What could have ended the Midland's 'small engine' policy

[Guest Belgian]

Re the Hughes Mallet:

 

Surely they wouldn't have designed a loco with that length of unsupported boiler and smokebox, would they? The US Malletts (and Challengers etc) had massive sub-frames for the boiler/smokebox with a huge bed for support at the front end.

 

JE

Edited January 29, 2013 by Belgian

[Michael Edge]

Re the Hughes Mallet:

 

Surely they wouldn't have designed a loco with that length of unsupported boiler and smokebox, would they? The US Malletts (and Challengers etc) had massive sub-frames for the boiler/smokebox with a huge bed for support at the front end.

 

JE

It's not unsupported, there's a slide support on the front unit - se thread on my model of this loco.

[Pandora]

Fowler was not really a Loco engineer, I think he was the Gas engineer prior to appointment to CME.

In fact did he not say, all these locomotives designed by me, I had nothing to do with them, or words to that effect.

 

In otherwords the Derby drawing office simply carried on  without the leadership to promote new ideas

 

  

Edited February 8, 2013 by Pandora

[bluebottle]

Fowler was not really a Loco engineer, I think he was the Gas engineer prior to appointment to CME.

In fact did he not say, all these locomotives designed by me, I had nothing to do with them, or words to that effect.

 

In otherwords the Derby drawing office simply carried on  without the leadership to promote new ideas

 

 

Fowler was Gas Engineer on the Midland 1900 to 1905, Assistant Works Manager then Works Manager at Derby before becoming CME in 1910. After a series of important positions such as director of production at the Ministry of Munitions during WW1, he became deputy CME of the LMS in 1923. It's often said that he didn't design engines (I can't at the moment find a direct quote from the man himself to that effect; if he did say that, chapter and verse would be nice).

If “design” means personally producing drawings of new engines, then that wasn't his job – as CME he indicated what was wanted and the drawing office team dealt with the detail. Fowler had other things to do: for example, the efficient reorganisation of the main works at Derby, Crewe and Horwich.

Whatever his merits or demerits, Fowler was constrained by the misguided Midland-dominated higher management of the LMS, and by the fact that locomotive running activity in the LMS wasn't managed by the CME but by the Superintendent of motive power – Fowler's bête noir J.E. Anderson.

Most of the above comes from Griffith's “Locomotive Engineers of the LMS”. Reference was also made to Essery and Jenkinson, Nock and the Dictionary of National Biography. Any howlers are, no doubt, mine.

 

 

Gordon

[MarkC]

I <think> that it was in Hamilton Ellis' book "LMS- a Railway in Retrospect" that Fowler is quoted as 'having never designed a locomotive in his life'

 

Mark

[coachmann]

The Big Four formation effectively put the Midland in charge of the mighty LNWR!  I think the equivalent would have been the formation of SELNEC in 1948 taking in Manchester Corporation buses (the largest) and all the surrounding towns buses and putting Barlows coaches, who never had anything larger than 29 seat Bedford OB's, in charge.

[Sheffield]

I'm not sure the difference in size between the LNWR and the Midland was as big as the differnce between SELNEC and Barlows. The Midland had a better business organisation, but their methods of operation did not suit the rest of the LMS.

The Midland had what are now called infrastructure constraints such as round house type sheds and weak underline bridges that limited the physical size of their locos, but in pregrouping times I would suggest they were not far behind the rest in the effectiveness and efficiency of their locos, GWR excepted. For passenger use none of the other pregrouping railways, other than the GWR, had many locos that could do more than a MR compound, bearing in mind the GNR pacifics do not really belong in the pregrouping era. Certainly the other LMS constituants could not offer any thing much better.  

[coachmann]

I'm not sure the difference in size between the LNWR and the Midland was as big as the differnce between SELNEC and Barlows. The Midland had a better business organisation, but their methods of operation did not suit the rest of the LMS.

The Midland had what are now called infrastructure constraints such as round house type sheds and weak underline bridges that limited the physical size of their locos, but in pregrouping times I would suggest they were not far behind the rest in the effectiveness and efficiency of their locos, GWR excepted. For passenger use none of the other pregrouping railways, other than the GWR, had many locos that could do more than a MR compound, bearing in mind the GNR pacifics do not really belong in the pregrouping era. Certainly the other LMS constituants could not offer any thing much better.  

