Spanish Rail Crash

[The Stationmaster]

....it makes no difference James. If his company wish to speak with him by phone then they do it whilst he is not carrying out safety critical duties...otherwise they are as guilty as he is and maybe more. 

 

Dave

I'm sorry Dave but if that is the way RENFE work then that - like it or not - is the way RENFE work (hence my comments earlier about people producing RENFE Rule Books and relevant procedures).  Lots of continental administrauions do things in a very different way from the way we go about them and they approach many things on completely different principles from us.  For example SNCF think nothing of a Driver learning a 500 mile route in less than a week - because they drive to a Livre Ligne so they don't need much route learning, even on a 'difficult' route.  Some administrations use 'phone and radio links in a totally different way from what we are used to and unless or until we know RENFE's procedures and whether or not the Driver (and others)  was following them correctly we are hardly in a position to criticise what he did by the standards to which he was supposed to be working.

 

The same goes for those who contacted him - for all we know it might have been an important call but it could just as easily be the Spanish equivalent of asking him to work his Rest Day - again we simply do not know.

 

Thus to criticise the Driver for his actions, or failure to act, is at this stage no more than a different form of speculation.  We might all have our views - indeed most of us do - but we can only fairly criticise if we know the facts  and those facts include the RENFE Rules and procedures - and we don't know them.  The Driver seems to have made a statement fairly typical of that you get from someone who has been closely involved in a serious incident - anyone who has ever been close to/involved in one or had to take early statements from those who were in that position will know exactly what I mean - the poor chap has a whole string of emotions running through his head and that will affect both his memory of events and how he responds to questioning.  As for us - well basically we're still in the dark on just about everything involved in this derailment apart from the fact that it happened.

 

 

 

...if any other 'on train' staff had route knowledge then it is reasonable to ask why the communication cord wasn't pulled. Also if high speed trains were being worked over lines with significant speed restrictions then why wasn't it normal to caution trains with signals on the approach to the restriction or double man the cab. I'm struggling to understand why so much emphasis was being placed on one mere mortal.

 

Dave

 

It's probably more common than you might think - it certainly used to be on BR.  But it is an area where proper information will have to be established by the technical inquiry - which hopefully will get out all the facts, my fingers are crossed on that aspect.

 

Incidentally the reluctance of other staff to pull the cord, or for a Guard to apply the setter (brake valve in his compartment - or its equivalent), is not an unusual feature of derailments involving excessive speed, certainly in Britain if nowhere else.   A common theme from many past accident investigations is that they were trusting the Driver to know what he was doing and were effectively either very wary or worried about interfering.

[Torr Giffard LSWR 1951-71]

...I'm waiting to hear the outcome too but I wouldn't like to be defending against a driver saying that he was distracted in this way. 

 

Dave

[James]

....it makes no difference James. If his company wish to speak with him by phone then they do it whilst he is not carrying out safety critical duties...otherwise they are as guilty as he is and maybe more.

It all depends on their safety systems - and there are plenty of safety critical roles on the railway here where you're expected to answer your phone.

[RJS1977]

Incidentally the reluctance of other staff to pull the cord, or for a Guard to apply the setter (brake valve in his compartment - or its equivalent), is not an unusual feature of derailments involving excessive speed, certainly in Britain if nowhere else.   A common theme from many past accident investigations is that they were trusting the Driver to know what he was doing and were effectively either very wary or worried about interfering.[/i]

I can certainly appreciate that one - having been in a similar sort of situation myself (as a passenger!), though no means as serious.

 

In this instance it was not long before the VEPs were withdrawn from Reading-Waterloo services and I was travelling to work in Bracknell in the section of carriage immediately adjacent to the guard's compartment. We were delayed approaching Wokingham as the Turbo in front of us had been delayed at Wokingham and we had to wait for it to clear the station. It moved off and we ran into the station and stopped. The starter signal was red of course as the Turbo was still in the next section (headed towards Guildford). Presently the signal cleared to green, the guard blew his whistle and stepped into the van. However I'd noticed that the "feather" on the signal was not illuminated (i.e. the signal was showing for the Guildford line). First thought was "Do I pull the cord?" Maybe a bit too drastic, I think, so instead consider going to the van and pointing it out to the guard. Then I think that perhaps the train crew might be privy to information that I am not (e.g. they may have been informed by the signalman/station staff that the route was correct but that the lights were not working). So I did nothing, thinking that they probably knew what they were doing. The train sets off and sure enough starts heading to Guildford! Fortunately the driver spotted what was happening and was able to stop the train before it ran off the juice....

