Why did GWR have drivers on the right, when signals were on the left?

[Morello Cherry]

15 hours ago, Wickham Green too said:

I think you're working on the position of the regulator which is normally pivoted in the centre of the backhead ......... the real dexterity when driving is more concerned with the reverser and brake. [ Of course the word 'dexterity' stems for the Latin for 'right' ! ]

 

My father was naturally left handed, too, and he had to write right-handed at school in the '20s/'30s ... a habit he never lost.

 

As someone who is left handed but who throws and bats right handed I find RHD easier than LHD.  On a LHD it is easier for me to operate the brake, blower etc with my right hand and on RHD I find it easier to do it with my left. I'm not going across myself.

 

To check that I wasn't going crazy, I watched one of the Watercress line videos on youtube and the driver on the Ivatt tank which is LHD did everything right handed, if he had been left handed he'd have had to have twisted.

 

That said, it may well be that 100 years of LHD locomotives the layout progressed to suit right handed drivers and that if you were to drive an LHD from the 1850s it would not be so conducive to a right hander.

 

I just find it strange that ease of firing is given as a reason when what is easiest for the fireman would surely be among the lowest considerations when deciding LHD or RHD

Edited June 6, 2022 by Morello Cherry

[The Johnster]

2 hours ago, JimC said:

 

Isn't signal siting on the modern railway going to be very different? And presumably the larger crews on modern mainline steam makes a difference too.

 

Signal siting on the modern railway is done to facilitate clear viewing from modern diesel and electric locomotive and multiple unit cabs; I very much doubt that the problems of sightin them from steam locomotives are considered at all.  Instead, steam locomotive crews are trained to observe the signals irrespective of how difficult that might be from a particular type of locomotive, and irresepective of smoke and steam obscuring the view; AFAIK steam locomotives running on main line railways have video showing signal aspects, and the road ahead in general, from ahead of the chimney. 

 

The number of men on the footplate may be counterproductive in regard to sighting and calling signals for the driver.  It shouldn't be, they are all professionals who know their jobs and keep out of each others' way, but conversation (when it's quiet enough) and interaction between them may distract them at a vital moment*.  I recall watching the 'Top Gear' episode on which The Idiot Clarkson rode on Tornado's footplate from KX to Edinburgh.  There were 4 men including The Idiot on the footplate, and when the loco began to slip at 75mph 3 of them dived simultaneously for the regulator, while the The Idiot was wondering what was going on!  (To The Idiot's credit, having been handed a shovel at KX before the off in case he was expecting a jolly, he stayed in the cab for the entire journey, the crew and inspector being relieved en route, and was a coal dust encrusted mess of physical exhaustion on arrival at Waverley.  Not sure I could have escaped wobbly legs after a run like that either in all  fairness.  He did better than The Hamster, on a Vincent Black Shadow, who called it a day before Newcastle IIRC.  Captain Slow won in an MG TC drophead, but only because Tornado was delayed by a slow running local on the run in to Waverley).

 

 

*That said, there were only 2 of them on the footplate when City of Wells came close to sideswiping a down South Wales HST at Royal Wootton Bassett a while ago.  There are all sorts of things that distract engine drivers, and firemen, and this will be a problem for as long as we permit human beings to drive trains.  An ideal situation is where there is a man and a dog in the cab, the man being there to feed the dog and the dog being there to bite the man if he tries to play with any of the controls...

 

17 minutes ago, Morello Cherry said:

To check that I wasn't going crazy, I watched one of the Watercress line videos on youtube and the driver on the Ivatt tank which is LHD did everything right handed, if he had been left handed he'd have had to have twisted.

 

Apropos tank engines, a lhd driving position on one is a rhd position when the loco is running bunker first, which is usually for about 50% of it's diagram.  Just saying...

[Wickham Green too]

10 minutes ago, The Johnster said:

... Apropos tank engines, a lhd driving position on one is a rhd position when the loco is running bunker first, which is usually for about 50% of it's diagram.  Just saying...

No - lhd & rhd stay the same ..... you just have to have your head on back to front.

[Michael Hodgson]

8 hours ago, Wickham Green too said:

 [ Of course the word 'dexterity' stems for the Latin for 'right' ! ]

 

My father was naturally left handed, too, and he had to write right-handed at school in the '20s/'30s ... a habit he never lost.

 

and of course the Latin for southpaws like your dad was sinister !