(My capitals). The GWR did indeed have the best engines but there was no virtue in in substituting Compounds that were used to handling 280 ton loads for LNWR Georges and Princes that were handling 400 ton loads on the fastest pre World War One schedules and 450 to 500 ton loads on the decelerated schedules on force from January 1917. LNWR George V's coal consumption out of shops was probably lower than any engines in the country other than those of the GWR.

[kevinlms]

(My capitals). The GWR did indeed have the best engines but there was no virtue in in substituting Compounds that were used to handling 280 ton loads for LNWR Georges and Princes that were handling 400 ton loads on the fastest pre World War One schedules and 450 to 500 ton loads on the decelerated schedules on force from January 1917.

That's because the Compounds, Princes & Georges had around the same tractive effort at around 21,000lb. Shows that a single statistic is useless & meaningless, yet to the bean counters, it meant they were the same.

[Sheffield]

When in the early days of the LMS various locos were compared they found the Compounds had some of the lowest costs, and were the appropriate choice for the future. Unfortunately of course this choice was based on the circumstances of the past, not the future. But were these findings because that is what the ex-MR management wanted them to be, or because the LNWR policy was to have low cost locos, work them hard, and accept the higher operating cost, unlike the MR? It does seem to me that, GWR excepted, when the pregrouping companies tried to produce bigger locos than the prevailing 4-4-0s to meet the increasing train loads the results were generally not much of a success. The real difference between the MR and the others was that the MR never actually produced any thing larger, despite a number of proposals.

I would mention when the LMS wanted to try a nonstop London-Scotland run one of the locos chosen was a Compound, not a LNWR loco. 

[PhilJ W]

There were several very good (non-GWR) 4-6-0's about, the GER '1500' (B12) for example. There are many different factors in the design of a locomotive the principle of which id the type of work and the road on which it is expected to work.

[kevinlms]

I would mention when the LMS wanted to try a nonstop London-Scotland run one of the locos chosen was a Compound, not a LNWR loco. 

Yes, but that Royal Scot train was run in 2 portions on that day. The Glasgow portion with a new Royal Scot & the Edinburgh portion with a Compound. As the Glasgow portion was always the heavier train and I believe that both portions only just made it with volunteer crews, it wasn't something any where near sustainable. It has to be stated that it was purely a gimmick to beat the LNER publicity.

[DerekEm8]

When in the early days of the LMS various locos were compared they found the Compounds had some of the lowest costs, and were the appropriate choice for the future. Unfortunately of course this choice was based on the circumstances of the past, not the future. But were these findings because that is what the ex-MR management wanted them to be, or because the LNWR policy was to have low cost locos, work them hard, and accept the higher operating cost, unlike the MR? It does seem to me that, GWR excepted, when the pregrouping companies tried to produce bigger locos than the prevailing 4-4-0s to meet the increasing train loads the results were generally not much of a success. The real difference between the MR and the others was that the MR never actually produced any thing larger, despite a number of proposals.

I would mention when the LMS wanted to try a nonstop London-Scotland run one of the locos chosen was a Compound, not a LNWR loco. 

Presumably after the early retirement of Hughes and before the Royal Scots arrived, In the interim the LNW Claughtons and L&Y Dreadnoughts held sway

The relevant comment being

'in the event it proved impossible to operate the erstwhile LNWR main line with Midland sized engines and much double heading continued '. Essary & Jenkinson LMS Locomotives Volume 1

 

The Midland Compounds were relegated to secondary (Midland Type) lightweight duties with the advent of the Scots. Patriots and Jubilees - even ex- LNWR Claughtons were modified for the Midland Main Line.

It is also interesting to note that under the Midland based classification system the Compounds remained class 4 whilst the LNW and L&Y 4-6-0s were Class 5.

[coachmann]

Not even the most ardent devotee of the Midland could justify putting the LNWR George V's in power class 3P. The fact is the latter were on top of their tasks along with the Prince 4-6-0s and no amount or arguing can whitewash history. The West Coast Mainline was operating nicely and the LNWR had at least attempted to keep up with increasing train weights. Had the Big Four not been created, the LNWR/L&Y would have had to build larger locomotives in the 1920s to speed up services and keep up with Pacifics on the East Coast. The notion that a 4P Compound 4-4-0 could keep the West Coast route astride of developments on the East Coast tells us everything we need to know about Midland dogma.