[Hobby]

...if any other 'on train' staff had route knowledge then it is reasonable to ask why the communication cord wasn't pulled. Also if high speed trains were being worked over lines with significant speed restrictions then why wasn't it normal to caution trains with signals on the approach to the restriction or double man the cab. I'm struggling to understand why so much emphasis was being placed on one mere mortal.

 

Dave

 

As a guard on a high speed train I'd say two things, first modern trains are not like old ones where you could dump the brake, activating the communication "cord" these days simply sets off an alarm in the drivers cab and then applies the brake if he doesn't react, the driver can over-ride it to stop the train stopping in a bad location (such as a tunnel)... The other point is that we do other jobs than just sitting watching the scenery go by unless its mega quiet, so unless we happen to be looking out at the right time and act very (very!) quickly it's unlikely we could have any effect on the outcome other than highlighting the driver's error. I worked one yesterday where for most of the journey I only just managed to get to the PA in time to announce the stations! Bear in mind we don't know the braking points as we are not drivers and don't have a clear view ahead of where we are going, though experience does give us some idea otherwise we'd spend a lot of our time picking ourselves up off the floor(!), but by the time we've noticed that point has been passed and we have got to the nearest red lever it would be too late anyhow when at full line speed... Being realistic, in the time we'd have to react in this sort of situation, it is very unlikely we'd even manage to pull the cord... 

 

As ASLEF have pointed out in their posters the Driver should be DRIVING and doing nothing else, this accident would seem to prove the wisdom of their words if what is said happened is true...

 

(Please note that all the above relates to British practice, and Voyager working)

[Torr Giffard LSWR 1951-71]

...agreed H but there can be e.g. other drivers with route knowledge on the train, travelling as passenger. 

 

Dave

[jamie92208]

There are huge institutional pressures that stop other crew members from taking action.  This was a major factor in the Kegworth air crash where an engine on a 737 caught fire and the cockpit crew shut down the wrong engine.   Apparently one of the cabin crew had seen the engine fire but  for a variety of reasons didn't tell the cockpit which side it was.  My brother was a senior captain for BA at the time and he spent a lot of the next year teaching groups of cabin crew when to intervene and communicate with the cockpit.  IIRC it was quite  a cultural shift for many of them as they had been taught that the flight crew knew what they were doing.  

 

Jamie

[Torr Giffard LSWR 1951-71]

...as a former BR driver instructor Jamie, I can tell you without hesitation that if I felt that my life was endangered by the actions of others whilst I was travelling by train and I was in a position to affect the outcome....then I would take action and worry about explaining why later.  

 

Dave

[Edwin_m]

Driver errors of this seriousness are very rare, and most non-driving staff and even drivers without appropriate route knowledge wouldn't really know the difference between a late brake application and failing to observe a restriction.  In quite a number of historic accidents the guard was "just reaching for the brake" or similar, or at least claimed to be, when the accident happened - and this was in the days when the guard had an official duty to observe signals and monitor train running. 

[Fat Controller]

...agreed H but there can be e.g. other drivers with route knowledge on the train, travelling as passenger. 

 

Dave

Though these aren't always as reliable as they might be; whilst I still worked on the trains (rather than just passing on them most days as I do now), we were crossing 'on the cushions' in a vehicle that didn't convey paying passengers. Our driver, who had a lot of experience, was convinced we were off the road; others amongst us advised him that the ride was always rough when the secondary suspension cushions weren't fully inflated.

 

I think the 'phone call' might be less of a factor than people might imply; I suspect that the driver had been having one, or more, episodes of 'microsleep'. This is quite common amongst shift-workers, and people doing tasks such as long motorway drives (or long train drives through largely featureless countryside). Research in France, partially sponsored by SNCF, has involved small cameras focussed on the driver's face, which are used to observe the movement of eyes and eyelids.

Alarmingly, it has shown that it is quite common for people's eyes to shut for a few seconds; even more alarmingly, some people driving the A6 from Paris to the Mediterranean coast drop off for fifteen seconds or more at a time, and when 'microsleeps' have been added together, have had their eyes shut for five minutes or so in total. When driving a train fitted with a Driver Vigilance Device of some sort, an alarm will sound, waking the driver (on lines fitted with TVM, the Control Centre will also have an alarm- and will call the driver to ask if there's a problem. I don't know if the RENFE system has a similar feature, but would be surprised if it didn't), though the driver may be disorientated.

'Microsleep' episodes seem to peak a couple of hours into a task and then again about seven hours in- for drivers on the A6, this means about the time they encounter the traffic coming from the north of France and the Low Countries near Beaune, and again when they encounter the heavilly-trafficed section along the Mediterranean coast, in both cases when they need to be as alert as they can be.

