February 10, 2016 The second film is 'not available'? Should be Brian Link to post Share on other sites More sharing options...
Talltim Posted February 10, 2016 Share Posted February 10, 2016 Edited my post to correct the link and it seems have worked, but embedded the first video too, I tried for ages to get them to embed when I first posted... Link to post Share on other sites More sharing options...
FelixM Posted February 10, 2016 Share Posted February 10, 2016 I suppose one puzzling aspect is, assuming experienced drivers, even if a wrong side failure did occur wouldn't the driver who usually waits for the passing train not query signal before moving? A timetable in Germany does only say a train where it should be at which time. It has no safety features. A green signal does mean to a train driver that he has the right to continue. A signal only displays green when the interlocking has checked all requirements and found them okay. If the requirement check was not successful, the signal stays at red. Even manual overriding can at best cause a flashing white light at a signal, called the Ersatzsignal Zs 1. This means to the driver that he can behave as if the signal shows green, but the requirements for a train movement are not met by the technics. However with Zs 1 the train driver is required to rely on the signaller and continue as normal. Crash course in requirements for a train movement which are checked by an interlocking: 1) The block section must be unoccupied. 2) The overlap after the signal at the end of the block section must be unoccupied. 3) Folgefahrschutz: Behind the preceding train going in the same direction at least one signal must have returned to danger and be locked in the danger position to prevent rear-end collision. 4) Gegenfahrschutz: The signals of the same line in the opposite direction, if present, must be at danger and locked in the danger position to prevent head-end collisions. On double track lines without signals at the wrong line the Gegenfahrschutz concept is done by the prohibit of sending trains on the wrong line. Hence the train driver is not to blame when continuing after getting a green signal or an Ersatzsignal Zs 1 (which both have not yet been confirmed in this accident! But somehow the train must have got a signal to start). Back in the 1980s the DB didn't have a system of route knowledge we have in the UK. DB drivers have a route book in the cab for the route they are driving. a typical loco would have a veritable library of route books in the cupboard in the cab. the driver would have the appropriate route book open on the desk in front of him as he drove along. Hence the km markings on OHLE and other markers which we don't usually have in the UK. Maybe this accident as a case of WCR-itis? something isolated that should not have been? Best not speculate though. The German safety philosophy transfers the route knowledge away from the driver onto the signaller. Signals always have distants in fixed spaces, usually 1000 m. The line knowledge as it would translate is written down into these books you describe which are called Buchfahrplan. They describe the permitted line speed and the signal positions. This means in comparison with British practice German train drivers know exactly where they are required to stop and always can use a "standard braking curve" because the signals are always the same distance apart. DB is soon but unfortunately not yet free of any track circuits. They are expensive to maintain, but always fail-safe. This is done by continuously applying DC to a relay which is on the other end of the circuited track. An axle on the track will cause the relay to de-energise, but an undesired contact to something connected with earth or an isolation in the track will always de-energise it as well. This means if in doubt a track is always declared occupied when there is a problem with the technical equipment. There are AC track circuits in operation as well, they work without any isolation within the rail itself, but these as well can detect faults due to a change in frequency when something gives contact that shouldn't or is broken. Problems with track circuits usually leads to tracks being declared rather occupied than clear, so a common method of dealing with it is to check whether anything else is alright and then send the train on sight which means low speed and the ability to stop short of any obstruction. This has obviously not happened here as far as we know now, but let's see what the investigation will bring. Link to post Share on other sites More sharing options...
RMweb Premium PhilJ W Posted February 10, 2016 RMweb Premium Share Posted February 10, 2016 Should be Brian Edited my post to correct the link and it seems have worked, but embedded the first video too, I tried for ages to get them to embed when I first posted... I was able to view it by clicking on the '3.30' which was highlighted. Link to post Share on other sites More sharing options...