[Hal Nail]

8 hours ago, The Johnster said:

Apropos tank engines, a lhd driving position on one is a rhd position when the loco is running bunker first, which is usually for about 50% of it's diagram.

Except, of course, those tank engines when the driver wasnt even on the loco for 50% of the diagram...!

[F-UnitMad]

13 hours ago, The Johnster said:

I recall watching the 'Top Gear' episode on which The Idiot Clarkson rode on Tornado's footplate from KX to Edinburgh. 

..... Captain Slow won in an MG TC drophead, but only because Tornado was delayed by a slow running local on the run in to Waverley).

Captain Slow also won because he used the modern road network, instead of the 1930s network. Single-carraigeway A1 going through the middle of every town centre along the way? It should've taken him days.... 🙄🙄😁

[Wickham Green too]

7 hours ago, Michael Hodgson said:

....... your dad was sinister !

I didn't know you knew him !!?!

 

 

 

Sorry dad - only joking  !

[The Stationmaster]

As a matter of correction the S160s were right hand drive and hence were straightforward for firing right-handed from the left hand side of the footplate (yes, I have fired one).   There were two reasons why many men, particularly Firemen,  didn't like them. The worst for Firemen being the rocking grate which was greatly appreciated but found to be all too easy to take that bit further and erroneously use it to drop the fire when out on the road.   The other disliked feature was the water gauge which was difficult to read, especially at night, and led to at least one fatality when a firebox crown sheet collapsed due to low water level.  But those features apart some Western men were reasonably happy with them although they considered them a bit rough and ready (some didn't like the pull-out regulator handle but got on with it).

 

Oddly the fact that the Stanier 8Fs on the GWR were left hand drive was discussed in the Report as a possible contributory factor in the Dolphin Jcn collision because of the restricted view they offered of the DoDolphin Jcn Distant signals.  In that case left hand drive gave the Driver of a train on the Down Relief a clear view of the Down Main Distant some time before he could see the Down Relief Distant.  There was conflicting evidence about the state of the Down Relief Distant and in any case responsibility for the collision really rested with the Signalman but it is interesting to note that there - where the Down Relief Distant was on the left of the line to which it applied - a right hand drive engine gave an earlier sight of it than a left hand drive engine (because of line curvature etc).

[kevinlms]

4 hours ago, The Stationmaster said:

 

 

Oddly the fact that the Stanier 8Fs on the GWR were left hand drive was discussed in the Report as a possible contributory factor in the Dolphin Jcn collision because of the restricted view they offered of the DoDolphin Jcn Distant signals.  In that case left hand drive gave the Driver of a train on the Down Relief a clear view of the Down Main Distant some time before he could see the Down Relief Distant.  There was conflicting evidence about the state of the Down Relief Distant and in any case responsibility for the collision really rested with the Signalman but it is interesting to note that there - where the Down Relief Distant was on the left of the line to which it applied - a right hand drive engine gave an earlier sight of it than a left hand drive engine (because of line curvature etc).

Did it not come up before with drivers' discussing the problems of siting signals? Would have thought such a potentially dangerous problem would have been highlighted by drivers improvement classes, or whatever they called semi-official meetings.

Sharing that sort of information has obvious benefits.

[The Johnster]

Cost Benefit Analysis, the reason we don't have cab signalling, and the reason that ATC/AWS was resisted for so long outside the GWR.  CBA is done, assessing the likelihood of an accident costing more than installing the better system, and then accidents happen anyway and cost huge amounts of unforseen money and the worst sort of publicity.  AWS was being installed anyway, but the Harrow & Weadstone and Lewisham accidents in the 50s resulted in a media campaign that assisted considerably in making the cash available!

[LMS2968]

9 hours ago, The Johnster said:

Cost Benefit Analysis, the reason we don't have cab signalling, and the reason that ATC/AWS was resisted for so long outside the GWR.  CBA is done, assessing the likelihood of an accident costing more than installing the better system, and then accidents happen anyway and cost huge amounts of unforseen money and the worst sort of publicity.  AWS was being installed anyway, but the Harrow & Weadstone and Lewisham accidents in the 50s resulted in a media campaign that assisted considerably in making the cash available!

I'm not sure I agree on that last point, Johnster. It's often stated that Harrow prompted the adoption of AWS, but trials of the system on the Eastern Region started the week after Harrow, so the development was already well in hand. The actual roll out started in 957, and Lewisham happened in the December of that year, so after that began. But it took time: the lack of AWS was a factor in the rear end collision at Eccles on 4 December 1984.

