Hixon crash 1968

[Michael Delamar]

I recentley come across this newsreel for the Hixon crash.

 

http://www.britishpathe.com/workspaces/billwrb57/Hixon-Train-Crash

 

also shows one of the steam breakdown cranes on its side, ive never noticed or heard about that incident before, a shot of it appears here aswel.

 

http://www.search.staffspasttrack.org.uk/engine/resource/exhibition/standard/child.asp?txtKeywords=&lstContext=&lstResourceType=&lstExhibitionType=&chkPurchaseVisible=&txtDateFrom=&txtDateTo=&x1=&y1=&x2=&y2=&scale=&theme=17&album=&resource=2591&viewpage=%2Fengine%2Fresource%2Fexhibition%2Fstandard%2Fdefault.asp&originator=%2Fengine%2Ftheme%2Fdefault.asp&page=3&records=116&direction=1&pointer=9524&text=0&exhibition=146&offset=0

[Michael Delamar]

shot of the loco a few years before.

 

004-17-Crewe-14-8-65-E3009 by david.l.quayle, on Flickr

[Arthur]

An account of this tragic incident here, and a copy of the accident report.

 

http://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/docsummary.php?docID=74

[Oldddudders]

The AHB programme was in full swing nationwide at the time - and came to a grinding halt while questions were asked. The Pathe film gives a very balanced view of AHB safety, I think. Would that all media attention was so constructive! The later shot of a 2-BIL EMU is either Spatham Lane or Beddingham AHB, between Lewes and Polegate - can't recall which.

[byron]

I was the section Controller on duty at the time - wonderful cover up by plod! Never trusted them since. Thank God it was an up train (first class at the front).

 

Mike

[devondynosoar118]

Wreckage looked very nasty. About the worst thing you could hit as a transformer that size is pretty much solid. You also have to feel sorry for the train crew who had no chance at all. I bet some poor constable got his marching orders for that.

[Guest stuartp]

also shows one of the steam breakdown cranes on its side, ive never noticed or heard about that incident before, a shot of it appears here aswel.

 

http://www.search.st...on=146&offset=0

 

I never knew that either ! Story here - http://www.bdca.org.uk/stories.html#ad (scroll down a bit) - apparently temprary track laid to give access to the transformer gave way under the crane.

[Southernman46]

Interesting how close the public could get to accident sites in those days.......................you'd be lucky to get into the same county these days

 

Yet another interesting new (to me) web-site (the BDCA).

 

Anecdotally and not too OT (I hope)..........

 

Dangerous things, rail cranes..........had personal experience of three incidents.

 

The sideswipe with the 33 at Hilsea (unfortunately killed the train guard) in 1978(?), a snagged rope (not funny whilst lifting of 08) at Hoo Junction and the KIROV toppling over during a major bridge renewal in 2004 (without injuries - thankfully).

[The Stationmaster]

Interesting how close the public could get to accident sites in those days.......................you'd be lucky to get into the same county these days

 

Yet another interesting new (to me) web-site (the BDCA).

 

Anecdotally and not too OT (I hope)..........

 

Dangerous things, rail cranes..........had personal experience of three incidents.

 

The sideswipe with the 33 at Hilsea (unfortunately killed the train guard) in 1978(?), a snagged rope (not funny whilst lifting of 08) at Hoo Junction and the KIROV toppling over during a major bridge renewal in 2004 (without injuries - thankfully).

Quite agree - it sometimes frightens me to see the rather less carefully controlled way in which cranes (not of the breakdown variety I hasten to add) are used today. Reading station rebuilding currently includes a tower crane which has three running lines and, I think, three bay platforms, well within its sluing radius but judging by what can be seen of its operation is totally divorced from any sort of attention to rail movements - very odd in this highly safety conscious (at least on paper) age.

 

And regrettably while I think it is now much less frequent a moments inattention with a breakdown crane could result in either it capsizing or something else being hit - I once spent a few very fraught hours as the Ops Supervisor on a crane re-railing a dmu in Paddington Sidings, not much fun when the breakdown gang were looking for a finish and i wasn't happy with lifting going on while trains were passing within the jib radius

[Oldddudders]

I was the section Controller on duty at the time - wonderful cover up by plod! Never trusted them since. Thank God it was an up train (first class at the front).

I was about to embark on a period of Control employment at that time, so you certainly have my sympathies.