Edited February 10, 2013 by coachmann

[Sheffield]

I was not really trying to say the MR Compound was suitable for the West Coast, but that it was suitable for the Midland Railway. The Midland "small engine policy" suited the Midland, but as has been pointed out, not the LMS or the ex LNWR main line. But I did want to suggest that the MR locos were not really smaller than the majority of pregrouping locos, and those that were bigger generally were not much better. Quite a number of designers produced good 4-4-0s, but could not produce significantly better 4-6-0s.

It is interesting to speculate how the new LMS would have developed suitable locos had the MR thinking not prevailed in 1923. The LNWR Claughtons had significant failings, and the L&Y 4-6-0 soon showed they were unsuited long distance operation on the West Coast. Was there the ability in the CME's organisation to design any thing up to the job apart from more compounds? I have thought that the demonstration of a GWR Castle by the LMS operating section indicated their lack of trust in the CME's dept. to produce what was required, A sort of frustrated "this is what we want, stop messing and produce some"

[DerekEm8]

But surely Hughes had tried to break the Derby thinking with the Horwich Crab. Hughes (and Horwich) learned from the mistakes with the Dreadnoughts and had a number of proposed designs - Hughes unfortunately retired early. allegedly because of in house battles .

It seems that the Hughes/Horwich thinking was  influential  with the 4P 2-6-4T and the Royal Scot 4-6-0 which appeared in 1927. And then the backward step with the Derby thinking influencing the Garratt design and the  3P 2-6-2T.

 

Essary & Jenkinson LMS Locomotives Vol 4

[coachmann]

This was my reasoning behind not mentioning the Claughtons and Dreadnaughts, as they represented a dead end. Niether could be developed successfully as was found when larger boilers were put on the Claughton to make a 5XP. The achilles heel was the typical LNWR thin frames and centre axle bearing, hence new 'engine' portion allied to the big boiler = the Patriot 5XP.

[Sheffield]

While I agree the Hughes 2-6-0 did avoid the worst of the MR thinking, I suggest his refusal to go higher than 180lbs boiler pressure was almost as bad. A version of the Royal Scot with that boiler pressure and the large cylinders that would be necessary would not really be the answer. The Crabs were good engines, but in a lumbering sort of way. I still suggest in the first days of the LMS there was nothing suitable available and there was an incapability to produce the locos the West Coast line needed. More Compounds were all that was available, and it was not until the involvement of North British to produce the Royal Scot that the LMS got the locos it needed, with the Patriot evolving from the Royal Scot.

There seems to be a feeling in the enthusiast world that the MR "small engine policy" was wrong, and the "dead hand of Derby" was wrong to impose that policy on the LMS. I suggest the policy was sound for the Midland, and although it was wrong for the "operators" to impose it  on the new LMS, the "engineers" were incapable of providing anything that would allow a difference operating policy. All of course not helped by the civil engineers.  The backward step in design in the Garratts, and the manner in which Anderson went directly behind the back of the CME to Beyers indicates the lack of trust they had. The fact that Anderson could not do any better, indeed did worse, does not change that, although it does seem that it was the efforts of Anderson that drove the Senior Management to agree to the Scots, rather than the CME. .

The real fault was the failure of senior management to stifle the MR/LNWR rivalry and create a unified LMS. That had to wait until Lord Stamp and Stanier.   

[The Stationmaster]

There seems to be a feeling in the enthusiast world that the MR "small engine policy" was wrong, and the "dead hand of Derby" was wrong to impose that policy on the LMS. I suggest the policy was sound for the Midland, and although it was wrong for the "operators" to impose it  on the new LMS, the "engineers" were incapable of providing anything that would allow a difference operating policy. All of course not helped by the civil engineers.   

I think the Midland and its acolytes probably did no more than create a big sort of cloak around and to 'explain' or support the small engine policy.  Towards the end of 19th century the principal heavy freight and mineral engine on the 'big' companies was an 0-6-0, mainly tender but in some cases a tank, and often double-headed as train weights were increasing.  By the time of the Grouping almost every significant long distance mineral hauling railway had moved to 8 coupled locos in some form or another for the simple reason that they were cheaper to operate than double-headed combinations.  More than a few railways had moved to 2-6-0s and even 4-6-0s for express freight traffic and general freight - again because with rising trainloads they were cheaper to operate.