 

The GWR is often given great credit - deserved - for introducing its ATC system while the others are pilloried for not following their example, but they introduced colour lights - easier to see - and track circuits to prevent wrong signal indications. All cost money, and none of the Big Four could have afforded everything.

[Wickham Green too]

2 hours ago, LMS2968 said:

..... It's often stated that Harrow prompted the adoption of AWS, but trials of the system on the Eastern Region started the week after Harrow, so the development was already well in hand. ....

The Strowger-Hudd system was trialled as early as 1931 on the Southern, L.M.S.R & L.N.E.R. and was installed on the L.T.& S. from 1948 : the B.R. standard AWS was little different in principle though incorporating features from the G.W.R. system. (  https://en-academic.com/dic.nsf/enwiki/593517 )

[LMS2968]

I think the main difference, certainly for drivers, was that the BR AWS gave a visual display - the 'sunflower' - which stayed visible until replaced by the next actuation, so the driver had a constant reminder that the previous signal was On or Off after he had passed it.

[kevinlms]

22 hours ago, The Stationmaster said:

  There was conflicting evidence about the state of the Down Relief Distant and in any case responsibility for the collision really rested with the Signalman but it is interesting to note that there - where the Down Relief Distant was on the left of the line to which it applied - a right hand drive engine gave an earlier sight of it than a left hand drive engine (because of line curvature etc).

Don't forget that exactly the same (but reversed) problem existed on railways such as the amalgamated LNWR/L&Y, when their drivers were given the early LMS built versions of 2P, 4P and 4F's. These drivers were used to signals positioned for LHD, then they had to deal with looking for signals with a boiler in the way! Not so bad on the 3F Tanks, because the boilers were a little smaller.

[The Stationmaster]

4 hours ago, LMS2968 said:

I'm not sure I agree on that last point, Johnster. It's often stated that Harrow prompted the adoption of AWS, but trials of the system on the Eastern Region started the week after Harrow, so the development was already well in hand. The actual roll out started in 957, and Lewisham happened in the December of that year, so after that began. But it took time: the lack of AWS was a factor in the rear end collision at Eccles on 4 December 1984.

 

The GWR is often given great credit - deserved - for introducing its ATC system while the others are pilloried for not following their example, but they introduced colour lights - easier to see - and track circuits to prevent wrong signal indications. All cost money, and none of the Big Four could have afforded everything.

The GWR was actually quite a way of the pack with track circuiting having started well before 1914 and it had a large programme for track circuiting for block controls from that year which was delayed by the onset of war and then the Grouping.  But it also spent a lot of money on the ATC programme.

 

Western ATC was more prone to failures (invariably right side) than the BR AWS induction based system.  And this got worse as train speeds rose following dieselisation, probably a consequence of increased wear on the ramps - one reason for the replacement of the WR system by the BR one.

 

18 hours ago, kevinlms said:

Did it not come up before with drivers' discussing the problems of siting signals? Would have thought such a potentially dangerous problem would have been highlighted by drivers improvement classes, or whatever they called semi-official meetings.

Sharing that sort of information has obvious benefits.

Simple answer appears to be a resounding no - certainly officially.  Years ago I went right back through years of minutes of LDC meetings at a major GWR shed and there was no mention at all of anything whatsoever to do with signal sighting although certain classes of engine came in for criticism (but nothing about left hand drive engines - even after the Dolphin Jcn collision).  Similarly there is nothing in the way of complaints, or even comments, about signal sighting in the Rules & Regulations Committee minutes (of which I have a full set) which is definitely the place where it would have been raised had there been any sort of issue.

 

10 minutes ago, kevinlms said:

Don't forget that exactly the same (but reversed) problem existed on railways such as the amalgamated LNWR/L&Y, when their drivers were given the early LMS built versions of 2P, 4P and 4F's. These drivers were used to signals positioned for LHD, then they had to deal with looking for signals with a boiler in the way! Not so bad on the 3F Tanks, because the boilers were a little smaller.

And similarly so on the LNER where Gresley pacifics - with very big boilers - changed from A1 right hand drive to A3 left hand drive.  and countless other examples across the UK rail network.  But a big difference is that these changes occurred in the inter-war years when public outcries from staff were definitely not allowed so there was nothing getting into the public arena.  The post-nationalisation situation with the Brits on the Western was very different because, apart from what some footplatemen thought of them, one of their number got his extremely adverse comments about the engines published in the national press which probably further encouraged some of his colleagues.