 

As far as the police are concerned, I've just been looking at the report as linked above and - if it is to be believed - it is apparent that the 2 constables concerned had only been assigned to their general duties 5 days before, were only given the instruction to assist the exceptional load on the day, and had had no specific brief beyond ensuring the safety of oncoming road traffic. They had not been to Hixon before, and had no idea it was part of a (then) high-speed railway. Neither they, nor anyone else in Staffordshire's police force, seems to have been given any sort of briefing about the sea-change between manned and unmanned crossings. The report seems to have found a lack of comprehension of the new risks on all sides, not least BR, sadly. My impression is that it was a ghastly event that simply grew from a black hole of general ignorance.

 

The modern railway, I believe, is strong on risk assessment by individuals. We may all be able to assess the risk we understand, but few of us can assess risks we do not know exist. Hixon seems to have been in the latter category.

[JeffP]

I've read the account in a book, "Obstruction, danger", by Adrian Vaughan, Patrick Stephens Ltd., and it brought home a lot of confusion. The then BR must shoulder quite a lot of blame: signs were wrongly erected and depite it being pointed out to them on a previous occasion when a heavy load stalled on such a crossing, that these sort of loads could cause problems, their reply left something to be desired:

"...the contingency of a road vehicle stalling on the crossing and becoming immobile was one that was considered (when such crossings were in the planning stage), and found too remote to be taken seriously.....in brief, road vehicles must not become immobile on these crossings. (my italics). If they do, they become not only a hazard to themselves but to the trains and whoever is travelling in them. Nothing which has been said above detracts from the action of your driver. We are obviously grateful that he removed the hazard at risk to himself.

I must emphasise that the hazard was of your making."

 

Their arrogance in that last sentence beggars belief.

 

The book contains a sentence that chilled me then, as it still does now:

 

"Mr. Groves, [one of the heavy load drivers], did not see, or hear the warnings [that sounded], but he did see the express slipping swiftly and silently through the flat green fields towards him."

 

He must have been petrified, but, instead of getting himself clear, he tried his best to move the load forwards, and, in so doing, actually putting himself in more danger!. I believe his bravery was rewarded.

 

It's very starnge that a small area of the UK, Hixon and Colwich, less than 4 miles apart, should have seen THREE major accidents since the coming of the electric railway.

 

The road over the crossing where the accident occurred has now been lifted onto a bridge. No AHB remains.

[beast66606]

Jeff,

 

there is a sign, VERY clearly visible which states

 

In emergency

or before crossing with

exceptional or heavy

loads or cattle

phone signalman

 

I would class a transformer as both a heavy and an exceptional load, it's certainly a heavy one - and no-one phoned the signalman ... I think the arrogance was with those concerned with moving the load. If we assume the crossing was a user worked one, rather than an AHB, it's likely that exactly the same outcome would have happened, as no steps were taken to ensure safe transit. In other words, the fact that it was an AHB was not necessarily the major cause of the accident (in *my* opinion)

 

Sadly the innocent suffered.

 

Incidentally, I recently bought the BR instructions for the first AHB installation - off eBay ( for a couple of quid )

[2mm Andy]

Quite agree - it sometimes frightens me to see the rather less carefully controlled way in which cranes (not of the breakdown variety I hasten to add) are used today. Reading station rebuilding currently includes a tower crane which has three running lines and, I think, three bay platforms, well within its sluing radius but judging by what can be seen of its operation is totally divorced from any sort of attention to rail movements - very odd in this highly safety conscious (at least on paper) age.

 

It was certainly the case a few years ago (when I spent some time working in the 'Asset Protection/Outside Parties' team working for Network Rail) that slew restrictors were required to be fitted to cranes working alongside the railway to prevent any movements towards/over the running lines. I think the system for tower cranes was called 'SMIE' or similar. Of course, the approach may have changed since then.

 

Andy

[John_Hughes]

Leaflets warning about the operation of the new crossings were I believe supplied by BR to the local police, who regarded them as 'for public information' and put them out on the front desk.

 

They didn't get round to reading them themselves....

[Oldddudders]

Leaflets warning about the operation of the new crossings were I believe supplied by BR to the local police, who regarded them as 'for public information' and put them out on the front desk.

 

They didn't get round to reading them themselves....

Quite, and that might have helped - but it might not. I still maintain that it is very easy for those of us with a little railway knowledge to see how big a change AHB actually was/is - but the fog of uncertainty about how trains operate leaves the man in the street not much further forward. As a parallel example, I have heard it said that the current is only present in the third rail when a train is actually approaching, and I cannot conceive of a system that would allow that to happen. Do people who never travel by train appreciate the long braking distances - so different from their car? Since 1830, level crossings had been the responsibility of the railway - the gates only opened to road traffic when it was safe, and all the motorist had to do was drive. Suddenly AHB required vehicles to behave quite differently - e.g. not moving past the barriers unless the exit was clear - and on their own initiative. How much education does that take? I suggest considerably more than sending out leaflets.