[Glorious NSE]

The mention of Moorgate is interesting, I do wonder whether the apparent lack of any safety system to protect  the speed restriction on this curve (beyond a vigilant driver) is due to a similar thought process as LTs - which seems to have been that they didn't need to provide a train stop as nobody would be likely to try and drive through a terminus...

[Miss Prism]

It would seem the English-speaking media has now generally dropped its coverage of the story, and thus we now only have the Spanish media to rely on. The nature of the Spanish court looking at this case is strange. It is not a public enquiry in the way we understand the term. The proceedings appear to be private, with a 'statement' being issued from time to time. A Spanish newspaper has obtained a video, presumably unofficial, of the court's proceedings, but court officials, speaking anonymously, have confirmed only that the video appears 'authentic'. There appears to be an investigation into how an "inaccurate report" of the black box's findings was leaked to the media. This bizarre lack of transparency, coupled with difficulties and sloppiness in translation and reporting, lay behind why we have got such a confusing story.
 
Whereas previous reports are that the phonecall was made by someone in RENFE, or another driver of another train, it now seems the call to the driver was made by the onboard "conductor" (or "inspector") of the train, Antonio Martin Ruthin. Astonishingly, it seems Ruthin did not mention the phonecall in his evidence. There seems to be an ongoing question as to whether the phonecall was still taking place at the time of derailment. Despite this confusion, it seems the Judge has already declared the phonecall "was not the cause of" (or "not relevant to") the accident, and accordingly has decided that there is insufficient evidence to charge Ruthin with criminal negligence.
 
Some event timings related to the crash are given here and here, but be aware any Google translation to English doesn't make much sense, and there is an obvious confusion surrounding the translations/meanings of 'before' and 'after'. We do know the emergency brake was applied by the driver shortly before entry to the curve, but the duration of the brake application seems to be unclear from what has been reported from the blackbox data. If the reported speed drop (192km/h "shortly before the crash" to 153km/h "at the moment the train left the tracks") did take place over a reported 7s, that would give an average deceleration of approximately 6m/s/s. (Which seem rather high to me.)

 

ADIF has now imposed a 30km/h restriction on the Grandeira curve as a precautionary measure.

[The Stationmaster]

An interesting thing in there is the reference to a balise - I wonder what its purpose is?

 

(For those who are not aware of the term a balise is basically a 'lineside transmitter' which gives information to the train which is then shown on a display in the driving cab.  Balises can be used for various purposes and indeed the context of the term can vary from country to country - hence my wondering about its purpose in this instance as there were various audible signals heard in the cab on the video of the correct approach to the restriction and these seemed to occur at some box shaped items in the five foot - again an are where we really need information on Spanish equipment).

 

According to my (French) guide to European signalling systems RENFE lineside signalling includes a specific approach signal aspect for a 30kph limit of speed in advance of the next signal if that signal is at green.

[James]

...as a former BR driver instructor Jamie, I can tell you without hesitation that if I felt that my life was endangered by the actions of others whilst I was travelling by train and I was in a position to affect the outcome....then I would take action and worry about explaining why later.

I'd take the same view in a box too.

[Fat Controller]

I'm not in the least surprised that the English-language press (and the Francophone one as well) has seemingly lost interest; we are talking about 'journalists' and their readers who have the attention span of a gnat on amphetamine. I will be interested to see what appears in this month's 'Today's Railways- Europe', as David Haydock is capable of turning out well-researched pieces.

Such hearings as are going on at present would be preliminary ones to establish the parameters of any public inquiry and/or criminal trial; equivalent to the police submitting a case to the CPS in England or Wales. I would be surprised if such ruminations took place in public, and even more so if any journalist bothered to cover them.

[Fat Controller]

An interesting thing in there is the reference to a balise - i wonder what its purpose is?

Not sure, Mike, but a reference follows to an audible warning (un aviso acústico), which makes me wonder if the Spanish system is similar to the French KVB (Controle du vitesse par Balise). It does seem to lack the capacity to impose braking in the event of an overspeed. The only stuff I have on Spanish signalling is a short piece in a work by Daniel Wurmser, published by 'Chemins de Fer'; this doesn't make any reference to systems beyond the conventional ones, which is hardly surprising given it was published in 1997.

I did find this piece, originally in IRJ (but subsequently 'pulled', it would seem) on the web:-

"However, the final ETCS balise on the high-speed line, which is situated 4km from the crash site, would only inform the driver that he is exiting an ETCS section, that all automatic driving modes are disabled, and that manual driving mode is active. This means that if ETCS was in use the accident may still have occurred, and any train could in theory enter the 80km/h section at 200km/h. Drivers of Avant trains brake manually on the section where the accident occurred because the driver interface does not display a braking curve in the transition section between ETCS and Afsa....