Mike Storey Posted February 10, 2016 Share Posted February 10, 2016 I am not sure how "safety" is defined in the UK but it certainly is not done with percentages and the like in Germany. You either have full safety, then the system is fit for work, or you do not have full safety, then it must not be used. New safety systems that seek permission must apply to the rule "same safety level as current systems", this is enforced by the Eisenbahn-Bundesamt (EBA, federal railway office). Each generation of safety systems, may it be block systems or interlocking/signalbox types, are fail-safe, otherwise they would not be considered "safe" itself. I previously described how in regular working train collisions are prevented. Fail-safe means, that when there is a failure of the technical systems, then a fallback level of guaranteed safety is reached. This is valid for each component, parting signal and point wires in mechanical interlocking, charred contacts in relay interlocking and so on. In doubt, nothing will work anymore. Fail-safe extends on working instructions. In case of a blackout noone is required to hurry with a red flag on the line and the like. If a signal does not become green though the signaller requests it, then probably the technics are right and the signaller wrong. A signal displaying nothing at all shall always be considered as displaying the most restrictive aspect that is possible for the signal (you can distinct stop and distant signals by their mast board). My statement of "could not" does include working technical systems, technical failures as well as the rules which have to be obeyed. This way it is possible to warrant the German signalling system an Absolute Safety. I guess it might sound strange to British ears to have absolute safety in railway signalling but this is what Eisenbahn-Bau- und -Betriebsordnung (EBO), Deutsche Bahn Richtlinien, the universities and all the signalling authors say. I have talked to a few colleagues earlier today and noone of them could highlight any aspect of the interlockings in use on the particular line in Germany that would leave room for such as disaster. Disobeying rules is explicitly not part of my statement. There are ways to override the systems, and these are protected from misuse as far as practical. It however is not possible to address every issue in regular working, there are too many of them. As I have written earlier in such a case the signaller acts on his own responsibility. The technics won't stop him in such a case, but there are well defined rules what has to be checked first before doing such a thing. Therefore I am staying with that the German Interlocking is a safe system which always prevents trains from colliding. This statement comprises regular working, technical failures and rules for behaviour of railway staff. It does not extent onto misbehaviour which is a common German perspective of view. When taking human errors into account then your view of that there is a certain probability of things going wrong is true and I agree with you. I hope you will agree with me too. Whomsoever told you that is talking bo11ocks, misleading you. There is no such thing as absolute safety, and all calculations made on the possibility of wrong-side failures are percentage based, and any safety professional should explain to you why that is. Each generation of new signalling, has been introduced as being absolutely safe. Each successive train crash tells us that is not so. Safety systems are greater than just the signalling electronics logic employed. You are correct in assuming that human error or deliberate actions have been the cause in many cases, but by no means all. Relative safety with successive systems has improved, but absolutism is both arrogant and presumptuous. If this is a national pride thing, and thus defensive in its argument, I can understand the concern, but I don't think anyone on here is stupid enough to believe that the safety system of any one country is better than that of any other. My sympathies to your country and its people for this tragic event. We will await the outcome of the investigation so that all nations can learn for their own situations. Link to post Share on other sites More sharing options...
Glorious NSE Posted February 10, 2016 Share Posted February 10, 2016 Felix, to be clear - I am not suggesting the interlocking was not a fail safe design.I am saying that things can sometimes occur which are not part of that design.For example, the whisker of wire at Clapham giving a false clear as Roy says above.Another example, back in 2011 there was a collision between an ICE and a freight train at an interlocking in Holland, that was caused by a cable theft which allowed a track circuit on pointwork to falsely show as unoccupied, allowing the signaller to set a conflicting route.In both situations the signalling was designed to be fail safe in it's normal operation, but in the first, there was an accidental wiring fault which bypassed that, and in the second, a similar fault was effectively created deliberately by a criminal act.Again - all the kind of thing that is very rare, but so are head on collisions on lines with good signalling, so until we know what is was... Link to post Share on other sites More sharing options...
RMweb Gold martin_wynne Posted February 10, 2016 RMweb Gold Share Posted February 10, 2016 Maybe this accident as a case of WCR-itis? something isolated that should not have been? Best not speculate though. ??? Why speculate if it's best not to? Link to post Share on other sites More sharing options...
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