 

When we come to the Milton derailment there was undoubtedly a circling of the wagons by enginemen in support of their colleague and it was mainly over the signal sighting issue that was already firmly in the public arena.  There is a story about Milton and a particular accusation which was never really brought into the public light - probably because while it was believed to be a regular practice on the part of some Drivers there was no evidence to prove what some suspected.  Whether or not it took place it was long debated in various quarters and there was a strong conviction on the part of some traffic staff - in particular - that it had a bearing on the incident.  Somebody I knew who was one of the first on the scene after the derailment was always of the view that it had happened but, again, he saw no evidence to prove it although he was involved with helping passengers and went nowhere near the engine other than looking for the crew

[Morello Cherry]

I am not sure if this should be a separate topic or not, but it is related to signal sighting but also route knowledge. I was re-reading Nock and he mentions an accident at Ashchurch where the driver 'lost his way' and that he knew the driver involved who was killed. Nock mentions that he knew the driver from St Pancras. When I dug into the accident report, the driver was on a turn/link at Derby which was Derby-Manchester-Bristol-London. It describes the turn as Derby to Gloucester 4 weeks in 13. My question is two-fold - to me it strikes me as a huge amount of route to know and maintain knowledge of, especially considering the complexity of approaches into places like London, Manchester and Bristol as well having to know a huge number of intermediate signals at places like Ashchurch, Charfield etc. Was this a 'normal' amount of route knowledge for a passenger driver in this era? the second thing is how does this compare to the amount of route knowledge for a modern driver - for example would a midlands based driver in the 1980s have covered a similar trackage, or even a post-privatisation driver?

 

If anyone is interested - the link is here - https://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/doclisting.php?location=199&acctype=all&&event=261

 

The engine was rhd compound (1060) and there is some discussion in the report about how the driver normally would move to the fireman's side to observe the signals but did not on this occasion.

 

It is interesting that Harrow has been mentioned and other accidents involving signal sighting have been mentioned, isn't one of the hypotheses about the accident that the driver of the southbound express missed a signal in patchy fog but continued to look for it and ended up missing the next signal which was at a different height.

Edited June 7, 2022 by Morello Cherry

[Compound2632]

1 hour ago, kevinlms said:

Don't forget that exactly the same (but reversed) problem existed on railways such as the amalgamated LNWR/L&Y, when their drivers were given the early LMS built versions of 2P, 4P and 4F's. These drivers were used to signals positioned for LHD, then they had to deal with looking for signals with a boiler in the way! Not so bad on the 3F Tanks, because the boilers were a little smaller.

 

Some mythology there, I suspect. As far as I can make out, the Western and Central divisions received LHD engines, by and large, though later changes of allocations resulted in them getting small numbers of RHD engines.

 

Of the main build of standard 4Fs, 190 were built RHD and 340 LHD; the 45 built in the late 30s were also LHD. By the end of the main build, there were 230 allocated to the Western Division, 60 to the Central Division, and 40 to the Northern Division, with the balance of 200 on the Midland Division. [D. Hunt, J. Jennison, R.J. Essery and F. James, LMS Locomotive Profiles No. 10 The standard Class 4 goods 0-6-0s (Wild Swan, 2007).] I haven't looked at allocations in detail but running my finger down the columns of the 1935 allocations it is rapidly apparent that the bulk of the RHD engines were at Midland Division sheds.

 

Of the standard 4P compounds, the first 40 were built RHD and the remaining 155, LHD. [D. Hunt, J. Jennison and R.J. Essery, LMS Locomotive Profiles No. 13 The standard compounds (Wild Swan, 2011).] Again, allocations of RHD engines were, at a casual examination, chiefly to the Midland Division.

 

I don't have such an authoritative reference for the standard 2Ps but, as far as I am aware, they were all built LHD, not appearing until 1928.