 

Yet the Midland didn't follow this policy - it simply remained with its head firmly stuck in the sand using small engines, with two crews and six sets of driving axleboxes on its heaviest freight instead of an engine with a single crew and only 4 sets of driving axleboxes to do the same job.  True men were cheap, and so was coal but why on earth didn't the Midland do what all the other long distance coal hauliers were doing?  They had to replace turntables with larger to take bigger engines and probably make other civil engineering adjustments too.

 

And while I don't know what the Bridge Loading situation was to blame lack of development on the civil engineers is somewhat off the mark I think - the Robinson 8K 2-8-0 of 1911 had a lower axleloading than Fowler's 4F 0-6-0 of the same year; Churchward's 28XX 2-8-0 similarly had a lower axleloading than the 4F, and Churchward's 'Saint' 4-6-0 had a lower axleloading than a Midland compound.  I'm sorry but I think the situation at Derby was very simple - they were wedded to relatively small engines and Midland operating practice was too - end of story.

 

And the LMS of course - as I think everyone agrees - could do no better until they got rid of the all pervasive and massively outdated Midland influence.

[kevinlms]

While I agree the Hughes 2-6-0 did avoid the worst of the MR thinking, I suggest his refusal to go higher than 180lbs boiler pressure was almost as bad. A version of the Royal Scot with that boiler pressure and the large cylinders that would be necessary would not really be the answer. The Crabs were good engines, but in a lumbering sort of way. I still suggest in the first days of the LMS there was nothing suitable available and there was an incapability to produce the locos the West Coast line needed. More Compounds were all that was available, and it was not until the involvement of North British to produce the Royal Scot that the LMS got the locos it needed, with the Patriot evolving from the Royal Scot.

There seems to be a feeling in the enthusiast world that the MR "small engine policy" was wrong, and the "dead hand of Derby" was wrong to impose that policy on the LMS. I suggest the policy was sound for the Midland, and although it was wrong for the "operators" to impose it  on the new LMS, the "engineers" were incapable of providing anything that would allow a difference operating policy. All of course not helped by the civil engineers.  The backward step in design in the Garratts, and the manner in which Anderson went directly behind the back of the CME to Beyers indicates the lack of trust they had. The fact that Anderson could not do any better, indeed did worse, does not change that, although it does seem that it was the efforts of Anderson that drove the Senior Management to agree to the Scots, rather than the CME. .

The real fault was the failure of senior management to stifle the MR/LNWR rivalry and create a unified LMS. That had to wait until Lord Stamp and Stanier.   

Was it really an issue of rivalry preventing development of new, better locos?

 

Part of the problem was that between 1924 & 1928 Crewe Works was extensively rebuilt, with the paint shop being largely closed during this period, thus leading to many locos being patch painted the original black (with correct LMS insigna). Prior to this 1923, quite a few locos had been painted in the new LMS red livery, some even lettered LM&SR or variants because the lettering/number style had yet to be determined. By the time the rebuilding was complete the decision had been made to only paint the largest passenger locos red, so most were/remained black.

 

 

 

from HTS_Arch_Assess_Crewe.pdf

 

"In 1921 the works covered 137 acres (Gallicham 1921, 110). Between 1926 and 1928, after an investment of £750,000, the Crewe works were substantially reorganised with a production line system greatly enhancing productivity. In 1938 it was claimed that a workforce of 6,500 men could now accomplish what formerly took 10,000 (Chaloner 1950, 75). The works were said to be ‘the biggest in the world’, and output rose between 1923 and 1948, with almost 2000 locomotives built (Mee 1938, 72). "

 

For 750,000 pounds to be spent then, that was some rebuilding.

 

No wonder Stanier moved in there for his most important work rather than Derby.

[Ohmisterporter]

 

 They had to replace turntables with larger to take bigger engines and probably make other civil engineering adjustments too.

 

And while I don't know what the Bridge Loading situation was to blame lack of development on the civil engineers is somewhat off the mark I think - the Robinson 8K 2-8-0 of 1911 had a lower axleloading than Fowler's 4F 0-6-0 of the same year; Churchward's 28XX 2-8-0 similarly had a lower axleloading than the 4F, and Churchward's 'Saint' 4-6-0 had a lower axleloading than a Midland compound.  I'm sorry but I think the situation at Derby was very simple - they were wedded to relatively small engines and Midland operating practice was too - end of story.