[beast66606]

Since 1830, level crossings had been the responsibility of the railway - the gates only opened to road traffic when it was safe, and all the motorist had to do was drive. Suddenly AHB required vehicles to behave quite differently - e.g. not moving past the barriers unless the exit was clear - and on their own initiative. How much education does that take? I suggest considerably more than sending out leaflets.

 

There are examples of user worked crossings going back a long long way.

 

297 to be precise with 207 automatic crossings

 

Hixon was converted some 9 months prior to the accident, so hardly a "new fangled" thing.

 

Source - Accident report for Hixon.

[The Stationmaster]

Quite, and that might have helped - but it might not. I still maintain that it is very easy for those of us with a little railway knowledge to see how big a change AHB actually was/is - but the fog of uncertainty about how trains operate leaves the man in the street not much further forward. As a parallel example, I have heard it said that the current is only present in the third rail when a train is actually approaching, and I cannot conceive of a system that would allow that to happen. Do people who never travel by train appreciate the long braking distances - so different from their car? Since 1830, level crossings had been the responsibility of the railway - the gates only opened to road traffic when it was safe, and all the motorist had to do was drive. Suddenly AHB required vehicles to behave quite differently - e.g. not moving past the barriers unless the exit was clear - and on their own initiative. How much education does that take? I suggest considerably more than sending out leaflets.

I believe the logic at the time was that motorists would react to a red light at an automatic crossing in the same way as they should react to a red traffic light (there is an obvious flaw in that argument of course but if we were to follow that line we'd have gates at every set of traffic lights). The Highway Code was extensively amended to include a section on automatic level crossing at some time in the early 1960s and when I took my test in April 1965 I was asked more questions about automatic level crossings than anything else in the book (in fact more than everything else in the book put together) notwithstanding the fact that there wasn't such a crossing within 100 miles of the Test Centre.

 

That I should be examined to that extent suggests to me that there was some sort of national edict about the subject and I'm sure it would have gone to a wider audience than Driving Examiners (unless I had an Examiner with a particular bee in his bonnet?).

 

If I, as a schoolboy, was expected to be fully conversant with that part of the Highway Code in 1965 why shouldn't police officers have a similar level of knowledge 3 years later, especially as they had one 'on their patch'? I have always taken the view that responsibility for the Hixon collision must rest with the police officers, and perhaps - but to a lesser extent - with the road vehicle driver, for the very simple reason that they ignored a road traffic sign and failed to stop. If you or I had done that and had been caught we would, quite rightly, be prosecuted. Nothing to do with leaflets in police stations but basic knowledge of the Highway Code and the job they were doing - as simple as that.

 

The 1839 Level Crossings Act (the first piece of legislation to apply universally to railways in Britain) required that gates should be provided where a railway crossed a public road and that they should be operated by a member of railway staff.

[Oldddudders]

There are plenty of examples of user worked crossings going back a long long way.

Certainly - but these tend to be used by the same people on a regular basis, so they understand the need, for example, to open gates both sides before proceeding onto the crossing - the users are accustomed to looking out for themselves. [Or were. The recent spate of events on such crossings during harvest time, using itinerant labour etc, has changed that.] They were also the sort of location that people in the much better-staffed old railway took an interest in, would inspect. AHB affected every motorist, in an era when simply following the car in front - thumb up bum, brain in neutral - had become a way of life.

[The Stationmaster]

Certainly - but these tend to be used by the same people on a regular basis, so they understand the need, for example, to open gates both sides before proceeding onto the crossing - the users are accustomed to looking out for themselves. [Or were. The recent spate of events on such crossings during harvest time, using itinerant labour etc, has changed that.] They were also the sort of location that people in the much better-staffed old railway took an interest in, would inspect. AHB affected every motorist, in an era when simply following the car in front - thumb up bum, brain in neutral - had become a way of life.

User indiscipline at UWC crossings is nothing new - as I've posted before. We were having problems with it back in the 1970s and there was nothing itinerant about some of the clowns who owned the (large) farms and big house which the crossings served - they were just plain idle or stupid or both.