Edited June 7, 2022 by Compound2632

[The Stationmaster]

1 hour ago, Morello Cherry said:

I am not sure if this should be a separate topic or not, but it is related to signal sighting but also route knowledge. I was re-reading Nock and he mentions an accident at Ashchurch where the driver 'lost his way' and that he knew the driver involved who was killed. Nock mentions that he knew the driver from St Pancras. When I dug into the accident report, the driver was on a turn/link at Derby which was Derby-Manchester-Bristol-London. It describes the turn as Derby to Gloucester 4 weeks in 13. My question is two-fold - to me it strikes me as a huge amount of route to know and maintain knowledge of, especially considering the complexity of approaches into places like London, Manchester and Bristol as well having to know a huge number of intermediate signals at places like Ashchurch, Charfield etc. Was this a 'normal' amount of route knowledge for a passenger driver in this era? the second thing is how does this compare to the amount of route knowledge for a modern driver - for example would a midlands based driver in the 1980s have covered a similar trackage, or even a post-privatisation driver?

 

If anyone is interested - the link is here - https://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/doclisting.php?location=199&acctype=all&&event=261

 

The engine was rhd compound (1060) and there is some discussion in the report about how the driver normally would move to the fireman's side to observe the signals but did not on this occasion.

 

It is interesting that Harrow has been mentioned and other accidents involving signal sighting have been mentioned, isn't one of the hypotheses about the accident that the driver of the southbound express missed a signal in patchy fog but continued to look for it and ended up missing the next signal which was at a different height.

On the WR c.1990 a policy was introduced that in order to maintain knowledge a Driver should work over a route on a minimum of 5 occasions in 12 weeks but this was never national policy and things were very different on other regions.  Even on the WR that standard was reduced for very simple routes.  On an Inspection Special c,2002 we had a Hither Green Driver down the GWML as far as Reading and I very quickly twigged that his route knowledge was  not good am nd ended up calling signals for him when he obviously didn't realise he was approaching them.  The same could be said of Eastleigh Drivers who worked through to Saltley at one time and they had a noticeable record of SPADs on certain unusually sited ground position lights there.

 

The national position was that Drivers re-certified their route card every 6 months and it was a personal decision on their part to either keep a route, knock it off, or seek a refresher.  This gave rise to a view among many that a Driver need only go over a route once in six months which was of course a nonsense for retaining knowledge.  When I was working fora train operator in the 1990s the official policy there was that 5 in 12 weeks was a basic norm which could be, and was, reduced if a suitable risk assessment supported such a reduction and our Traincrew Manager and I regularly reviewed that situation - usually with me 'coming the heavy' to secure grteater frequency where I considered our work was too thin to support what was in force.

 

Poor road knowledge was undoubtedly the cause of SPADS and, in some instances, collisions.  Harrow was definitely a SPAD but the reasons for it have long been debated with no real conclusions.  All that is certain is that Driver Jones braked very late having already passed the Outer Home Signal at danger and he only braked possibly when he saw the Inner Home at danger or even when he saw the rear of the stationary train - he definitely applied the brake before reaching the detonators at the signal box.  The difference in elevation of the arms of the Outer and Inner Homes was only 2'6" (30ft on the Outer, 32'6" on the Inner) while the yellow aspect on the distant was at 14'1" - all heights are 'above rail level'.   From the balance of evidence regarding visibility the Outer Home should have been visible from around 200 yds and the distant from 50 yards or possibly more.  So relative signal heights were irrelevant.

 

Jones had worked over the route, especially the Up fast Line, several times in the months preceding the collision so should I think be reasonably assumed to have had good current knowledge of the route.  And irrespective of the fog he had two good landmarks in the shape of overbridges between the distant and Outer Home signals.  We will never know why he missed the distant or - it appears from all the evidence - the Outer Home and why, in consequence, he braked so late.  Possibly a touch of 'we're never checked here' syndrome - although it was not unusual to be checked at that time of day; possibly that for whatever reason he wasn't sure of where he was; or quite simply that he, and perhaps the Fireman as well, were distracted by something we'll never know about (although a past colleague - our Traincrew Manager - and I did have a theory of our own which did have some mileage when he discussed it with steam era WCML footplate men - but it was just a theory).

[kevinlms]

1 hour ago, The Stationmaster said:

 

Simple answer appears to be a resounding no - certainly officially.  Years ago I went right back through years of minutes of LDC meetings at a major GWR shed and there was no mention at all of anything whatsoever to do with signal sighting although certain classes of engine came in for criticism (but nothing about left hand drive engines - even after the Dolphin Jcn collision).  Similarly there is nothing in the way of complaints, or even comments, about signal sighting in the Rules & Regulations Committee minutes (of which I have a full set) which is definitely the place where it would have been raised had there been any sort of issue.