Wasn't the chief civil engineer Alexander Newlands from the Highland Railway? He was the chap who banned F.G. Smith's River class from the Highland in their hour of desperate need simply to get one over on poor old Smith; a CME who understood modern methods of calculating hammer blow on track rather than simple dead weight. Newlands banned the engines and they were sold to the Caledonian, at a profit, although he accepted the Clan class built by Smith's successor Cummings even though the hammer blow was in excess of the Rivers.

[coachmann]

I still suggest in the first days of the LMS there was nothing suitable available and there was an incapability to produce the locos the West Coast line needed. More Compounds were all that was available,

I simply dont get this line of thought to put it mildly. Why the line " .........in the first days of the LMS there was nothing suitable available and there was an incapability to produce the locos the West Coast line needed. More Compounds were all that was available."

 

Rail travel was an on-going business and did not stop because of the 1923 grouping. The LNWR men and engines were running the West Coast heavy traffic without any problems and I have never read that the LNWR was having difficulties working the West coast traffic. Its locos were cheap to build, they could be thrashed to do outstanding work and they received regular maintenance as a result. However, LNWR practices were not really suitable for widespread use across the much larger LMS system, and neither were Midland practices. There was no real answer to the LMS motive power problems in the 1920s. The LMS operating department knew what it wanted, GWR 'Castles' (and probably 2-8-0s) but it had to wait until Stanier arrived on the scene.

[Sheffield]

. There was no real answer to the LMS motive power problems in the 1920s. The LMS operating department knew what it wanted, GWR 'Castles' (and probably 2-8-0s) but it had to wait until Stanier arrived on the scene.

That is the point I was trying to make. There was nothing suitable, and the designers had not shown themselves able to design any thing suitable. Hence Andersons trial of the Castle. Although it is true that the LNW locos were working the West Coast traffic they were not suitable for the heavier trains that were in prospect. And the CME's organisation was unable to provide what was wanted, partly because of a lack of clear direction from Fowler.

As regards the Midlands continued use of 0-6-0s on the London coal trains, was there not a greater problem than turntables? The Civil Engineers ruling that the underline bridges on the London extension were unable to take any thing heavier. Hence the sacred MR 8ft-8ft6in wheel spacing. It was the Civil's interpretation of the bridge loading curve rather than just axle load. The fact that these interpretations were later discredited is irrelevent. There were difficulties getting 8 coupled locos within the restrictions, and even a Mallet was considered.  

[The Stationmaster]

That is the point I was trying to make. There was nothing suitable, and the designers had not shown themselves able to design any thing suitable. Hence Andersons trial of the Castle. Although it is true that the LNW locos were working the West Coast traffic they were not suitable for the heavier trains that were in prospect. And the CME's organisation was unable to provide what was wanted, partly because of a lack of clear direction from Fowler.

As regards the Midlands continued use of 0-6-0s on the London coal trains, was there not a greater problem than turntables? The Civil Engineers ruling that the underline bridges on the London extension were unable to take any thing heavier. Hence the sacred MR 8ft-8ft6in wheel spacing. It was the Civil's interpretation of the bridge loading curve rather than just axle load. The fact that these interpretations were later discredited is irrelevent. There were difficulties getting 8 coupled locos within the restrictions, and even a Mallet was considered.  

Turntables weren't a problem on other railways - they simply put in longer ones, and if they needed to rebuild bridges they rebuilt them.  I suspect that even on a Bridge Curve (which I'm certainly no expert on as I'm the first to admit) a GC 8k would present no greater problem than a 4F, and in many respects it was a much better prospect as the weight on the driving axle was significantly less.  And if civil engineers were presenting a problem over bridges curves there was a simple answer - kick them into line and get them to double check their figures, as happened on other companies.

 

However the usual reason for lack of progress is very simple - it doesn't happen if people don't want it to happen - people like Churchward and Robinson (to name but two) wanted it to happen and made it happen, end of story.

[Clive Mortimore]

However the usual reason for lack of progress is very simple - it doesn't happen if people don't want it to happen - people like Churchward and Robinson (to name but two) wanted it to happen and made it happen, end of story.

Hi Mike

 

Churchward and Robinson had a management that listen to them and then allowed them to put into practice what they had said. Deeley went off to write his books on lubrication geology and meteorogy becuase the MR management would not listen to him.