 

Both Asfa and the more advanced Asfa Digital are automatic train protection (ATP) systems, but the latter provides the driver with information on braking curves while standard Asfa only triggers an emergency brake application if a signal has been passed at danger. It is unclear at this stage which version of Asfa is installed on the line."

[Hobby]

...agreed H but there can be e.g. other drivers with route knowledge on the train, travelling as passenger. 

 

Dave

 

Usually very few and they tend not to watch the scenery! I've found that a Driver's route knowledge of where they are when travelling on the cushions tends to be quite poor, the view is very different from what they are used to... At night I would guarantee that I'd have a better idea where I was than a driver travelling with me inside the train... 

 

I would again say that by the time we had realised that there was a problem it would be too late to do anything, though if there was time rest assured we'd do something...

[Andy Hayter]

 The nature of the Spanish court looking at this case is strange. It is not a public enquiry in the way we understand the term. The proceedings appear to be private, with a 'statement' being issued from time to time.

 

Nothing strange.  The nature of many European legal systems is that they have cooperative rather than confrontational systems.

An official investigation into an incident is then little different from say the CID investigation into a similar incident in the UK.

The major difference is that the investigation proceedings are overseen by a judge.

As such then the proceedings are no more public than a CID investigation would be.

To assume that such an investigation in any way equates to or approximates to a UK public enquiry is a mistake.

[Andy Hayter]

One there would be just over 70 seconds other point that I have not seen mentioned is the timescales involved.

 

AT 190kph there would be just over 70 seconds between exiting the high speed stretch and the point of impact.  This hardly seems time for anyone to react to what might be perceived as a driver error and alert the driver or pull the cord.  It is also a very short period of time for the driver himself to react if/when he realises his error.

 

[Ozexpatriate]

There are huge institutional pressures that stop other crew members from taking action.  This was a major factor in the Kegworth air crash where an engine on a 737 caught fire and the cockpit crew shut down the wrong engine.   Apparently one of the cabin crew had seen the engine fire but  for a variety of reasons didn't tell the cockpit which side it was. 

The recent Asiana 214 crash at SFO had some similar aspects.

 

After the plane came to a halt the forward cabin crew asked the cockpit if they should evacuate. Somewhat amazingly (in retrospect) the cabin crew said "no", and that they would await instructions from the airport. At this point a mid-cabin flight attendant saw the starboard side fire from No. 2 engine and took matters into his own hands.

[Kris]

The latest update to the investigation. 

 

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-23610747

[Hobby]

Well that clarifies that:

 

"Mr Gomez-Pomar said that under Renfe's rules drivers are banned from sending text messages during journeys, they can only use their work phone if strictly necessary and are not allowed to make calls on their personal phone."

 

Wonder what was so important that it couldn't wait until he'd stopped...

[Fat Controller]

Well that clarifies that:

 

"Mr Gomez-Pomar said that under Renfe's rules drivers are banned from sending text messages during journeys, they can only use their work phone if strictly necessary and are not allowed to make calls on their personal phone."

 

Wonder what was so important that it couldn't wait until he'd stopped...

 What has not been made clear is to whom he was speaking, and who initiated the call. This should be automatically registered by the call-logging on both the in-cab system, and by that in the Control Centre; such 'tapes' (they're more usually discs, or solid-state recordings these days) are usually pulled as a matter of course after even a minor event.

It is quite possible that, when he had passed the first balise that gave him an audible alarm, an automatically-generated 'emergency call' would have been sent to the control centre; in this case, the signaller would have called the train to ascertain if there was a problem. This is certainly the case on any- TVM-based system; usually, such calls are the result of wheel-spin, or a driver forgetting to activate the Driver Vigilance Device.

[Arthur]

Not that clear, it confirms he was using the company phone and we 'know' it was only to be used 'if strictly necessary', a phrase open to wide individual interpretation (look at some of the 999 calls made). Maybe, we don't yet know, RENFE's rules include some better defined guidance. As Brian says, we don't know who the colleague was, what was the purpose of the call, who initiated it.

[Dunsignalling]

So long as trains are equipped with CSR, GSM-R or an equivalent system for safety critical communications, there should be no need to permit active mobile devices in the cab (or the front of any moving road vehicle for that matter, but that's a personal hobby horse) . 

 

In this country, NR apply such a ban in signal boxes/panels. The same should apply to drivers but I am not certain if all operators forbid such use.

 

John