 

I certainly recall reading in books written by LMS footplatemen, that they attended some sort 'engineman improvement league' (probably the wrong term), where they met IN THEIR OWN TIME to help junior loco crew understand how steam locomotives worked and how various pieces of equipment operation could be improved on. IIRC things like injectors and firing techniques were often discussed, with the aid of working models.

So perhaps there was no OFFICIAL discussion on something that perhaps undermined the railway company, but if they were discussing off duty, then they would likely to cover other topics. Importantly the would be no official written record.

 

But perhaps, I'm barking up the wrong tree?

[jim.snowdon]

25 minutes ago, kevinlms said:

I certainly recall reading in books written by LMS footplatemen, that they attended some sort 'engineman improvement league' (probably the wrong term), where they met IN THEIR OWN TIME to help junior loco crew understand how steam locomotives worked and how various pieces of equipment operation could be improved on. IIRC things like injectors and firing techniques were often discussed, with the aid of working models.

So perhaps there was no OFFICIAL discussion on something that perhaps undermined the railway company, but if they were discussing off duty, then they would likely to cover other topics. Importantly the would be no official written record.

 

But perhaps, I'm barking up the wrong tree?

What you appear to be referring to were better known as 'Mutual Improvement Classes', held outside of company time, but quite probably with the company's blessing as the results were in their interests.

[The Stationmaster]

21 minutes ago, kevinlms said:

I certainly recall reading in books written by LMS footplatemen, that they attended some sort 'engineman improvement league' (probably the wrong term), where they met IN THEIR OWN TIME to help junior loco crew understand how steam locomotives worked and how various pieces of equipment operation could be improved on. IIRC things like injectors and firing techniques were often discussed, with the aid of working models.

So perhaps there was no OFFICIAL discussion on something that perhaps undermined the railway company, but if they were discussing off duty, then they would likely to cover other topics. Importantly the would be no official written record.

 

But perhaps, I'm barking up the wrong tree?

Many loco depots on all the big four (as far as I know) ran Mutual Improvement Classes (MICs) for enginemen and they were very handy for those coming up for promotional exams. In some cases groups of such classes even published text books and there were one or two other books specifically aimed at the MIC market as 'easy learning' guides.

 

Whether or not anyone raised any signal sighting issues through this route I wouldn't l know but it would be very unlikely to get anywhere.  staff suggestions schemes - which seem to have started between the wars may well have received some suggestions about signal sighting but there is no reference to any in the relevant GWR minutes I mentioned above while there are references to other suggestions - e.g the colour of tail lamps.  But that was not the proper route for any complaints about signal sighting which would have been by a written report or possibly a conversation with an inspector which would have led to it appearing in consultation meeting notes if there was not a satisfactory reply.  and as i said I went through the meeting notes for a  large (GWR) depotr over the entire period such meetings qwere held right up to the early 1950s and there were no references nor did I ever hear of any thing like that over the years I chaired such meetings with enginemen (albeit much later but still a good sprinkling of (G)WR signals on the 'wrong' side).

 

In fact the only stuff which did come out at meetings was almost inevitably about wrong aspect sequences although one WR Driver. a member  of Sectional Council at that time did come out at one meeting with the very apposite comment 'Red signals do not stop trains'.  during my entire time on the WR (basically its final quarter century)  I only ever heard of one signal - a colour light as it happens - being moved for sighting reasons and even then the request to move it didn't come from Drivers but from a Divisional Traction & Traincrew Supt.

[Michael Hodgson]

4 hours ago, Morello Cherry said:

 My question is two-fold - to me it strikes me as a huge amount of route to know and maintain knowledge of, especially considering the complexity of approaches into places like London, Manchester and Bristol as well having to know a huge number of intermediate signals at places like Ashchurch, Charfield etc.

 

From what I have read, some drivers made a point of gaining (and keeping up to date) as much route knowledge as possible because it meant they could be be roastered to drive Wakes Week Specials and Exucrsions etc, which basically meant they got a day at the seaside as well as being paid to go there.

[The Johnster]

Route knowledge in the 70s when I worked on the railway, and for some time afterwards (I am unsure of the current situation, so much has changed and I haven't been keeping track of it), was to a very large extent a matter of trust, and had been since 'time immemorial'.  Drivers, passed firemen/secondmen/assistant drivers, guards. and conductor guards, signed their route cards 'on their own cogniscence'.  Signing conveyed a legal obligation to have satisfied yourself that you had learned a route to an extent that you could work a train, which I considered to mean any train at any time, over it safely.