[Arthur]

 

"Mr. Groves, [one of the heavy load drivers], did not see, or hear the warnings [that sounded], but he did see the express slipping swiftly and silently through the flat green fields towards him."

 

He must have been petrified, but, instead of getting himself clear, he tried his best to move the load forwards, and, in so doing, actually putting himself in more danger!. I believe his bravery was rewarded.

 

 

Though the report commends both drivers, Mr. Groves was in the lead tractor unit, it was a Mr. Illesley, driving the rear pushing tractor, who was driving himself into the path of the train. The impact was just a few feet ahead of him.

 

This, from the report itself;

 

He then accelerated and so did the driver of the tractor at the rear, Mr. A. L. Illsley, though this meant that the latter was deliberately bringing himself into the direct path of the train.

 

As lead driver and in charge of the entire unit, Mr Groves was apportioned a goodly amount of the blame though the report accepts that there was confusion between driver and police escort about the exact nature of their roles and responsibilities. However, reading the report, it also apportions blame to British Railways, The Ministry of Transport, Staffordshire Police (at all levels), Robert Wynn & Co and English Electric.

[martin_wynne]

there is a sign, VERY clearly visible which states

 

In emergency

or before crossing with

exceptional or heavy

loads or cattle

phone signalman

 

To which should surely have been added in red: THE TRAIN CANNOT STOP.

 

When I have talked to members of the general public about level-crossing accidents, they nearly always say something like "why didn't the train stop if there was something on the track?". Most recently about the Moreton-on-Lugg accident. So the message has still not got through 40 years later.

 

Martin.

[the penguin of doom]

The lockington crash in 1984 had similar results after a van drove onto the crossing into the path of a train.

 

regardless of blame for the Hixon crash, it seems 17 years later, the incident had been forgotten by this driver and the results spoke for themselves.

 

Cheers.

 

Sean.

[martin_wynne]

This sight must cause some alarm to drivers -- signal down and barriers up: http://g.co/maps/zv4qu

[Arthur]

To which should surely have been added in red: THE TRAIN CANNOT STOP.

 

When I have talked to members of the general public about level-crossing accidents, they nearly always say something like "why didn't the train stop if there was something on the track?". Most recently about the Moreton-on-Lugg accident. So the message has still not got through 40 years later.

 

Martin.

 

Agreed Martin. Here are some more quotes from the report which illustrate the misunderstandings about the 'new, crossings by the drivers and the police escorts;

 

Firstly Mr. Groves under cross examination;

 

 

Q. Did it occur to you that if you actually went on to this crossing

without stopping and the train was very close at hand, it would not

matter whether the engine driver knew or not, because he could not

do a thing about it?

A. No Sir; I am afraid it did not.

 

and later;

 

Q. So as soon as you saw that sign you knew you were coming to such a

crossing?

A. Well, I realised that it was a different type of crossing.

Q. You deduced that it would be the train that would set it working?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And if the train set it working when you were on the crossing, did you

pause to think how would it be stopped then, or what would happen

if you were on the crossing when the train started the automatic

apparatus working?

A. Well, as I say, sir, I never realised that there was so short a margin

of when the gates operated, the barriers operated, and, as I say, it

went through my mind, while on the crossing, that while the load is

on the crossing there must be something in the mechanism to put the

signal at stop to the train, giving him sufficient time to stop the train, to avert disaster.

 

Essentially he believed that once on the crossing some mechanism existed to prevent the approach of a train.

The inquiry chairman commented that he found Mr. Groves an honest witness who gave a truthful account of his thoughts and actions on the day.

 

and comment about the police escorts;

 

 

134. Neither of the constables knew of the extremely short warning time

before the onset of an express train (indeed P.c. Nicholls, who was clearly very

shocked, said that when the accident happened " I was absolutely astounded

by the speed of the whole process ") nor of the existence of a telephone, and '

neither of them had observed the Emergency Notice (which was not a traffic

sign that they are trained to observe) on either side of the crossing,

(my bold)

 

Much of the above might be astonishing to rail enthusiasts, let alone rail professionals, but just goes to show both the general ignorance of railway operations amongst the public and the need for very specific education on risks old and, in particular, new. One of the criticisms of British Railways was that they had not identified the particular risk presented by these slow moving abnormal loads and then approached, at least, the two leading heavy hauliers, Wynns and Pickfords with specific advice.

[Michael Delamar]

The beginnning of british transport film "Second nature" from 1967 shows an AC electric flying through a barrier level crossing, was wondering if anyone knew the location? thought it may have been Hixon at first but not so sure.