 

This would include the signals and sighting thereof, including ground signals, speed restrictions, gradients, and route availability of all running lines on the route signed for.  You would designate your own landmarks and braking points on that basis, and usually learn them from men already cogniscent with the route.  Guards would also need to know which tunnels required tail lamps to be lit during daylight.  As guards, we were usually allowed a week to acquire this knowledge, which on the routes of around 60 or so miles in the bottom freight link was adequate, and additional route knowledge was acquired over time or when one took up a place in a higher link.  As a Canton guard, I eventually signed Swansea, Carmarthen via Landore or Swansea District, Danygraig as far as the Freightliner terminal, Bridgend via Vale of Glamorgan, Penarth, Barry Island, Radyr via Waterhall, all the Valleys passenger lines of those days, Hereford, Worcester via Hereford or Gloucester, BNS but not via Worcester, Bristol via Gloucester, Swindon via Badminton, Stroud, or Bath, Westbury, and Bridgewater.  This included East Usk and Cardiff Tidal branches, and North Somerset-Bath Rd. 

 

I considered myself capable of working any class of train over any of these routes at any time of day or night, except the Valleys routes.  These I was expected to sign 'passenger only', which I objected to; objection overruled.  By this time I was in the Valley passenger bottom link, which I had been transferred to not by my choice, and was not expected to indulge in valley freight work, colliery shunting, or incline working.  As Stationmaster will affirm, this was Radyr men's work...

 

Now, there are obvious grey areas here.  What was to prevent me from using my week route learning to kick back, ride around on trains chillin', or even book on and go home and come back 8 hours later to sign off?  Who would check up on the extent to which I had absorbed the requisite knowledge?  There were men at Canton who signed roads 'back cab only', which should not IMO humble or otherwise have been permitted, but the attitude was 'you don't need to know how to work a brake van over (example) the Swansea District because you'll only ever work fully fitted back cab oil trains over it'; I took more pride in the job than that and, in fact, did work a brake van over it to Carmarthen Jc on one occasion, several years later.  It was possible to be a freight guard at Canton in the 70s and get away with a very low standard of route knowledge, to the extent that one of my colleages from the same training course put the ground frame back under the train at Grangetown just before the morning rush hour...

 

And was not sacked as a result!

 

Things taken on trust will inevitably see that trust abused, such is human nature, and especially when cash in the form of mileage bonus and the opportunity to make overtime is a factor.  And certain of my colleagues were guilty as charged of this.  I also knew drivers who would happily go to places they had barely seen the sky over, or had not seen the sky over since god was in shorts despite new layouts and replaced signalling.  These people were in the minority, but were there, and nobody ever checked up on them. 

 

Depots such as Crewe, York, and Saltley had very wide ranging and long distance duties, so men in their higher links required very extensive route knowledge, and may have been required to work over some routes at infrequent intervals.  Men could request refreshers and were normally given them if they hadn't worked over a route for a while, but releasing them from their link obligations often meant refreshers on rest days at rest day overtime rates, again something open to abuse.

[Michael Hodgson]

On 06/06/2022 at 17:18, kevinlms said:

Did it not come up before with drivers' discussing the problems of siting signals? Would have thought such a potentially dangerous problem would have been highlighted by drivers improvement classes, or whatever they called semi-official meetings.

 

 

I may be misinformed but I thought Sighting Committees generally included a driver in order to avoid any blatant mistakes from the footplateman's point of view?

[The Johnster]

In addition, with regard to route knowledge, at many depots there were diagrams that routed trains over certain routes with the specific intention of maintaining traincrews' route knowledge.  This was common where diversionary routes were in use, and the routing of WR trains between Exeter and Plymouth via Okehampton, and vice versa, is well known.  At Canton passenger trains diverted over the Vale of Glamorgan were of this sort; there was only one job that top link men had over the route, the up Pembroke Dock-Paddington sleeper, and it was important to keep their cards up to date.  In previous times, there were diversionary routes to the SWML between Llanharan and Stormy Down via Tondu as well, and between Tondu and Margam there still is, involving reversal at Tondu.  Another Canton one from the old days was Bristol via the Severn Bridge, Lydney-Sharpness, interesting because of the route availability on the bridge which produced Dean Goods on Cardiff-Bristol jobs in the early 50s when the Severn Tunnel was closed for Sunday maintenance.